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ABSTRACT
Minority and infancy are technical legal terms signifying 
legal subjects and statuses which are non-adult, less than 
'full' legal persons because they are below the age of 
minority. How the law creates and sustains differences 
between the category adult and non-adult, between adult­
hood and childhood, how age divisions are made concrete 
and socially significant through the differential distribution 
of legal rights, protections, capacities and disabilities, 
provides the focal point of this work.
Drawing on recent theories of ideology, subjectivity and 
discourse analysis, we explore how the law, in defining 
subjects capable of participating in the law-making process, 
responsible enough to be governed by its rules, and with 
the attributes to initiate legal actions, can also, by a process 
of exclusion, constitute the subjectivity of 'the child'. The 
age lines bounding the child from the adult are arbitrary and 
historically transitory, they also apply differentially across 
genders. They are extremely useful because they tell us a 
great deal about the legal assumptions made about the 
rationality, responsibility and competence of children. When 
we begin to link age lines, with cognition/competence and 
legal capacity/disability across different branches of the 
law, we are offered a variety of definitions as to what is 
to count as adult and minor. The differing ages at which 
certain rights, obligations and responsibilities may be 
assumed provides us with the means of identifying the 
particular social relations and interests which each branch 
of the law privileges and preserves.
To this end, we explore in turn; the legal conception 
of infancy and minority, conceptions of consent and 
discretion and the effect of the age of majority; the 
system of inheritance as a process by which family 
statuses (crucially adults and minors) are preserved 
and reproduced over time; the social relations guardian­
ship and parenthood and family membership and how these 
have become an intimate concern of the judiciary and the 
state; finally, the process by which children were made 
no longer subject to the full sanctions of the criminal 
law. These aspects of inter-generational relations are 
discussed within the context of the English legal system.
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This work takes up and expands on ideas as 
material previously published, in Fitz (1981) 
'The Child as a legal subject', in Dale R. 
et. al. (eds) Education and the State Vol. 2, 
and in Fitz (1981) 'Welfare, the Family and 
the Child', Unit 12, O.U. Course E353. Some 
of the material in Part 2 of this work has 
previously been presented in Fitz and Hood- 
Williams (1982) 'The generation game: playing 
by the rules', in Robbins D. et. al. (eds). 
Rethinking Social Inequality. Aspects of the 
legal position of children in the U.K. covered 
in this work have presented in a more condensed, 
through differently organized, version in Hood- 
Williams and Fitz (1985) 'Minority status in 
Great Britain', in Hengst (ed) Kindheit in 
Europa'.
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INTRODUCTION
'The law is the true embodiment 
Of everything that's excellent.
It has no kind of fault or flaw 
And I my Lords, embody the Law.
The constitutional guardian I 
of pretty young Wards in Chancery 
All very agreeable girls - and none 
Are over the age of twenty-one.'
W. S. Gilbert, lolanthe, Act 1.
— 1 —
PROLOGUE; 'Sociologists are creatures of their time'
(Bernstein 1974)
Setting down the natural history of an intellectual project 
has the merit of allowing into the text one's early intentions, 
hesitations and difficulties. But there is another purpose; 
to clarify the direction of one's research and to explain the 
form it has taken.
It began with a simple and practical question. Why had I, as 
a classroom teacher, written reports on pupils who were due to 
appear before the magistrates of the juvenile court? I had no 
special training or competence to write out reports for the 
court; my authoratative statements rested upon an ascribed 
status in the legitimate institution, the school. It seemed 
a useful line of enquiry; if schools and juvenile courts were in 
a constellation, one with the other, what was the nature of 
the relationship? After a year immersed in the sociology of 
education (1976/77), I understood something about the process 
of schooling and the social functions of education, but I knew 
little about the juvenile court. The sociology of deviance 
was an established part of the sociology of education (ranging 
over Becker's account of pot-smokers, to Hargreaves' study of 
schooling and its resisters). Delinquency, labelling theory, 
(later superseded by 'critical criminology'); the methodology 
of participant observation all became part of our sociological 
baggage The process of juvenile justice though merited
little serious consideration; perhaps it didn't exemplify 
any particular sociological paradigm.
There was, and is, an enormous body of literature addressing 
the recent history of juvenile courts, juvenile crime and its 
punishment, care orders and supervision orders at the disposal 
of magistrates, as well as fascinating social histories of 
juvenile delinquency. Much of it was in the periphery of the 
sociology of education. These were accounts produced in the 
domain of social work, social administration, and in law, either 
by practitioners in those fields or by academics in associated 
disciplines.
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To return to the practical problem of the relationship 
between schools and courts, I tried to formulate some kind 
of enquiry into that relationship, in the form of an M.A. 
thesis proposal. The outcome of that research (Fitz 1978) was 
that schools, teachers, and their relationship to the juvenile 
court, ceased to be of any direct concern; the object of study 
was the court itself and the social group caught up in its 
processes - the juveniles. The immediate reason for the 
slippage, was at first sight entirely practical; the sheer 
volume of reading necessary just to understand the processes 
of juvenile justice and to see what the field of research 
surrounding it, looked like required a step out of the frame 
of education into the frame of law. Focussing initially on 
the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act, it was possible to 
follow through on one piece of social policy, its origin, 
implementation and effects. In hindsight, however, this 
involved a fundamental shift in perspective, moving from the 
sociology of education into the sociology of law.
The slide across to law was facilitated by the intellectual
context of the sociology of education (conceived in terms of
its theoretical orientation and research practices). There
were continuities between schools and courts, education and
the law. Both were considered to be institutions and social
sites situated within a capitalist social formation (encompassing
a capitalist labour process, giving rise to class divided
society, sustained and reproduced by the state); a social
structure which profoundly affected the character and functions
of all institutions and social practices. Education or law,
schools or courts, it didn't really matter because of the
prevailing intellectual culture within the sociology of education;
at that time (1977/78) we were predominantly pre practising, or
2
post-Althusserians . An analysis of a specific institution or 
set of social practices really only provided us with a chance 
to do an exegesis on the state, ideology, the reproduction of 
the relations of production, a chance to display theoretical 
rigour, show off epistemological exactitude and worry about just
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how relative our 'autonomy* was. Looking back, that 
Althusserian theoreticism was a black hole for students 
trying to put pen to paper; any account required an elaborate 
securing of epistemological flanks. Empirical enquiry became 
a risky business (more respectable to do theoretical critique), 
methodology was hardly a polite word (correct epistemological 
position was the guarantee of scientificity - all else was 
ideology). Regardless of the specific object of research, 
there was only one method which homogenized all social differences. 
It was actually difficult to engage with the 'dense reality' of 
social life and experience. We were more at home in the library 
'reading' ideologies, 'symptomatically', or otherwise. That 
comprised empirical enquiry. It was ideologically unsound practice 
to make policy proposals however, in spite of our critical evalu­
ation of each and every aspect of social policy or educational 
practice. Along with Althusser, Bernstein, Bourdieu, we were 
in search of 'deep structures'. The politics and practice of 
policy-making were phenomenal forms to be penetrated.
Theoretical remits aside, (implicit in the recognition that 
schools and courts were similar in status and function - as 
R.S.A.'s or I.S.A.'s) the continuity between juvenile courts 
and schools was also practically based. In common, they were 
concerned with the care, control and management of social 
groups defined in terms of their chronological age. To be 
concerned with the juvenile court is to be concerned with the 
social categories represented by reference to age and youth; 
'juveniles', 'children' or 'young persons', 'infants' and 
'minors'. So there followed broadly based concern to understand 
the historical development of these categories, especially 
conceptions of 'children' and 'childhood', something taken for 
granted by educators and sociologists of education. Bernstein 
a decade ago noted critically of classroom studies that 'The 
basic interactional unit of their study is an inter-generational 
relationship' (Bernstein 1974;147). I think he was almost alone 
in recognising that contests of authority, the process of trans­
mitting school knowledge and the interactional process of
negotiating meaning were more than transactions between 
teachers and pupils, they were also relations of power and 
authority between dominant (adult) and subordinate (child) 
social categories.
Indeed this was the first move; to conceive adult-child 
relations like class or gender relations, in terms of power 
and authority, in terms of dominance and subordination. It is 
at this point that one ceases to pursue children and childhood 
simply in terms of chronological age, but instead to pursue 
these categories as differences; child and childhood only have 
meaning if we understood the categories adult and adulthood.
In other words, we can grasp the quality of childhood if we 
can understand the social construction of the difference between 
adults and children, and, equally importantly, understand the 
nature of the social relations between adult and child.
Looking at the social formation through a grid of generational 
divisions asked the pertinent question; what was the material 
basis of that social difference? How was it sustained and 
reproduced? How would it be possible to give the adult-child 
relation an identity of its own, something as hard and material 
as class divisions and class relations, without reducing it to 
an effect of class? The way forward was to follow on the women's 
movement and the theorization of patriarchy, in order to 
appreciate that not all structures of domination and subordination, 
power and exploitation are generated by the capitalist relations 
of possession/non-possession of the means of production. This 
involves a fundamental shift; away from capitalistic relations 
of production and from the capitalist economy, to the structure 
and relations of the family, with two consequent effects.
Firstly, it led to my initial engagement with family law and 
social policy directed at the family. Secondly, through family 
law there emerged a growing realization that not all of its 
categories, nor its history, could be satisfactorily explained 
by any instrumental reference to the 'needs and interests' of 
the ruling class. In fact, family law presented some awkward 
problems for theorizations of social change and transformation 
via reference to changes in the mode of production.
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There was oneother intellectual current, visibly loosening 
the bonds of Althusserian theory, in the form of a critical 
deconstruction of the possibility of a general theory of 
ideology (Hirst, 1976), a deconstruction of 'interpellation' 
as a concept applicable only to class relations and their 
reproduction (Laclau 1977) and deconstruction of the necessary 
relations between class position and political practice embedded 
in the theory (Hindness 1977) . And there was a parallel
development; an interest in Foucault and the practice of discourse 
analysis; a shift in interest and perspective but given solidity 
by the publication of a magazine fostering it as an intellectual 
and political enterprise (Ideology and Consciousness; No. 1,
May 1977) .
These were debates conducted at a fairly high level of abstraction 
and stand in stark contrast to the contemporary accounts dealing 
with childhood, of which there seemed to be comparatively few, 
and solidly empirical. Aries (196Z) historical study, was 'holy 
writ', alerting us to the socially constructed nature of 
childhood through his discovery of the absence of significant 
boundaries between adulthood and childhood in the middle ages, 
and delineating how an awareness of childhood was fabricated 
during the 17th century. Pinchbeck and Hewitt's two-volume 
study (19 69, 1973) of children in English society remains still 
the classic study of legislation, law and social policy directed 
at children and remains as a strong reminder of the tight 
relationship between the rise of strongly bounded and clearly 
identifiable social groups, and, the development of an institu­
tional apparatus which sustains and reproduces their social 
visibility. Then there was de Mause (1974) psychogenic theory 
of history, wherein 'The history of childhood is a nightmare 
from which we have only recently begun to awaken' (p. 1).
Like David Hunt's (1970) Parents and Children in History, de 
Mause's study is grounded in psychoanalytic theory. Hunt's 
book contains a"substantive account of the early years of 
Louis XIII, based on a physician's diary of events.
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These early studies are deeply flawed (see Stone, 1974), 
and I shall comment on this in the next section. They did, 
however, constitute a field of study, and needed to be engaged.
In fact, however, in hindsight, these studies occluded our field 
of vision; there were large and charted areas of childhood 
studies, but these were located in studies of the family in 
history, 'child saving' commentaries on the state of legislation 
and social policy, and histories of childhood, youth and 
adolescence in U.S.A. (see Sommerville 1982; de Mause op.cit. 
for his bibliography). Children and childhood were not so 
much 'hidden from history' (Hendriks 1984), as excluded from 
prominence in English histories, with the notable exceptions 
of Pinchbeck and Hewitt (op.cit.) and J. H. Plumb's (1975) 
study of the 'new world' of childhood emerging in the middle 
and commercial classes in 18th century England. Yet we cannot 
say that the young were entirely neglected in sociological 
studies. There has been a tradition of'youth studies' 
encompassing a) 'the problem of the generations' (Mannheim, 1929, 
Eisenstadt, 1956), b) youth as a problematic category in social 
theory (Allen, 1968; Woods, 1977) c) youth culture and sub­
cultural practices (e.g. Hall, Jefferson CeJs.) , 1976/ Dorn
and South, 19 82).
One way to explore theories of ideology and the social con­
struction of childhood, to bring together theoretical and 
concrete issues was to make the child as a legal subject, the 
specific object of research. It was a means of bringing into 
constellation theorizing about childhood, the law, the state 
and ideology. Use of 'subject' here alluded to two principal 
theoretical interests; the function of ideology in the production 
of subjects, and, the material effects and consequences of legal 
subjectivity (in terms of its possession, loss or exclusion).
In practical terms, this meant that it was possible to use the 
law's representation of 'the child' to illuminate the formal 
boundaries between adult and child over time to explore the 
question of historical specificity and transformation. Further, 
we could deploy the law's representations of the child to 
explore the functions and practice of the law itself. The 
legal subject 'the child' could be used as a tracer; to illuminate 
the character of dispersed texts, cases, practices, rituals and
7 -
discourses which constitute the law;, bo explore the process 
of the legal construction of 'the child' through the criteria 
and attitudes the law used to construct a particular sub­
jectivity (early formulations reported in Fitz 1981a, 1981b).
While my previous remarks were somewhat critical of Althusser, 
it was well to remember the impetus that he gave to the re­
examination of theories of ideologies, the relationship between 
ideology and the structuring of consciousness, the claims that 
systems of signification, representation and ritual were 
material practices - the very stuff of ideology - were worthy 
of investigation, both in terms of their own independent history 
and because of their power erf feet in and on social relations.
The I.S.A.'s Essay (1971) stimulated a theoretical discourse 
which was at once infuriatingly abstract, while it also refined 
our understanding ideology, the state and 'the subject' and the 
relationship between these elements in a capitalist social 
formation. Trailing in his wake are bitter accusations (the 
ideological policeman of the PCF, anti-humanist apologist for 
Stalinism, itself without, and devoid of, human agency) (see 
Thompson 1979; Connell 1983; of Anderson 1980), Yet for many 
of us, Althusser was the first engagement we had with Marxist 
theory. Cynically we might now recall, 'what a place to start' ! 
But we should also recall why the sociology of education was 
generally concerned with structuralist accounts of social and 
cultural reproduction (e.g. Bernstein (1975), Bourdieu (1977), 
Bowles and Gintis (1976) and Althusser (op.cit.).
The crucial object of analysis was the relationship between 
the education system and the class structure, but I think it 
is fair to say our concerns went beyond this and on to a broader 
issue. Namely, how were social divisions (not social 'difference') 
divisions between social groups standing in an unequal relation­
ship to each other, in terms of the distribution of goods,
(material and symbolic), in terms of access to power and authority, 
generated, sustained and reproduced? How are social systems 
which are oppressive and exploitative made durable over time, in
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the face of reforms (educational, legal, economic) which seek 
to redress the more visible and contradictory inconsistencies 
and incoherences, which reveal the structure to be unequal and 
unjust. By social divisions here we do not only address 
differences in power, and authority, the relations of domination 
and exploitation fundamental to the social relationship between 
capital and labour in a capitalistic society. We live in a 
social formation divided along the lines of gender (encompassed 
as a relationship of men's dominance over and exploitation of 
women in a theory of patriarchy), along the lines of race, and 
finally along the lines of generation. It was an important 
project then, to describe, analyse and explain the existence 
of these social divisions, how they were imbricated in a variety 
of practices, institutions and experiences. It remains an 
important project still. Through Althusser, we began to get 
some purchase on the importance of the state, the crucial 
importance of ideology, the place of institutions and their 
function in keeping the structure in place (just by staying in 
existence) and, some inkling (imprecise, a 'black box', perhaps) 
as to the structuring of consciousness such that individuals 
were prepared for their 'places' in the system. Interpellation 
(Althusser) habitus (Bourdieu) mental structures/codes,
(Bernstein), are all indexical of a process of structures 
structuring consciousness; they are concepts bearing tremendous 
theoretical weight and perhaps inadequate to the task. But at 
least they alert us to the considerable fact that a theory has 
to explain both the durability of a structure and human agency, 
however imperfectly individual theories achieve that end.
One reaction to the political pessimism inherent in 
'reproduction' theory, having its roots in the 'culturalist' 
Marxism of E. P. Thompson (1963) was 'resistance theory' (e.g. 
Willis 1977; Clarke et al 1979). Reproduction theory where 
it was emptied of human agency provided little space for 
resistance, struggle or dissent; categories and meanings could 
be re-imposed unproblematically. But where were the dissonant 
voices, where do we find the evidence of social forces contesting
'reproduction'? According to the best known centre of 
'resistance' theorising, (the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies), the cultural practices and cultural production 
of (male) working class youth were one example. Another is the 
popular struggles (in the context of the social history education) 
and political organisations to be found contesting the form of 
provision of mass compulsory schooling (Johnson 1981). 'Repro­
duction' on this view was less self-propelled and more contingent 
upon struggle, which produces the form and character of social 
structures, which in turn shapes the kinds and forms of struggles, 
opposition and contest observable in any social formation.
Resistance, struggle and dissent at least permitted the 
possibility of change or transformation rather than 'reproduction' 
The problem, however, is to define what counts as 'resistance' 
(chucking paper pellets at teacher, truancy, mucking about?) and 
where 'resistance' (as a political act seeking to contest and 
transform the structure of power and domination) really ends?
(a homologous situation with Althusser's I.S.A.'s). Willis 
certainly dispelled the idea of 'the lads' being victims of an 
empty self-reproducing system; 'the lads' were actively shaping 
the school and their own educational and vocational destinies, 
but with theoretically predictable (and politically pessimistic 
results). Nevertheless, 'resistance theory' underscores the 
extent to which social divisions have to be constantly re­
produced and re-made by individuals also having the capacity 
to 'unmake' and 'undo'; 'reproduction' therefore is made something 
more contingent, something which actively has to be achieved.
It also undercuts any simplistic relationship between institutions 
engaged in the business of imposing meaning (the I.S.A.'s) and 
the unproblematic reception of those meanings by subjects (see 
Connell 1983; 150-154). There was also a price. Working class 
and male youth sub-cultures; the raw, spontaneous, creative and 
combative practices constituting it, took on heroic qualities.
The equally divisive aspects of those cultural productions (a 
visible sexism and a silence about the fact that cultural
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production,^'white', 'cultural' production), in the early 
writings, somehow were overlooked. Culture and sub-cultures 
expressively flowed from the fundamental and dominating 
categories of class.
These interventions however were useful and necessary 
theoretical 'corrections' to reproduction theory, and certainly 
encouraged a greater degree of methodological pluralism.
We cannot claim it encouraged a greater degree of theoretical 
pluralism. The CCCS work, in spite of its critiques of 
Althusserian structuralism, can be seen as being rooted firmly 
in that tradition (Connell op.cit; 224-225). For example, 
cultural practices, like 'texts', can be interpreted or read 
(by a knowing theorist) to reveal an underlying 'reality'
(whose character is generally explainable by reference to a 
structural theory of class) (Connell; 225).
Note the continuities between reproduction and resistance 
theory; the dualisms of a) subject/social formation, b) 
phenomenal forms (cultural production/practice)/underlying 
reality (class structure), c), cultural production/specific 
class location. I note these instances simply to indicate 
how a theoretical framework seemingly in opposition to re­
production theory, by one means or another carries on and 
re-creates the theoretical premises of the original. This is 
important because it goes some way to explaining the attraction 
of what we might call the discourse theoretic, for it seemed 
to provide a means of 'reading' texts, assessing the production 
of knowledge in terms of the power effects it produces, and 
an interesting way of problematizing the individual/society 
dualism.
By discourse theoretic, I refer to the work of Foucault (1977) , 
Donzelot (1979), taken up and expanded by such writers as the 
Ideology and Consciousness Collective (1977-79), Sheridan (19 80), 
Henriques, Holloway, Urwin, Venn and Walkdine (1984). Having its
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intellectual roots in a variety of European traditions 
(psychoanalysis,semiotics, Saussurean linguistics, Marxist 
theorizing on ideology)(see Coward and Ellis (1977) and 
Henriques et. al. (op.cit.), its prime focus is on the 
production of meanings, the consequences of those productions, 
the constraints, limitations and relations within which the 
production of meaning takes place. There is one sense in which 
the theoretical object might resemble the realm, in classical 
Marxist theorizing, designated the superstructure. This would 
be misleading. One of its prime purposes is to problematize 
the theoretical 'break' between base and superstructure. To 
claim that meanings/knowledge/culture, as a region distinct 
from 'the base', implicitly recognises that 'the base' has 
none of these elements, nor is productive of them. This implies 
that the social division of labour in an enterprise (boss/worker) 
has no meaning, the shopfloor has no culture.
Much of the substantive work on law which follows in the 
subsequent chapters is located substantially within a framework 
of the discourse theoretic, so I shall eschew any lengthy review 
of its claims at this point. I have some reservations about 
writings which fall within this field of research which I shall 
briefly explain below, before distilling out the lines of approach 
I find useful and which I later try to put to work in a modest 
way.
I have to say that my reservations about the writings which drew 
on Foucault's work (virtually all the articles in Ideology and 
Consciousness; see also the journals of Screen and Screen Education) 
are personal reflections on encountering a complex and difficult 
apparatus of social analysis. We used to have an old seminar 
joke; 'entry by Paris Access Card only' to describe some of 
these writings. From hindsight, we were commenting on two things; 
unfamiliar intellectual traditions, and a peculiarity of style. 
Firstly, the background intellectual traditions of the discourse 
theoretic, psychoanalysis, semiotics and structuralist 
linguistics made it difficult to appreciate quite what was going 
on. These were disciplines in which we had no formal grounding
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(the formal and abstract theorising which went with structural 
analysis was certainly not alien; after all, we routinely 
engaged with Bernstein and Bourdieu), Certainly, it was an 
impressive and demanding framework of analysis but there was 
an underlying suspicion; where was the theoretical advance, 
what would this tell us about the social divisions which were 
the focus of our work, what precisely was the politics of it 
all, what was its potential? Was this yet another impediment 
to substantive investigation?
The second obstacle was more trivial, but on the whole a 
problem. The writings constituting the discourse theoretic 
(and this includes Foucault's) required you to embrace not only 
a theory but also a particular style of writing. It becomes a 
serious point when stylistic flourishes begin to obscure meaning, 
and, when it is difficult to separate substance from style. There 
seems to be a touch of elitism about an approach where one is 
required to deploy the concepts and mimic the magisterial style 
of a Parisian belle-letterist (e.g. Rose, 1979; Jones K. and 
Williamson J. 1979).
These comments are not meant as substantive criticisms. They 
are reservations I had about discourse analysis and reservations 
I still hold. Why then pursue it, what was attractive about it, 
other than it being a) French b) novel? Why bother with Foucault 
at all? The reasons are somewhat instrumentalist, perhaps wholly 
pragmatic. I think Foucault provided the means of analysing 
the data (collected from case law, legal text books, government 
White Papers, prison records and so on) concerning children and 
the law. Moreover, he provided the impetus to include data that 
would have been or marginal interest to legal historians working 
in the field, and provided a means of organising data in a way 
that is radically different from and an advance on some atheoretical 
social history. The effects in this work are most concentrated 
in a short appendix on juvenile convicts in Van Diemen's Land, 
attached to Part Four below. My concern now is to set out briefly
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those aspects of Foucault's work which I found attractive, 
partly because of their explanatory power, and partly because 
they provided organising principles around which to construct 
an enquiry.
1. At the heart of the corpus of Foucault's writings are four 
substantive studies, into, the foundations of modern medicine 
(The Birth of the Clinic, 1973), the social classifications of 
madness and reason (Madness and Civilisation, 1967),the 
historical transformation of criminology and penal practices 
(Discipline and Punish, 1977), and the social construction of 
sexuality (History of Sexuality, 1979). To these detailed 
analyses, theory is both secondary and subservient (Sheridan,
1980; 213), yet theorizing (as any one even only vaguely familiar 
with these works will know) is not absent. Theory is not an 
iron cage; there are no imperatives that things can only be this
way; there is no command that the orders of determination are
already known only therefore need to be applied (c/f Althusser).
The order of things privileged substantive research; a positive 
inducement to go and do likewise.
2. The focus of Foucault's studies were institutional complexes;
e.g. ('the clinic', the beginnings of modern medicine), the rise
of the penitentiary (a substantive part of the disciplinary complex) 
and the rise of the asylum (the institutional site for the classi­
fication of the mad). To leave it there however is much the same 
as claiming that Marx wrote about factories and Weber about 
bureaucracies. In Foucault, they are a point of departure; a 
means to trace out the relationship between the rise of the 
human sciences, the position of an institution with respect to 
deploying and amplifying particular knowledge systems and the 
consequences this has for the social body. Note, however, that 
these social sites are of irreducible importance for Foucault; 
their character and effects need not be causally related to 
pre-given configurations of political power and authority.
Quite the contrary, the institutions of which Foucault speaks
are perfectly capable of generating and distributing power relations
within societies, creating effects which are not 'secondary' and
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which need to be subsumed under 'class' or 'state' power, 
but they are instead autonomous, material social forces, 
requiring description and analysis in their own terms.
In effect, this is quite the reverse of the Althusserian 
procedure, where 'the last instance' is always already present 
(see Assiter, 1984).
3. One considerable effect for those of us who wished to 
investigate the institutional complexes hitherto assigned to 
the superstructure was that Foucauldian style analysis freed 
the data of research - the dispersed set of texts and documents 
constituting a delineated area of thought and practice - from a 
science vs ideology dichotomization. Moreover, those who produced 
the texts or based their authority and practice in them, the 
professionals, specialists, experts and practitioners whose 
competence was both judged and circumscribed by their knowledge
of the texts, no longer had to be 'relocated' in terms of their 
class position before their material effects could be judged. 
Similarly techniques, technologies, professionalism and 
expertise need not be inserted into place as classed practices 
before assuming political importance, precisely because the 
exercise of legitimate know-how was, inherently, a political 
practice. Therefore, intra-professional and inter-disciplinary 
disputations (e.g. Lancaster vs Bell in monitorial schooling, 
or the separate vs separate and silent system in the organisation 
of penitentiaries) over relevant knowledge and practice are 
first order problems precisely because these are struggles to 
exercise domination over other individuals or other social 
groupings.
4. Displacing ideology with the notion of 'discursive practices' 
has several theoretical effects. Firstly, it marks a shift away 
from the chain of meaning (embedded in the Marxist use of 'ideology') 
wherein 'real relations' are represented in phenomenal forms.
'The real' is always already given (class relations). 'Representatioi 
in these terms is unproblematic (i.e. there is a clear correspondence
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between what is to be represented and the means of representing 
it, ergo,language ritual, symbol,forms of signification are 
totally neutral or trasnparent - mere conduits, with no 
independent effect). Decouple what is to be represented from 
the means of representation then necessarily problematizes 
the area of signifying practices and their separate effect.
In short, signifying practices themselves evoke meanings, 
construct identities and therefore become socially significant. 
Moreover, they are themselves socially constructed and also 
partly determine what could be said, and by whom. To take 
one illustrative example; the legal notion of 'benefit of 
clergy' (a device which allowed felonious 'clerics' to escape 
the gallows because as men of the cloth there was a presumption 
of the absence of criminal capacity or intent). One legal test 
of the accused clerics 'authenticity' was to ask him to read; 
a signifying practice which ruled out a considerable proportion 
of the population in feudal and early modern England. (It was 
a legal device which became increasingly unreliable when, as it 
did, it became common to coach prisoners in the dock to recite 
off by heart the test pieces used by the Courts). I use the 
male indicative here because women could not be clerics so the 
benefit of clergy provided no escape route.
The lineage of 'signifying practice' refers us back to structuralist 
anthropology, to semiotics, linguistics, and theories of cultural 
production (literature and film studies). In Foucault's work, 
the effect of its introduction is to lower the unit analysis; 
unimportant texts, minor events, forgotten regulations, 
ordinary and simple examinations and confessions emerge to 
trace out different trajectories and intersections of social 
practices in the social body. The second effect is to expand 
our sense of what is to count; as knowledge, data, evidence.
In Discipline and Punish for example deploys records of an event 
such as the ritual slaughter of Damiens the regicide, the 
organisation of individuals in space, contained in the diagrams 
of the panoptican, the penitential timetable illustrates the 
organisation of bodies in time; records of military drill, 
procedures and instructions on calligraphy, all these are brought 
together in a network of circuits to explain the operation of a 
disciplinary society.
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How then do we distance our accounts from mere untheorised 
collections of emphera; where does systematic description, 
analysis, and explanation enter? Here we introduce 'conditions 
of existence* as a central conceptual tool.
5. Any object of analysis is multiply and complexly connected 
with other sites, practices and relationships, which affect the 
character and meaning of that object, without (contra Althusser) 
any one factor acting as a 'determining essence' (Wickham 1983; 
469) . That is to say any object of analysis has definite
'conditions of existence' which shape its form, character and 
meaning , Introducing conditions of existence into an analysis 
has a three fold effect.
a) It avoids an object of analysis being reduced to the 
expression or reflection of some external essence, to which it 
corresponds more or less adequately (Wickham op.cit. 468).
b) It invites accounts of social phenomena based on the notion 
of multiple and complex determinations, without any one being 
held to be causal, at the expense of others.
c) Signifying practices exist within definite limits, and, 
their meanings and functions are dependant upon specific 
conditions of existence. Taking benefit of clergy as an example 
again, the importance of the act of reading is dependent upon us 
describing the other practicesit is articulated to. Firstly, we 
need to know about the criminal law itself, and the existence
of capital punishment. Secondly, the relationship between 
the criminal law and its categories, and, the Catholic church 
in feudal and early modern England. Thirdly, we need to know 
why reading as a skill was so narrowly distributed, such that 
if a man read, it could be reasonably assumed he was a cleric. 
Fourthly, and crucially, why the priesthood was all-male, which 
then explains the exclusion of women from the benefit of clergy.
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Signifying practices then are bounded and their social 
significance can only be understood in relationship to other 
social practices to which they are articulated. There is 
nothing here to suggest that economic organisation of production 
the relationships of possession/non-possession of property, in 
various enterprises and or in family systems are unimportant 
or secondary. What it does problematise is pure economic 
determinism, because it presupposes that economic forms them­
selves have conditions of existence (legal forms of possession, 
contract, labour relations and so on) which powerfully construct 
'the economic' as much as the physical and technological processes 
do.
6. There is a sense in which signifying practices may be seen 
as the building blocks of Foucault's diffuse conception of 
'discourse'. Particular groupings of signifying practices 
construct the object of which they speak; the grouping, the 
unity of these practices gives us both the discourse (a regulated 
series of statements in the common sense meaning of 'discourse') 
and its social significance (what is being constructed and by 
what means). Foucault himself often as not uses discursive 
practices.
'(which) are characterised by the delimitation 
of a field of objects, definition of a legitimate 
perspective for the agents of knowledge, and 
the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts 
and theories (Foucault 1977; 199).
'Discursive practices', he adds,
'are not purely and simply ways of producing 
discourse. They are embodied in technical 
processes,in institutions, in patterns of 
behaviour, in forms of transmission and diffusion, 
and in forms which, at once, impose and maintain 
them.
(Foucault, op.cit.; 200).
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For Foucault, discourses are analytical tools for exploring 
the power relations of knowledge systems ; a means for detecting 
the systematic exclusion of material events, behaviours, or 
persons; a means for detecting who could legitimately make 
statements about the social body, or, who could construct 
'the norms' of a scientific discipline; a means to compare and 
contrast discursive practices across sites and across apparently 
exclusive domains of knowledge and practice (e.g. law, medicine, 
psychiatry, penal practice) (Sheridan 1980, 100-103).
For my purposes, the conceptualisation of discourse was a 
useful way of examining the law as an apparent unified structure 
with several elemental branches, but dispersed materially across 
a variety of sites (the hierarchy of courts,legal texts, rituals 
and symbols). It was a means of examining, in their own terms, 
what constituted the specificity of the common law as compared 
with equity, family law as against company law, criminal law 
as against say, welfare law.
It is a formulation which inherently directs one's gaze away 
from the lawyers' grandiose claims about the necessity of 'the 
rule of law' and 'natural justice' to the minutuae which construct 
the power of the legal system. The focal point becomes the 
technical points, the mechanics of the process, the little rituals, 
the seemingly trivial distinctions between say 'real' and 'personal' 
property, between 'actus reus' and 'mens rea'. The power of 
lawyers lie in their possession of the technical means (obtained 
either by apprenticeship or formal training or - in the case of 
modern day barristers - both) to render the complexities of 
social relationships into a form which the courts will recognise. 
This boils down to knowing which court to use for the pursuit 
of litigation, the appropriate form of writ or commission to enter, 
and what kinds of technical argument the courts consider legitimate. 
Whatever the jurisprudents say about 'rights' and 'justice', the 
materiality of the law lies in the petty technicalities, which 
exist in specific groupings (discourses) constituting the different
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branches of the law, and thus the conceptions of 'rights' 
and 'justice'. The branches of law are each embodied in 
sites, knowledges and agents with each branch having a particular 
historical trajectory given in the changing relationship between 
site, knowledge and agent, and in the changing relationship 
between contrasting discursive practices. I illustrate this 
at length in the text, in an analysis of the competing strategies 
of common law and equity in reconstituting the notion of real 
property.
I therefore want to hold on to the idea that legal categories 
and technicalities are important(î>ecause they constitute the 
law's manifold discursive practices) and in order to display their 
functions. But the idea of discourses allowed me to think through 
the specificity of the different branches of the law, and, by 
comparison, indicate the differing ways in which they constituted 
legal subjectivity. It is to the theory of the subject I now turn
7. One theoretical gain of Althusserian theorising was its 
explicit critique of humanism and the effects it had on social 
theorising. Humanism posits an essence, the human individual 
as an unbounded creator of social phenomena. At the common 
sense level, we perceive its effects in a phrase like 'it's only 
natural' (that men and women are at root competitive and 
acquisitive) which then explains socially constructed features 
of capitalistic nation states. It is a process which abstracts 
the features of the social body from an unproblematic rendering 
of the individual which lie at its foundation. The unitary, 
non-contradictory, rational individual (Henriques et al 1984; 93) 
is one of the key elements of Western liberal juridico-political 
theorizing, where 'the individual' is the unproblematic target 
of a state bent on shackling its freedoms and annuling its rights.
The critique of 'society' and 'human individual' as essences 
has its provenance in Marx and Engels; 'society' was explicitly 
regarded as an 'ensemble of relations' and a historically specific 
ensemble at that (given in the formulation, mode of production).
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The process of individuation arises from antagonistic relations 
of production, which gives rises to a conception of the individual 
produced through the organisation of the economy and the means 
of producing surplus value. In these formulations, the individual 
is conceived only in terms of the processes of its historically 
specific production; 'human attributes' are not separated from 
the social relationships in which individuals are located. Ergo, 
there is no European 'essence' which finds its expression and 
shapes the culture, political forms and economic organisation 
of 'Western' democracies that in turn can be explained by reference 
to some immanent spirit. Social organisation; the structure of 
the economy., the means of producing the means of life from finite 
resources, a complex of institutions, language, forms of cultural 
signification and kinship, shapes our notion of what is 'human' 
and the attributes of the individual.
It follows that any society will produce social differences; 
the criteria of 'difference' will vary historically and geo­
graphically; it may be based on the ownership of pigs, kin 
relations, signification of gender, age or race, madness or 
sanity, or purity and delinquency. It is not given in advance 
how differences are transformed into antagonistic social 
divisions such that some attributes are more highly regarded 
than others; here for example the possession of birds of 
paradise feathers; there, the veneration of age and wisdom, 
or elsewhere, both. The production of social difference and 
social division will have definite conditions of existence 
so there will be variety across social groupings, both in 
space and time. One of the historic tasks of social science 
is to describe and explain social differences, social divisions 
and the relationship between them. There are profound disagree­
ments as to how we might achieve this; the diversity of attempts 
and the antagonism between them probably constitute the discipline 
of social sciences. What we cannot escape from, however, is the 
considerable fact that social research constantly changes our 
view of 'the ensemble of social relations' and how we see the 
self of ourselves. At this point, we can return to the conception 
of the construction of the subject.
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Subjects in Althusserian theory were the products of the 
ISAs, they were the bearers of a limited range of consciousnesses 
and were to function in support of the existing (capitalist) 
relations of production. The function of the ISAs was to re­
produce the relations of production by reproducing subjects to 
be fitted into appropriate spaces within an already existing 
structure of positions. Human attributes on this view are un­
necessarily limited and always on view only in relationship 
to capitalistic economies as the ruled (who hold an imaginary 
vision of their place) or the rulers; we have the Subject and 
subjects (who are ruled, and given their identity by the ISAs).
I won't repeat the problems with this position already mentioned 
above. However, as Hirst (1979) and Cutler et. al. (1977) pointed 
out, you don't require an elaborate 'superstructure' to reproduce 
the relations of production; the existence of a specific organisation 
of an economic enterprise (with boss, foreman, worker) did this 
perfectly well. Secondly, not all subjects were human; corporate 
entities - companies, local authorities, state owned industries 
were perfectly capable of owning the means of production, initiating 
legal actions and so on.
Thirdly, it doesn't allow us to consider how social differences 
between men and women or adults and children are rendered as 
unequal social divisions without the intermediary conception 
of class. Fourthly, it invited an interpretation that, however 
'relatively autonomous' the ISAs were, their knowledge systems 
interpellated subjects as always functional to capital, whereas 
some ISAs could equally produce 'resistances' to it (e.g. the 
family, the school, the university). Moreover, it is inconceivable 
quite how the social category of say, madness, is primarily or 
only functional to the interests of dominant economic classes.
The politics in Althusser are quite clear; the commanding heights 
to be assaulted and taken were the capitalist economy and the 
state and this could only be done through the agency of class 
struggle. The forms which classes take in struggle (parties, 
unions, associations) as Hindness (1977) showed were quite
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unimportant; a problem in itself because the organisation 
forms were never 'pure' either in identity or purpose. Above 
all, however, Althusser's occluded vision of 'social formation' 
and 'subject' rendered an account only in terms of class divisions 
and economic agents. Foucault's choice of social categories 
to be described and explored, madness and reason, sexuality, 
criminality and penology and medicine and psychiatry is an 
immanent critique of Althusser's version of 'the ensemble of 
relations' and 'the subject' and so invited a much more complex 
account of each to be rendered. It also posited a different 
version of politics and power (see, for example, Minson (19 80) 
Wickham (op.cit.) ). The best summary of Foucault's oriention 
I know is in Dews (1984;77). It is. Dews claims:
'The analysis of modern forms of social 
administration, which Foucault has been con­
ducting ever since Madness and Civilisation, 
combining the theories of a centralisation, 
and increasing efficiency of power with the 
theme of the replacement of overt violence 
by moralisation. Power in modern societies 
is portrayed as essentially orientated towards 
the production of regimented, isolated and self­
policing subjects.'
On this view, the social relations giving rise to human 
attributes ^ re far more diverse and complex than the Althusserian 
vision. The conditions of existence for the production of 
subjects will, summarily, include:
a. the content of modern forms of social administration 
(the knowledges they produce, their organisation, their 
techniques - embodied in regimes, timetables, available 
technology, their spatial arrangements).
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b. the process of transformation of forms of social 
governance ('the replacement' of 'violence' with 'moralisation' 
i.e. the application of 'norms').
c. the forms of power invested in social sites (which are embodied 
in the classificatory systems used to produce a variety of
social identities, the claims of each site to be the exclusive 
or legitimate authority to speak for or on behalf of individuals 
traversing it). To take a worked example (mathematically speaking). 
The 'minor' in law, may well be Daddy's darling within the family, 
the average scholar at school, a good inside forward at the hockey 
club but a client with a slight speech impediment at the clinic.
Each site operates a specific classificatory system (which in 
turn has its own conditions of existence) such that persons are 
distributed around a 'norm'. Here we are speaking of the 
location of discursive practices at social sites constructing 
different facetsof 'the human' and thus producing the non-unitary 
individual human subject. These discursive practices equally 
produce 'socially recognised' categories (Minson, op.cit.;29) 
needing special treatment or regulation (in education, 'the 
gifted child', 'the disruptive pupil', while on other agendas 
it may well be 'the broken home', 'the single parent family',
'the abusive parent'). What is posited here is that there is 
no distinction between the categories of subject produced and 
the discursive practices producing them at specific social sites.
It may well be that differences produced between subjects at 
one site will become the raw materials of discursive practices 
elsewhere ('the disruptive pupil' transferred to a special unit 
for example becomes 'subject' to a different kind of educative 
programme). Likewise, 'the delinquent' or 'the mad', may well 
emerge at the intersection of several sites and discursive 
practices (e.g. law and medicine) (Wickham op.cit.;479).
Indeed, it could be argued that modern forms of social administration 
deploying seemingly 'natural' unproblematic categories such as 
'the family' across different social programmes (c/f Land 19 78)
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produces the most socially significant effects because it
is a category to which all social programmes and all individuals
are made accountable.
What is socially useful about theorising the subject given 
the complexity of it all? I would like to approach that 
problem at three levels. Firstly, at the level of political 
tactics and strategy, if we accept that forms of social 
governance involve more than statutory and administrative 
instruments, we have to include into our analysis theories 
about 'the social' and theories about 'the human' (i.e. the 
content of the theoretical armoury of professionals and 
administrators). It may well be that some of these accounts 
have their material effects in and through legal, administrative 
and professional practices. Therefore it becomes 'political' 
to describe 'the subjects' and 'the social' inscribed in those 
discursive practices. Donald's (1981) analysis of the 'crisis' 
in education, Rose's (1979) analysis of mental measurement 
and Henriques et al (1984) attempt to deconstruct 'the subject' 
of developmental psychology are all pertinent examples here.
I don't want to imply that analysis is political practice only 
if it is done this way, simply to say that there are a variety 
of means by which we are subjectified, socially identified and 
morally regulated, all of which are open to deconstruction and 
de-constitution. What is involved is to ask new questions about 
what constitutes power, and politics simply by 'lowering' the 
threshold of analysis from 'global' sites such as capitalism, 
class relations and state formations, without ignoring their 
considerable social importance.
Secondly, in terms of broad sociological practice, the conception 
of knowledge-producing agencies which take as their object 
social relations and social practices, inherently produce and 
sustain notions of 'the social' and 'subjects', suggests an 
open approach as to how social differences and social divisions 
are reproduced. Discursive practices are themselves productive
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of social difference and social division; they don't reflect 
or correspond with 'real' relations but are part of them.
In other words, the social categories produced in discourse 
are not one thing and 'real' people and behaviour is another, 
for our knowledge of 'real' people and concrete practices is 
itself a resight of an ensemble of signifying practices (embodied 
in language, reason, cultural and bodily signs). Thus, at the 
time of writing (late 1984) Mrs. Thatcher's support of the 
National Coal Board against the demands of the National Union 
of Miheworkers, her insistence that pits stay open, a quiescent 
attitude to unemployment at the expense of storing up revenue 
for a tax cut and so on do not reflect Tory Party policy; it 
is the very stuff of it. They are policies productive of social 
divisions (the working miners vs the violent pickets, those in 
real jobs' vs those in parasitical (state) occupations vs the 
unemployed), embodied in the production of subjects. The 
category 'unemployed' for example arises at the intersection 
of two major discursive formations, one being the classification 
of occupational statuses, the other being the programme of social 
welfare. In the latter, being unemployed has significances 
beyond being out of work, it means a measure of entitlement 
to fiscal benefit. The 'real' situation of being out of a job 
as a lived experience may well be a miserable and undignified 
position but is only so within the context of the complex 
calculations of capitalistic economics whose theories and 
practice on the one hand posit a certain amount of unemployment 
for strategic purposes while denying social and economic support 
for the casualties so that the arcane notion of 'pressure' may 
be put into play.
It seems to me that we can dislodge the old distinction of 
'real relations' and 'phenomenal forms' by asking how real 
relations can become known without first being signified, 
however complexly, in some kind of discursive practice be it 
the wage form, the marriage contract or the legal status of 
guardianship.
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Thirdly, and instrumentally, theorising of the subject 
lies right at the heart of anlaysing the law as it relates 
to children and childhood. Here we have a specific example 
of one of the major forms of social governance, the legal 
system, producing forms of social difference and creating 
socially divisive relationships between categories of subjects.
That process itself appeared to be an interesting theme for 
exploring the law and how it functions, and the effects it 
has on and for the subjects it renders incompetent as agents. 
Althusser's original conception of 'subject' drew upon the 
provenance of the legal term (Assiter, 1984) (though English 
lawyers are more inclined to speak of legal person or legal 
personality). One can see the attraction of the legal 
terminology for a theory of ideology founded on the construction 
of a fictive subject that the law itself invests with content 
and limited forms of agency/rights to act in certain ways - 
initiating litigation etc.).
I will not dwell on theories of legal subjectivity here, for that 
area will be covered in Section 3 of this Introduction. Suffice 
for the moment to say that analysing the law in terms of the 
process by which subjects are constructed doesn't mean that 
the analysis of the law ends there. There are Marxist theories 
for example which set the law in the context of the state; 
an apparatus which provides the state (and by extension, the 
ruling class) with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 
(e.g. Althusser). Another strand sees the law in terms of 
its class content; the extent to which its categories (crime, 
contract, property) maintain and support capital-labour relations 
(e.g. Pashukanis 1978, Edelman 1979). 'These are pressing 
problems in the sociology of law and should not be bracketed 
out unnecessarily. However, my object of analysis is primarily 
relations between generations which require a different orientation 
and other tools of analysis like the theory of the subject.
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In conclusion I want to raise the question as to whether 
the substantive study of the law and childhood below, could 
be labelled Foucauldian? I think not, for several reasons. 
Firstly, Foucault makes use of a regulated series of concepts 
such as 'archaeology', 'oeuvre', 'discipline', 'episteme', 
'statement', 'enunciation','grids of specification', 'surfaces 
of emergence', 'positivity', (a collation of terms he once 
called a 'bizarre machinery') (Sheridan op.cit. 103). They 
don't make an appearance in all his substantive work all the time, 
and he appears to feel free to drop them if they seem not to work. 
There is nothing new in this procedure. In Marx for example 
in his brilliant studies of the commune and the Civil Wars in 
France, he takes those parts of his theoretical framework as 
are necessary to illuminate and analyse a concrete social 
situation (Marx 1973, 1974). Like Foucault, he was given to 
the arresting image when necessary to make a point (I'm thinking 
here for example of his description of the French peasants 
being like a sack of potatoes). For a work to be bracketed 
as Foucauldian it would have to make a more systematic use of 
his theoretical tools than I have done here.
Secondly, I have some reservations of Foucault's périodisation, 
a more or less complex use of 'before' and 'after';the classical 
age or the ancien regime in contrast to the disciplinary society. 
Again, nothing unusual about this; we only have to think of Marx 
and Weber and the elaborate edifices built on 'pre-capitalist', 
'capitalist', 'pre-industrial', 'industrial' (and post-industrial) 
social formations. Foucault's historical classification may well 
have some purchase on French history but can look decidedly 
ahistorical in the English context. In the grand sweep of 
European history, for example, I am somewhat sceptical about 
the modernity of 'the disciplinary society' that arises 
with the growth of complex forms of administration. I am thinking 
here of the organisation of the inquisition in the Middle Ages; 
the massive attack on the 'heretics' by the Roman Catholic church.
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While the signifying image might well be the auto de fe 
(the trial and burning of the heretic), behind it stood a 
complex administrative machinery, collecting, recording, 
sifting and storing information on the populations in towns 
and rural areas (Lea, 1900, A History of the Inquisition 
of the Middle Ages, Vol. I). In this respect, 'specific 
procedures of individualisation, a specific technology 
of power, and a new political anatomy of the body ... subtle 
mechanisms of discipline ... and their insertion throughout 
the social body in the form of a generalised gaze' (Smart 
1982, 128) which signify 'the disciplinary society', can be 
said to be present at the end of the 13th and at .the'beginning of 
the 14th century.
Nevertheless, we do have to account in the English context 
for the decline of capital punishment, whipping, branding, 
the stocks and the rise of the penitentiary and the rise 
of a regime of 'treatment' at the expense of 'retribution' 
and on these matters Foucault proved a useful guide (see for 
example Ignatieff, 1978)
In one other respect, Foucault's history, focussing on the 
grand 'discontinuities' had limited utility for this project.
For what is striking about legal categories in English law 
is their longevity. There is no easy division historically 
between Feudal law and the law under capitalism, between an 
ancien regime and 'modern' society in this matter. Indeed, 
one of the interesting themes which unfolds below is a recuperation 
of just how much of 'the feudal' remains in the legal categories 
currently deployed in law, especially in family law.
Thirdly, I continue to deploy (and this relates to the point 
above) Marxian categories (mode of production, class in terms 
of possession/non-possession of the means of production, exploitation, 
state and civil society, Feudal-Capital historical divisions, for 
example) for the purposes of intelligibility. For me it is also
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the language of inequalities; of power, of material and 
symbolic goods. They remain analytically useful categories 
which can be reworked (as in the case of the family as an 
economic system) without losing the cutting edge of pointing 
up systematic social injustice. I spoke earlier of lowering 
the threshold of what is counted as political but there are 
moments when we want to hold on to a distinction say, between 
the institutions comprising the state (as a site at the 
intersection of publically funded bodies) and the organisations 
and institutions of civil society (like the family or the 
trade unions) however much the latter are said to be 'incorporated* 
or invidiously invaded by the values of the former. There are 
always points in time when they are 'up against' each other 
as are the organisations which speak for and on behalf of 
determinate social groups. While I am aware of the limitations 
of the Marxist categories, we cannot deny their historical 
tradition and current utility providing the necessary means 
for critical commentary and this is why I continue to use them.
In combination with other analytical concepts laid out above 
we can move away from an object of analysis which is wholly 
about capitalism and the social relations and practices said 
to be founded on it, to more complex views of the social.
'CHILDHOOD ...
Probably the most commonsense understanding of children 
and childhood is based on the biological differences which 
exist between adults and children. Such an approach stresses 
children's physical and mental immaturity, and their vulnerability 
and helplessness. Writers from Rousseau onwards celebrate 
childish innocence, spontaneity, and the ability to experience 
the natural world quite differently from the way in which adults 
experience it Because of their physical and mental immaturity.
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children are therefore assumed to be necessarily dependent 
on adults - usually their natural parents - for the necessary 
means of life, in the form of food, clothing and shelter.
Relating childhood to biological programming seems to us quite 
natural; thus an extended period of early life free from the 
cares of working and making a living is more or less regarded 
as unproblematic, even as a natural right attaching to a 
particular social group. This conception of children and 
childhood is firmly embedded in most if not all western 
industrial social formations.
We can question this seemingly 'natural* or biological 
approach to children and childhood by referring to the research 
produced by anthropologists and social historians. Anthropological 
studies, probably the best known and most accessible of which 
are by Margaret Mead (e.g. Mead, 1943), suggest that childhood 
is a socially and culturally specific category. Her studies 
of societies in New Guinea and Samoa suggest that 'western' 
childhood is not a trans-cultural phenomenon (i.e. we cannot 
generalise our conceptions of childhood across other'cultures).
The passage from childhood to adulthood in other societies 
is often marked by what are called 'rites of passage' or 
initiation ceremonies, often related to puberty. The status 
of childhood and that of adulthood are clearly delineated.
However, this does not mean that other forms of childhood are 
free from 'adult' responsibilities, such as contributing by 
labour to the social product. More often, the opposite is 
the case; children are expected to make some contribution to 
the material well-being of the social group, taking part in 
collecting or gathering food, looking after younger children, 
etc.. Childhood is not free from productive activities. The 
anthropologists therefore problematize the necessary and 'natural' 
connection between stages of biological maturity (often expressed 
in age) and the responsibilities and status of children and 
adults. In other words, the young in some societies cease to 
be 'children' at puberty and assume the status of adults; further­
more, they may never have experienced a 'childhood' as we 
conceive it.
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Recent research by social historians focussing on 'western* 
childhood has convincingly demonstrated that our notions 
of childhood are historically specific, and cannot be easily 
generalised back to the past^. These historians have also 
demonstrated that different social classes constructed the 
notion of childhood in different ways and on different 
chronological scales. Childhood was not a universal phenomenon 
prior to the nineteenth century. Forms of childhood existed 
before then, but it is important to realise that they were 
specific to certain social classes. However, as Pat Thane 
(19 78) points out, there were variations in the form of 
childhood even within social classes. What historical research 
points to is the socially constructed nature of childhood, 
in opposition to the notion of childhood being a 'natural' 
biologically programmed category. This does not mean that 
we should dismiss the 'biological' completely. The babe 
in arms, for example, is highly dependent on adults for the 
means of life. However, what social historians have demonstrated 
is that there is nothing natural or biologically necessary in 
the extension of that initial dependence, for instance to the 
age of sixteen or eighteen
Children, and the collective representation of their social 
location embedded in the notion of childhood are problematic 
categories. The inference of status and location draws on 
biology and sociality; they are categories emerging as it were 
at the intersection of 'nature' and 'culture' and as such, 
have presented problems to writers of anthropology , social 
history, philosophy and juridico-political theory, psychologists 
(clinical and developmental) and to sociologists. The biological 
cannot be dismissed completely because we are confronted by 
segmentsof the population whose synapses are in the process of 
connecting up at a rapid rate, whose bones are malleable, who 
are as yet incapable of human reproduction, and who are still 
'growing', unlike other segments of a population where these 
biological processes have slowed down or declined. Biology is
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not an invariant either in time or space; pubescence 
or menarche demonstrably changes over historical time 
(with a possible link to change in diet). Perhaps a 
super-abundance of steroids or hormones in diet could 
produce 'adult* characteristics in young children (as they 
can produce secondary sexual characteristics across genders 
in adults). Recognising that there are biological differences 
within populations, that humans age and die becomes sociologically 
significant when attempts are made to infer that social differences 
and divisions are somehow determined by an invariant sub-stratum 
of biological factors.
The long held tension between 'nature' and 'culture', nature 
being one thing, culture another is most evident when the 
categories of analysis involve the difference between men 
and women, child and adult, and racial difference. The 
important point is to recognise that biological factors in 
human life are socially organised in a variety of ways 
If we think of more recent classifications of what is meant 
by 'death', past struggles with legal definitions of what 
was meant for a foetus to be counted as a social person with 
'a right to life', then even basic biological 'facts' are 
not free from social description and prescription. As Hood- 
Williams (1984) in his critique of Mannheim succinctly puts it;
'Instead of properly studying the social 
categories men-women, adult-child through 
the structural relations that construct them 
there is too frequent reliance upon the so 
called 'fundamental (biological) facts'.
(Hood-Williams, 1984;43).
Quite so. We have to construct categories of child, children, 
childhood in relationship to other social categories, adult, 
adulthood. The meaning of each emerges through contrast, and 
through opposition.
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I shall take as a starting point, then, that to be of a 
certain age or biological 'stage' is not in itself sufficient 
to designate a subject as a child. Childhood is a position 
or status accorded through definite means; in some societies 
it is that age prior to certain rites of passage, often related 
to puberty. Currently, western childhood is given through a 
series of political and legal exclusions (not being able to 
vote, having no property rights, etc.). It is positively 
confirmed by cultural artefacts (children's books, children's 
clothes, music, TV programmes etc.), and by a series of 
time/place relationships (kindergartens, nurseries, schools) 
which separate the child from the adult, and the child from 
other dependants (the aged or the sick). It also entails 
a formal separation from work, giving rise to an extended 
period of dependency, usually on (natural) parents, reinforced 
in and through a complex relationship with the state.
The implication of this approach is that, if we assume 
childhood is a position or status accorded through definite 
means, the object ofstudy becomes the 'definite means' through 
which childhood is constituted. Here I am referring to the 
set of social relations and social practices by which the social 
category, childhood, is supported and maintained, and I am 
focusing specifically on the knowledges, discourses and 
institutions associated with the constitution of childhood.
This in turn should allow us to grasp the means by which 
children are constituted as subjects separate and different 
from adults, and to understand the complex of mechanisms by 
which this separation is produced and maintained.
We shall begin with a consideration of Philippe Aries'
Centuries of Childhood (19 62), still probably the major text 
confronting those who wish to understand the constitution of 
childhood. Aries takes as his source a variety of cultural 
artefacts; texts on astrology, education, child-bearing;
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paintings of family groups; religious iconography; 
illustrations of clothes and games. He maintains that 
collectively these artefacts suggest that in medieval Europe, 
childhood as we know it did not exist; after infancy - which 
lasted from birth to the age of five or seven years - people 
moved straight into the world of adults. Aries provides a 
wealth of information from a variety of sources to illustrate 
this point. For example, he quotes from a medieval text which 
uses age classifications in a very different way from that in 
which we now use them:
'The first age is childhood when the teeth 
are planted, and this age begins when the 
child is born and lasts until seven, and in 
this age that which is born is called an 
infant, which is as good as saying not talking, 
because in this age it cannot talk well or form 
its words perfectly, for its teeth are not yet 
well arranged or firmly implanted, as Isidore 
says and Constantine. After infancy comes the 
second age ... it is called pueritia and is 
given this name because in this age the person 
is still like the pupil in the eye, as Isidore 
says, and this age lasts till fourteen.
Afterwards follows the third age, which is 
called adolescence, which ends according to 
Constantine in his viaticum in the twenty-first 
year, but according to Isidore it lasts till 
twenty-eight ... and it can go on until thirty 
or thirty-five. This age is called adolescence 
because the person is big enough to beget children 
says Isidore. In this age the limbs are soft 
and able to grow and receive strength and vigour 
from natural heat. And because the person grows 
in this age to the size allotted to him by Nature. 
(Yet growth is over before thirty or thirty-five, 
even before twenty-eight. And it was probably
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even less tardy at a time when work at a 
tender age mobilized the resources of the 
constitution earlier on).
Afterwards, follows youth which occupies 
the central position among the ages, although 
the person in this age is in his greatest 
strength, and this age lasts until forty-five 
according to Isidore, or until fifty according 
to others. This age is called youth because 
of the strength in the person to help himself 
and others, according to Aristotle.
(Aries, 1962, p. 19).
He goes on to say:
M n  Medieval society the idea of childhood 
did not exist; this is not to suggest that 
children were neglected, forsaken or despised.
The idea of childhood is not to be confused 
with affection for children; it corresponds 
to an awareness of the particular nature of 
childhood, that particular nature which 
distinguishes the child from the adult, even 
the young adult.
(op.cit. p. 125).
According to Aries, the idea of childhood began to emerge 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Representations 
of children begin to appear then, showing them dressed in 
clothing which is different from adult garb and also showing 
children and adults playing different games. But, more 
importantly, the young just out of infancy were being ascribed
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with a particular nature, and he suggests that it was 
the construct of particular social groups.
'We have studied the beginnings and development 
of two views of childhood. According to the 
first, which was widely held, children were 
creatures to be 'coddled' and childhood was 
held to last hardly beyond infancy; the second 
which expressed the realization of innocence 
and the weakness of childhood, and consequently 
of the duty of adults to safeguard the former 
and strengthen the latter, was confined for a 
long time to a small minority of lawyers, priests 
and moralists (my emphasis).
(op.cit. p.316).
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the idea of 
childhood was crystallized through the realization of 
children's innocence and weakness. These ideologies did 
not merely exist as 'ideas' expressed in texts but came to 
exist materially in the form of schools and academies, 
and in practices such as the censoring of children's reading 
materials and the disciplining of their behaviour within 
these institutions. These institutions simultaneously marked 
off those who attended them from full participation in the 
adult world. Educational institutions were not as age-specific 
as at present, but to be a scholar was to have a status different 
from that of an adult. As Aries says: 'To say that someone 
was of school age did not necessarily mean that that person 
was a child, for school age could also be taken to mean the 
limit beyond which a pupil had small hope of success' (op.cit.; 
p. 317).
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The practice of having a large age range in the same 
educational institution did not die out until the 
nineteenth century. Along with the development of 
educational institutions, Aries notes the growth of a 
scientific pedagogy:
"The real innovators were the scholastic 
reformers of the fifteenth century. Cardinal 
d"Estouteville, Gerson, the organisers of 
the colleges and pedagogicas, and finally 
and above all the Jesuits, the Oratorians 
and the Jansenists in the seventeenth century. 
With them we see the appearance of an awareness 
of the special nature of childhood, knowledge 
of child psychology, and the desire to devise 
a method suited to that psychology."
(op.cit.: pp 317-18).
Educational establishments of the seventeenth century 
were not the sole province of any one class; the working 
class made little use of them; for the nobility formal 
schooling was only one form of apprenticeship among others 
which included military training. But, Aries argues, if 
schools and colleges were not yet the monopoly of one class, 
they were the monopoly of one sex (op.cit. p. 318). 'Apart 
from ... domestic apprenticeship, girls were given virtually 
no education. In families where the boys went to college, 
(girls) learned nothing.' (op.cit. p. 319). For girls, 'the 
habits of precocity and a brief childhood remained unchanged 
from the middle ages to the seventeenth century', (ibid).
In families of some property and substance, girls were married 
off at twelve and thirteen years of age. By the age of ten, 
Aries comments, 'girls were already little women; a precocity 
due in part to an upbringing which taught girls to behave 
very early in life like grown-ups' (ibid).
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One final and important point noted by Aries is the 
connection between educational institutions and social 
life outside them: 'The essential difference between 
the medieval school and the modern college lies in the 
introduction of discipline. Discipline was gradually 
extended from the colleges to the private pensions where 
the schoolboys lodged, and sometimes to the town itself, 
though generally without any success in practice' (op.cit. 
p. 320). Furthermore, 'This discipline not only took 
the form of better supervision inside school, but it tended 
to force parents to respect the complete school cycle.'
(ibid).
In spite of the richness of Aries' work in terms of the 
variety of sources he uses to develop his arguments, and 
the lines of approach to the study of childhood suggested 
in his book, his research is by no means unproblematic.
For example, his use of cultural iconography (the representation 
of children in paintings and illustrated books, and on religious 
masonry, etc.) supposes a necessary correspondence between 
artistic conventions of representation and the social world 
which informs the artist's mode of representation. Yet 
artistic conventions are by no means fixed and are susceptible 
to changes which need not necessarily reflect, or correspond 
with, the existence of social categories outside an artist's 
representations. Social historians (Stone 1974) are also 
somewhat wary of the way in which Aries leaps about in time 
and space, drawing on sources from markedly different social 
contexts of various nation states in order to argue the 
emergence of childhood in the seventeenth century. Moreover, 
as Martin Hoyles (19 79) points out, the creation of childhood, 
for Aries, was the work 'of a small minority of lawyers, 
priests and moralists' - an account which privileges ideological 
changes over changes in the mode of production, the process of 
proletarianization, the stratification of society by class. 
Nevertheless, it was largely Aries who put the study of child­
hood as a socially constructed category back on the agenda of
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the social sciences. I think that he does demonstrate 
the importance of the connection between the development 
of institutions, and the knowlege which informed their 
practices, and the rise of a new and different social 
category, that of children.
There are two serious problems with Aries' model of 
historical change, namely the change from 'medieval 
sociability' to 'enlightenment individualism' (Stone 
op.cit.; 27). The first concerns his presentation of the 
undifferentiated character of cultural life in the middle 
ages; that adults and children dressed alike, played the 
same games together and generally intermingled homogeneously. 
Now this may well be true in some respects, but is profoundly 
misleading in others. From the evidence of the legal practices 
I cite below in the body of text both church and state drew 
a very clear distinction between adults and infants, in respect 
of church and civic rights and responsibilities, in terms of 
property rights and in terms of criminality responsibility.
In the case of the church, that distinction prevailed wherever 
the Catholic Church dictated the features of religious practice 
In the late 13th century, we learn that under the inquisition,
'in places much suspected of heresy every inhabitant must be 
cited to appear, must be forced to abjure heresy and to tell 
the truth, and be subjected to a detailed interrogatory 
about himself and others' (Lea 1900, Vol. 1; 402). All except 
those who had not reached 'the age at which the Church held 
him able to answer for his own acts' (ibid). In Toulouse, 
Beziers and Albi, this was assumed to 14 years for males,
12 for females; elsewhere it was anyone over 7 years old, 
in other regions, 9h for girls, 10^ for boys (Lea; 403).
So the absence of childish garments, a lack of sentimentality 
towards children does not diminish the socially significant 
divisions which existed between adults and children in the 
middle ages in England or in Catholic Europe. Crucially, these 
remarks somewhat undermine the general thrust of the argument, 
that of childhood being a recent invention.
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Secondly, Aries' brave attempt to trace out the history 
of the family as a sentimental institution (in many respects 
the most difficult kind of history to write precisely because 
it takes on psycho-sexual relations as the object of analysis) 
is gravely flawed. The family before the 16th century, Aries 
argues, was more a 'moral and social reality' than a sentimental 
one (Aries;p.356). Children were sent to wet-nurses, apprenticed 
out (either to great estates to learn the accomplishments of 
nobility, or to master craftsmen to learn a trade, according 
to status). This rise of the family as a sentimental 
institution, displacing the older 'reality' corresponds with 
the child returning to the bosom of the family; wet-nurses 
came into the home, apprenticeship was abandoned in favour 
of schools, children kept apart from the corrupting influences 
of adult life outside the dual enclosures of the school and 
the family (Aries, p. 357). He continues, this 'also corresponded 
to a desire on the part of parents to watch more closely over 
their children, to stay near them to avoid abandoning them 
even temporarily to the care of another family' (ibid) (my 
emphasis). As soon as the 'family centred itself on the child', 
we are given both the form of the modern family and character 
of modern childhood. On this view, the agents of change are 
predominantly 'the desire of parents', an essentialism posited 
in the existence of some atheoretical psychic domain. As 
Stone pertinently observes, where are the 'ever-encroaching 
institutions of the modern state' to which the family, from 
the middle ages to the nineteenth century (sic) lost many of 
its older functions' (especially its welfare and caring 
functions). He argues that 'the power of the state undermined 
the influence of the kin, and thus increased the isolation 
and privacy of the nuclear family. This process can hardly 
be called the rise of the family but rather its reorientation 
to serve a narrower, more speicalised function' (Stone 1974 
27). In short, where is the state in Aries' account? One 
only has to think of Pinchbeck and Hewitt's two-volume study 
of children in English society to perceive how state policies
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crucially determine the location: of children in civil 
society and how these policies mobilise conceptions of 
children and childhood to reorientate families to a 'more 
specialised function'. This is a theme I take up and 
develop in Part Three of the text.
Summarily, though there are some problems with Aries' history 
of childhood, his ground-breaking work lies in his attempt 
to identify how children came to be viewed as subjects with 
socially identifiable cultural and emotional needs (affection, 
coddling, discipline) and attributes. He grasped the conception 
of childhood being causally related to the rise of discourses 
on psychological development, the development of schools, 
the changing practices of middle class and aristocratic 
families (abandoning apprenticeship, abandoning out-house 
wet-nurses), and the practice of excluding the young from 
certain areas of social practice by enclosing them within 
the guiding confines of the family and the school. In the 
last instance however, he is talking about male children, by 
his own account, girls rarely left the bosom of the family 
anyway - they remained with their parents or left to set up 
house under the dominion of their husbands.
For Aries, then, the emergence of childhood as a socially 
recognised stage in the life cycle is evidenced by the benign 
indifference to children displayed in the medieval family 
giving way to the privileged status accorded to children 
in 19th century family relations. He is careful to argue, 
however, that 'there is a connection between the concept of 
class and the concept of the family' (Aries; 398). He then 
goes on to locate in class terms, 'the modern family' (the 
enclosed, privatized family, where parents and children are 
most intimately connected, where outsiders are excluded, where 
the family is 'morally ascendant' over other social sites).
In his thesis, this family form emerges in middle class
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families, and with it the 'modern' attitude to children 
and childhood. Childhood is a protected space in which 
children are coddled, disciplined and regulated because 
they are treasured and privileged. Upper class families 
and working class families contrarily retain some of the 
old modalities of attitudes towards children. The old 
practices of apprenticeship (in 'the big house' for the 
children of nobles, the house of the guild master for 
the working class and petty bourgeoisie) are retained.
The young here continue to mix in crowds, form peer group 
alliances (Gillis's (1974) bands of wandering young men, 
Yarborough's (1979) Bristol apprentices) and continued to 
enjoy a certain amount of unregulated moral space and 
social and cultural autonomy. At the point at which Aries 
tries to connect 'family' with 'class' we appreciate the 
extent to which his account lacks any substantive material 
either on working class family life or working class childhood 
It is at this point also that the historians who followed 
Aries take diverging courses.
We can identify three broad approaches to the study of 
childhood and youth in history. There are the family 
historians who are concerned with parent-child relations 
and how these change historically (e.g. Stone, 1977;
Flandrin, 1979; Anderson, 1971, Laslett, 1972, Demos 
and Boocock (eds), 19 78; Haraven, 1978). There are 
historians using oral and written biographies of childhood 
(the best attempt to recuperate the working class accounts 
'missing' in Aries and Stone) (notably, Burnett, 1982; 
Thompson, 1981; Vincent, 1979, 1981). There are historians 
predominantly concerned with social movements and institutions 
whose object was the education and control of the young (e.g. 
Walvin, 1982; Pinchbeck and Hewitt op.cit.; Platt, 1969; 
Humphries, 1981; Dyhouse 1981; Horn, 1974).
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From these sources we have a convincing record of the 
variability of childhood (the length of dependence, education, 
work and family experiences) across classes. We only have 
to compare the drudgery of young labourers described in Marx's 
Capital (Vol 1), Cruickshank (1981) and in Walvin (op.cit.) 
with the contrasting experiences of the gilded young in 
aristocratic and bourgeoisie families to confirm the 
differences (e.g. Slater's 1976) account of the Verney 
family, Wohl's (1978) studies of upper class Victorian 
families, Thompson's (1981) biographies of Edwardian 
childhoods and Lawrence Stone's (1977) account of aristocratic 
families).
The very heterogenity of feelings and attitudes about and 
towards children, the variety of child-rearing practices, 
the different kinds of autonomy granted to the young, to me 
seems to undermine 'the psycho-genic' history of childhood 
presented by de Mause (1974). We no longer practice infanticide 
on a large scale, no longer brutalise our children, he argues, 
because parents are increasingly able to 'empathise' with their 
children, because parents are better able to 'regress' to the 
psychic age of the child. This historical process and the 
changes in parent-child relations are independent of other 
social, religious or economic factors. 'Mere mystical nonsense', 
comments Stone (1974;30), and I have to agree. de Mause 's 
model of historical change is located somewhere in the psyche 
and implicitly requires us to believe that all parents at 
particular points in time and in all places become equally 
empathetic, when social historians are displaying quite the 
opposite. We might want to admit the trans-cultural existence 
of the sub-conscious, but then to write out the material 
existence of religious, judicial, economic and customary 
practices which shape and pattern parent-child relations, 
in favour of one determinant, is ahistorical, essentialist 
and overly dependent on a Whiggish idea of 'progress'.
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There is a productive tension between the idea of hetero­
geneous childhoods in the past and the convergence thesis 
implicit in the accounts of Aries, Stone, Pinchbeck and 
Hewitt, and Walvin, to take some typical examples. How do 
we think through the increasing social separation of child­
hood from the social milieu of adulthood, in all classes?
We can identify two major forms of explanation. The first, 
developed by Stone and Aries considers that childhood 
emerged in the 'modern family' practices in the upper stratas 
of society, in tandem with broader changes (development of 
psychology, changes in religious attitudes towards children, 
the promulgation of child-rearing manuals, pedagogical 
practices within schools) which then seeped down to the lower 
orders. Secondly, that the length of childhood as a dependant 
protected space was articulated by the ruling classes and 
then imposed elsewhere via the mechanism of the state (through 
juvenile courts, poor law regulations, policing the streets, 
regulating the hours of work, regulating economic activities, 
compulsory schooling) (e.g. Platt, op.cit.; Humphries, op.cit.; 
Hoyles, 1979). The first theme accents the coming into 
existence of children as objects of familial love, protection, 
regulation and discipline; the second accents 'the public' 
construction of the child's social location, as an object 
of protection, and gives us the means to identify the mechanisms 
as to how one view of childhood became generalised. Both 
are useful contributions to the history of childhood but limited 
in the respect that categories of age are treated as secondary 
to a concern to unravel the emergence of 'the sentimental family' 
or as secondary to an analysis of class antagonism conducted 
in and through the complex of the state. Whereas Stone and 
Aries dwell at length on the young of ruling class families,
Platt and Humphries consider at length the control of the 
working class young. We need to shift our focus to an analysis
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which takes as its object the similarities that exist 
between the young in aristocratic and in working class 
families in order to apprehend the character of inter- 
generational relations, across classes.
The social division between adults and children, the 
difference between categories of age and generation are 
to be properly located in the field of family relations.
Here, the differences between adults and children are 
grounded and made effective both at the level of personal 
relations and in terms of structural, durable oppositions.
This proposition I hope to explain and defend at length 
in the text which follows. 'It is impossible', argues Stone 
(1974;30) 'to study children in isolation from those who 
killed them off or fed them, beat them or fondled them, 
namely their parents'. To which we should add, 'or other 
adults or social agencies given the powers to act as if 
they were 'natural' parents '. If there is 'a history of 
childhood' , it is to be found in the social processes by 
which children are excluded from areas of social practice 
while at the same time rendered subordinate to the category 
adult. Childhood emerges at the intersection of social 
practices which exclude and subordinate the young, thereby 
differentiating this stage of life from 'adulthood'. Children 
are the subjects produced by the same multiple means of 
exclusion and subordination. It is within familial relations 
that inter-generational relations are made effective, given 
their character and then become 'the raw materials' of dis­
cursive practices in other sites.
Customarily and formally, the nature of the parent-child 
relation may be described in terms of provider-dependent, 
protector-protected, controller-controlled. The parental 
obligation to maintain and protect gives rise to corollary
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rights to discipline and control their dependants. That 
relationship has been transported to other sites (the 
work-place, the school, the reformatory, the orphanage).
It is a relationship which is visible across class-specific 
family forms. The material situation of the family will 
determine precisely how the relations of power and dependence 
work out. Within aristocratic families, for example, it may 
well be a relationship secured by the timing of the release 
of estates or other family goods to young family members 
while in working class families the relationship may well be 
based on the length of time to which labour services accrue 
to family elders. The intra-familial relations are not and 
never have been purely inter-personal exchanges but are produced, 
maintained and recreated by property law, by family law, by 
social policy and by customary practice. The law of real 
property means that minors can never control estates (even 
though they may 'own' them), their parents or surrogate parents 
do so. In the contracts of apprenticeship, minors enter the 
trade of master-craftsmen (and historically 'his' household) 
but became subject to a regime of training and discipline 
entirely familial in character, where the master assumes 
the parental right to beat young workers. One aspect of being 
a child means precisely being in someone's care and custody, 
that some social agent is standing 'in loco parentis', acting 
as, or as if it were the parent. The similar status of the 
married woman (under the potestas) of her husband, and the 
child is readily apparent here.
The proper study of childhood then requires us to re-cast 
view of the family, to move away from Aries' history of 
changes in sentiment to a view of the family as an ensemble 
of relations entailing positions and relationships of power 
and control, dependence and subordination. Familial relations
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then are not 'given' but are located at the intersection 
of economic practices, property law, family law, laws 
concerning the protection of children and the law of inheri­
tance, to take some of the more pertinent examples. We are 
required to map out the relationship between male heads of 
households, women-wives, sons and daughters; dis-aggregate 
the constructs of 'parent' and 'children' in order to display 
the weft and warp of the network of power and authority, 
dependence and subordination between genders and between 
generations. It is for this reason that the following 
substantive account of the construction of the child in law 
appears to be an analysis of family law. Yet when we turn 
to the legal categories of 'infant', 'minor', 'heir',
'child', and so on, the object of analysis, 'the child', 
appears only in opposition to 'parent', 'guardian', and 
in relationships of 'guardianship', 'custody', and 'wardship'. 
The legal categories themselves create and maintain social 
divisions between subjects by age and by gender. On closer 
inspection there is no unitary category of 'parent'
(husbands and women-wives are accorded quite different statuses, 
powers and obligations) or of 'child' (boy sons and girl 
daughters are subject to quite different modes of regulation, 
and this will vary across classes according to the possession/ 
non-possession of the means of production, for example.
Yet we can still argue that all boy sons and girl daughters 
by custom and law share a broadly similar location in respect 
of their parents or other adults who are accorded a status 
to act as if they were parents. Transferring parental status 
to other adults or social agencies is precisely what the 
legal system accomplishes, by conferring on them the same 
legal rights over children that natural parents have acquired.
To me, this process is far more sensitive to the processes 
by which one form of childhood becomes a generalised status 
in western social formations than is the culturalist theories
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of Aries or Stone, or the class control theories of, say, 
Humphries or Platt. It is actually much more sensitive to 
means by which boy children and girl children are differentially 
disciplined and regulated. It is far more explanatory 
of the generational qualities of the relations that inhabit 
the institutions of the state (schools, juvenile courts, 
reformatories etc.) concerned predominantly with the training, 
treatment, regulation and discipline of the young. To take 
a brief but pertinent example; schools retain the right to 
discipline children (in some cases, beat them up) in profoundly 
familial ways. To my knowledge, no capitalist employer retains 
the right to beat wage-labourers, so in this sense, schools 
and other institutions dealing with young are in many respects 
operating with very un-capitalist modes of authority and 
control; class theory therefore has very little to say about 
the kinds of power and control exercised within these 
institutions. It is therefore possible to argue that there 
are considerable similarities between the regime of the public 
school and the regime of the reformatory even though these are 
institutions populated by the young of vastly different 
family and class backgrounds.
Through familial relations we can begin to apprehend the 
quality of inter-generational relations, and the material 
foundations which generate their specific character. But this 
is by no means an exhaustive account of what constitutes child­
hood. The other part of this enquiry must concern the means 
by which formal and public boundaries constitute the limits of 
childhood and construct certain subjects as children. What is 
the complex of social practices and the institutions which mark 
off one social grouping as children, so as they are socially 
identified as being separate and different? We can present 
these summarily for the English context.
4 %^ -
a) Subjects under a certain age (of majority) are excluded 
from the ownership of certain kinds of property. This gives 
us (historically) the categories of 'infant' and 'minor'. In 
the past the ownership of property determined voting and 
other civic rights (jury service) and as such minors were 
precluded (with certain exceptions) from participating in 
the polity.
b) Beginning with the 19th century Factory Acts, subjects 
under a certain age were gradually excluded from the process 
of waged labour. The Acts were never entirely effective, 
but the long term result has been to exclude the young from 
full-time paid employment, thereby increasing and ensuring 
their dependence on parents (and increasingly (in the 1980's) 
on the state).
c) The rise of compulsory schooling (effective from the 1880's) 
and the raising of the school leaving age (currently 16 years
3 months) effectively separates school aged subjects from the 
world of work; while requiring them to attend sites of learning 
and discipline away from and outside the domain of the family.
f) The Youthful Offenders Act (1854) and subsequent 
changes in the criminal law and penal system (the formation of 
the juvenile court system in 1908) provides age-specific forms 
of trial and punishment, distinguishing between 'the child',
'the young person' and 'the adult' in terms of legal subjects.
g) The development of a comprehensive system of protection 
for the young against neglect and abuse (e.g. Custody of 
Children Act 1891, Children and Young Persons Acts 1933, 1969) 
has enabled state and private agencies to intervene in family 
life, thus emphasising their privileged and protected status.
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h) Welfare policies (School Meals Act 1906, Medical 
Inspection 1907) separate out a social group for identifiably 
different forms of support and maintenance, again based on age.
i) The 'licensing' of sexual relations and the age of marriage 
The ages of consent, discretion and marriage function to permit 
adult control over important areas of minors' lives on the
one hand, while at the same time sequencing boys and girls 
into adulthood along different time-scales
The above represents a series of exclusions and prohibitions 
constituting a social group (by age) as children. Precisely 
where the age linesfall, and how they vary historically is a 
matter for further determination. How age lines relate to 
boy children and girl children varies across genders and 
across time. However, all children by definition suffer from 
a series of exclusions and prohibitions regardless of class 
or gender. The above list represents 'the definite means' by 
which they are rendered non-adults. In this way, English 
society develops its highly age-stratified character.
The 'history of childhood' can be recounted by tracing_.out 
the development of the practices which divide adults from 
children, which renders childhood as a protected, dependent 
and subordinate status. The means by which the boundaries 
are solidified and policed, by the emergence of institutions 
directed towards the control, treatment, management and well­
being of an age-specific group, provides an analytic account 
of what is expected of children and of what they are expected 
to be.
Unlike Aries, this approach places the complex institutions 
of the state at centre stage, those institutions being 
implicated as agents in the formal and public definitions 
of what is to count as 'the child' and 'childhood'. They are
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the means by which the boundaries between 'adult' and 
'child' are put into place and effectively regulated.
They are the means by which we can explain and explore 
the conception of 'the child' as a non-unitary subject, 
and retain the sense of a general distinction between 
adults and children.
I would not want to claim that the means by which the legal 
system delineates the child as a subject provides an ex­
haustive account of 'the history of childhood'. That it 
does systematically divide subjects along lines of age, the 
significance it has for subjects on either side of the age- 
lines it constructs, (the rights, duties and obligations 
with which these subjects are either invested or denied), 
makes the law's sayings and doings an essential element in 
any such 'history'.
I have purposely eschewed any precise definition of 
children and childhood in terms of chronological age.
I have tried to speak of these categories defined only 
in terms of an objective social group and social location 
that are 'not adult'. This leads to the question, what 
is the difference between child and youth or adolescent 
given the existence of youth studies as research practice 
in sociology and a prominently sociological concern with 
the category youth and adolescent (Gasktll, 1983; Willis, 
1977; Springhall, 1983/4; Humphries, 1981; Dorn and South, 
1982; Smith, 1983, 1984; .Hall et al.,1976, McRobbie, 
1978; Woods, 1977; for example).
What I define as children and childhood would certainly 
subsume many of the subjects and practices that in other 
accounts are labelled youth, adolescent or youthful. The
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problem is not, however, entirely nominalistic nor one 
that can be settled by reference to age lines alone.
Because I am concerned predominantly with legal categories 
elsewhere, I rely on 'infant' or 'minor' as a general referent 
(subjects below the age of majority), but I am not adverse 
to labelling this status as childhood (non-adulthood). As 
the age of majority historically was drawn at the age of 
21 and 18 years respectively, clearly it encompasses subjects 
and practices that other social scientific discourses count 
as youth and adolescence. This means that these other 
discourses need to be assessed to discover what actually 
constitutes youth or adolescence. All that we share is 
a concern with the young (age unspecified), but there are 
significant differences as to how constitute the material 
differences and relationships between 'the young' and 'the 
elders'.
Springhall (op.cit.) being a notable exception, the field 
of youth studies largely comprises a) accounts of youthful 
cultural practices (styles of dress, music, dance, street 
behaviour) constituting a distinct social grouping, comprising 
an opposition to the cultural practices of elders; b) youth 
as distinct category in the labour market, suffering high 
rates of unemployment, experiencing considerable difficulties 
in getting a job and subject to the regime of specialist 
institutions concerned vocations training (Youth Opportunities 
Programme, Youth Training Scheme). The latter approach has 
had considerable effects in the sociology of education, with 
a renewed interest being shown to the school-to-work transition.
The problem with youthstudies concerned with cultural practices, 
as Hood-Williams (1984) notes critically, is its reliance on 
a very Mannheimian conception, namely identifying generational 
groupings on the basis of a shared system of beliefs and values
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(given through their adherence to distinctive styles and 
cultural forms). That project is unherently unstable because 
of the diversity of cultural forms and styles adopted by 
the young (punk, mod, rocker, hippy, new romantic) and 
because some belief systems (political allegiances organised 
around political parties, animal rights, CND, Friends of the 
Earth) are profoundly cross-generational, and are diversely 
distributed within the category youth. The early CCCS work 
on youth (Clarke et. al. 1975) actually told us very little 
about the material location of youth through it (and later 
work, e.g. Woods 1977 had a great deal to say about class 
(the basis of accounting for the diversity of youthful 
cultural styles).
We have to acknowledge I think that at the end of the day, 
the street-wise lads probably return to the mundane but 
powerful existence of the household, where the allocation of 
space, the timing of meals, and the distribution of familial 
goods is largely out of their hands. And there also, we meet 
their sisters, for given the absence of girls at sub-cultural 
sites, we have to assume (for reasons unspecified) that their 
sisters didn't leave the house at all. As the field of study 
unfolded, we learn that youth as a category is riven by class 
and gender but it never really gave us the basis for generating 
why youth is 'a stable category sharing (a) similar social 
location'(Hood-Williams; 43). I think the procedures I have 
set out above, locating the field of study as part of the study 
of familial relations articulated to state practices and 
institutions goes considerably further towards this end 
than does the culturalist studies of youth, and indeed, 
subsumes it.
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How youth is articulated to the labour market, the growth 
of age-specific training schemes are both relevant and 
immediate political issues. The framing of the issue; 
analysing YOP and YTS initiatives predominantly in terms 
of capitalistic attempts; to overcome a major crisis in 
capital accumulation, and, to re-impose its discipline on 
the labour force by sustaining high rates of unemployment 
and through the ideology of 'vocationalism' in schools and 
training course, sets the scene largely in terms of class 
conflict. There is an alternative analysis, I think, which 
is more sensitive to the inter-generational issues involved. 
The new vocational schemes can be seen as a means of re­
inforcing and extending the enforced dependence of the young, 
on their parents and on the state (i.e. extending childhood). 
Read in these terms, the recent (December 1984) moves to 
reduce student grants, the Manpower Services Commission 
proposal that school leavers accept training or lose benefits, 
the continued refusal to introduce Educational Maintenance 
Grants (other than on a very local, highly discretionary 
basis), and now the Gillick case, all constitute attempts 
by sectors of the state and civil society to redefine the 
limits of childhood, by extending parental authority and 
parental responsibilities. On this view and without losing 
the context of 'the crisis of capital', we can more readily 
appreciate the generationally specific effects of these social 
policies.
'... and _ the Law'
The three 'greats' of sociology each brushed with the 
law. Marx and Durkheim wrote extensively about it without 
developing any general theory of the law Weber's appli­
cation of his typology of authority to the Occidental legal 
systems produced perhaps the most systematic and comprehensive 
account of the three. His collected writings on the law 
provide a sophisticated history of the legal thought, legal 
institutions and the legal professions in the West. For
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Weber and Durkheim, the law existed as a social 
phenomenon to be described and explained through the 
application of more general tools of sociological analysis. 
For Marx, the law-in-general was conceived as the juridical 
expression of the more fundamental relations of the material 
base. The law enters his work, however, more concretely, 
as a series of analyses of specific pieces of legislation 
used to generate an account of specific laws and their social 
functions  ^. My orientation to the law does not draw exten­
sively on these sources so I shall eschew any elaborate cri- 
ticandum so that I may locate more fully the background to 
my approach and choice of method and materials.
I shall try to identify and describe three approaches to 
the study of law and indicate why I want to distance myself 
from these positions. These are a) the 'crude materialism' 
of Marx and Engels, b) the liberal jurisprudential support 
of the Rule of Law, c) the radical-demystificatory critique 
of the capitalist and bourgeois legal orders. I do this 
within the context of the unfolding of recent attempts 
(within the last decade or so) to identify and explain the 
socsial origins and character of the law and the attempts 
to analyse its functions, which have now become an embedded 
part of modern sociology and social theory. I deal with these 
approaches somewhat summarily because I am interested here 
only in outlining some theoretical traditions which I drew 
on but want to move beyond; the intellectual matrix as it 
were of my own substantive account of the law.
Recent sociological attempts to theorise the law are 
grounded in two other developments; a) Marxist theories of 
the state (put seriously on the agenda by the Poulantzas- 
Miliband debate in 1972 (see also Jessop 1977, 1980 , 
Holloway and Picciotto 1977 , Therborn 1984 , Offe and 
Ronge 1975  ^Offe 1972 ) . ^ b ) Marxist theories of
ideology (e.g. Althusser 1971 , Poulantzas 1968, 1978 ,
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Therborn 1980 , Larrain 1982 , Williams 1976 , Hirst 
1979 , Blackburn 1972). It is not surprising that out 
of the two enterprises, concerned with a general theory 
of the capitalist state, and the elaboration of and critique 
of a general theory of ideology that Marxist theory turned 
its attention to the law as a specific instance founded at 
the intersection of the state and ideological practice.
It is possibly correct to claim that in the early 1970's 
Marxist theory paid little attention to the law. From 1975 
onwards, however, there has developed a large body of 
literature on Marxist perspectives on the law (Hay et. al. 
1975, Thompson 1975, Hunt 1976, Balbus 1977, Fraser 1978,
Hall et. al. 1978, Chambliss 1979, Cohen 1978, Fryer et al. 
1981, Cotterrell 1979, Benney 1983, Burns 1980, Hirst 1979, 
Kinsey 1978, Klare 1979, Redhead 1982, Santos 1979, Sugarman 
1981, Sumner 1979, Tushnet 1982, Gavigan 1981). Marxist 
theory on law solidified (in the English context) in 1979 
when the British Sociological Association Conference of 
that year (Warwick University) took as its theme law and 
society (see Fryer et. al. 1981 for a selection of the 
conference papers). Its critical mass was extended by the 
publication of texts such as Fine et. al. (1979) Capitalism 
and the Rule of Law, Edelman's (1979) Ownership of the Image, 
Pashakanis (1978) Law and Marxism: a General Theory, Cain and 
Hunt's (1979) collection of Marx's scattered writings on law 
Phillips's (1980) similar attempt to collect Marx's obser­
vations on law and by Collins (1982) excellent overview of 
Marxism's attempt to theorize the law, in Marxism and the 
Law.
These writings deal with the law at different levels of
abstraction, at different levels of generality (varying
from the abstract derivation of the law and capitalism
from economic properties of the capitalist mode of production 
10
(Pashukanis) to detailed accounts of historically specific 
events (Hay et. al., Thompson/976) . Given this diversity.
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sustain it and with changing forms of law and their 
relationship to changes in the material base, only 
rarely have they got to grips with the specificity of 
the Rule of Law (in terms of its content and functioning) 
By this, I mean that one rarely finds a critical account 
of the central principles used by liberal jurisprudence 
to discuss and justify existing law, legality, and legal 
relations.
The best (and highly accessible) critical account I 
know of, written from a Marxist perspective is by 
Hugh Collins (op.cit.) and I shall draw on his work 
here.
Collins begins by admitting that there is a paucity 
of Marxist jurisprudence, not surprising in his view, 
because legal rules and legal institutions are tan­
gential and peripheral to a body of theory focussing on 
'the economy and corresponding power relations within 
society' (p. 10). He then argues, 'To demand a general 
theory of law from a Marxist is to ask him to run the 
risk of falling prey to what can be termed the fetishism 
of the law (p. 10, my emphasis). Legal fetishism, he 
argues, has three significant features:
1. The thesis that a legal order is necessary to social 
order. Legal rules are the centre-piece of social life, 
providing the organising principles for peaceful social 
intercourse. Legal rules provide a norm and thus provide 
'the foundation for exchanges, reliance, safety, privacy. 
Without these rules it is argued, either enshrined 
formally in a legal system or in some similar coercive 
system, the social order would disintegrate, (p. 11).
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(made manifestly more difficult by the internecine 
debates between Marxists) can we specify what Marxist 
theorizing on the law looks like? Without reproducing 
the immense complexities of the debates between Marxists 
we can highlight some of its insights schematically, by 
returning to the objectives of Marxist theories of the 
state and ideology. We do no theoretical violence here 
because some of the prominent theorists (Althusser, 
Poulantzas, Jessop, for example) address the law as part 
of their theorizing of the state and ideology.
The objective of Marxist theories of the state comprises a 
critical attack on the nature and function of the bourgeois 
state. Its aim is to show that the bourgeois state is not 
the ideologically neutral or benign set of institutions and 
practices which operates on behalf of all social groups 
(by mediating struggles and conflicts, guaranteeing the 
rights of all citizens, acting as the repository of universal 
values and beliefs, for example). Quite the contrary.. Its 
juridico-political, economic, social and welfare institutions 
and practices are the product of past struggles between 
economic classes but whose nature and function represents 
predominantly the needs and interests of the economically 
dominant groups. On this basis, therefore, it cannot be 
'captured' or 'used' as the means for achieving social 
transformation; in the Leninist tradition, it must 'wither 
away' or else be replaced by other forms of social admini­
stration. To this core of ideas, there are a variety of 
accommodations, however, which have considerably advanced 
our understanding of the precise unfolding of the forms of 
capitalist states (e.g. Jessop), considered the relative 
autonomy of the state from the material base (Althusser, 
Poulantzas, Offe ) or seek to show a more optimistic version 
by indicating the extent to which the working class benefits 
and shapes the nature and function of modern capitalist 
states (Therborn, 1983, 1984). Whatever the problems
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attending Marxist theorizing of the state, its approach 
has considerable explanatory power when we turn to the 
reproduction of social divisions (the unequal distribution 
of revenues collected by the state between capitalist 
enterprises and individuals with desparate social needs, 
for example), and in our consideration as to how capitalism 
continues to survive as social formation (where the needs 
of the capitalistic economy set limits to forms of social 
and welfare administration, and to the character of relations 
between agents, all being subject to the values of 'profit' 
and 'market' relationships). It has also demanded that we 
think of state form in relationship to specific historical 
conjunctures, in relationship to economic formations, in 
relationship to class divided societies. This means that 
state forms are not lifted away from 'the social'; its 
history is not to be found only in the logic of an autonomous 
unfolding of rationality, or in the teleology of liberal 
juridico-political theorists. .Above all, we are made aware 
as to how particularistic interests and values can assume 
universal meanings through institutions and practices 
which seemingly serve all facets of society.
In the strengths of Marxist theories of the state lie also 
its weaknesses; its privileging of the state as a product 
of class struggle and its function as re-securing the 
relations of production, the place it has in providing 
the means of continuing the extraction of surplus value 
and supporting the accumulation of capital limit the 
horizons of what can be said about the state. I shall 
carefully distance myself from some of these positions 
but I want to hold on to the critical usage of 'bourgeois' 
state with 'capitalist' functions, terms which speak of 
undesirable and unjust social practices.
-59 -
The main propositions of Marxist theories of the state 
apply with equal force in Marx's conception of ideology 
(see Rose 1977, Larrain, 1982). In Capital I , for example, 
bourgeois economic categories (price, profit, wage form) 
are phenomenal forms which conceal the exploitative system 
of capitalistic extraction of surplus value. These categories 
'mask' or 'conceal' the real relations of the economic base, 
and do so on behalf of and serve the particular interests 
of capitalists. Larrain (op.cit.) argues that the extent 
to which these economic forms and practices mask or conceal 
exploitation thus serving to hide their contradictory nature 
(a seeming exchange of formal equivalents - labour power for 
wages) renders them ideological in Marx's terms because these 
are forms and categories which serve the exploitative classes. 
In this sense, Larrain argues, 'ideology' is a 'negative and 
critical concept' (Larrain; 6-9).
I have to say immediately that, Post-Althusser, ideology 
has become defused, and has lost some of its 'negative 
and critical' connotation. The specific meaning which Marx 
attaches to the term in the German Ideology and other early 
writings has been supplanted (Larrain; 7). Ideology has more 
recently become 'an objective level of social reality' 
(Larrain; 8 ); material because it is embodied in social 
practices and has real effects (therefore cannot be 'false'), 
and functions to interpellate or produce subjects. Yet in 
spite of these re-writings of the concept, ideology in 
Marxist theory retains some of its negative and critical 
elements. In Althusser, for example, interpellate subjects 
are allocated to places which support the structure of 
capitalist relations of production. The concept of ideology 
also refers to the process by which particularistic values 
are rendered as universals and, in a class-divided society, 
the particularistic values or world views presented as 
univeral values are produced by and work in the interests 
of the economically dominant classes. If the concept ideology
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loses this last characteristic, I think we could agree 
with Larrain that it loses its 'negative and critical' 
function and by extension, is not Marx-ian, or Marx-ist.
We are now in a position to elicit what is meant by a 
Marxist theory of law.
There are, I think, two limbs to a Marxist approach to 
the law; the first is explanatory, the second, critical.
The first limb attempts to describe and explain the origin, 
character and social function of historically specific 
legal practices, relations and institutions. The second 
limb is 'critical' insofar as its objective is the de­
construction of 'bourgeois' law as an ideologically 
neutral representation of universal values and aspirations. 
The centre-piece of this system is the liberal writings 
on jurisprudence, particularly the idea of 'The Rule of 
Law ' .
1. 'Your very ideas are but the outgrowth
of the conditions of your bourgeois 
production and bourgeois property, 
just as your jurisprudence is but the 
will of your class made into law for 
all, a will, whose central character 
and direction are determined by the 
economical conditions of existence of 
your class.'
Marx and Engels,Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, 1848, quoted in Phillips, 1980;40.
'At a certain stage of their development, 
the material productive forces of society 
came in conflict with the existing relations 
of production, or ; what is but a legal 
expression for the same thing - with the
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property relations within which they 
have been at work hitherto.'
Marx and Engels, Preface to a Contribution 
to thé Critique of Political Economy, 1859.
The main propositions about the law made by Marx and 
Engels are as follows. Firstly, they emphasize the 
classed character of the law. Secondly, the law is an 
ideological element of the superstructure (the realm 
of modes of thought, sentiment etc.). Thirdly, legal 
forms and institutions are economically determined 
insofar as they correspond with the material mode of 
production, and as changes in the mode of production 
occur, new legal forms and institutions are called into 
existence, predominantly but not only, at the behest of 
economically dominant classes. The economism or 'crude 
materialism' (Collins 1982; 22;23) of these propositions 
has long since been criticised by all varieties of Marx­
isms, but nevertheless, it is present in Marx and Engels 
and informs their analysis of bourgeois legislation.
Taking these propositions uncritically, one can see how 
easy it is to slide into the position whereby the law 
becomes merely an oppressive system, an instrument 
expressly in the hands of the bourgeoisie, brought into 
being predominantly as a mechanism to ensure that class's 
continued power and domination.
Collins notes three problems about 'crude materialist' 
accounts of the law. Firstly 'there is no analysis of 
the relationship between law and other social institutions' 
(p.23). Relations between the family and law, or moral 
and legal ideology are ignored. They fail to examine 
the links between the law and the state and it fails to 
examine the interaction between moral values and the 
content of legal concepts. In other words, some content
-  62 -
of bourgeois legal concepts may well be of universal 
value and worth preserving. Secondly, he argues, 'an 
analysis of the functions of law is entirely absent.
No reason is offered to explain why the law is needed 
to express the relations of production. In addition, 
the role of law in controlling relationships such as 
marriage which are outside the processes of production 
(sic) is beyond the horizon of an economistic perspective' 
(ibid). Thirdly, he maintains, 'the fashion in which the 
material base determines the form and content of law 
remains crudely formulated ' (ibid). Reflection theory, 
expressed in terms such as 'determines', 'expresses', 
'arises', 'corresponds', etc. are suggestive but hardly 
explain how social practices are transformed into legal 
system.
Collins' objections to crude materialism condense the 
lines of attack to be found in more recent Marxist 
theorising of the law. Crucially, these theoretical 
objections have provided the launching points for a far 
more subtle and elaborated attempt to provide a materialist 
theory of the law. Approaches which seek to elaborate; 
the relationship between the law and the state (e.g. Hunt 
1976), the law as an ideological form constituting agents 
as unpersonified and non-unitary legal subjects (Hirst, 
1979), the law as part of the social relations of 
production as opposed to superstructural equivalent of 
them (Thompson 1975, Fine 1978), the law and its relation­
ship with institutions ignored by crude materialism, 
namely family law (Gavigan 1981, Smart 1984). All these 
approaches share one thing in common; they define their 
own position in contrast to and in comparison with crude 
materialism without necessarily stating why they begin 
there at all. What binds the variety of approaches into 
a coherent field is the political current which distingu­
ishes Marxism from other social theories; a project which
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inherently concerns itself with power, modes of 
domination, systems of exploitation, how these are socially 
held, achieved and reproduced. It relies on a conception 
of the economically dominant classes being the most 
politically powerful. How economic power is transformed 
into political forms is one of the basic objects of 
analysis of materialist accounts of the state, the law 
and ideology. One of the problems central to Marxist 
theory however is that relations of domination and sub­
ordination, exploitation and dependence, is its privileging 
of class relations. How then do we theorize about and act 
on social relations, including legal relations, which 
cannot be reduced to class terms and how do such relation­
ships articulate with or are necessary to capitalist 
relations? Patriarchal relations and inter-generational 
relations, for example?
It is possible, I think, to adopt and adapt certain 
strands of Marxist theorizing of the law to a more 
adequate materialist account of the law, without jetisoning 
its classed character, by retaining the idea of relating 
legal forms and institutions to economic systems and 
state forms by arguing that class divisions are not the 
only social divisions in historically specific social 
formations. Social divisions between men and women, adult 
and child also are legal relations and as such are present 
in the legal system, giving it shape and character. In 
short, I would hope to retain the 'negative and critical' 
aspects of the Marxist theorizations of law, while ex­
tending its horizons.
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2. The Rule of Law, legal fetishism and jurisprudence
'Law. 1. The written and unwritten
corpus of rules largely derived from 
custom and formal enactment which are 
recognised as binding among those persons 
who constitute a community or state, so 
that they will be imposed upon and enforced 
amongst those persons by appropriate 
sanctions.
2. One of the rules of law ... 
jurisprudence. The science or philosophy 
of law.'
Curzon (1979). A Dictionary of Law
These are quotations taken from a dictionary of law 
I have at hand and usefully illustrate the ideologically 
neutral representation of law and legal relations which 
Marxism seeks to deconstruct. There are good reasons 
for taking a closer look at constitutive elements of 
what is termed the Rule of Law. Firstly, it is an all- 
pervasive organising principle embodied in legal practices 
and legal institutions. Secondly, the Rule of Law is part 
and parcel of political rhetoric directed at civil society 
used to sustain and support existing parliamentary 
political, policing and legal practices. Thirdly, 
sociologists immersing themselves in legal categories, 
are in grave danger of themselves beginning to think 
legalistically (i.e. defining social relations in legalistic 
forms of description) . Fourthly, while Marxist theory 
has been concerned with the relationship between legal 
forms and economic relations, with the relationship 
between political power and the legal forms used to
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2. 'Law is a unique phenomenon which constitutes a 
discrete focus of study. Legal systems are not simply 
types of a broader species of systems of power, but 
they possess distinctive characteristics' (p. 11).
a) 'There are regular patterns of institutional 
arrangements associated with the law such as the 
division between the legislature and the judiciary'.
b) Lawyers communicate with each other through a 
distinctive discourse, though the exact nature of legal 
reasoning remains contraversial (p. 11).
c) Legal systems are not simple arrangements of force, 
exercised by one group over another, because legal rules 
are also normative guides to behaviour which individuals 
follow without the presence or absence of overtly coercive 
officialdom threatening sanctions for failure to comply 
with the law.
3. The doctrine of the Rule of Law. Schematically,
'the core principle of the doctrine is that political 
power should be exercised according to rules announced 
in advance ' (p. 11), and once announced, or legislated
into existence, all should abide by them, and the rules 
should function to constrain the weak and the powerful 
alike. The Rule of Law does not require laws to have any 
particular content, only that universalistic principles 
(i.e. everyone should know the rules and play the game) 
should apply. Collins' formulations on the Rule of Law 
are deliberately schematic here because he wanted only
to demonstrate the connection between this doctrine and 
the general features of legal fetishism.
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The fetishism of the law, Collins argues, is a 
'pervasive feature' of political and social theories 
outside the Marxist tradition and also underlies the 
general theories of law which are commonly to be found 
today. I think we could add that it is also a pervasive 
belief in common-sense understandings of the social 
order and the social structure.
Marxists would stand outside the liberal jurisprudential 
tradition because they acknowledge the classed character 
of the law, whilst critical of any claim that legal 
rules represent universalistic values and would deny that 
the law is an autonomous sphere of social thought and 
practice because it must be seen as an expression of other 
determinations. These claims however would not let 
Marxists off the hook entirely. Firstly, legal institutions, 
legal discourse and legal relations do exist, do have 
material effects in the way social life is organised.
The paucity of Marxist jurisprudence has meant that, until 
recently, Marxists have not really taken seriously the 
specificity of the law. By this, I mean legal categories 
(other than those concerned with property, labour relations 
or crime), legal institutions and legal discourse itself 
has received little attention by a general refusal to 
take on these facets of social life, critically on their 
own terms. It still remains a problem to provide a concrete 
knowledge of how the law operates, how legal categories 
shape and divide classes and individuals without resort 
to a more or less mediated reliance on the 'essence' of 
class instrumentalism. Secondly, there are aspects 
of the doctrine of the rule of law, aspects of legal 
fetishism which need to be taken seriously. Precisely
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what aspects of the Rule of Law are negative, 
socially undesirable and ought to be transformed? To 
what extend is the concept of 'formal equality' of 
bourgeois law an illusion, to what extent is the concept 
of the formal equality of subjects in law socially 
necessary to free and socially and economically demo­
cratic social orders? Collins work is extremely useful 
here because he indicates the value of getting 'inside' 
legal fetishism, to appreciate its system of values as 
a precondition of their de-construction. On this basis,
I now turn to his specific snalysis of the Rule of Law.
We begin by saying, 'Because the system of political 
power is so dependant upon public and positive law it 
is often referred to by the term the Rule of Law which 
is at once a description of the State in ideal' (p. 135). 
There are three connected strands of moral judgement con­
tained in this ideal. The Rule of Law doctrine holds;
a) to a preservation of the neutrality of the state 
between competing interest groups and classes. Power 
resides with those who satisfy the constitutional require­
ments are neutral with respects to persons, ignoring 
might, privilege or economic advantage (p. 135).
b) that 'laws are sovereign in their determination of 
the issues of who should hold political power and how it 
can be exercised'. The constitution will also lay down 
the procedures by whish laws are to be made, and no 
subject can 'arrogate to himself the power to ignore them 
or to dispense with laws without due process'. Legal 
procedures are to be paramount and to be followed even at 
the inconvenience of the dominant class (p. 135).
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c) that laws are publically available, be readily 
understood and are to be enforced according to their 
obvious meaning. Citizens and officials should be 
able to discover their respective rights and act on 
them with the confidence that, where necessary, the 
courts will uphold them' (p. 135).
The ideal enshrined in this doctrine, the image that 
it seeks to present argues Collins, is that law is a 
set of rules 'above petty political conflict and remote 
from the control of particular groups or classes'
(p. 135). On this view, justice is guaranteed because 
the law neturally applies the same set of (knowable) 
rules to every person or agent, irrespective of personal 
or economic circumstance. Secondly, the operation of 
the law must be seen to be impartial in the application 
of rules by its officials and that these rules are 
applied through the use of judicial logic without resort 
to considerations of social justice or personal gain 
(Collins; 136). In short, the Rule of Law doctrine 
asserts the apolitical character of the legal system and 
asserts the autonomy of the law through the existence of 
neutral rules governed by the application of judicial 
logic.
The immense value in Collins' short account lies in the 
way he specifies the organising principles of a very 
powerful ideology, embodied in liberal jurisprudence.
He has outlined aspects of the law rarely addressed 
explicitly in Marxist theories of the law. He enlarges 
our conception of what the object of analysis should 
be by highlighting organising principles internal to 
the law, legal thought and practice. Finally, he outlines 
a position that those seeking to present a materialist 
account of the law must try to avoid, otherwise the law 
ceases to be an object of analysis and becomes an un­
problematic element of the social order.
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The Rule of Law doctrine defines how liberal juris­
prudents specify the object of their knowledge (the 
legal rules) and how that object may be evaluated 
(apolitical neutrality, logical application of the 
rules, universal meaning and applicability). It is 
an object and a practice that can be criticised in any 
number of respects. How Marxists would view the claims 
of this doctrine are elaborated above, so I shall 
pass on to other critical approaches. The doctrine may 
be criticised;
a) in respect of the class and gender membership
of the officials (i.e. the judiciary) (Griffith 1977, 
Miliband 1969, Macdonald 1977 ), who are generally
drawn (the upper reaches of the law anyway) from 'the 
establishment' and are generally male, thereby calling 
into question the very idea of an apolitical judiciary.
b) in respect of the market forces operating in the 
provision of legal services; due process can be expensive 
thus precluding sections of the populations from making 
use of lawyers and pursuing their rights in court.
c) in respect of legal discourse, which is mystificatory 
and thus alienates the law and the legal profession from 
civil society, while making it difficult for citizens
to know what their rights are and how they might be 
protected. It can be argued that this mystification is 
deliberate and systematic.
d) in respect of the operation of legal logic which 
is far less profound and rigorous in practice than the 
doctrine supposes (see Murphy and Rawlings.MLR, 1981,
1982 for a critical look at legal logic at work in House 
of Lords' judgements).
These critiques of the law enlarge our sense of the 
impossibility of the 'ideal' in a social formation 
fundamentallly divided along lines of class and gender, 
along lines of power and authority.
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The kind of criticisms of the Rule of Law made above 
may well accept the idea of the perfectability of legal 
practices, that the ideal is fine but imperfectly realised 
(possibly best exemplified say by the NCCL and by Michael 
Zander's journalistic commentaries on contemporary legal 
issues). The idea of perfectability contrasts strongly 
with the approach I turn to now.
Alongside the critiques of law which emphasize the 
contradiction between the ideal of the doctrine and the 
reality of law in practice, there is another approach 
to the law; the 'left' radical-demysticatory orientation. 
This is exhibited in the new 'left' criminologies, most 
notably Taylor, Walton and Young (1973) The New Criminology; 
Quinney (1973) The Critique of the Legal Order, Chambliss 
W. and Mankoff (1976) Whose Law? What Order?, Bankowski 
and Mungham (19 75) Images of Law. The approach is, not 
entirely limited to crime and law, but includes critiques 
of social welfare law as well (e.g. Biernie (1977)
Fair Rent and Legal Fiction, Ginsburg (19 79), Class,
Capital and Social Policy. More recent examples occur 
in National Deviancy Conference publications, (1979) 
Capitalism and the Rule of Law, (1980), Permissiveness 
and Control. The radical critique of the law is by no 
means a homogeneous body of enquiry and this is difficult 
to characterise simply.
The publications' titles indicate the nature of its 
discourse; predominantly Marxist in orientation, the 
objects of knowledge are law in relationship to capitalism, 
the capitalist state and the bourgeois political order.
The 'new' criminologies critically effected a shift away 
from crimonogenic theories of crime, to a focus on the 
creation of the rules which made some behaviours criminal, 
to a concern with the social and economic location of the 
law-makers and to a more explicit concern with the social, 
economic and political context of law making and breaking.
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The prevailing view of the law is class-instrumentalist; 
legal categories aid and abet the continued processes 
of capitalist accumulation whilst the character of the 
legal system indicates the ideological and coercive work 
it does on behalf of the bourgeoisie to control and 
oppress the subordinate classes. Certainly, the later 
writings in this field (e.g. Young 1980) are critically 
aware of the crudity of these formulations, but I think 
it can be fairly claimed that this is its major orientation 
The nature of the radical critique of the law, and its 
limitations can be seen by turning to three writers 
expressly concerned with the radical theories of law 
(Fraser 1978, Hunt 1980 and Collins 1982).
Fraser's concern is with the practices of radical 
lawyers and their anxiety to 'demystify' the law as a 
crucial part of their political practice
The process of demystification is 
seen by most radical lawyers as essential 
to the emergence within the oppressed 
classes of a rational awareness of their 
real interests and historical role. That 
belief in the primary significance of legal 
demystification leads to a powerful ten­
dency to reduce radical legal theory to a 
kind of systematic expose of the sordid 
reality of the capitalist legal order ...
The rush of emotion that accompanies the 
experience of demystication, the feeling 
that at last, one has discovered eyes with 
which to see, usually received expression 
in the belief that because the forms of 
legality are ideological shams, the sub-
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stantive inequality and domination 
experienced by the working classes can 
obly be overcome by abandoning legal 
discourse altogether and turning to 
more genuine forms of political action 
aimed at building up working-class 
organization and proletarian power. 
(Fraser; 150-151).
Like Fraser, Collins (op.cit.) is acutely aware of 
the dilemma of radical lawyers; required to work 
within legal institutions, follow legal rules, while 
remaining aware of their non-universalistic character 
('to be a Marxist and a lawyer promises to be a con­
tradictory or schizoid existence', Collins; 139). 
Unlike Fraser,however, Collins endorses a programme 
of demystication but with definite limits;
'What is needed is a programme for the 
demystification of the neutrality of 
the liberal political order, and its 
replacement by an appreciation of the 
class structure or government. The 
most vital areas for this ideological 
struggle will occur in practices only 
tangentially concerned with law, but 
since the form of law routinely endorses 
the Rule of Law ideology it merits a 
Marxist critique. This must be the 
principal aim of Marxist jurisprudence'.
(Collins ; 141).
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Quite so, but Collins here looks as if he exemplifies 
precisely what Fraser is criticising, to the extent that 
the focus of analysis and ideological struggle shifts away 
from the law to 'practices only tangentially concerned 
with law'. Collins escapes insofar as he is not concerned 
with or contented by a systematic expose of the sordid 
reality of the capitalist legal order but seeks to criticize 
the fundamentals of its basic ideological form, the Rule 
of Law and fetishism of legality.
For Alan Hunt (1980) the radical critique of law 
'... is essentially an orientation or even a mood or 
stance' at its present stage of development (p.34).
He continues :
The term 'radical' is used to designate 
a self-conscious challenge to orthodoxy 
which takes the form of a denial of 
orthodox thought. The essentail challenge 
is to the assumption of the desirablity 
and naturalness of the law. Challenged 
is the assumption of the neutrality of law 
as a necessary expression of a well- 
balanced and integrated society. Denied 
is the integrationist assumption of law 
as an agency of conflict resolution ...
The radical critique tends to proceed 
through the negation or reversal of 
conventional wisdom ... Law is not an 
agency of integration but is the creator 
and amplifier of social inequality and dis­
equilibrium, and is the bearer of class 
bias and privilege'.
(Hunt ; 35).
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He then seeks to distance himself from two characteristics 
of 'the radical critique' paradigm; its 'verbal militancy' 
(p. 38) which results in an unanalysed connection between 
'law' and 'oppression' (ibid), and, its idea of 'praxis' 
(deriving political practice from theoretical practice, 
a la the National Deviancy Conference), where the 
'authenticity of the deviant act' gives rise to the 
espousal of prisoners' movements, gipsy rights, etc.(p.38) 
On this view, he argues (somewhat similarly to,Fraser) 
the analysis of law is reduced to 'expose of the crimes 
of the powerful' and/or 'law for the poor' and/or an 
obsessive concern with minority groups and their rights. 
Whereas, the target of Fraser and Collins' analyses are 
the radical lawyers. Hunt's concern is predominantly with 
radical academics
The plausibility of the radical and demystificatory 
approach to the law is strained on several acount.
Firstly, as Fraser suggests, the tendency towards journ­
alistic expose displaces any theoretical grip on the more 
mundane, routine legal practices which silently imbricate 
themselves into everyday discourse, social practice and 
social relationships. Secondly, the predominant concern 
is with the classed character of the law, a view which 
invites us to conceive the legal system purely as an 
expression of 'bourgeois' interests, at the expense of 
all others. Thirdly, the law is conceived largely as a 
confidence trick, that its formal offerings of equality 
and justice are false, an ideological sham. The task 
therefore is to render the law as a phenomenal form, 
masking and supporting 'real relations' which lie beneath 
it. On this view, the law has no independent effects at 
all for the real object of analysis lies elsewhere. 
Fourthly, the radical mode of reasoning (contained in its 
challenge to all aspects of bourgeois legal orthodoxy)
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posits an alternative vision of a utopian social formation 
where no rule of law would be necessary, and which would 
not need policing. Fifthly, we are invited to exchange 
one form of class justice for another, thus we dissolve 
all the 'distortions' of bourgeois law but without any 
specification of what forms, 'due process',trial and 
evidence, or justice, would take. Or alternatively, 
we are offered models of community justice, justice as 
espoused by de Sousa Santos in h is studies of Portugal 
and South America, for example. These versions however 
have to be set beside less romantic forms of community 
justice; the punishment squads in Northern Ireland. Any 
vision of the necessary superiority of working class, 
community based justice entirely disappears here 
Finally, we are given a notion of the law which is visited 
upon the working class, that for them the law is of little 
consequence other than its oppressive presence because 
it does not serve their needs or interests. By extension, 
any policing represents an intrusion, a surveillance 
of their social practices. More recent evidence suggests 
otherwise; recent crime surveys report that working class 
communities are seriously concerned about crime, law and 
order and lack of policing because they are more likely
to be the victims of petty theft, burglary, assault etc.
12
than their middle class counterparts
The radical critique is 'negative and critical' but also 
nihilistic and somewhat romantic. E. P. Thompson (1975) 
foreshadowed the objections to it in his 'Rule of Law' 
Conclusion to Whigs and Hunters (p. 258;269). In some 
respects he argues the law everything that the radical 
critique claims it to be: 'a phenomenon of ruling class
power and hypocrisy' (p. 259); it was a weapon in the hands 
of a particular class, and it was used to impose class 
power (p. 262).
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But it is a view he rejects on two counts. Firstly, the 
law is not only of superstructural phenomenon, it is not 
only an instrument of the ruling class. It is also part of 
the economic base; legal relations are fundamentally a 
part of the economic base, and is so because it constitutes 
the forms of possession and non-possession ('I found that 
the law was at every bloody level' was one of his more 
pungent remarks; Thompson 1978; 288). The law he finds to 
be a medium of struggle between classes, a cultural and 
social system which shapes and constrains the social 
practices of the powerful as well as the subordinate. 
Secondly,and more controversially he opposes the nihilism 
of the radical critique . The rule of law, he argues, 
is not to be dismissed as an 'ideological sham' (p. 263;
265); the notion of 'the rule of law is itself an unqualified 
good' (p. 267). The true comparison which has to be made 
is 'between arbitrary extra-legal power and the rule of 
law' (p. 265).
On these counts, Thompson distances himself from crude 
materialism and from naive revolutionary praxis. He 
then argues that the law constitutes an arena of independent 
study, that it should not be consigned to the existence 
of merely reflecting pre-given class relations:
'For class relations were expressed, 
not in any way one likes, but 
through the forms of law; and the law, 
like other institutions which from time 
to time can be seen as mediating (and 
masking) existent class relations (such 
as the Church or the media of communication) 
has its own characteristics, its own inde­
pendent history and logic of evolution'.
(p. 262).
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For a materialist account of the law to be materialist 
we have to take Thompson's last statement at its face 
value; we have to discover and construct the law's 
characteristics, independent history and logic of evolution.
By these means, we can discover 'the forms of legal 
domination, past and present' (Fraser, op.cit.; 183), place 
it within the context of other forms of social and economic 
power but without reducing the law to a simple reflection 
of them.,
Summarily, I have tried to set out three positions on law: 
a) crude materialism and reflection theory, b) liberal 
jurisprudence and the fetishing of the law, (c) the nihilistic 
view of law posited in the radicals critique, and indicated 
why I want to distance myself from each of these approaches.
My purpose now is to suggest ways of providing a concrete 
knowledge of the operation of law, of understanding how 
legal forms, thought and practice are proactive in shaping 
social relations and social divisions. I do so within 
defined limits because my object of analysis remains the 
law in relationship to children and childhood.
LAW; TOWARDS A MATERIALIST ACCOUNT OF THE SUBJECT
I now turn to focus specifically on the study of law.
How do we take the law as an object of analysis, how 
can we present an account of the concrete processes of 
the law which avoids the problems association with 
reflection theory and the problems attending legalistic 
accounts that privilege the autonomy of legal practices, 
thought and logic?
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The materiality of the law lies in the real effects 
it has for the subjects it produces; to be rendered a 
criminal, a company, a bastard and so on are legal 
productions which have wider social and economic sig­
nificances. To describe and analyse the range of 
intersecting practices and discourses that produces 
legal subjects, and to understand their specific 
conditions of existence requires us to engage directly 
with law as a productive and signifying system, with 
independent effects. Privileging the law as a dis­
cursive realm for the production of legal subjects 
avoids the problem of being required to produce a 
general theory of law, because the law in general has 
no material existence (it is not a unified system and 
has a diversity of effects for the plurality of legal 
subjects it produces). As a means of analysis it has 
the practical merit of precisely conceiving the law 
as a disparate range of practices and institutions 
whilst retaining an approach which is generalisable 
across a range of legal subjects. Here I focus on the 
legal subjectivity of children, also to an extent the 
subjectivities of married women, but it is a method not 
limited only to those categories, nor only to human 
individuals (one could produce an account of 'the charity' 
or 'the trust' for example).
The structure of this section is as follows. Firstly 
I shall explore further the idea of legal subjects and 
criticse the kind of subject found predominantly in 
reflection theory. Secondly, I shall discourse sources 
and materials relevant to the study of law. Thirdly,
I shall explain how these aspects shape the body of 
the work.
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1. Law and Subjectivity
Utilizing the theory of the subject helps make sense
of the English legal system, which is a very dispersed
body of texts, institutions and professions. The law
is a heterogenous entity, concretely embodied in legal
rules, in a diverse range of courts, symbols, rituals,
practices, writings and institutions . Unlike
Continental systems, English law is uncodified (there
is no general statement of first principles in a written
constitutional form, policed and governed by a Supreme
Court,in England); it has material existence as common
law and equity , as public law and private law, criminal
law and civil law; courts exist in the form of Parliament,
High Courts, Crown Courts, County Courts, Magistrates
Courts (which are hierarchically arranged, and displayed
as such in the appeal process by which decisions in
lower courts can be reviewed by courts of a higher 
13jurisdiction . Legal texts exist as statutes, law 
reports of selected cases, legal commentaries, parliamen­
tary reports, each producing differing effects (statutes 
and case law may 'make' laws, enunciate legal rules and 
pronounce on legal practices; legal commentaries may 
produce dicta but in no real sense 'make' law and cannot 
be used as precedent, though they may inform present and 
future legal practice). We may obtain a theoretical 
purchase on these diverse practices, institutions and 
texts by seeing them as the very material which constitutes 
legal subjects. By these means, we privilege the materiality 
of the law and can speak of its effects without reducing 
them to mere reflections of pre-given social relations 
and forces.
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On the other hand, we must recognise that the elements 
comprising the law, past and present, have their own 
conditions of existence; the law cannot be disembodied 
from the totality of other social practices. The 
criticisms here, directed at liberal jurisprudents do 
not extend to the foremost practitioners of the history 
of the law, the legal historians (e.g. Holdsworth, 1903; 
Stephens 1914; Pollock and Maitland, 1968; Radzinowicz, 
1948). I would want to distance myself from the inherent 
telology of those accounts, from the Whiggish historiography 
of progress and continual enlightenment and their implied 
defence of the necessary rationality of the development 
of the law. But from them we can learn a great deal 
about the dynamic of the law constantly transforming 
and adapting itself through a continued evaluation and 
critique of its own practices. The accounts provided by 
legal historians make it impermissible to reduce legal 
rules, institutions and the practices of legal personnel 
simply to the expressions of political and economic 
divisions of power and authority which lie outside the 
law. For the materiality of the law, and of current 
legal practice and procedure, can only be understood 
only if we recognise what the law once was, and acknowledge 
the diverse sources of contemporary jurisdictions and 
practices. For us to understand why certain legal 
anachronisms still have a material effect we need to 
appreciate the inputs, from Roman Law and ecclesiastical 
law, past methods of legal training, the jurisdictions 
which existed alongside the mainstream of common law 
and equity (e.g. the law merchant and customary law; 
see Walker, op.cit. 6-72).
Engaging with legal historians produced for me a dis­
satisfaction with Marxist accounts of the law, surprisingly 
in areas where Marxist analysis seemed to be most relevant
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and where its tradition was strongest, namely in the 
law of property . My objections are somewhat different 
from those posed by Hirst (1979). Whereas he properly 
claims that Marxism's theorisation of property fails to 
take account of corporate bodies as bearers of property 
rights, and as subjects endowed with the attributes 
of economic calcualtion and with rights to initiate forms 
of legal action, my objections are based on the rather 
large gaps between Marxist theorising of property and 
the contents of property law as presented in the legal 
texts. The consequence of this is that reflection theory 
simply fails to come to terms with the significant fact 
that the dispossessed, and the non-possessors of property 
were and are not only the working class, but considerable 
numbers of the aristocratic and bourgeois classes, namely 
married women, infants/minors, and the mad.
Turn where you will to legal texts on property (typically 
Blackstone Vol. 2, 1766, Dicey 1963, Cheshire 1962) and 
you will find the relations between an object and its 
possessor is intimately bound up with the means by which 
property can be transmitted; sale, gift or inheritance.
It is the latter, the laws of inheritance which are almost 
entirely missing from property relations as they are 
analysed by Marx and Engels , Pashukanis (1978) and 
G. A. Cohen (1978) , to take some pertinent examples. .
Reflection theory demands a correspondence between the 
economic subjects of capitalism, who are formally free to 
enter relations of production and exchange, and legal 
subjects who are equally formally free to hold and 
exchange property (be it goods or labour services (i.e. 
the relations of production generate their equivalence 
at the level of legal subjectivity) . Yet the law 
itself, customary law, statute and case law has never 
recognised this to be the case, either in feudal or 
capitalist modes of production. The effect of the law
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itself has been to produce classes of persons, legal 
subjects, unable to hold, sell or transmit by testatacy 
or inherit property (this apart from the formal rights 
granted to economic subjects to transmit property which 
they have never been able to possess or accrue). My 
objection is that if you ignore the significance of these 
legal exclusions, you are not producing a materialist 
account of the law, but an abstraction of it. The law 
under capitalist relations of production does not produce 
unproblematically subjects with formally equal abstract 
property rights (the equivalent of its theorization of 
economic subjects); in the sense the law is not purely 
reactive, but has its own independent effects, exampled 
by the laws of inheritance. ^4
Clearly, inheritance laws have conditions of existence 
with which Marxist theorizing has all too rarely engaged.
While I would not wish to claim that the whole 
process has been bracketed off as a non-economic process,
(to claim that inheritance does not involve economic 
relations is patently absurd), the relative unimportance 
of inheritance, as a process and as a system of social 
relations, is indexical of the privileging of class relations 
at the expense of familial and personal relations as they 
regulated by law, together with a disregard for the forms 
these relations assume in law. Inheritance profoundly 
concerns familial relations (the economic and personal 
standing of men and women, elders and infants), the laws 
pertaining to inheritance have diverse sources, drawing 
on canon law and common law, and have real effects, 
(historically 'postponing' women as heirs in favour of 
male relations for example). These are consequences 
of the law in operation and do not flow unproblematically 
from class relations external to it.
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There is a second difficulty which is debated throughout 
this work, which concerns the problem of périodisation 
and specifically, the feudalist-capitalist dichotomy. 
Refusing to accept a périodisation based on fundamental 
changes in the mode of production inherently means 
confronting the relationship between base and super­
structure. The thesis that transformation of productive 
forces brings about changes in the relations of production 
and in turn brings into existence changes in the super­
structure (necessary to sustain a particular economic 
structure) - changes that can be explained by reference 
to the economy - (a summary of historical materialism) 
is of great utility in describing some aspects of legal 
change. In other respects, it and the périodisation of 
historical change that attends it, is quite inadequate.
One example, developed more fully in the text, will serve 
to display the problem. The relations of possession/ 
non-possession of real property (landed estates) closely 
map the thesis of historical materialism. The Tenures 
Abolition Act 1660 signals the end of the feudal system 
of land tenure (land held in return for personal services) 
and formal beginnings of land conceived as a commodity, 
to be freely exchanged at the market, and to be held in 
exchange for money rent (a simplification which must serve 
for the moment). Here, we have a fundamental legal change 
which can be adequately explained by changing productive 
forces and by changes in the relations of production 
(for simplicity, a shift from strip agrarian agriculture 
to enclosures, from peasant to capitalist relations of 
agricultural production).
However, the complementary legal form, the laws of 
inheritance, do not display anything like the same 
temporalities of transformation. Indeed, the laws of 
inheritance as we shall show, are profoundly resilient 
to the unfolding histories of modes of production. It
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is possible to show that feudal modes of transmitting 
property down the family line, in its principal features, 
continued unabated until the 20th century. In other words, 
there is no necessary relationship between the unleashing 
of new productive forces and the rise of new legal forms 
of regulation of property or of personal relations.
This problem can be overcome by taking legal texts as the 
objects of analysis rather than relying on the histories 
of modes of production which construct accounts of economic 
subjects before generating accounts of their legal equivalents
The general method of privileging economic subjects and 
then trying to abstract a legal equivalent has several 
limitations, not the least being a rampant economism and 
class essentialism.
These problems are exampled by Pashukanis (op.cit.) in his 
attempt to derive the legal form of bourgeois law from the 
commodity form. His work can only be very crudely glossed 
here . For Pashukanis, the legal subject 'is the very 
atom of juridic theory', and the law is a relationship 
between subjects. Pashukanis' legal subject is the analogue 
of the economic subject (as a possessor of a commodity 
equivalent, meeting other subjects at the level of exchange). 
The legal form comprises subjects as bearers of rights, 
meeting in dispute over the possession or pursuit of 
rights. His abstract derivation of the legal form from 
the commodity form realises two related problems.
First, the legal subject is a simple read off from the 
economic subject, thus allowing no real space for the 
processes of legal subjectification. Secondly, rights 
seem to be constituted outside the legal system, which 
therefore has no effect in constructing these rights; 
that is, rights take on some form of extra-legal quality. 
Rights are constructed in and through the legal system.
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and definite limits are placed on subjects by the law. 
The right to vote, is not some universal quality assumed 
at the age of majority; certain subjects cannot vote; 
votes can be cast in only a stipulated constituency; 
there are residential and nationality qualifications 
etc. .
To recuperate the effectivity of the legal system, we 
can consider Hirst's proposition (1976;401).
"Legal subjects are entities created 
through legal recognition which are 
capable (in forms of law) of initiating 
actions (suits, please, etc.) and of 
supporting certain statuses (possession, 
responsibility, etc.). Such subjects 
exist only relative to legal recognition 
(they cannot exist in law otherwise, 
other entities are represented only as 
a possession of subjects or object of 
dispute between them). ... To be denied 
the status of a legal subject is not incon­
sequential, it is to be unable to initiate 
legal actions or to support the consequences
The status, rights, privileges and disabilities afforded 
the legal subject are not given outside the legal system 
but in it and through it. Therefore it is necessary to 
recognise the specificity of the elements of the legal 
system in order to account for the differentiated subjec­
tivity of individuals, corporate bodies, etc., for it 
is through the play between the various elements, that 
differentiation is constructed, and further, that we can 
begin to understand the contradictory nature and location 
of the child as a legal subject.
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This work then is refusing a theory based on the law 
in general, for as such, the law has no materiality.
The law exists as a dispersed set of practices, 
institutions, texts and agents. Rather we shall treat 
the law as a discrete but related set of discourses; 
each discourse specified by the objects of which it 
purports to speak (marriage, property, contract, 
criminality, etc.), and each operating with a definite 
set of categories, concepts and notions and each discourse 
producing definite effects. There is little doubt that 
legal discourses, in English law, are hierarchically 
arranged; land law for instance provides a definite 
limit to space allowed for transformations within other 
areas of the legal system, as we shall later indicate.
We shall consider legal subjects as constituted by, and 
having a definite position in relationship to separate 
and different discourses. This we hope will allow the 
multiple legal subjectivities possible for a social agent 
to emerge, and to display some of the contradictions 
involved. Such a procedure will also display, in spite 
of an apparent diversity, the unity of the position of 
specific subject (for example, children) over the totality 
of legal discourses, and make some proposals about the 
regulating principles which seem to inform the unequal 
distribution of legal capacities.
2. Sources and Materials
"Until then I had thought each book spoke 
of things, human or divine, that lie 
outside books. Now I realised that not 
infrequently books speak of books; it is 
as if they speak among themselves. In 
light of this reflection, the library 
seemed all the more disturbing to me. It 
was then the place of a long, centuries
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old murmuring, an imperceptible 
dialogue between one parchment and 
another, a living thing, a receptacle 
of powers not to be ruled by a human 
mind, a treasure of secrets emanated 
by many minds, surviving the death of 
those who had produced them or had been 
their conveyors."
(Umberto Eco, In the Name of the Rose, 
1980;286).
I offer here a summary and descriptive guide to legal 
and literary sources of law I use most extensively.
The principal legal sources of English law are legislation 
and judicial precedent (Walker, 1980;86). The law-creating 
agencies are therefore parliament and the judges presiding 
in court, and every rule of law created in the past may 
be changed or modified either by parliament or the 
judiciary (Walker;87).
Every legal source has a corresponding literary source: 
for parliament, it is legislation published as statutes 
or as Treaties (on international matters); for judge-made 
law, especially with respect to precedent, law reports.
For lawyers, those practising or constructing legal 
history, legislation and case law represent the primary 
sources. However, there are certain textbooks which 
are indirectly primary sources (notably Littleton, c. 1481, 
Coke 1628 , Blackstone 1765), that is to say they may be 
cited as 'books of authority', a text the judiciary counts 
as a legitimate citation of precedent and practice. In 
past times these were often original sources of common 
law, a text where the lawyers might find the relevant 
precedents in the absence of nationally agreed forms of 
reporting cases heard. Their antiquity does not diminish
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their relevance today; we find reference to these texts 
in Halsbury's Laws of England and not infrequently in 
modern case law. Walker argues that there are a dozen 
books universally accepted (i.e. by nations states with 
an English common law tradition, generally ex-colonial 
states in North America, Australasia, AFrica) as books 
of authority, mostly written by authors who were, or had 
been judges. We can assume for all practical purposes 
that there are in fact three primary sources; statutes, 
law reports and books of authority. Beyond this, there are 
modern text books, produced predominantly by academic 
lawyers, and each branch of the law will have its 'book'(s)
15which acts as guide, practice manual and standard referent 
Where the persuasive arguments of these books run counter 
to the principle stated in case law and reported in the 
law reports, the principle contained in a precedent or 
judgement will always prevail (Walker; 162). I have drawn 
extensively on each of these sources, and in practical 
terms I use modern legal textbooks as if they were a 
primary source because of the important function they 
perform in the training and practice of the legal profession, 
though I acknowledge the formal distinction between legal 
textbooks and primary sources of law.
Were it so simple 1 There is clearly a very technical
and highly political relationship between the two forms
16
of law-making, legislation and judge-made law . In the 
hierarchy of courts, no lawyer would gainsay the fact that 
in formal terms parliament represents both the highest 
court of the land and the most important source of law. 
However, the English legal system acknowledges that 
judges have the power to interpret statute law in cases 
before them where the material circumstances of the case 
require it. Moreover, in common law, judges are bound 
by principles of precedent which guide their decision­
making, but these precedents were themselves established
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by judges in times past . So judges effectively
are pulled in two directions, by parliament and by their
predecessors.
Though they are unlike the Supreme Courts in nation 
states having a written Constitution (setting down the 
first principles of the rights, duties and obligations 
of the state and the individual), where the judiciary 
goes back to the first principles to ajudicate any case, 
and retain the considerable power to veto any legislation 
which does not accord with these principles, judges here 
retain considerable capacity to shape the material effects 
of legislation, and to shape legislation in the making.
As Doreen McBarnett argues, "... the fact that legal 
decisions not only settle cases but make law somehow 
seems to have failed to permeate general consciousness", 
(McBarnett 1982;412). The relationship between the two 
processes of law-making abound in the law reports and 
legal textbooks where they assume a literary discursive 
form. On these grounds it is permissible to take these 
as primary data for the study of law, as a source for 
discovering the principles imbricated in the construction 
of legal subjects.
I do not dismiss out of hand participant observation 
studies in court of law; the invisible 'codes' on the 
one hand, and the highly visible symbols and rituals on 
the other that create and sustain the hierarchical 
relationship between legal personnel, and between the 
majesty of the law and supplicant citizens standing 
before its authority . But I am not willing to describe 
one as real and concrete, the other as ideological, 
abstract or imaginary; both approaches - a concern with 
written forms, and observation and analysis of the 
trial process - are capable of discovering governing
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principles, the rules of order. Whereas practitioners 
and historians of law would be concerned only or 
primarily with their own primary sources, sociologists
would set these in a historical, political, economic and 
cultural context and would further employ social theory 
as a means of generating any analysis.
One feature of the texts that function formally as primary 
sources, including books of authority, and legal texts, 
is that they assume the form of a mini-history. This is 
a feature of each case appearing in law reports, and is 
predominantly an acknowledgement of the powerful presence 
of judges making law. In pursuing any line of enquiry, 
therefore, one is constantly driven back through historical 
time. The expertise of lawyers is still required to deter­
mine precisely if, how and when new rules of law have been 
made; for me this was the function of modern legal texts.
I still find it difficult to view a reported case 'cold' 
(without commentary) and determine with any precision 
which rule of law is at stake and how it was (if at all) 
transformed. I found that as I read the law reports, 
however, I became less indulgently voyeuristic, ceasing 
to be concerned with the material events discussed, and 
increasingly interested in the legal principles used to 
settle the case. They do retain an elusive character and 
a mystique, which is itself significant.
Doreen McBarnet (op. cit.) argues that 'case law is an 
exceptionally esoteric body of knowledge', and continues:
"But the mystique of case law lies 
not only in the esoteric nature of 
professional knowledge; it lies in 
the very particularistic and post 
hoc form it takes. Case law makes
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law by establishing precedents 
at the same time as deciding cases.
But the precedent is both estabished 
and applied in relation to the facts 
of the particular case in hand.
Since every case is, or can be made 
out to be, unique, this means that 
what there is in relation to that 
case, whether it will continue an 
established line of reasoning or 
establish a new refinement cannot 
be known in advance ... you literally 
never know what the law is."
(McBarnet; 412-413).
She concludes that the law isn't simply elusive because 
of the lay person's lack of legal knowledge, it is 
elusive per se (ibid).
McBarnet discovers certain regularities in the discursive 
form of case law which illuminates how case law operates 
concretely. There is an inherent cleavage between the 
abstract (the celebration of the abstract rules of law, 
the recitation of precedent, justice in abstractio) and 
the concrete (the material events of the case). This 
allows certain rights, duties, and obligations to be 
simultaneously celebrated and denied (her particular 
example concerns civil rights vs. the extension of police 
powers) (p. 414). Politics enter at the point where 
the material events disappear under the abstract principles, 
or where contradictions are negated by 'exceptions, provisos 
and qualifications' (ibid). The power of case law form, 
she argues, resides in the fact that it can render both 
the abstract principles, and exceptions to it as lawl (p.414)
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Herein also lies the enormous power of the judiciary.
Over and above the legitimate powers they have to make 
judgements that are binding on the parties concerned 
in a particular case, they have enormous capacity to 
ease their way around contradictions between the abstract 
and the concrete. By small adjustments, the law can be 
made to follow new and different directions. In doing 
so, the judiciary can argue that they are being entirely 
consistent with an (imaginary) 'out-there', 'societal 
changes', economic practices, 'new realities', etc., 
which have rendered previous decisions obsolete (knowledge 
of the 'out-there' being brought to their attention by 
the novel circumstances of the material events they have 
to adjudicate).
In this sense, case law can be of enormous benefit to 
social scientists, insofar as we have a written record 
of material changes taking place in forms of social 
relationships and cultural and economic practices, and a 
detailed account of how the law responded to them. A 
snapshot as it were of a social and judicial event at a 
particular point in time, where case law stands as 'event' 
at the intersection of law and civil society and illumina­
ting our insights into both. Case law does allow us to 
look both ways. It is both an 'event' and a 'record'.
Case law has to be used with caution, however, for it 
constitutes only part of the concrete process of the law; 
there are always social forces, registered in forms of 
parliamentary political representation, producing laws 
in the form of statute, providing an antidote to overly 
legalistic accounts of historical events.
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How then do these literary legal courses impact on a 
sociological account of law? Firstly, the existence 
of two streams of law-making (parliament and courts) 
makes the law an elusive object. One is never entirely 
sure that one has quite understood quite what its 
concrete operation was because of the continuing 
complexities of the relationship between a statute and 
the judicial interpretation of it.
This is made manifestly more difficult by the divided 
jurisdictions of the courts (common law, equity, admiralty, 
chancery, probate, ecclesiastical courts and so on). These 
divisions each have different series of law reports 
so it is only with the guiding commentaries of legal 
text books that one can produce a kind of narrative.
Secondly, I referred to the sources being in the form 
of mini—histories. As such, one is constantly referred 
back to past events and cases in order to trace out the 
development of a legal rule, technicality or practice.
These are not anachronisms but points of departure from 
which modern law develops. If this account is predominantly 
historical that is partly because the materiality of the 
law demands it to be so.
Thirdly, the history of law presses on us its own rhythms 
and periodizations. Sometimes it is marked out as periods 
between significant pieces of legislation, sometimes it 
is not,because case law is running ahead of legislation.
All that some statutes achieve is to consolidate what 
case law has already achieved by other menas. In other 
'histories', very important aspects of legal change go 
virtually unrecorded elsewhere. I am thinking here of 
the Judicature Acts 1873-75 which consolidated the 
streams of common law and equity into one system of High 
Courts and Courts of Appeal. Here, where there was a
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conflict between law and equity, the rules of equity
were to prevail (see Holdsworth, op.cit.; 640). I
know of no Marxist account which has taken this significant
development as its object of analysis, though the story
is fascinating because it involves the rooting out of the
patronage and profitability which attended 'the Old
Corruption' (see Holdsworth; 255-264, 416-428).
Fourthly, the divided jurisdictions provided conclusive 
proof that legal subjects are non-unitary; there is no 
one all embracing system which works in a unified manner 
to construct subjects in an uncontradictory form. The 
generative mechanism is not the law as a system, but the 
diverse legal discourses which constitute it. The search 
for 'the child' in law begins not with the juvenile court 
but in the law relating to property. Take an early example; 
Bingham's (1816) The Law of Infancy and Couverture. The 
definition of the infant is always given in its relation­
ship to property, rights of tenure, forms and means of 
inheritance, the obligations and duties of parents and 
guardians. The book appears to be saying more about these 
aspects than about the infant, a subject which appears 
to be a by-product rather than an object of speical attention 
It is only more recently that legal text books speak of 
the child and the special privileges and protections it 
is accorded in law (see Bevan 1973, Hoggett 1977). From 
this point of view, to find out about the child in law 
we are required to turn to the law of property, inheritance, 
the family and criminal law, per se. It is here that we 
find children's civil, criminal and economic privileges 
and exclusions being created by a diversity of legal 
discourses.
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Finally, as to the texts themselves, I have not 
attempted any analysis on the lines of a linguistic 
analysis in order to discover hidden structures.
I am concerned with 'surface' features insofar as I have 
read them in terms of their effects as productive of 
legal subjects. That is to say I am predominantly con­
cerned with, and how, certain attributes characterise 
particular subjects and how this in turn qualifies or 
disqualified as legal subject with specific rights of 
action. Further, I am also concerned to relate texts 
to other, and sometimes, pre-existing practices, so that 
we may appreciate the social matrix in which particular 
meanings arise and function.
REFERENCING
Because of the arcane and mystificatory form of legal 
citation, I offer a very brief guide to the referencing 
of sources. I draw here on Walker (1980; 87-163) and 
Hood Phillips and Hudson (1977; 168-191, 246-259).
a. Legislation
A Sb'atute is usually cited by its short title and calendar 
year (e.g. Guardianship of Infants Act 1886). Equally, 
statutes may be cited 3 Hen VII.C.l (3rd year of Henry 
VII's reign, first statute passed of that year).
b. Law Reports
Law reporting in the form recognisable today began in 
the 16th century and its organisation was reformed in 
1865; most current series commenced in 1866 or later.
It is here that lay people find most difficulty.
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i) The Year Books 1272-1535
Written in 'law French' (though they are available 
with a simultaneous modern translation) the Year Books 
are the earliest form of law reports we have. The legal 
profession regard them as rather variable in quality 
though they do excite some speculation as to origin 
and purpose. I make little direct use of them, preferring 
to draw on Pollock and Maitland's (1968) 2 volume.
History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I , a 
text of considerable authority and cited by medieval his­
torians .
ii) ' 16th Century to 1865
Reporting here was undertaken by barristers or judges 
who wished to report cases. They vary in quality and 
reliability, and because the name of the series follows 
the name of the reporter, these are the nominate reports. 
Citation here follows the pattern, Bevan v. McMahon 
(1861) 2 Sw and Tr. 230 (parties to the case, year,
Swambey and Tristram (reporters) Vol. 2, page no.).
These have now been collected (though not all) and 
reprinted in the English Reports or Revised Reports 
and cited E.R. or Eng. Rep.
iii) Current Law Reporting
From 1865 a Council was established to produce 
quickly and cheaply reports of the decisions of superior 
courts (Walker; 154). The Law Reports are reported by 
barristers (a precedent is citable only if it is vouched 
for by a barrister who was present in court when a judge­
ment was given) (Walker; ibid). Each division of the 
High Court has its own series, the citation indicating 
which division heard the case (e.g. Barrington v. Lea 
(1972) 1. Q.B. 326 (Queen's Bench). The Times Law Report 
(TLR), Criminal Law Review (CLR), Modern Law Review (MLR) 
will report cases also and may sometimes be cited if no 
record exists elsewhere in the 'official' reports.
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c. Books of Authority
Of the books of authority Glanville's treatise 
De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Anglicae (G. 1187) and 
Bracton's (C. 1250) book of the same name ('Of the 
laws and customs of England') are the earliest. Not 
referred to directly by me, they are important legal 
sources for Pollock and Maitland. Littleton's Of Tenures 
(C. 1481) as the name suggests, is a substantive account 
of the English land law; 'an ornament of the common law, 
and the most perfect and absolute work that was ever 
written in any human science' according to Coke (Walker 
op.cit.; 160). Edward Coke's presence in English law is 
difficult to over-estimate; as scholar (producing the 
authoratative series of Coke's Reports (Co. Rep.) 1600-15, 
the 4 Institutes (treatises) ), and practitioner (Chief 
Justice of Common Pleas, Chief Justice of the King's 
Bench in 1606, and 1616 respectively) (see Hood Phillips 
and Hudson, 1977, 174-75, 252;254). From 1628 on. Coke 
published The Institutes, probably the most frequently 
cited authorities in English law. The First Institute 
was the commentary on Littleton, and is commonly cited 
Co. Litt. (Hood Phillips and Hudson; 252). His exposition 
was incredibly valuable as a rigorous attempt to set out 
the principles and procedures governing early common law. 
Between 1765-69, William Blackstone produced Commentaries 
on the Laws of England, based on a series of lectures 
given at Oxford. Book I, 'The Rights of Persons', Book II 
'The Rights of Things', Book III 'Private Wrongs' and 
Book IV 'Public Wrongs' deal with all aspects of English 
law (though Blackstone was a common lawyer, so equity and 
'civilian' law gets short shrift). In the absence of 
relevant statute or guiding precedent, he is still cited 
here, while in the USA, the history of law usually begins 
with a recitation of Blackstone because its common law 
was founded in Blackstone's time (Hood Phillips and Hudson; 
257).
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This is by no means the full recital of books of authority, 
but those cited in my account. Sir Matthew Hale's (1780) 
History of the Pleas of the Crown, Hawkins (1716) Pleas 
of the Crown, are other books considered to be authoritative, 
for example.
It has to be said that the books of authority I refer to 
were written for and by practitioners of the common law 
and functioned as treatises bringing together as a ready 
source of reference the legal rules exposited in common 
law courts, often in conflict with the manifest intentions 
of sovereign and parliament. Jeremy Bentham wrote a 
contemporary Comment on the Commentaries, a criticism of 
Blackstone's celebration of the common law tradition of 
judge-made law. His rebuke to Blackstone was on the 
grounds that in a context of representative democracy, 
there was little to celebrate in a system of law-making 
where the law makers were non-elected and unaccountable.
His observations are interesting in two respects; books 
of authority are fairly arbitrary attributions - they are 
authoratative because the legal profession and judiciary 
count them to be. Secondly, and in a wider context, the 
general thrust of Bentham's critique deserves to be read 
by advocates and critics of a Supreme Court system for 
England.
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3. Childhood and Law
I have taken as my primary material, the documents, 
texts and cases which have governed the practices 
of the judiciary and the legal profession. Those 
materials have pressed on this work its structure 
and provided the principles by^which certain branches 
of the Law are covered at length while other aspects 
of social life legally regulated have been given very 
little weight. My main concern has been to explore 
how legal and judicial ideology and practice constructs 
a relationship between the age of legal subjects and 
their legal attributes and how this affects their status 
in respect of other legal subjects. In this respect,
I have remained fairly narrowly on the terrain of the 
writings and practices of the law.
To this work, there are four major divisions, a structure 
which closely follows the divisions with the law itself 
as it pertains to minors. Like conventional legal sources 
and authorities, I deal in turn with: (1) the categories
of infancy and minority, the age lines which describe them 
and the legal attributes relating to them, (2) the laws of 
inheritance which are the context for the production of 
divisions between heirs and bastards, the distinctions 
between male and female minors of the family and for re­
producing social divisions between elders and minors,
(3) the laws pertaining to parents and guardians and describe 
how the state assumes the legal rights once held exclusively 
by the former, (4) minors and the criminal law, especially 
with the distinctions made between adults and children in 
matters pertaining to criminal responsibility, guilt, 
innocence and punishment.
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The content of Part 1 is virtually self-selecting.
No discussion could adequately proceed without the technical 
definitions of infancy and minority. Nor could we proceed 
without defining the relevant chronological ages in law.
Much the same can be said for the choice of contents in 
Part 3. Large portions of the laws relating to children 
take place within the general conspectus of family 
law. Here the legal rights, obligations and responsibilities 
of parents are defined. In so doing, however, family law 
constructs a normative view of the status of minors and 
their relationship to parents and guardians. No account of 
the legal subjectivity of children would be complete without 
reference to the means by which the criminal law conceived 
of and dealt with them. To discuss only the civil law 
without reference to the system of crime and punishment 
would have detracted from the multi-faceted construction 
of the legal 'child'. The material in Part 2 which refers 
to the laws and system of inheritance however appears to 
be somewhat unconventional and less self-evident for 
inclusion.
Extended discussion on the laws of inheritance partly
arises because the primary materials ■ especially the common
law texts, discuss technical definitions of infancy in
the context of those laws. More importantly, however,
there are theoretical considerations which merit an
extended discussion of the laws of succession. I argue
that as property is passed down the generations, so is
a system of statuses and positions. The inheritance laws
can be understood not only as the means by which property
is transmitted, but it is also the means by which powerful
social divisions, between elders and minors, male and female 
and
are reproduced the means for elaborating the categories 
of legitimate and illegitimate children. The laws of 
succession therefore invited an extended discussion as to 
how family statuses and relations are transmitted over time.
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The structure I have adopted is one which can be 
readily understood by practising and academic lawyers, 
and by judges. The divisions are those produced by 
lawyers and they represent broad areas which the legal 
profession specialise in. The boundaries between the 
fields of knowledge are those they acquire (tacitly) in 
their training.
The strength of this approach is four-fold. Firstly, 
it remains immanently faithful to the materiality of 
the law. The categories of the law inhabit the writing 
of the analysis, forcing one to engage critically with 
those categories, their mode of production, their value 
system and the tacitly acquired assumptions that go with 
them. Secondly, while one is forced to submerge oneself 
in judicial ideology, legal phraseology and lawyers' 
definitions of social life, one is constantly reminded 
that these categories have practical and concrete appli­
cations. By these definitions, people are disinherited, 
deprived of the custody of children, put in jail and so 
on.
Thirdly, the categories of property law, the criminal 
law and laws of inheritance for example^construct subjects 
bearing rights and attributes or suffer exclusion and 
disability, specific to each discursive regime. The legal 
rights and attributes, the exclusions and disabilities 
are real enough and they are produced in law. They are 
not the product of second order analysis. So in staying 
close to legal texts and case law, the many faceted nature 
of legal subjectivity slowly emerges. Finally, in retaining 
conventional divisions between major branches of law, we 
are able to compare and contrast the rights and attributes 
accorded to minors across those divisions. By these means, 
we are able to show how each branch differentially
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distributes rights, attributes and capacities by age 
and by gender. We are then able to appreciate how and 
why boy and girl minors of different chronological ages 
are subject to differing modes of exclusion and regulation.
There is a price for staying on the terrain of the legal 
system. Using legal texts and case law as the predominant 
forms of primary material for the analyses of minors and 
minority inevitably excludes other social processes, central 
to the 'history of childhood', which have a legal dimension. 
The development of compulsory schooling, the exclusion of 
minors from the workplace, the welfare services developed 
for and on behalf of children and the formation of the 
modern juvenile court from 1908 through to the present day, 
all are fundamental to any complete description and under­
standing of 'modern' childhood. These social processes and 
their associated institutions are the very material of 
boundaries creating adults on the one hand, children on 
the other. They have a legal dimension because everything 
from compulsory schooling to the juvenile court is enshrined 
in statute law. Why then exclude these processes from our 
analysis? There are two general reasons.
Firstly, there is the practical problem of defining the 
scope of one's study. If we take as our important primary 
material the documents, texts and cases which inform the 
practices of the judiciary and the legal profession, 
necessarily we bracket out sources and materials which 
would underpin the proper analysis of compulsory schooling, 
employment and the provision of welfare for children.
Each of these areas would require a thesis length discussion,
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Secondly, in the legal materials we have taken as our 
primary sources, education, welfare and the employment 
of children were for centuries simply subsumed under the 
laws pertaining to parenthood and guardianship. In law, 
these aspects of children's lives were simply not that 
important in the legal subjectivity of children. These 
were jealously protected areas of concern for and powers 
exercised by parents and guardians. Why and how this was 
so, I elaborate in Part 3. As I argue, it is from the 
19th century onwards when the state, assuming the mantle 
of parens patriae, first formulated in Chancery, that 
the education, employment and welfare of children became 
important public political issues as opposed to private 
spheres of concern best left to and regulated by the family
I have treated the education, welfare and employment of 
children as matters really of social policy rather than 
as issues central to the construction of the legal 
subjectivity of children. By this, I mean the education, 
welfare and employment of children speak of the provision 
of services, protection and economic assistance designed 
however imperfectly, to be enriching, life enhancing and 
to meet their specific and basic material needs. None of 
these policies, enshrined in legislation fundamentally 
altered the minors' rights to pursue theit interests in 
courts of law and none of the measures fundamentally 
altered the means by which the law formulated the relation­
ship between age-lines and legal attributes. The Factory 
Acts of the 19th century, the early Education Acts, and the 
various Acts concerned with the protection and welfare of 
children, extend already existing differences between 
adults and minors. What they critically achieve, however, 
is the right of the state and its agents to pursue the 
interests and protection of children against the wishes 
of parents, in and through the courts of law. Minors 
effectively remain the passive objects of legal disputes 
conducted by adults.
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Unlike conventional legal accounts and most radical 
sociological accounts, I pay relatively scant attention 
to the implementation and operation of the juvenile 
court system. My approach is unconventional in two 
senses. Firstly, I have focussed on aspects of the law 
and courts of law which on face value,have little to do 
directly with children as legal subjects. In conventional 
terms, the legal regulation of children currently largely 
takes place through the operation of the juvenile court 
system. However, the categories of the law and 'the 
juvenile' operational in these courts have their antecedents 
elsewhere. Conceptions, that children need protection 
against adults (including parents), that juvenile delinquents 
need different modes of trial and punishment, that juvenile 
courts should function as family courts, can only be 
explained if we look to what was going on in other courts 
of law historically. Dingwall and Eekelaar (1984) argue 
that 'the twentieth century has seen no fundamental 
innovations in the categories of children whose welfare 
may be thought to require some state intervention', (p. 95). 
They continue that the Children's Acts including and since 
the 1908 Children Act, were 'essentially measures of con­
solidation and re-enactment which modernised powers and 
definitions first set out in the nineteenth century or 
earlier legislation', (ibid).
My later work on the Chancery Courts and their contribution 
to the shifting balance between the rights of parents and 
the state seems well justified in light of these views.
Secondly, the legal regulation of children in the juvenile 
court still actually tells us very little about substantive 
divisions between adult and child in respect of relations 
of possession and non-possession of property, inheritance.
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contract, marriage rights, age of discretion, age of 
consent and sexual relations and guardianship. It is 
interesting to recall that juvenile courts are magistrates' 
courts and so in the legal hierarchy are still subject to 
the values and rulings of superior (High) courts. To lose 
sight of this is to lose sight of the whole tradition of 
judge-made law.
In sum, I have eschewed any direct 'history' of the 
juvenile court, but I have sought instead to locate its 
historical significance in the context of the unfolding 
inter-generational relationship of adult and minor. It 
is an institution which hardens the boundary and which 
contributes to a sense of 'difference' between these 
social categories. The juvenile courts formalise a 
boundary between adults and children in law, but does 
so along lines well in evidence in advance of the Childrens 
Act 1908 and the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.
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NOTES
1. Hargreaves (1968), Becker (1971), Young, J. (1974), 
Taylor, Walton and Young (eds.) (1975).
2. The two key texts were Althusser (1969) For Marx, 
and (1971) Lenin and Philosophy.
3. While one celebrates social 'difference' (diversity, 
variety, plurality), 'division' has a negative 
connotation. How social formations create divisiveness 
out of 'difference' such that some groups are 
marginalised or oppressed has always been a concern
of social science.
4. For example, William Blake's poems collected under
the title 'Songs of Innocence'. On the representation 
of children in classical and commercial art, see 
Fuller (1979) 'Uncovering Childhood', in Hoyles, M.
(ed.).
5. See P. Thane (1981) Childhood in History, and Hendrik
(1984), Review essay, 'The history of childhood and 
youth'.
6. See Hirst and Woolley (1982). Their account of the
way various writers have dealt with 'feral' children 
is illuminating (p. 43-58).
7. The Gillick case is an illustrative example (Guardian
21 and 22 December 1984). The Court of Appeal's 
ruling that it was illegal for doctors to prescribe 
the contraceptive pill to girls under 16 without 
parental consent is an example of the 'licensing'
of sexual practices.
-  108 -
8. For a full discussion of Durkheim and Weber on 
law, see Alan Hunt's (1978), The Sociological 
Movement in Law. It is this work I draw on here.
See also Rheinstein's edited collection of Weber's 
writing on law, in Max Weber on Law in Economy and 
Society (1954). Further discussion of Durkheim's 
writing on law and its indexical relationship
to forms of social solidarity can be found in Clarke 
M. (1976), 'Durkheim's sociology of law, and Cotterrell 
R. (1977) 'Durkheim on legal development and social 
solidarity.'
9. For collections of Marx and Engel's writings on law, 
see Cain and Hunt (1979) and Phillips (1980). The 
latter is particularly useful in displaying Marx
and Engel's discussion of specific pieces of legislation
10. The so-called 'capital-logic' approach. See Holloway 
and Picciotto (1977) and Jessop (1980; 47-50, 84-90).
11. The liberal jurisprudential theory that Collins has 
in mind is represented by H.L.A. Hart (1961) The 
Concept of Law, R. M. Dworkin, (1979), Taking Rights 
Seriously, L. L. Fuller (1969), The Morality of Law,
J. Raz (1979) The Authority of Law, R. Unger (1876)
Law in Modern Society (Collins; 147-149). See also.
Hunt (1981; 53-61) for a critique of American juris­
prudence.
12. Young and K^insey (1985) 'Crime is a class issue'.
New Statesman, 11 May 1985.
13. For the divisions between common law and equity 
and for the structure and hierarchy of English 
courts, see Walker and Walker (19 80) and Hood Phillips 
and Hudson (1977).
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14. Pashukanis (1978) provides a pertinent example of 
the form of argument here:
'Capitalist property is basically 
the freedom to transform from one 
form to another, the transfer of 
capital from one sphere to another 
for the purpose of gaining the 
highest possible unearned income.
This freedom of disposition inherent 
in capitalist property is inconceivable 
without the existence of propertyless 
individuals in other words, of 
proletarians.' (p. 127, my emphasis).
Whither married women, infants and the mad? It is 
this kind of essentialism that we are trying to 
counter by reference to inheritance, for example.
15. A few relevant examples here include the encyclopaedic
Halsbury's Laws of England, Cheshire's Modern Real 
Property, Latery, The Law and Practice of Divorce, 
Anson on Contracts, Bromley's Family Law, Bevan's
The Law Relating to Children, Topham's Real Property. 
These books run into several editions (e.g. Latey 13, 
Topham 10 are examples I have to hand). Often as not, 
the author became part of the citation as modern 
editors revise and update according to current 
legislation and practice.
16. Judicial interpretation of statute is said to take
place according to certain rules. 'Interpretation' 
is simply the process whereby meaning is assigned 
to the words in a statute' (Walker, op.cit.; 99). 
However, there is a process technically called 'con­
struction' which 'is the process whereby uncertainties
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or ambiguities in the statute are resolved' (ibid).
The general rule that judges are required to follow 
is 'to ascertain the intention of parliament' (Walker; 
102). The whole process becomes highly political 
when parliamentarians argue (as in the GLC Fares Fair 
policy) that judicial interpretation does not accord 
with parliamentary intentions. For an account of how 
arbitrary the meanings attributed to statute can be, 
see two articles by Murphy and Rawlings (1981, 1982), 
'After the Ancien Regime: the writing of judgements 
in the House of Lords'. MLR 44 (6), 45 (1).
17. The technicalities of precedent are very complex. 
Principally it concerns the citation of a judgement 
or decision in order to justify a later case. There 
are different degrees of precedent, each more or less 
binding, and in the hierarchy of courts, precedents
of superior courts are binding on inferior jurisdictions. 
For an extended discussion, see Walker (op.cit.; 129;
141). The theory of precedent rests upon an understanding 
that judges must abide by a rule of law; past judgements 
per se so establish a rule which must be adhered to by 
later judges.
18. See, for example, Pat Carlen (1976) Magistrates'
Justice.
PART ONE
THE INFANT; A MINORITY STATUS
"If then there can be a case where it 
can be for the advantage of one man 
to be under the power of another, it 
must be on account of some palpable 
and very considerable deficiency, on 
the part of the former, in point of 
intellects, or (which is the same thing 
in other words) in point of knowledge 
or understanding."
Bentham (1789) An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation
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INTRODUCTION
The English legal system, from the earliest times through to 
the present, has drawn a broad distinction between the legal 
subject of 'full age' and the infant. This is the function 
of the age of majority; an arbitrary age line fixing subjects 
on either side of it. It is the prime division that we have 
in law clearly distinguishing between the adult and the child. 
Childhood formally ends when a subject reaches the age of 
majority. But in writing this difference the law simultaneously 
constitutes specific forms of social relationships between 
these structural positions which have profound economic, 
political, social and personal consequences for individuals 
allocated to these categories.
However, the age of majority renders only a crude distinction 
between adults and children; infants are further divided by 
notions of discretion and consent, drawn at various chronological 
ages - often gender specific - and which operate to make opaque 
the legal attributes of what comprises adulthood and childhood. 
Infants of a certain age are legally ordained with some adult 
attributes, whilst simultaneously being denied others. Infants 
can and could marry, but not vote; procreate legitimate children 
but not devise familial property to them; be old enough to vote 
but not freely participate in homosexual relations; be capable 
of violent sexual assault but be legally incapable of rape ^; 
enter the labour market but not sign valid contracts.
The law's infant then is not a unitary category, but divided 
and internally inconsistent. One of the broad themes we 
shall address directly will be how the legal system creates 
and manages these internal inconsistencies.
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Broadly, the legal subject of less than full age suffers two 
general disabilities, which the law often presents as 'privileges' 
it extends to those of tender years. Firstly, the dispossession 
of property. Secondly, personal subordination to the dictates 
of particular adults. Two other legal categories bearing similar 
disabilities - historically, the married woman, and the mad, are 
rendered child-like precisely because of their enforced economic 
dependence and personal subordination. This will be the object 
of our second line of analysis, to explore the incapacities 
of legal infancy and to indicate the basis of those incapacities, 
and to note how the law re-writes them over time.
A third broad theme acknowledges the legal system's capacity 
as an ideological system with a unique power and position to 
render class and age and gender specific interests as universal 
categories and values. Perhaps this is best illustrated by the 
manner in which the age of majority has been cast in law.
Everyone becomes 'of age', but the means by which 'full age' 
was formulated had particular relevance for very few.
Finally, we shall address what is the most commonly experienced 
form of adult-infant relationships, that of the parent and the 
child. Unlike the psychological theorising of the relationship 
as a personal-affective bond, we shall be concerned with some 
of the harsher aspects of it, because the law's rendering sub­
sumes parent-child relations as particular species of the 
generic guardian-ward relation. We asserted earlier that 
personal subordination is a broad characteristic of infancy.
We shall argue that it is precisely through notions of guardian­
ship, that the personal subordination of infants is secured.
We are in the last analysis dealing with legal categories which 
have social functions and social consequences. Like most legal 
rules and sanctions, we may well only become aware of the limits 
placed on social action when we run up against them. And yet 
their subtle effects extend beyond their mere coercive power 
because they enter social relations and individual consciousness 
at multiple points and in a variety of ways . To write about
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the law is to reveal something of the underlying structures 
constituting what is 'the social'. Simply recognising that 
not all social groups have the power to make laws and enforce 
them, and that not all individuals have the necessary symbolic 
and material capacities to pursue their rights (or protect them) 
in the manner which the law prescribes, is a partial step towards 
understanding that law is not neutral either in its mechanism 
or effects. A particularistic study of infancy can only go 
so far in displaying the law's articulation with economic and 
political structures of power and authority. It cannot say it 
all and neither should it do so. It is the case, however, that 
the legal infant, the age of majority, notions of discretion 
and consent, legal notions of reason display patterns which can 
be wholly explained by reference to the unequal distribution 
of economic and political resources. A sociology of law, if 
it is to be a sociology rather than a straight legalistic account 
must acknowledge the social context within which legal systems 
are embedded. Trying to balance this against the need to tease 
out some of the technical details about the law's character 
leads to some awkward accommodations. This is perhaps one of 
the virtues of focussing on one particular legal category because 
it does allow us to acknowledge the complexity of the determinations 
at work in and through its construction.
To this end, we have consciously taken the law's categories 
to work with; as given, but not to be taken uncritically.
Usefully, these categories tell us how the law does its work, 
signals something about the values and the social order that 
legal rules, principles and doctrines sustain and reproduce.
This account eschews a straight legal history of the age of 
majority but it is unashamedly historical. Legal categories 
have a history, both in the sense of passing through time and 
in the sense of continuities and changes in the social effects 
they produce. If anything, what the study of legal infancy 
reveals is the longevity of the legal categories in which it 
is an embedded part.
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INFANCY; A LEGAL ACCOUNT
"The law of the thirteenth century knew, 
as the law of the nineteen century knows, 
infancy or non-age as a condition which 
has many legal consequences; the infant 
is subject to special disabilities and 
enjoys special privileges."
(Pollock and Maitland II; 438)
Infancy in law is a 'technical' word; infancy describes 
that period prior to the age of majority and is given through 
a series of incapacities or exclusions. The denial of the 
right to hold property - in land or written transfer; the in­
capacity to be a full party to a valid contract (including 
marriage); the exclusion from public office; the incapacity 
to make testamentary dispositions - collectively describes the 
legal infant. The possession of these capacities conversely 
describes the 'full' legal subject. Proscribing the use of 
alcohol, tobacco, street trading, sexual relations to persons 
deemed to be under the age reinforces the separation of the 
infant and the adult  ^. Currently, the age of majority is 
18 years (Family Law Reform Act 1969), though historically, it 
and the notion of infancy display remarkable transformations.
Putting systematic périodisation to one side for the moment, 
let us pursue the diversities of infancy observable in the 
history of the law. In the 13th century for example, we find 
the following:
"There is more than one 'full age'. The 
young burgess is of full age when he can 
count money and measure cloth; the young 
sokeman when he is fifteen, the tenant by 
knight's service when he is twenty-one years 
old. In past times, boys and girls had soon 
attained full age; life was rude and there 
was not much to learn ... In later days our
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law drew various lines at various stages 
in a child's life; Coke tells us of the 
seven ages of woman; but the only line of 
general importance is drawn at the age of 
one and twenty; and the infant - the one 
technical word that we have as a contrast 
for the person of full age - stands equally 
well for the new-born babe and the youth 
who is in his twenty-first year."
(Pollock and Maitland Vol. II; 438-39).
Infancy is a general condition attaching to the young and 
has meaning only in its 'contrast' to the person of full age. 
But let us pursue the 'difference' in Coke's (1645) writing on 
infancy ;
"Note that the full age of a man and woman 
to alien, demise, let, contract, is one and 
twenty years. Before this age a man or woman 
is called an infant ... and certain privileges 
he hath in respect of his infancy."
(Coke, 1st Institutes: 1818 edit:170).
A 19th century commentator elaborating on the different stages 
within infancy records:
"A male at twelve years old may take the oath 
of allegiance; at fourteen is at years of dis­
cretion, and therefore may consent or dis­
agree to marriage, and may choose his guardian, 
and at twenty-one is at his own disposal 
and may alien his lands, goods and chattels.
A female, also at seven years of age may be 
betrothed, or given in marriage; at nine is 
entitled to dower, at twelve is at the age 
of maturity, and therefore may consent or 
disagree to marriage; at fourteen, is at 
years of legal discretion, and may choose a 
guardian; and at twenty-one may dispose of 
herself and her lands."
(Macpherson 1842;337).
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Finally, in the 20th century context, we may consider the 
Latey Report (the White Paper preceding the 1969 legislation 
re-writing the age of majority), which had as its brief:
"... to consider whether any changes are 
desirable in the law relating to contracts 
made by persons under twenty-one and to 
their power to hold and dispose of property, 
and in the law relating to marriage by such 
persons and to the power to make them wards 
of court."
(Latey Report 1969; 13).
These dispersed texts display the subjectivity of the legal 
infant through their various incapacities, incapacities which 
separate them absolutely from the full legal subject. Infancy 
is defined in the negative; a 'lack' of the capacities 
^hich are differentially distributed around the age of majority.
For something like 600 years, in spite of its historical 
fluidity, the age of majority functions in a similar manner; 
it becomes the point of origin of a legal classification whereby 
subjects emerge as either infant or adult The process of
allocation to the structural position of adult and minor is 
based on an arbitrary chronological age line. By custom, through 
the courts and latterly by statute, it will be apparent that 
the age of majority has been fixed variously at 14, 21, and 
now 18 years; the legal disputes have focussed on where
it should be drawn, not whether it should exist. The age line, 
juridicially determined, has specific, social, economic and 
political effects; determining and limiting, privileging and 
protecting, defining and distributing the possible social re­
lationships of both adults and infants and thereby, contributing 
in a significant way to the fabric of the social.
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But if the texts cited above display the continuity over time 
of the age of majority as a significant feature within the 
classification system of the law (thereby continuously pro­
ducing and reproducing the subjects adult and infant),it is also 
the case that at certain periods (in the 13th through to the 
17th century, for example,) there appears to be more than one 
'full age'.
The age of majority, wherever it is drawn, does mark a formal 
rite of passage from status to another, from one generation 
to the next. It is a legal status which descends on the bearer 
with the coming of age. No acts of bravery or courage, no 
evidence of menarche nor any secret initiations or markings on 
the body are required, as in many other cultures. Nor does 
the attainment of adult status depend upon 'emancipation' 
(discretionarily given to children and slaves) from the potestas 
of the father, under Roman law (Pollock and Maitland II; 438).
It signifies the de jure flight from 'perpetual tutelage'; 
though for women at least, that is a state of grace historically 
reimposed through marriage contract, and for members of the 
working class, resecured through the non-possession of the 
means of production.
Let us now explore more fully the character and form of infancy 
in English law. It will be apparent from the passages cited 
above that the legal infant is not the product of learned jurists 
debating what 'ideal' rights and protection should attend an un­
differentiated legal subject called 'the infant' . Rather the 
process involved the discursive positioning of subjects in re­
lationship to determinant theoretical (legal) objects. Infancy 
is constituted as a legal category only in relationship to 
discourses 'about' land law, tenure, contract, wardship and 
marriage. This enables us to understand the fractured and 
contradictory position of the legal infant. For, though the 
age of majority has a timeless quality - it is always already 
present in law- the specific qualities of infancy, the attributes of
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which inhere in the notion of infancy can and do change over time 
The character is determined by the particular combination of 
incapacities and privileges operative at any period of time, 
as we shall show here and in the following chapter. We shall
now elaborate a more substantive account of infancy by looking
at 3 distinctive historical periods. By this means, we can 
begin to map the specificity of the infant in English law, and 
discover which capacities are being distributed and the modality 
of the distribution process.
It may seem curious to devote so much of the following to the
technical intricacies of feudal law, but we do so precisely 
because present day categories of adult and minor were either 
written by or in reaction to those early formulations. More­
over, these feudal categories are of considerable longevity.
In later episodes we have eschewed any lengthy formal state­
ments about what infants could and could not do for sake of 
brevity. Instead, we shall concentrate on the conditions 
under which the law reformulated the age of majority. This 
has the advantage of displaying the law's temporality; its cate­
gories, modes of action, and the interests it serves. The law 
has a rhythm not entirely consonant with the grand historical 
sweep theorised through changes in the mode of production.
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CHAPTER ONE: 'THERE IS MORE THAN ONE FULL AGE ...'
Our focus will be with some aspects of the common law in feudal 
and early modern England, up to 1660; a broad sweep of historical 
time, a timespan somewhat alien to social and medieval historians, 
concerned with detailed accounts of local custom, social practice 
and institutions over much shorter periods. How we can then dis­
regard their historical practices? With difficulty, and out of 
necessity but with some justification. For our theoretical 
object is legal infancy, signified most powerfully by an age 
line, or rather a plurality of age lines, one of which, the age 
of majority, has real import. We are not so much concerned with 
dividing historical periods by 'events' but understanding the 
conditions of existence through which the age of majority was 
constructed, and, how it continued to function long after those 
particular social relations changed.
In one sense, we enter the historical time that lawyers elaborate. 
They write out the common law rules as though chronological 
historical time did not exist. It is not important. Their time 
acknowledges only two periods; that time after a new principle 
or rule is elaborated and the period when the 'old' principle 
operated (be that only 10 days or 10 years). And if no new 
principle doctrine, rule or principle but only marginal shifts 
of interpretation arises, then passing centuries are of no con­
sequence; infancy is a case in point.
We dwell on the common law because it is in this branch of the 
legal system that legal infancy was elaborated; not in law 
merchant, nor in borough courts, nor in the manorial courts, 
and only later by statute. If we look at present day books 
concerned with infancy, we are referred back to the common 
law's definitions of it
The fundamental reason why the early formulations of infancy 
have their longevity, the reasons why the significant age lines 
remain unchanged lies in the character of common law itself, its 
power to impose its definitions in other branches of the law, 
and the particular circumstances allowing common law lawyers
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to protect their own material interests and those of their 
clients through its courts and specific forms of action. As 
long as the common law was able to assert itself as the primary 
means by which landed property (to which political power and 
authority was attached) was to be regulated, guarded and 
preserved in the hands of those in possession of it, then it 
was able to float its definitions of legal relations and legal 
subjectivity into all other areas of the law. The périod­
isation here acknowledges a time when the common law's primacy 
was virtually unassailed.
As a discourse, the common law is a curious beast. In structure, 
its nature,comprises a complex interplay between case law 
settling specific disputes, by reference to specific forms of 
action (writs of trespass etc.) and by reference to precedents 
often as not set down in a few authoratative texts. In one 
sense legal discourse here is self-defining; an 'authority' is 
one that the legal system counts as an authority and legal 
debates, inflections of meaning, shades of interpretation 
rotate around a common core of 'given' authority. On age lines 
for example, we find a text such as Blackstone's Commentaries 
in the mid-18th century merely citing at length what Coke had 
to say nearly a century earlier, referencing in passing sub­
stantive cases (which are more than likely cited Coke anyway). 
There is little dispute about relevant 'ages' or their legal 
effects;so for economy we have declined the practice of 
authorial and authorative overkill. Citing multiple texts 
saying much the same thing may well make an immutable case in 
law but hardly advances our understanding of the principles 
structuring the social relations between adults and infants.
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1. The Age(s) of Majority
A brief digression. As a general principle under feudalism, 
the status of subjects for legal and civil purposes is deter­
mined by the individual's relationship to land; as a tenant, 
great or small, or as a landless labourer. Town dwellers are 
accorded a status, regulated by local custom not by common law.
The law of status and the law of tenure are knotted together; 
the 'unfree man is an unfree tenant' (Pollock and Maitland II;359); 
the free man holds a free (though not necessarily 'freehold') 
tenure. Free tenures can be divided into three broad kinds 
(though each contain several sub-species); military, spiritual 
and socage . We shall be concerned primarily with military 
tenures; tenures held in return for services broadly military 
in origin (services including the provision of one or more 
foot soldiers, attending the lord's court, fighting personally 
at his side, or paying a cash equivalent, and, socage tenures. 
Tenures in socage are defined because they are non-military and 
non-spiritual. Services rendered were agricultural in origin; 
working on the lord's desmesne directly, paying over so much 
of one's produce as rent, or paying an annual sum in lieu of 
these putative services. Tenants knew with some certainty what 
their renders were to be from year to year
Villeins, or the unfree, in contrast to the above 'free' 
tenancies are unfree because they hold unfree tenures. The 
difference is in many respects technical, and the lived ex­
perience of the free tenant holding a small quantity of land 
may well have been almost indistinguishable from a tenant in 
an 'unfree' plot. The difference resides largely in the fact 
that the free tenant could protect his tenure, have his dis­
putes arbitrated in the king's courts; the unfree tenant could 
not. Being a tenant 'at will', the villein was required to 
pursue his legal battles in the court of his superior lord 
(even though this land was not protected there against the 
lord). Villein land was to become what we later called copy­
hold land; held from the manor and protected by custom, ancient
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rights of possession, and local hundred and manorial courts, 
not through common (or the king's ) law.All tenures had these 
things in common; depending upon the requisite services being 
rendered (in person or its equivalent in cash or kind), the 
entry fines being paid (at the entry of a new tenant, e.g. 
the heir succeeding the ancestor), the tenures were secure and 
heritable: they could not be freely devised, nor could substitute 
tenants be installed, nor could sub-tenants be adopted, without 
the consent of the superior lord (again, in practice, not with­
out some fine or relief being paid). In the case of military 
tenures, however, the arrangement of collecting personal 
services or their equivalent was extended to (under the cloak 
of protecting the land from alienation by sub-tenurial subterfuge 
controlling the marriages, wardships etc. of infants of sub­
tenants. By contrast, military tenures whilst having more ways 
of collecting money from sub-tenants than socage tenures, 
were also regarded as more burdensome tenures than socage land 
holdings (i.e. superior lords could employ 'the seven great 
fruits' (Blackstone) of military tenure to raise cash at times 
other tl^n crucial points in the life cycle (births, marriages, 
death) '.
A sketch only of the relationship between tenure and status, 
but necessary, in fact central to any understanding of legal 
notion of 'full age'.
For the most important meaning in law of* 'full age', arises from 
the age at which an heir could assume seisin (possession and 
use) of an estate in land. And so we can have until 1660, more 
than one full age; for military and spiritual tenures one and 
twenty years, for socage tenures, at 14 or 15. There is some 
dispute between authorities here. Coke argues that 'full age' 
is attained at 14 (1st Institutes; 9th edition 1685; 88), as 
does Blackstone (Commentaries I ; 461-462) on the ground that 
at this age, tenants of socage land pass out of guardianship. 
Pollock and Maitland (above) and Latey (1969;21) say 'full age' 
is acquired at 15. For our purposes, we shall assume the latter 
age, for the sake of consistency, and certainty: the age line 
is useful only in contrast to the military age.
0.23 —
By way of summary then, we can state the following:
1. Full age, the age of majority, is regulated by the form of 
tenure; for military tenure it was 21; for socage tenants, 15. 
These are the recognised ages at common law, for these are the 
tenures adjudicated by real actions in the king's courts.
2. Note the absences. Villeins become of age by custom, 
regulated through the local courts, but no age is specified by 
the major commentators. Serfs, the landless peasantry, and 
likewise the townspeople in one sense have no specified full 
age in common law for the assumption of a real estate in land 
is not at issue.
3. Land, regulated by common law, can only be held and controlled 
by those over the age of majority. In the case of land devolving, 
because of the death of an ancestor, to an heir, below the age
of majority, whilst seisin rests with the heir, control and use 
of the land was assumed by the infant's guardian, until the 
attainment of (the appropriate) age of majority. Infants of 
whatever relevant age may 'own' but not dispose of the funda­
mental means of production (i.e. land).
4. Deriving directly from the legal problem of what was to 
happen to land destined for an infant, is the whole complex 
structure of guardianship and wardship - the system of personal 
subordination. The law of infancy and the operation of majority 
is actually much more obscure and opaque than points 1-4 suggest. 
There are a number of problems we have to address. Firstly,
why did the common law settle upon these age lines. Secondly, 
the gradual submersion of the lesser 'full age' under the 
knightly age of majority. Thirdly, the 'full ages' of women as
opposed to men. Lastly, the articulation of economic dependence,
arising out of dispossession, with the system of personal 
subordination written through the laws of guardianship and 
wardship.
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1. Why the ages of 21 and 15 were settled upon as common law 
full age remains speculative and obscure. For males in 
'barbarian' Northern Europe, the Romans reckoned the age of 
majority at 15, when young men were able to bear arms (Latey 
op.cit.:21). Riche's essay (1973) argues similarly, as does 
James (1960). By the time of the Magna Carta (1215), men entered 
service as knights at 21 and were therefore able to hold 
knight's tenure. Legal historians have generally adopted the 
line that the age of majority rose as a response to changes in 
military hardware. The mounted knight, clad in heavy armour, 
it is argued, required a degree of physical strength acquired 
only after early youth. There may well be a practical claim 
in this line of analysis, for entry as a knight did bear the 
notion of military service - fighting for one's lord, taking 
part in judicial combat - as well as the ritual attendances at 
the lord's court. Commuting military service and personal 
attendance at court to cash equivalents (i.e. scutage) as a 
means of rendering service to hold tenure seems well established 
by the middle of the 12th century (Pollock and Maitland II; 
262-76). Paying scutage - payments in lieu of military service 
was a means of rendering service in cash rather than turning 
up in service of the king with say forty armed men. The intro­
duction of scutage may well have brought about the downward 
spread of military tenures with each sub-tenant liable for an 
aliquot part of a knight's fee (Pollock and Maitland II, 266-67). 
Whatever, the age of majority did not change with commuting of 
service to cash but retained its ancient meaning.
The scheme of things by which the great barons held a parti­
cular tract of land in return for supplying the king with a 
fixed number of mounted armoured knights seems to have been the 
work of the Conqueror. What is more striking is the fact that 
there were probably only 5000 such men. 'The whole feudal array 
of England would be in our eyes been but a handful of warriors.' 
(Pollock and Maitland II, 259). Whatever the weight given to 
the military age by the common law, the military 'full age' 
would have only directly affected a small part of the population; 
its more common effect accompanied the spread of land held by 
'military' fee, rendered more generally in cash payments rather 
than in service.
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For the 'common people' the 'rustic' age of 15 (Latey op.cit.;21) 
was the age of majority, the age at which they could inherit 
and take seisin of an estate in land . And this is probably 
true for free and villein tenures. That common folk were suf­
ficiently able to take on and manage an 'agricultural' tenure 
at this age, to cope with the rigours of animal husbandry and 
breaking ground, speaks strength and skill but clearly of a 
lesser order than the demand of military combat. Degrees of 
maturity are being expressed largely in terms of physical 
strength (the ability to manage the sword or the ploughshare.
But age itself acquires a symbolic value, not merely in the 
sense that elders are to be venerated because they are old, wise 
and experienced, but because the tenures to which each full age 
relates were hierarchically ordered. The noble tenures so 
called were predominantly military, though not exclusively so. 
(Blackstone, Commentaries II; 62 ; Pollock and Maitland II;
229;356).
The authoratative accounts of 'full age' and its origins 
strongly suggest that the classification of adult-infant, in 
the end, is based on two axes, one of physical strength, the 
second - only lightly touched on - being cognitive ability.
The social construction, taking place and made effective through 
commonlaw classifications is determined by the system of feudal 
tenure, and is really an extension of the general principle that 
tenure strongly determines all forms of status.
2. Let us recall that socage tenants at 15 had proprietary 
rights in land. At this age, land could be inherited, the 
title passed and was held to be good. Rents and services could 
be collected from sub-tenants, if any, and tenancies protected 
in common law courts. To this extent, at 15, socage tenants 
were capable of owning, managing and reaping the benefits 
directly from the means of production. They are free of guardians
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But though
"the tenant in socage has no guardian, 
he is still for many purposes a minor".
(Pollock and Maitland II; 439).
Coke is able to announce, without demur from later commentators,
"Note that the full age, according to 
common speech is said to be the age of 
twenty one years."
(1st Institutes 9th edit.; 79).
As in a legal and popular sense, the full age of tenants in 
socage was of lesser importance than the age of majority at 21. 
The submersion of the socage 'full age' under the knightly age 
of majority seems to arise partly through the way in which the 
land law dealt with proprietary rights. While there is little 
dispute that infants in the 12th and 13th centuries could have 
proprietary rights in land - the seisin passed to them - 
actual control and use of the tract was at the behest of the 
father, or guardian or superior lord, they could not alien or 
devise it. And this seems to be the position of a 15 year old 
tenant of socage land. Their possessary right seems to encompass 
only holding legal title, occupation, use and enjoyment. The 
other side of possession - the right to dispose - by sale or 
testamentary disposition - absolutely, was seriously doubted 
in Bracton's time (1250-58). Any sale, gift or other form of 
alienation could well be reviewed and reneged on when an infant 
reached the age of 21. Whether contracts signed by infants (in 
the case of land) were valid at the point when the infant 
attained the age of 21 was never entirely settled in law for 
several centuries after Bracton, but this is a matter which we 
shall return to below. In this manner it would seem that the 
knightly age was pressed upon the common law in general; full 
age meant that full possession obtained in the matter of land.
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But the question must now be posed; where are the infants
without property, where are the infants who inherited nothing
but the privilege of having their labour appropriated? It is not too
strong to suggest that they are invisible in the texts on
infancy. As a comment on the law, the absence of the property-
less infant gives considerable weight to the claim:
"But here again we have a good instance 
of the manner in which the law for the 
gentry becomes English common law."
(Pollock and Maitland II; 439).
In terms of the distribution of capacities, the right of 'full' 
possession of land becomes the key to understanding the common 
law age of majority. It is, in the last analysis, a class 
specific definition; the origin of why 21 is much less impor­
tant than the means by which it was sustained as 'the age' of 
adulthood, and this was created and reproduced primarily in 
relationship to property - particularly, though not exclusively, 
land.
We can now begin to appreciate that land law is central to the 
production of the legal infant. The protection and orderly 
transmission of land from one generation to the next is perhaps 
the crucial determinant of the position of the infant in law.
We should not consider this concern for the sanctity of land as 
a simple reflection of feudal or pre-capitalist legal discourse.
For example, Latey's review of the evidence presented before 
the Select Committee displays exactly the same concern:
"It has been urged on us that in relation to 
land law which is such a basic feature of 
our legal system, there must be no room for 
uncertainty; that is the basis of the bald 
provision in S.1.(6) of the Law of Property 
Act 1925, which creates an absolute prohi­
bition against the holding by an infant of 
legal estate in land."
(Latey 1967;99) .
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A striking statement, some 700 years on from the early formu­
lations and settlements about the age of majority.
The age of majority, in sum, is a chronological divide bearing 
several messages about the infant. The line is riven with 
notions about physical strength, degrees of maturity, attain­
ment of skills and assumptions about cognitive abilities that 
the infant lacks. Within the law, however, these assumptions 
are crucially orientated around a particular point - the land, 
and who will be in possession of it, direct its use, management and 
disposal. Full age means full possession - rights of 'ownership', 
use,benefit and disposal (as much would be allowed in a feudal 
system of tenurial occupancy). Infancy is status defined in 
common law by the exclusion from full possession of the means 
of production. In terms of intergenerational relations, the 
social relationship between the adult and the infant is pro­
foundly economic (the old possessor, the young dispossessed), 
in which infancy emerges as a relationship of legally consti­
tuted dependency. The cultural wrappings of lack of strength, 
maturity, skill and cognitive ability are not so much window- 
dressing but are the reference in which the common law shrouds 
the infant's continued status as an economic dependant, and as 
we shall see in later texts, continually calls forth to defend 
a quite arbitrary, class specific age line.
3. What the common law judges to be majority and infancy, 
draws primarily on the male point of entry to adulthood (the 
ability to carry swords and lances, to manage the plough).
.Given that its obsessive concern was with the destiny 
of land, and that the destiny of land in the laws of inheritance 
(see Part 2) was to be male heirs, with women taking only in 
their absence, then the universalisation of the male age line 
should be no surprise. But what of women and their passage to 
adulthood. The significant age lines are of a different order. 
Perhaps the clearest way of demonstrating this is to return to 
Coke. Writing of tenure by knight's service, he notes:
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"But if a tenant dieth, his heir female 
being at the age of 14 years or more, the 
Lord shall not have the wardship of the 
land nor of the body, because that a woman 
of such age may have a husband to do knight's 
service, but if such heiie female be within 
the age of 14 years, and unmarried at the 
time of death of her ancestors the Lord shall 
have the wardship of the land holden of him 
until the age of such heire female of 16 years."
(1st Institutes 9th edit. 1685;75)
Pollock and Maitland referred earlier to Coke's seven ages 
of a woman. According to Coke:
"A woman hath seven ages for severall purposes 
appointed to her by law; as, seven years for 
the lord to have aid pur file marier; nine 
yeares to deserve her dower; twelve years to 
consent to marriage; until fourteen years to 
be in ward; fourteen years to be out of ward 
if she attained thereunto in the life of her 
ancestor; sixteen yeares for to tender her 
marriage if she were under the age of fourteene 
of her ancestor ; and one and twenty yeares 
to alienate her lands, goods and chattels."
(Co. Litt 78b, quoted in Pollock and 
Maitland II; 439).
For the female infant, legal subjectivity articulates to a 
different set of values. Whereas the male infant/adult divide 
refers to physical strength and common definitions relating to 
land law, for the female infant, life is periodised through the 
stages of marriage alliance; dower, consent, contract. Formally, 
there are two possible flights from infancy; attaining the age 
of majority, and marriage. However, customarily while the 
female infant moves out of wardship and guardianship earlier
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than the male infant, she never in practice moves out of 
domination; the domain of the lord/ward/guardian merely pre­
cedes the dominion of the husband. The marriage laws, en­
tailing for the married woman (under the doctrine of 'one 
flesh') meant an extended form of infancy for them (separation 
from property, loss of legal capacities to sue) etc.. The 
formal attainment of the age of majority in this sense does 
not necessarily mean the de jure and de facto acquisition of 
the legal capacities of the adult, unlike the male flight from 
infancy. Though we know specifically of no such instance, the 
common law permitted the marriage of a male infant at 14, to an 
'adult' woman over twenty one, and for her to enter his dominion 
with her land and goods passing over to his ownership and 
control 1
The female infant's legal subjectivity is considerably more 
complexly defined than that of the male infant, and, it can be 
argued, her age of majority is significantly less important
given the multiplicity of the stages of infancy which she must 
pass, and the multiplicity of points at which her life cycle 
was regulated. For while the 'ages' of dower, consent, marriage 
etc. may be read as permissions or rights to do and act, the 
majority of female infants in practice had little control over 
these crucial moments (see Middleton 1981 ).
The significant moments, the 'ages' of the female infant, are 
constituted by the overlap of three complexly related legal dis­
courses. Firstly, the one we are by now familiar with, contexts 
the female infant within the land law, as a dispossessed or 
putative tenant ('she may alien her lands, goods and chattels 
... etc.). Secondly, heavily dependant on ecclesiastically 
ordained law, there are the ages at which she is participate 
in various stages of consenting to marriage. Thirdly, and 
intricately related to the above, she is constituted as a 
dependent subordinate through the complex law of wardship and 
guardianship (which includes the rights of parents and superior 
landlords to dictate her availability for marriage, marriage 
partner, and ultimately regulate sexual practices).
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It is an intriguing question as to why the common law so care­
fully maps out the various stages of the female infant. The 
common law's concern was of course to reconcile two potentially 
competing social forces; on the one hand the superior tenant's 
interest in retaining control of tracts of land held from them 
and the services, dues or renders which went with it; on the 
other, the marriage contract, by which all a married woman's 
property devolved directly to her husband's ownership use and 
control  ^ . On marriage, a husband potentially gained both 
property and labour services (directly from his spouse, and 
potentially from the couple's offspring); paradoxically, this 
represented a potential loss to a superior landlord, of property, 
services and renders, and labour services, not only of the woman 
but of her (potential) offspring. The other side of the contract, 
of course, was that for superior landlords or husbands, marriage 
accrued (potentially) a larger stock of labour, the possibility 
of legitimate children, who by the laws of inheritance, would 
provide a certain destiny for tenures in the future, and future 
labour services, and sources of renders in cash or kind. To 
secure all of these, in absence of parents as natural guardians, 
the law elaborated a complicated system of wardship and guardian­
ship to oversee both the property and the body of the parentless 
infant (which included especially the control of marriage).
Condensing around the figure of the female infant, juridicially 
protected and stage-eased through life by the drawing of age 
lines, we begin to appreciate outlines of principles of structure 
and agency in the English variant of feudalism, to appreciate 
the intertwining of destiny of tenurial land, the status of 
individuals as present tenants of or future heirs to it, the 
importance of preserving (the feudal notion of reciprocal 
rights and duties) intact the present and future labour force 
on it, (producing their own subsistence and reproduction, and 
a sufficient surplus to pay for the incidents of tenures).
Land holding, law making and law giving - (common, civil and 
ecclesiastical) was almost an entirely male enterprise. Women 
appear, in judicial discourses at least, in two guises - as a 
threat (the means by which land might be diverted away from
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its allotted destiny, through marriage) and as a necessity - 
through their procreative capacity, producing future heirs and 
future labour services. To this extent, the female infant is 
circumscribed by three systems of regulation; that of her 
parents, that of the superior landlord and finally the Church.
4. But let us now make these observations substantial. To 
catch the interplay of three integrated discourses giving the 
female infant its meaning, specificity and the social consequences 
arising, let us pursue briefly the 'ages' of women. We can 
usefully introduce here legal notions of discretion, consent, 
issues of wardship and guardianship.
"Seven years for the lord to have aid pur
file marier."
One of the 'fruits' of military tenure, the occasional raising 
of a 'tax' allowed the superior lord to demand from his sub­
tenants to 'aid', a render of cash, at the marriage of his 
eldest daughter, and at the knighting of his eldest son 
(Pollock and Maitland II, 349-50). Majority for the male, 
marriage for the female bears the same meaning, leaving the 
absolute dominion of the father. That aid could be claimed at 
such an early age for 'the marriage' of the lord's daughter 
can only be understood by reference to medieval marriage laws 
and wedding ceremonies.
It had been settled by the end of the 12th century by theologians 
that the fundamentals of a valid marriage was the mutual consent 
of contracting parties (Outhwaite 1981, Hyams and Brand 1983, 
Searle 1979, Faith 1983). The Church would accept such plights, 
made at the Church door, at other public ceremonies, or in 
private (whether or not witnesses were required is not clear). 
Individuals of any status, kings to serfs were equally capable 
of contracting a valid marriage; no temporal official could in­
validate it. No sexual intercourse was required to consummate 
the contract, no exchange of gifts were spiritually required.
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The Church's view of. what constituted a valid marriage clearly 
flies in the face of the feudal relations of enforced dependence 
and mutual obligations; individuals were 'free' to contract 
valid marriages, regardless of their parents' or landlord's 
wishes.
However, individuals marrying without the requisite consents, 
from parents or lords were burdened with two material threats; 
disinheritance by parents, disseisin or distraint of familial 
lands by the lord (Searle 1979). Common law and manor law 
would hold marrying without these consents as good causes for 
parents disinheriting potential heirs, and for lords to take 
the land of sub-tenants who permitted a marriage to take place 
without his prior consent.
This had a material bearing on the age of marriage. Espousals, 
the giving of consents between contracting parties, always pro­
viding the interests of lords and parents were being served, 
appear to take place, if necessary, (to secure alliances of 
property and power) below the age of seven (Pollock and Maitland 
II; 392), that is below the age which the Church traditionally 
accepted individuals to be competent of taking communion and of 
having sufficient capacity to understand Christian doctrines 
of good and evil. Equally, marriage in any one of its stages, 
from the first espousals, through to presentation at the church 
door, could well be prevented by lords wishing to retain the 
profitable right of wardship, through to the age of 16 for 
women, 21 for men (in the specific case of military tenure).
Common and manor law resecured what canon law potentially took 
away, that is the rights of parents and lords to control the 
entry of infants into married status. And it is here we begin 
to see the interplay between the control of property and the 
control of persons. For in controlling marriage, lords and 
parents controlled who was and who was not to be recruited to 
the family economy of landholding and labour.
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In this respect the common law is quite clear; those holding by 
military tenure absolutely require the lord's permission (granted 
directly, or given to parents) to marry, and this was so for 
those holding directly from the king as for lesser knightly 
tenures. Symbolically, it acknowledges the services due to the 
superior lord; materially it protects the lord's profitable 
rights (which could be sold or traded) in the wardships and 
marriages of those in service to him (see Blackstone II; 67-68; 
Pinchbeck and Hewitt I; 1969; Chap. IV).
For the 'unfree' those holding 'at the will of the lord' and 
governed through manorial courts, villein marriages required 
not only the lord's consent, but many also paid merchet. Merchet 
was a payment made by a dependant peasant for a licence to marry 
off his daughter (Searle 1979 ;2). We can only acknowledge briefly 
here the debate about merchet in Past and Present about the 
character and function of merchet by medieval historians. The 
areas they contest and the positions they take signifies multiple 
meanings and functions of merchet and its importance. Summarily, 
Searle (1979) argues that merchet is 'about property'; merchet 
was collected only from peasants with substantial holdings in 
land. Firstly, as a form of tax on doweries of land and or 
chattels which removed from the lord some portion of his material 
wealth. Secondly, merchet functioned to control the entry of 
husbands on to his sub-tenancies, ensuring that they owed fealty 
to him, and no other lord. Thirdly, payment of merchet was held 
as good proof, that a villein actually held his land 'at the 
will of the lord' and not by any free tenure (a confirmation 
if you will of subject and dependent status).
Hyams and Brand argue that merchet was a means by which a lord 
could add small windfall taxes to his coffers; merchet was one 
amongst several other profitable rights which a lord may choose 
to exercise, and therefore worth collecting on substantial 
holdings. It also had, they argue, a further function. In face 
of the Church's construction of marriage as a contract which
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could not be invalidated by lords temporal, the marriage fine 
served to restrict the movement of villeins on to and off the 
lord's desmesne.
Faith (1983) explains merchet in terms of the wedding ceremony; 
the merchet was a form of licence, publically 'registering' the 
marriage of villeins, a means of signifying the lord's approval. 
She confirms with further substantive evidence, that merchet 
functioned to provide good proof of the distinction between 
villein and free status.
These differing interpretations collectively give us some sense 
of the stakes involved, firstly in the espousals, in the confir­
mation of marriage (if any) at a later date. The personal sub­
ordination of minors is indissolubly linked with adults, parents 
or lord, pursuing their separate and diverse interests in tying 
land into the family, and families into the land.
Middleton (op. cit.) addresses the issue of the seigneurial 
control of marriage from a slightly different aspect, lightly 
but interestingly addressed by Searle. Marriage as construed 
by the church, as regulated by the lords temporal and as viewed 
from the community begins to impose norms about licit sexual 
activity. There were formal means for fiscally punishing pre­
marital fornication (the leyrwites or lecherwites) by young women 
(Searle op.cit. 26-29, Faith op.cit.; 147). Middleton suggests 
that young women were doubly bound and doubly controlled in their 
sexual activities by parents and landlords, again both pursuing 
their interests in the land-line nexus.
We have strayed some distance from rgkid pur file, but we 
do so to demonstrate the relative unfreedom of the infant and 
how limited was the room for manoeuvre. Larger interests are 
at hand within the construction of chronological ages. Issues 
of property, power and authority are the proper means of seeing 
the relations between generations. In a real sense, part of the
notion of property is that of the body of the infant ; as a 
possession owned and controlled by parents and seigneurial 
lords. The capacity to consent to marriage, in reality is a 
capacity only exercised within the limits defined by parents 
and superior lords.
"... nine yeares to deserve her dower"
Dower functions primarily as a form of pre-mortem inheritance; 
giving land, chattels or cash to a daughter on marriage takes 
away from the stock of familial goods, and removes from the 
heir possessions which would formally become his on entry to 
his ancestor's estate, however great or small (Searle op.cit.). 
Several problems immediately attend us. Women had proprietary 
rights, perhaps stronger claims to familial property than we 
commonly assume. A sister of a deceased heir took the inheri­
tance to the exclusion of her uncle (a dead ancestor's brother) 
she could be a land holder in her own right, and could alien 
(by sale or testament) goods and chattels - but these rights 
have two provisos. Firstly, this applies to women of full age; 
secondly, to feme sole - the unmarried woman.
If a girl took dower at nine, to whom did it belong; did she 
have proprietary rights in it? The ownership of dower was and 
remained a moot point in law (see Pollock and Maitland I;420-28). 
Prior to the common law settlement of the division of property 
in marriage (the.rules seemed fixed by the middle of the 13th 
century) customarily what women took into the marriage, they 
took out at its dissolution, with the husband having the use of 
and fruits of such property (Pollock and Maitland II; 423). As 
for 9 year olds; it is unlikely they had anything like proprietary 
rights in full. A transfer of land would be deemed invalid, 
though she may have been able to give, by her own hand, a chattel. 
As for the dower, the marriage contract after the middle of the 
13th century, the land or goods would pass to her husband's 
possession and use, if not directly (because he may well be 
under 'the age'), then mediated by the husband's guardians.
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Given these constraints, perhaps we should conceive dower at 
nine as a stage in the affirmation of the espousals. For the 
transfer of property was a mark, a necessary sign that the 
contract was approved by parents and landlords who were now 
both prepared to let property pass into a new household.
"Twelve yeares to consent to marriage".
The age of consent is inextricably bound up with the age of 
discretion. The lines are of singular importance in the grading 
of infancy, second only to the age of majority, when infancy ends.
So for the moment, we shall address consent and discretion
together. For females, as Coke notes, "Consent" is construed
in terms of marriage. In common law male infants attain the
age at 14 years, which is located as the age of consent to
marriage, and, the 'years of discretion', (e.g. Coke 1st. Instit.;123)
There is no authoratative dispute on this point.
Imbricated in the law's construction of consent and discretion 
are several tangled themes which we shall attempt to tease out. 
Firstly, the lines signal the age of valid marriage. Secondly, 
they address issues of physical and mental maturity. Thirdly, 
they address issues concerning validity of contracts. Lastly, 
the age lines address a partial move away from the 'imbecilic' 
private life of the infant to a stage where infants acquire 
(merely by achieving a certain age) the requisite capacities 
to hold some public offices (apart from the proprietary 
rights of socage tenure).
The mode of construction of discretion at common law is signalled 
by the legal capacities the infant assumed on attaining the age 
of 14 years. Let us be clear what an infant at the age of dis­
cretion could do . Bingham (1316) lists the following:
1. "... an infant is capable of such offices as do not concern
the administration of justice, but only require skill and dili­
gence ; and these he may exercise himself when of the age of 
discretion, or they may be exercised by deputy, such as the 
offices of park-keeper, forester, gaoler etc.".
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2. They might be a lord of the manor and grant copy-holds, not 
withstanding their 'non-age' for in this matter they are only 
instruments of custom.
3. They might consent to a valid marriage (at 12 years for 
girls, at 14 years for boys).
4. At 14 years, they might be sworn in as witnesses.
5. At 14 years, the infant moves out of wardship in socage 
tenure and may choose their own guardian.
6. Though there is some dispute here, female infants at
12 years, and male infants at 14 years may make wills of personal
property.
7. They could bind themselves as apprentices.
8 . They could contract for the supply of the necessary means 
of life but not luxuries.
9. Over the age of 14 years, in criminal law infants were regarded 
as having 'full' criminal capacity therefore stood their trial,
and could be executed for crimes committed (see Part 4 for an 
extended discussion).
(Bingham; 57-100).
Bingham's later text, like Coke and Blackstone before him, 
asserts without demur that the age of discretion is 14 years.
The female infant in all but two cases (marriages and wills) 
was governed by the same line. Like the age of majority, the 
age of discretion is by extension the male age, even though in 
significant areas, the female line fell at an earlier age. This 
however is the work of the common law system. It functioned 
to universalise one age as the age of discretion, when the 
earlier ecclesiastical law, from which the very notion of consent 
and discretion were drawn, celebrated a variety of different 
ages of consent; its very imprecision being at odds with common
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law's perceived need for a clear and concise line. Moreover, 
it is to the pre-history of ecclesiastical law we must turn in 
order to understand why infants at 12 and 14 respectively were 
considered to have limited capacities to treat, through the law, 
with each other and with 'full' legal subjects. The key area 
where the common and ecclesiastical systems met was marriage; 
the first being primarily concerned with the sanctity of the 
contract, the second being concerned with licit sexuality and 
procreation - both systems together embody the regulation of 
property and control of personal relations. The age of discretion 
crucially mediates the legal subject's position in relationship 
to both objects, which is why it is such a crucial point in 
infancy.
To reiterate, simple consents given at espousals in the Church's 
eyes constituted a valid marriage (see also Brooke 1981, Ingram 
1981, Flandrin 1976). At common law, the marriage, because it
was a contract, could be valid only if the parties were at the
age of consent (Blackstone I; 436-438). Blackstone sets out 
the position so:
"By common law, if the parties were of 
the age of consent, there wanted no other
concurrence to make the marriage valid;
and this was agreeable to the canon law 
(ibid)".
How then did the age of consent become 12 and 14 respectively.
How was this to accommodate the ecclesiastical doctrine that 
two consenting parties of whatever age could contract a valid 
marriage? The Church and the Kings's law after all were regu­
lating two quite separate things; in the first case an unlawful 
marriage was a sin, in the second, an unlawful marriage con­
stituted an invalid contract.
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The main lines of canon law doctrine are well set out by Pollock 
and Maitland.
"At the age of seven years, a child was 
capable of consent, but the marriage re­
mained voidable so long as either of the 
parties to it was below at which it could 
be consummated. A presumption fixed this 
age at fourteen years for boys and twelve 
for girls. In case only one of the parties 
was below that age, the marriage could 
be avoided by that party but was binding 
on the other."
(Pollock and Maitland II; 390).
And they add, "this doctrine was accepted by our courts" in 
the 13th century (ibid).
Note the ecclesiastical construction, consent plus consummation. 
If the marriage was not consummated, the union could be dis­
solved, for it was reckoned by the church never to have been 
completed, and this provided the only sure claim for a divorce 
in ecclesiastical courts.
Common law adopts the same structure but infers somewhat 
different meanings, whilst adopting the canonical presumption 
about age.
"The next legal disability is want of age.
This is sufficient to avoid all other con­
tracts, on account of the imbecility of 
judgement in parties contracting; a fortiori 
therefore it ought to be avoid this, the most 
important contract of any. Therefore if a 
.boy under fourteen, or a girl under twelve 
years of age, marries, this marriage is only 
inchoate and imperfect; and when either of
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"them comes to the age of consent aforesaid, 
they may disagree and declare the marriage 
void, without any divorce or sentence in the 
spiritual court."
(Blackstone I; 435-36).
What the canon law takes as its referent in the second stage, 
the capacity to consummate, the common law renders in terms of 
attaining reason. The age of consent in common law marks the 
passage out of 'the imbecility of judgement'. And by legal 
logic, the age of consent in marriage (which it declares at 12 
and 14 for female and male infants) because marriage is a con­
tract, thereby infants are consecrated with sufficient capacity 
to enter a limited range of other contracts. So at 12 and 14 
parties consenting to spousals at an earlier age simply had to 
agree or renege on their earlier agreements for the marriage 
to be valid in common law. And there is considerable evidence 
that some chose the latter.
As an example, take the following. John Bridge aged 13-14, 
had been forced into an espousal with Elizabeth Ramsbotham, 
aged 11-12, to save his father's bond. When the time cams for 
her consent to the marriage, she refused, arguing that he never 
treated her lovingly, and recalled:
"...the first night they were married, the 
said John would eat no meat at supper, and 
when it was bed time the said John did weep 
to go home with his father ... Yet neverthe­
less, by his father's intreating, and by the 
persuasion of the priest, the said John did 
come to bed to this respondent in the night, 
and there lay still till in the morning, in 
such sort as this deponent might take unkind­
ness with him, for he lay with his back to 
her all night."
(F. J. Furnival, Child Marriages, Divorces 
and Ratifications ... 1561-66, quoted in 
Outhwaite op.cit; 9).
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Ingram's (1981) essay on spousals litigation 1350-1640 notes 
a declining number of cases over the period. However, throughout 
this period, church courts were confronted by plaintiffs from 
all social statuses (apart from the very rich and the very poor) 
seeking adjudication on the status of their spousals union. 
Because the church allowed a variety of ceremonies, words, 
customs, recognitions and promises (its liberality causing no 
end of uncertainty) equally to constitute a marriage, it was 
possible on attaining the age of consent (and later) to go 
before the church courts and overturn the simple consents at 
espousals, to unbind oneself from one's child-spouse. Or it 
could be a means of affirming in law, what was already known 
by the community, that two people were in fact married
The point at which parties were able to ratify the consents 
given at earlier espousals was a point of considerable tension 
between the church and the crown, between children and their 
parents. The church's view that consent between contracting 
parties was all that was required to form an indissoluble union, 
flies in the face of temporal authorities concerned to control 
marriage because it involved (potentially) the devolution of 
land. The church's construction of consent did give considerable 
discretion to 12 year old girls and 14 year olds boys to marry 
against the wishes and interests of their parents and those in 
seigneurial authority.
We acknowledged earlier that against the church and common law's 
recognition of infants capacity to consent to marriage, there 
were the formidable powers of regulation by disinheritance, a 
case where social facts could run against the tide of judicial 
acts. We know that where it suited parental interests, infants 
well under the age of consent were 'married' to further the 
political and property interests of parents and seigneurial 
authorities (e.g. Pollock and Maitland 11; 398-399: Furnival 
op.cit.). Can we judge with any certainty that canon and common 
law rights available at 12 and 14, were acted on immediately.
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Stone would argue no; it was rare, he states, for infants to 
run against their parents wishes, until the end of the 16th 
century, (Stone L. 1977; 183). Taking the demographic 
evidence gathered by the Cambridge Group for the History of 
Population and Social Structure (using the variety of methodo­
logical tools involved in 'family reconstitution'), Laslett in sum 
argues that it was uncommon for women to marry when very young.
He argues that one of the characteristics of Western marriage 
was the lateness of the age at which women first married 
(Laslett 1977; 39). He continues (drawing on a variety of 
historical demographic evidence) "It is accepted that no country 
in the West had ever had mean age at first marriage for woman 
as low as 20 years, or at least for no sustained period of 
time...". (Laslett; 40). As far as we can discern (and we must 
acknowledge some of the problems of 'aggregation' hiding diver­
sity of ages at first marriage) what the law gave through the 
age of consent and discretion, other social processes instantly 
removed.
One factor which accounts for this, certainly in the early 
modern period (and probably in feudal times c/f Laslett;48) 
was that while infants were 'of the family of their natural 
parents, they were not necessarily 'in' it. From the age of 
about 10 years onwards, the majority of infants (of whatever 
status) probably moved into other adults' households as servants, 
apprentices, companions, boarders, lodgers etc. (Laslett;43-45 : 
Flandrin op.cit;61-65). The infant's relationship there was 
more than a labour relation; entering the potestas of the 
patriarch meant that he controlled the possibilities of sexual 
liaison as well as the possibilities of marriage. A second 
factor, not to.be discounted, was the custom of marriage being 
formally sealed only when the dower changed hands (Ingram 
op.cit.;46), indeed being an 'economic pre-requisite' (Flandrin) 
for marriage. For female infants without land, or whose parents 
could not provide some small chattel, many years of servitude 
were required to amass even the small capital sum for a marriage 
dowry (Flandrin op.cit.; 184-85). These then are some of the
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underlying explanationsof the dissonance between the common 
and canon law age of consent and the demographic facts, or at 
least as much as we know of them. To this extent, the common 
law and ecclesiastical authorities were mapping out structural 
spaces, located by the logic of their own ideologies, having 
little relevance to the majority of the population.
Underlying and justifying the age of consent and discretion are 
the referents of maturity. In the church's view, maturity 
reads as sexual maturity, whereas the common law operates with 
notions of rationality - a measure of which is attained (by 
quite circular argument) at the age of discretion (anyway 
defined by the law). Our first observation, that the crown 
simply adopted and adapted for its own purposes the ages pre­
sumed at canon law indicates the fusion of two quite separate 
discursive orders embodied in the age of discretion.
Ecclesiastical maturity is entirely embodied in capacity to 
consummate the marriage union. However, sexual practices in 
marriage had to serve the ulterior purpose of procreation 
(Middleton op.cit.; Flandrin op.cit.), a possibility only after 
the onset of menarche and puberty (and further evidenced in 
the declaimations against pre-marital fornication, concubinage, 
anal intercourse and contraception). We cannot say with any 
certainty whether the ecclesiastical imputations about the age 
of sexual maturity was grounded in reality. Laslett's essay 
on the age of menarche speculatively draws some conclusions 
about Western menarche, the onset mostly occuring between 13 
years and 15 years (Laslett 1977; 227). However, the ages'of 
consent do provide us with some idea about ecclesiastical views 
on licit sexuality and sexual practice. Moreover, it provides 
us with an explanation as to why consent and discretion are 
distributed at gender specific ages. The church's discourse 
on maturity is precisely about the capacity for biological re­
production, and its ages approximate the lower limits of that 
capacity.
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The purely naturalistic and biological ages in canon law are 
taken up in common law, but reworked as approximations of 
marital aptitude and cognitive abilities. The 'code' word in 
common law is 'imbecility', a quality (asserted but never 
fully explicated) distributed around the age of discretion, 
which significantly is drawn at 14 years, the male line of 
maturity, ergo the female infant could consent, but not bear 
the capacity of discretion. Discretion subsumes consent; to 
have legal capacity of discretion reads off necessarily as 
possessing the capacity to consent. Maturity in common law 
signifies the attributes necessary to be a party to a contract 
(marriage, apprenticeship, supply of necessities but not luxuries 
It marks the partial acquisition of legal 'reason'.
Under a common ideology of consent, both systems were able to 
reconcile their separate logics. Agreeing upon a staged entry 
into a union which both systems counted as valid, there could 
be little dispute and no contradictions between the union com­
prising freely consenting parties entering a binding personal 
and affective relationship whose primary motif was procreation 
(the church), and the union premised as a contract entered into 
between free and equal legal subjects (the law).
What the ideology of consent clearly spells out, and a reason 
why 'the age' is of considerable importance, is the fact that 
both systems posit the infant as a subject with attributes of 
rationality, and a limited power to enter one binding contract 
(marriage) without the intercession of, nor guarantees from 
adults. It marks out in theory, a de jure space for auton­
omous decision making, potentially free of parental and seign­
eurial control. But what is also abundantly clear, is that 
temporal authorities, through the mechanism of the common and 
manorial law also had the means to delay the effectiveness of 
the capacity to consent, and, through wardship doctrines (see 
below) to extend infancy until the full age of 21 years.
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Moreover, the ideology of consent, working through canon- 
common law accommodation over marriage ('the basic contract' - 
Blackstone), has its effects in the sphere of contract law and 
the rights of infants to assume a limited number of public 
offices. Not all infants were the recipients of the law's 
beneficence, however.
For female infants, the possibility of ever moving out of 
infancy, in the sense of being economically and personally 'free' 
of adult (male) control was doubly reduced by the loss of legal 
autonomy on entry into marriage, which paradoxically, the common 
and canon law construed as a means of stepping out of infancy. 
Furthermore, as Pollock and Maitland remind us, women of full 
age are absent from the landscape of public offices. The pro­
prietary rights extended to feme sole did not qualify her as 
juror, justice, steward or bailiff. We cannot suppose then 
that female infants ever became 'park keeper, forester or 
gaoler', even after attaining the age of discretion and thereby 
acquiring the necessary 'skill and diligence'.
The common law doctrine of validating unions by accepting the 
mutual consents of those of sufficient consent never entirely 
solved the paradox embodied in the female infant heir and the 
threat she posed ,to 'familial' property. She could marry 
without parental consent, and the common law would accept the 
validity of the contract. It took statutory intervention 
(4 & 5 Ph & M C.8; 1557) to overcome the common
law's inherent contradictions. This Act made it unlawful for 
'any person or persons to take or convey ... a maid or woman 
child under sixteen years, out of or from the possession or 
custody or governance, and against the will of the father of 
such maid ... (or his testamentary guardian)"(ibid.: see also 
Blackstone 1;437). The head notes of the act make it quite 
clear who and what was specifically being protected, and 
what it was against. Legislative concern was with
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"... maidens and women and children of noble­
men, gentlemen and others ... having left to 
them ... lands, tenements and heriditaments, 
or other substances in goods and chattels, 
for and to the intent to advance them in 
marriage (for they) "sometimes approached, en­
treated by persons of lewd demeanour ... 
that for rewards buy and sell maidens and 
children, secretly allured and won to contract 
matrimony with the said unthrifty."
(4+5 Ph, and M. C. 8) .
The entrapment of female infants into clandestine m a r r i a g e , (pre-1753), 
itself a problem for the rich, provided the legislative initiative 
which required all female infants under 16 to have prior consent 
of parents or guardians, simultaneously resolving some of the 
contradictions of the common law's doctrine of granting marriage 
by the infant's consent only. Hence the nobility was able to 
remove at a stroke, not only a potential threat to their estates, 
but to require their consent before a daughter married, thereby 
formally extending parental control and marriage. No such 
impediments were placed on the male infant.
Though we have been addressing issues here in discourses about 
marriage and age being written and solidified by the middle of 
the 13th century, the principles then set out remained almost 
intact until 1929 (Bromley 1976, 5th edit.; 30). The principle 
that on reaching puberty (the legal age of which was 12 and 14) 
either party could avoid a union entered into at an earlier age, 
was overturned by the Marriage Act 1929 (Bromley op.cit; 30-31).
This statutory intervention required both parties to be over 
16 years of age. Secondly, any marriage to which either party 
was under the age was void and not merely voidable (Bromley 
ibid).
The considerable autonomy that the common law allowed infants 
in choosing their marriage partner was interrupted only by 
statutory intervention, primarily to protect infant heirs against 
clandestine marriages which endangered the transmission of 
familial property down the line.
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"... out of ward ..."
The wardship of the body was a consequence 
of the wardship of the land; for he who 
enjoyed the infant's estate was the proper 
person to educate and maintain him in his 
infancy."
(Blackstone I; 68).
Blackstone's pungent declaration neatly encapsulates several 
aspects of wardship. It was a profitable incident arising out 
of holding tenure of military lands. The parentless infant heir 
(heir, strictly speaking refers only to those with an inheri­
table claim to real property) entered the wardship of the lord 
from whom his ancestor's held their fee. During the infancy of 
the heir, the lord enjoyed any income and profits from the 
heir estates, but was equally bound to provide the necessities 
of life, offer protection and provide the rudiments of an 
education appropriate to the heir's status. These are the bare 
outlines of a very lengthy and complex position in common law, 
sufficient at this point to suggest the nature of the social 
relationship between the guardian and ward.
One futher important principle. Having the custody of the 
ward's body and estates, the 'military' guardian could sell the 
marriage of his ward, though the marriage could not be of a dis­
paraging kind (i.e a free person could protest a binding union 
with an unfree subject). (Pollock and Maitland II; 318-319; 
Blackstone II; 70-71). A ward could not marry without the lord's 
consent, and by the Statute of Merton (1236), lords were given 
efficient remedies to protect their interests in controlling 
the marriage of their wards (Pollock and Maitland I; ibid., 
Blackstone I;71).
The selling of wardships and marriages, put simply, meant that 
the guardian was paid a sum, no doubt fixed by market forces, 
by an outside party wishing to enjoy the profits and use of the 
infant's estates, or in the case of marriage, a sum paid for
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the privilege of entering an alliance with an estate of land.
It was on these common law principles, that Henry VIII was able 
to erect the whole corrupt assemblage of the Court of Wards in 
1540 (Pinchbeck and Hewitt I; 1969;59), enabling the Crown to
tap the revenues of the feudal ward and marriage market
At best, the parentless infant heir was a pawn in the game of 
marriage and property alliances, at worst a mere chattel to be 
traded for the best profit. The common law rights of military 
lords served to invest military tenures with yet another profitable 
'fruit' through the horse-trading of wards. But Henry VIII's 
statutory intervention (in part, a response to the appropriation 
of ecclesiastical lands) provided the machinery for the Crown to 
raise revenues (the Court tended to set the exchange price at a
ratio of the annual value of the ward's land) but it also became
the institutional means for a larger number of speculators 
entering the market, not for the purposes of alliance but for 
short term speculation (Pinchbeck and Hewitt I; 61-62).
Moreover, officers of the Court made considerable profits out 
of their unique position in the 'negotiations' (Pinchbeck and 
Hewitt I ; 61).
The early history of wardships allows us to grasp several 
themes which re-emerge in slightly different contexts in later 
parts of this work.
1. It is the infant with property which is subject to the 
attentions and protections of seigneurial authority, the Crown 
and the common law. There is nothing to suggest in the early 
law of wardship that lords or the Crown expressed any interest 
in wardship (the reciprocity of pecuniary privileges in return 
for protection) of the bodies of the landless infant (Pollock and 
Maitland II; 445).
- 150 -
2. The relationship between the guardian and the ward is both 
an economic and personal relationship, in which a ward is 
subordinate to and dependent on the guardian until a ward 
reaches the age of majority. Parent-child relations were 
regarded in law as a species of the guardian-wardship relation­
ship (Blackstone I;460-461).
3. Guardianship as profitable right, where the guardian has 
rights over the use and profits of the ward's land, is extended 
to cover notions of couverture in marriage. Thus, we have a 
homology between the adult guardian-infant ward, and, husband 
and wife (Pollock and Maitland II; 444: Blackstone II; 67).
4. The presumption that the Crown was the guardian above all 
guardians, and should protect those who have no other protector, 
and thus it is the king's courts, resting on the king's perogative 
and delegated authority, which are to oversee the parentless 
infants and the mad (Pollock and Maitland II; 445).
5. To be out of wardship implies being out of the direct 
control of seigneurial, parental and Crown authority, to have the 
capacity to pursue economic and personal relations free from 
these supervening powers. It is one of the fullest descriptions 
we have of what the law constitutes as a 'full' subject. In
the strongest sense, the meaning of infancy in law bears notion 
of being subject to the will of the parent - natural or surrogate. 
And for the infant heir to a landed estate (held by military 
tenure) the law cannot conceive one being 'out' of ward.
The timing of the passage out of wardship therefore brings into 
play the interests and values of those profitably holding 
infants in wardship. These timings are somewhat different for 
wards of tenure by military fee, and socage, so we shall deal 
with the latter below. For the landless, they were never 
strictly in wardship, though certainly not free of adult authority. 
Clearly, the longer the guardian had the profitable rights of 
infant's estate the better for him. Hardly a burdensome 
incident of tenure. As a ward moved out of guardianship, either
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by attaining full age, or by marriage, the lord was entitled 
to collect as his due a fixed portion of the annual value of 
the land (Blackstone I; 69-71), one of the occasional windfall
revenues collectable by military lords.
Male infants as heirs to military tenure moved out of wardship 
at the age of majority. Marriage appears to be no release 
because by common law they could not take seisin of their estate(s) 
until attaining the full age. Why the age of infancy ends here 
we have discussed earlier, so we shall pursue it no further.
The late passage out of infancy here can be judged either in
the law's terms, as the age which has to be reached before an
infant can assume the onerous responsibilities as knight, or, 
read as a chronological line drawn quite adventitious late for 
the guardians of such wards.
The age at which the female infant moved out of ward is somewhat 
unsettled. Blackstone argues that she moves out of ward at 
16 years and 'takes the delivery of their lands out of their 
guardian's hands' (Blackstone II; 68). Macpherson, like Coke, 
argues that a female heir could remove herself at 14, though 
seigneurial control could be extended by another two years in 
order to find a suitable marriage partner (p. 9). Pollock and 
Maitland's review of medieval authorities owns up to some 
ambiguity; it was unclear until the middle of the 13th century 
whether wardship ended at 14 or 21 years (Pollock and Maitland 
II; 320). Later law draws the line at 16 years for certainty 
(see James 1957;4). One thing they are clear about, marriage 
with her lord's consent put an end to wardship. However, she 
mov^sideways, from the guardianship of the lord to the couverture 
of her husband.
The technical intricacies of the female infant moving out of 
ward signalled in the variety of ages above, speaks of the 
tangled interests focussing on the body and the property of the 
female ward. Judicially, the female infant could move out of 
the lord's dominion several years earlier than a male ward.
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(they could marry at 12, take their lands as feme sole at 16).
It was clearly in seigneurial interests to marry off his female 
ward, to forge the best property and political power alliance 
possible, to secure the future interests of his sub-tenancies, 
while he had the power and judicial authority to do so (i.e. 
before the infant reached 16 years). On the other hand, delaying 
the marriage as long as possible meant his continuing profitable 
rights in her estates. A further consideration of course was 
the production of heirs and offspring to provide a secure destiny 
and continuing labour services for his lands; the earlier the 
marriage, the greater the possibility of producing offspring.
Note that these possibilities refer to the seigneurial interests; 
profitable rights of guardianship do not permit the later con­
structions attached to the relationship wherein the object of 
the guardian-ward relation was the welfare and interest of the 
infant.
The wardship of the female infant allowing ultimate seigneurial 
control of her marriage means, of course, the patriarchal .
control of female sexuality. Guardians were given in law J
specific rights to protect their wards against 'ravishment'
(clandestine marriage, seduction), (Holdsworth Vol. 23; 3rd 
edit. 1923;512). Ravishment writs were issued as offences 
against the guardian as an intrusion on his profitable rights 
in property and the potential labour of his ward. But the 
writs also gave considerable formal leverage or guardians to 
control the sexual relations of their wards.
Thinking through the guardian-ward relationship, we can only 
conclude that it continues by other means, the law's subjugation 
of the infant to the control and authority of adults other than 
their natural parents, as though they were their parents.
Whereas canon law justifies filial obedience through biblical 
references to the divine and natural order, the common law's 
continued concern is to protect the property of landholders 
by handing over to them the custody of the body of the ward, 
but drawing on that early and more ancient theme of filial 
obedience. The locus of the law's concern with the female (n*
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is with her potential as marriage partner, capable of procreation^ 
and this theme resurfaces strongly through the seigneurial 
control over their wards' marriage, and the potential problems 
it poses for the continuing land-line nexus.
Seigneurial control of the parentless infant, set out in common 
law principles, universalises one significant characteristic 
above all others. The destiny of the infant's body and property 
is to be decided by the patriarchs; the lord takes control of 
the heir ahead of a surviving mother (Pollock and Maitland II ; 320); 
their marriages are his to give or sell for his profitable 
right; their wardships are for his benefit; the marriage 
alliances are his to negotiate. The natural mother quite 
simply disappears in the early law on the wardships of infants 
who were heirs to military tenures.
There were concerted attempts in the early part of the 16th 
century by landholders, especially the bourgeois purchasers of 
noble estates and monastic lands (Tigar and Levy 1977; 202-203) 
to remove the feudal incidents of wardship, dower, marriage etc. 
attached to their purchases. Common law lawyers devised means 
to escape the aids, reliefs, dower etc. by creating equitable 
estates in land (Topham(lO edit.); 1947; 77-81). Land was conveyed 
to a friend or trust but secretly the uses and benefits belonged 
to a third person - the ancestor's heir, wife or other party 
(see Topham op.cit.; 79). Such manoeuvres considerably 
reduced the potential cash income of superior landlords and 
were thus clearly against their interests. It also meant a 
loss of revenues to the Crown (Tigar and Levy op.cit.;209). In
combination with the gentry and the common lawyers in the 
House of Commons, Henry VIII passed the Statute of Uses.
Feudal privileges and incidents were resecured, but at a price. 
Persons entitled to the benefit of lands conveyed became the 
legal owner (thus allowing freer transmission of property);
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transmissability of land by will virtually ended; finally, the 
Statute 'preserved to the common lawyers their mystical domain 
of real—property estates in land as well as the technical and 
profitable delights of conveyancing',(Tigar and Levy; 210).
The Statutory solution to common law contradictions preserved 
for the moment the ancient privileges of military tenure, 
and seigneurial control over wardship and marriage. Already, 
however, we are beginning to see the decline of the iron grip 
of common law rules on real estates, through the intervention 
of statutes and by the landed gentry pursuing their cases through 
equity in the Chancery Courts. And it was in these sites that 
the later definitions of infancy, guardianship and wardship 
were to be determined.
Socage tenure did not involve the burdens or privileges of 
wardship and marriage. The parentless heir did not become the 
chattel of seigneurial authority to be traded on the market.
An infant's estates and person fell to the next of kin who 
could have no claim on the inheritance (i.e. the mother or her 
kin). Guardianship in socage did not bear the same meanings we 
outlined for military tenures. It was not quite the same 
profitable right. Neither the marriage nor the wardships could 
be profitably sold; if they were devised the guardian had to 
'account' to the ward for any money raised in the transaction, 
which had to be returned to the ward, at the time they moved out 
of wardship. As did any profits arising out of the ward's 
estates over and above the expenses incurred on the ward's 
behalf.
Wardship in socage ceased at fourteen years of age (Blackstone 
II; 88). At this age, infants could choose their own guardian 
(a necessity if any property was to be disposed of on behalf 
of and for the benefit of an infant). The comparison here with 
military tenures is quite striking and confirms a general 
principle: that which the common law most highly values it protects
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by delaying the passage of infants into adult status. In 
the case of the infant without property, they are simply 
absent from the common law writings on wardship. Where an infant 
without property became a party to litigation, the common law 
anyway was simply prepared to let them recruit a prochain ami, 
or guardian ad litem, for that specific case, otherwise, it 
was prepared to let them fend as best they could (Pollock and 
Maitland II; 444). Their prime guardian, was their guardian 
by nature - the father - as he was so-called in common law; 
the parentless, propertyless infant was of no real concern 
to the common law. However, they were of concern to the state 
when they became a charge on the parish, and the effects were 
not about providing protections and liberties, but about the 
appropriation of their labour, and personal autonomy. But then 
the regulative institution comprised not the family, nor the 
common law doctrines, but the workhouæ, or the employer.
In the very absence of propertyless infants lies one of the 
substantial messages about the law operating as ideology 
insofar as it represents the interests of the particular as 
the universal values of all. To seek out what it is prepared 
to protect and what it excludes from its ambient cloak of 
protection - the infant heir as against the landless labourer — 
is equally revealing the law's origins, purposes and material 
function.
"... and at one and twenty years"
At 21, women assumed full proprietary rights; within the limits 
of her tenurial obligations she could alien her lands and chattels 
But only as feme sole; the married woman could not do any of 
those save with the say so of her husband. The female adult, 
the 'full' legal subject was the woman who attained twenty one 
and remained unmarried. A terse, but nevertheless complete 
statement of the common law's regard of women. Perhaps, we 
should conclude with Blackstone's comment on the married woman.
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for like the infant.
"...the disabilities, which the wife lies 
under, are for the most part, intended for 
her protection and benefit. So great a favour­
ite is the female sex of the laws of England."
(Blackstone, Commentaries I ; 445 ) .
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CONCLUSION: INFANCY AND THE IDEOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD
The common law's writing on infancy, its formation of categories 
and age lines, important because these colonise all other 
branches of the legal system, is actually a discourse on property, 
in which legal subjects emerge as entities in relationship to 
and referenced by proprietary rights in and over property. Even 
where the common law is concerned to fix marriageable ages, 
though it draws upon ecclesiastical precedents (established 
by the clerics for their own obvious purposes), the concern 
with the union is primarily about its status and function as 
a contract, with potential effects on the devolution of property. 
It displays no concern with the rituals or ceremonies attending 
marriage, with the wider social and cultural forms of community 
celebrating the union, its quest remains only for the certainty 
and precision that mutual consents are valid.
Concerned as it is with minimal ages at which subjects may 
acquire alien by sale or testament, parcels of land or goods 
and chattels, subjects below the age which the law determines 
to be competent are invested with qualities of imbecility and a 
lack of skill and judgement. The ideology asserts that age 
lines function to protect the infant's property from 'improvident 
ruin'. By contrast, the common law displays no similar concern 
about minimal ages at which infants may work or labour. The 
law's concern is with relationships of possession and non­
possession and not about labour relationships, in that no privi­
leges and protections are advanced on the infant's behalf.
These areas of social life are left to the governance of the 
infant's natural protectors - the father and the master. Like­
wise, the law has no formal rules stipulating who shall be the 
guardian of a parentless, landless infant, and in litigation 
the propertyless infant shall fend as best they can to procure 
a 'legal friend'.
-158 -
If the common law's interest in the infant reads a little more 
than the carefully stage-managed entry into the ownership of 
the means of production (signfified in taking the seisin of 
tenure, limited ability to contract, followed by the 'full' 
proprietary rights to devise property by sale or testament), 
then the process of differentiation between subjects (adult and 
infant, the heir and the propertyless), is a process of hierarch- 
ichisation being pursued along two different axes. Firstly, 
the process of inclusion and exclusion (who has and who has 
not proprietary rights over real estates, who can and who cannot 
call on the law for it to protect their persons and property 
without the intercession of a guardian). Secondly, the cele­
bration of valued status by prolonging the period of protection 
afforded to the infant. The noble tenures, most valued, are 
the last taken up; the offices of public importance and esteem 
are the last available. Age is functioning not only as a 
marker in the acquisition of reason, but equally as a sign of 
social significance or perhaps more precisely, a mark of an 
individual's significance to 'the social'. Thus the knight- 
errant assumes his responsibilities at one and twenty, the 
sokeman takes up husbandry at 14 years, the age of labour is 
unregulated. Paradoxically, the early acquisition of (albeit 
limited) proprietary rights at 14 years for the socage tenant 
is also a mark of lesser prestige.
Within these two axes, signifying as they do aspects of class 
and generation, the third process of differentiation plays out 
the separation between male and female infants. Her ages of 
consent, moving out of wardship acclaim her maturity - to choose 
a marriage partner, to choose a guardian, to take her inheri­
tance - at an earlier time than male infants but conversely 
celebrates both her low esteem and the certain destiny that 
the law, guardians and parents will accord her. It is but a 
short step from daughter to wife. What the common law gives 
in terms of proprietary rights on the one hand, it takes away 
from the married woman on the other. In a strong sense, the 
destiny of the woman was always to be a ward; of her father or 
his testamentary representatives, or of the lord until she married, 
and after that her husband. Only as a widow was she endowed
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with the legal capacity to direct her own life, (but as Middleton 
(op.cit.) argues, there was immense local communal pressure on 
widows to remarry), or as feme sole and unmarried was she really 
'adult'.
The law's doctrine of guardianship as a profitable right gave 
the natural and surrogate patriarch's power over the estates 
and the body of their wards, the authority to use and direct 
the flows of profits from the estates and to trade wardships 
and marriages as exchangeable commodities. In extremis, such 
a doctrine applied to military tenures only, however^ it supplied, 
the principle of parental rights and authority over all children. 
While heirs to socage land and the landless infant could not 
be traded to the same degree, the principle still held that 
any social relationship, unauthorised labour relationships, 
sexual liaison, or clandestine marriage constituted an offence 
against the patriarch, by depriving him of his natural and 
legal rights which would accrue to him either through the heir's 
body, estate or labour services. What the common law actively 
accomplished was the magical transformation of the divine rights 
a father had over his children, to legal rights over the body 
and estate of his offspring. Filial obedience demanded by the 
Pauline writings on the family and the demands made by generations 
of clerics and theologians on behalf of the patriarch's right 
to govern 'his' family takes on material force through the 
common law doctrines of guardianship and wardship. Moreover, 
by statute his rights to direct the lives of his offspring could 
be passed on, by testament, to other guardians of his choosing, 
against the wishes of the wife. Likewise, seigneurial control 
of the wardships and marriages of his wards, could be left as a 
profitable right to his descendants, much as he would will his 
beasts and estates. The law's process of commodifying social 
relationships in this period marks its distance from the later 
conceptions of where the welfare and interests of the child are 
held to be paramount. The writ of 'ravishment' that fathers 
could bring against those attempting to enter a sexual or un­
authorised labour relationship with his ward is homologous with
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the writ of trespass that a landowner brings against interlopers 
on his property, pursued in similar forms through the same
courts.
But we are already beginning to see a feature of adult-infant 
relationships which we dwell on later, the transferability of 
patriarchal authority over infants from one structurally located 
position to another (father-lord-testamentary guardian). Again, 
the early doctrines here refer us to the land law and tenure, 
especially military tenures. For in securing the welfare of 
parentless infants, 'military' landlords also secure and are 
given rights to do so, the destiny of their tenancies. What the 
law lays out are the rules concerning the appropriate person 
to have care of the infant and estate. Now it is the case that 
different kinds of tenure involve different forms and kinds of 
guardianship but it nevertheless underwrites the social process 
that ^  infants fall under some form of guardianship and 
this is true for a prince regent as for a domestic skivvy in 
a common household. The logic of the common law doctrines on  ^
guardianships strongly suggest that rights over the infant ward s 
person are incident upon the need to regulate the infant's esta e 
until such times as they have the capacity to determine their 
own destiny. This is joined by a second line of reasoning that 
wards are property which might be 'ravished ; therefore guar 
are given the means to protect their interests. But it also 
means that like property, wards become a transferable commodity - 
they can be given away, sold or left by will and testament. What­
ever, the law maps out a career in which the infant will always 
be subject to the personal subordination of some adult. But more, 
the guardian-ward relationship brings together the two aspects 
of infancy - economic dispossession and personal subjection, 
which itself is equally transferable, in common law doctrines, 
from one patriarch to another.
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These findings cause some further considerations on the current 
understanding of 'childhood as a recent phenomena'. As a 
lived reality, this view of childhood has considerable merit. 
Without re-telling the considerable differences between child­
hoods at various historical periods, however, what the study 
of infancy alerts us to is the antiquity of the distinctions 
being made between adult and infant. These distinctions may 
not be observable if we take the evidence of cultural iconog- 
raphers such as Aries, at face value. Social and cultural signi­
fications such as clothes and games may well display few dif­
ferences between adult and child. It may well be that children 
were not marked off by their exclusion from certain social 
spaces, the inn, the workplace, the bedroom and did circulate 
quite freely in these social areas and engage in social activities 
as though they were adult. It may well be true that children 
located in past social formations were thought of quite differently 
from the way in which we view children as a social group now.
In terms of périodisation, there are those like Aries that take 
the view that as soon as we can discern a body of texts (moral 
impramaturs to parents, pedagogical texts etc.) specifically 
addressing the special needs of children and outlining a proper 
programme of instruction and development in the context of 
particular institutions formulated around the notion of 'youth', 
we can begin to see the emergence of modern childhood. We can, 
by sifting the evidence on psychological studies of youthful 
development pin-point the emergence of degrees of childhood - 
evidenced, say, in the American formulation of the concept of 
'adolescence' (Gorham 1978). We can, by tracing the emergence 
of legislation and subsequent institutions, the hardening of 
the social and cultural boundaries between adult and child (the 
factory acts, mass compulsory schooling). The social and oral 
historians have alerted us to the diversities of childhood; it 
is not a unitary category, but one riven by class and gender, 
a stage of life differentially experienced. Give the strength . 
of these diverse lines of analysis, what limited claims can we 
make through the analysis of legal infancy?
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Primarily, we have mapped out the formal structure of inter- 
generational relations, exhibited as legal rules. The legal 
infant, formally distanced from the ownership of the means of 
production and personally subordinate to adult guardians, locates 
the character of the social relationship of power and authority 
between generations. It is revealing of who has the power to 
direct the destinies of others, to pace the stage-easing entry 
of others into public life, to change legal and social categories 
We have to add immediately that not all adults have the equal 
capacity to manage these things (an effect of class and patri­
archy), but equally the knight-errant and the plough-boy and 
milkmaid stand in a homologous relationship with their immediate 
male seniors. Like class-relationships, inter-generational re­
lationships are 'objective', independant of the will of indi­
vidual actors. This is not to eschew agency; clearly all sorts 
of voluntaristic accommodations are and were possible; children 
did refuse their parents' choice of marriage partner, ousted 
parents as their guardian, struck bargains in the face of 
their lord's interest, fornicated outside marriage and so on.
We might read this as 'resistance' to adult power but the 
structure of infantile economic and subordination was continued 
by legal means, secured if necessary by outright violence.
Ages of consent, discretion and majority function more or less 
unabated. Celebrating the riotous acts of (male) apprentices 
may well signal class and generational reaction to oppressive 
labour relations but hardly disturb the nature of the inter- 
generational relations.
The longevity and resilience of legal categories, elaborated 
in feudal England, but effective until well into the 20th century 
can only be explained by reference to the fundamental categories 
of class and patriarchy within which inter-generational relations 
are located. Infantile dependence and subordination is consti­
tuted within the law preserving proprietary rights in land, and 
to a lesser degree, the laws regulating personal property. 
Inheritance laws and common law rules on marriage map out the 
lines of patriarchy, which in turn provide the fundamentals of 
the differentiation between male and female infants.
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It is within this structure of intergenerational relations then 
that these writings' concern with 'childhood as an ideology' - 
childhood emerging at the times when children were assumed 
to have special psychological and affective needs - have to 
be situated. We cannot neglect the importance of the history 
of the ways and means by which children were thought of and 
written about as cultural, social and moral beings. At the 
same time, however, neither should we ignore the material 
relations which existed between adults and children long 
before 'the discovery' of childhood and which remain with us 
in spite of recent reports of a 'disappearing' childhood ' .
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CHAPTER TWO
TWENTY ONE; 'THE EMPIRE OF REASON'
THE TRANSITION IN LAW, 1500-1660
l*he transition from feudalism to capitalism represented in Marxist 
theory as a major shift from one mode of production to another, 
remains a formidable theoretical object in social theory and 
historiography. Problems reside in agreeing upon (a) the social 
and economic relations characteristic of feudalism and capitalism, 
(b) the social forces, balance of'power and the sequence of 
events thought to determine a long term historical change.
There is considerable debate amongst Marxists about the consti- 
tutive elements the historical social formation designated as 
feudal , (see Hilton 1978) . Within that debate, however, there 
is a common focus upon (1) the forces of production, (2) the 
i^sls^tions of production, conceived as the social relations extant 
between landlords and peasants. Against this, there are two 
non-Marxist approaches to feudalism. Firstly, the historians'view' 
of feudalism, seeing it -no longer the description of a whole 
social order but of certain specific relationships within the 
medieval ruling class', (Hilton op.cit.; 30), specifically the 
insistionship between land tenure and the obligation to render 
service. This is also very much the legalistic interpretation, 
found, say, in Pollock and Maitland. A second approach seeks out 
elements of capitalistic social relations within medieval society, 
in order to argue against the mode of production analysis, as a 
means of demonstrating the falsity of 'the break'. The most for­
midable exponent here is Macfarlane. His Origins of English
ism (1978) seeks out examples of formally free labour, 
a market in land, examples of legal subjects formally contrac­
ting sales of commodities, production for the market, a mobile 
labour force selling its labour where it could, as a means of 
demonstrating the existence of capitalistic relations always 
already existent in feudal England. As Hilton's short and brutal 
review points out, however, 'Macfarlane's picture of medieval 
England as a country of small, competing entrepreneurs entirely 
omits the fact of lordship, the concentration of the ownership 
of land in the hands of the nobility, the gentry and the clergy
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and their exercise of manorial jurisdiction over the rural 
population. This is not irrelevant to the argument about the 
existence of the peasantry, for it is one of the defining 
features of the class that it bears on its shoulders the burden 
of the state, the aristocracy and the Church'. (Hilton 1980;111).
Not all non-Marxist medieval historians are ill-disposed to 
the Marxist focus on seigneurial-serf relations. Recent studies 
have added to our understanding of that relationship even though 
their concerns have been with social customs and practices, over 
short time spans, and on a less grand scale than advancing new 
theories and knowledge about class relations per se ® .
Debates amongst Marxists concerned with the character and form 
of feudalism revolve around the discovery of the mechanisms, 
social processes and theoretical determinants which account 
for its demise, and from the precedents and ruins of which arose 
capitalist social relations, the formation of the 'revolutionary' 
bourgeoisie, the modern state, and the working class. By extension, 
Marxist concerns have also focussed on the period 1640-1660 ^ ,
the moment of institutional change, a flash point in the 
history of the relations between competing (putative) ruling 
classes - the landed aristocracy and gentry up against the newly 
emergent bourgeoisie - signified in momentous clashes between 
Crown and Parliament in the struggle for political power and 
authority, running in parallel with redefinition of equality 
and democracy exemplified in the political debates and struggles 
taking place within diverse sites such as New Model Army and 
in political movements such as the Levellers.
"The transition from feudalism to capitalism (writes 
Hobsbawm) is ... a long and by no means uniform 
process. It covers at least five or six phases. The 
discussion of this transition has largely turned on 
the character of the centuries between the first clear 
signs of the breakdown of feudalism (the 'feudal 
crisis' in the 14th century) and the definitive triumph 
of capitalism at the end of the 18th century'.
(Hobsbawm 1978; 163).
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Hobsbawm's quiet reminder is that we are looking at a time span 
of some four centuries, when the old order had not quite died 
and the birth of a new order had not been accomplished. In 
this view, we are looking at incredibly long-term changes, com­
plexly connected social processes, given in a variety of accounts, 
slightly different accents and emphases.
For Marx and Engels, capitalistic relations develop from two 
broadly separate sites in feudal society. Firstly, from the 
transformation of feudal relations of possession and modes of 
organising agricultural production, indicated by the change 
from the manor and desmesne into modern capitalistic farms.
In Marx's words:
"The history of landed property, which would demon­
strate the gradual transformation of the feudal land­
lord into the landowner, of the hereditary, semi­
tributary and often unfree tenant for life into the 
modern farmer and of the resident serfs, bondsmen 
and villeins who belonged to the property into agri­
cultural day-labourers, would indeed be the history 
of modern capital."
(Grundrisse 1973; 252-3).
Here, Marx abstracts several related processes. The trans­
formation of feudal relations of possession (tenure for perfor­
mance of service) into land held as private property (with full 
proprietory rights of possession, use and alienation) is the 
first. Secondly, redefinitions of land use; a move away from 
virgate (arable strips) and common grazing land into enclosed 
grazing land. Third, the dispossession and destruction of the 
peasantry and formation of day labourers, 'loosed' for the 
market, selling labour-power as a commodity. At the end of 
the process, lord and villein confront each other as farmer and 
labourer, over land as a means of production, in relations of 
unequal exchanges of equivalents, thus the extraction of surplus 
value.
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Secondly, in parallel (not in series), Marx notes the develop­
ment of towns as centres of petty manufacturing, sites of finan­
cial speculation, as entrepots for overseas trade and conquest.
The point is', writes Neale, 'that agrarian capitalism and petty 
production did not develop after feudalism - they were integral 
to it ...' (Neale 1975; 18). It is in the towns, with their 
guild organisations, exchanges, merchants' tribunals and judicial 
courts that the bourgeoisie have their economic base and develop 
their own forms of political organisation and basis of power and 
authority.
Clearly, the relationship between town and country is symbiotic 
(the common lawyers made their money out of the complexities 
of the law of land tenure, the landowners were a source of 
revenue for speculative trade ventures at home and overseas and 
beneficiaries of it); towns could be a source of employment for 
landless labourers etc.). But there were consisderable tensions 
between the mercantilists, manufacturers, financial speculators 
and the aristocratic landowners and the gentry. The former were 
fettered by ancient forms of law which did not have sufficient 
forms or variety of actions to suit the complexities of trading 
ventures at home and overseas (Tigar and Levy; 265 ). And so 
long as political authority at the national level, concretised 
in Crown and its executive councils, and in Parliament, remained 
as institutions representing and protecting the interests of 
landowners, then the statutory consolidation of emergent forms 
economic relationships, and, the political recognition of a 
shift in the balance of economic power were somewhat limited.
The Civil War continued these political and economic antagonisms 
by other means.
In all this, the legal system became an instrument of change 
and a site of struggle, between landed interests and the emergent 
bourgeoisie, between the common lawyers and the Crown. Any state­
ments about the relationship between legal and economic relations, 
between changes in the legal system and changes in political
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structures, and the relationship between classes pursuing their 
interests, and transformations taking place within the law nece­
ssarily lack any theoretical precision. We cannot with any 
certainty advance any precise statements about 'determination'; 
did for example changes in the organisation of agriculture cause 
the re-writing of the law of tenure, or, was it the case that 
the machinations of lawyers facilitate the capitalising of land 
and the social relationships pertaining to its ownership and 
use . At best, we can highlight some of the salient shifts 
in the development of the legal system, partly as narrative, 
partly to condense the balance of forces at play in these changes
1. Common law procedures were unwieldly and inefficient in 
dealing with disputes over contractual obligations to provide 
goods and services at some future date (modes of exchange which 
are the very basis of commodity production, exchanges and dis­
tribution and financial speculation) . Effecting a mortgage 
on a landed estate, for example, involved the cumbersome pro­
cedure of reconveying the capital sum and interest to the mort­
gager before the due date set out in a covenant. Simply by 
absenting themselves, mortgagers could take whatever had been 
paid, with any shortfall providing the means for them to keep 
the repayments and redeem the estate (Walker op.cit; 50).
Besides these particular weaknesses, the common law had not the 
means of adjudicating cases involving merchants trading abroad. 
All contracts made abroad, bills of exchange payable overseas, 
damage to cargoes, negligence and neglect of goods in transit 
on the sea etc. were all civil suits to be brought before the 
Admiralty courts (Holdsworth Vol. I, 1931, 5th edit; 552-553).
The use and form of writs as the basis of common law action, 
while useful devices for the defence and enforcing rights over 
certain types of property, especially land, simply fettered the 
common law's ability to deal with new forms of commodity and 
financial dealing.
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2. From about the middle of the 16th century, partly in 
response to the common law's weakness, rigidity and formality 
of action, in Chancery, the judiciary began to lay down the 
rules and maxims of equity . Equity developed the rules 
concerning beneficial use or 'the trust', equity of redemption, 
the injunction and specific performance - all binding on the 
person rather than on the object of possession. Chancery pro­
vided a subtlety and flexibility of action and provided new
11remedies that the common law courts could not provide 
They looked at the parties' intentions in the matter of contract 
rather than merely adjudicating the formal lettering of an 
agreement and whether or not the covenant was enforceable.
Equity stressed a just arbitration rather than the legally 
correct one. The forms of action available were clearly more 
responsive to the needs of landowners seeking to evade the re­
strictions on devising land and avoiding the feudal incidents 
attendant upon any sale or purchase. For the merchants, 
traders and petty manufacturers, the Court promised the means 
of adjudicating complex forms of exchange obligations.
3. To Admiralty and Chancery, the common law's response was 
two-fold. Aggrieved at 'outside' judgement of their legal 
practice and at the potential loss of income, posed by the 
threat of clients seeking guidance and remedies in other legal 
domains, by case law, the common law developed, out of its 
writs of trespass and assumpsit, its own complex rules of 
tort and contract law (Walker, 1980; 36-40).
The second response brought the common lawyers into political 
conflict with the Crown for what the lawyers sought was not 
only to have the perogative courts (of which Chancery was one) 
declared to be invalid, to be deemed not courts of record, but 
to destroy the very fact of Crown perogative itself . By 
reasserting the very basis of their material existence through 
their attempts to become the one and only system of law, the
- 171 -
common lawyers developed a legal ideology seeking the curtail­
ment of monarchical powers by arguing for a thorough—going 
destruction of all the institutions which were the legal/political/ 
administrative instruments of the Crown - the Council, the Star 
Chamber, the Court of Wards and Liveries - and by extension. 
Chancery and Admiralty.
There is a curious paradox in the history of the common lawyers' 
struggle with the Crown. Tigar and Levy put it this way:
"While it was indisputably true that parliament 
and the Common Law courts had on a number of 
occasions protested royally sponsored innovations, 
much of the common lawyers' protest, at least 
before the 1500's, was in the name of their 
erstwhile clients, the nobility and the gentry, 
and against the use of special jurisdictions 
and special rules to foster commerce at the 
behest of the bourgeoisie ... the merchants had 
been mostly on the other side of the battle, 
supporting the creation, by means of royal power, 
of courts that would apply civil-law-based rules 
relating to mercantile and shipping practice."
(Tigar and Levy op.cit.;265: my emphasis).
If the Crown perogative courts especially under the Tudors had 
served the merchants and the bourgeoisie well, why then the 
shift in alliance. Why did the bourgeoisie join the Common 
Lawyers against the Crown?
4. One line of thought is advanced by Tigar and Levy. "The Tudor 
institutions had served as the bourgeoisie's hammer against 
feudal resistance, but the spread of economic relations based 
upon contract, and the protection of property relations in 
the Reformation settlement, meant that there was no need for 
Tudorism after 1600." (Tigar and Levy; 266). This is only 
one side of the matter. For Tudorism, represented through the
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absolutist institutions of the Council and the Star Chamber 
was Janus—faced. On the one hand the Crown derogated the 
privileges of the common law courts and delivered efficient 
and fair adjudication, but on the other, derogated the rights 
of individual legal subjects to a fair trial, especially in 
trials which were decidedly political. In the Council and 
the Star Chamber, the Crown acted as legislator, executive and 
judicial inquisitor. As the latter, its guilt—finding process, 
modes of proof, absence of jury and rights of cross-examination 
laid it open to common law attacks about its arbitrary and 
political character which set it aside from the 'law of the 
land' (Tigar and Levy; 266-67). By such appeals, common lawyers 
were able to argue, with some success, that their system, was 
the law of the land and by the ruling of Magna Carta, not even 
the King was above it. The ideology of universal applicability 
of the (common) law provided one of the foundations of the 
alliance between common lawyers and the bourgeoisie and a 
combined struggle against the dark side of perogative rule.
The Council was abolished in 1641: the Star Chamber and all 
institutions of like jurisdiction, fell in 1660, effectively 
dismembering the machinery of Tudor absolutism (Holdsworth I; 
514-515) and making way for the separation of the judiciary, 
the legislative and the executive, a crucial balance of powers 
observable in a variety of modern liberal—democratic states.
5. As for the legal system; the common law changed by re-writing 
old procedures in new forms, appropriated from the law merchant 
the rules to deal with commercial and financial transactions, 
broadened the base of its clientele — bringing into its juris­
diction the bourgeoisie in addition to its traditional business 
of land conveyance. But the Chancery courts were not replaced; 
the rules of equity were not diminished. Moreover, with the 
reconstitution of Parliament as the legislature, the writing of 
law increasingly became the business of the Commons, not the 
judiciary. Judges were now to be appointed by Parliament, 
not the Crown, symbolically anyway unbinding the law from 
the Crown.
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6. The bifurcation of the judicial system into two main 
branches, (common) law and equity, with lesser tribunals 
(the law merchant. Admiralty) and, its lack of codification 
gives the English legal system much of its particularity.
For Max Weber these characteristics rendered a useful theo­
retical object. How was it, that a nation which first de­
veloped a modern capitalistic economy did so and yet retained 
an 'irrational' legal system whose structure and practices 
were decidedly feudal? (Weber 1954; Chapter VII; Hunt 1978;
122-128). We have argued that the transformation of feudal 
social relations of the estate into the modern capitalistic 
agrarian enterprise sharpened the distinctions between law 
and equity, to the extent that the conflict extended beyond 
mere intra-professional rivalry, into the realm of parliamentary 
political conflict and into struggles between parliament and 
the Crown. Now where this has some relevance to Weber's writing 
on 'the England problem' of law, concerns the structure of the 
legal profession, or more precisely its segmentation (see Weber 
1954; Chapter VII, VIII, IX).
The failure to develop 'rational' legal forms (in its purer 
form, signified by the codification of civil and criminal law, 
the development of legal theory, and, professional training in 
special law schools or universities) Weber explains, can be 
accounted for by the peculiar nature, organisation and training 
of the English legal profession(s). (Hunt op.cit.; 111).
Summarily, 'English lawyers impeded not only rationalisation, 
but also codification and rational legal education' (Hunt;III).
But how do these divisions between law and equity, between common 
lawyers and 'civilians' (equity lawyers) account for the retention, 
in Weber's words, an 'irrational' legal system in the face of 
the development of a capitalistic economy and a 'modern' bureau­
cratic state? What follows is the briefest of accounts.
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Firstly, law and equity are manifest in different sites; 
each jurisdiction has its own Courts, judges and officials 
(Kings Bench, Common Pleas etc. c/f Chancery as the centre 
of equity). Secondly, the modes of initiating actions and 
court procedures are different; in law, actions begin with 
writs; in equity, with the originating bill. Thirdly, the 
common law is concerned with the question as to whether the 
writ is formally a true bill and whether subsequent actions 
have (or not) fulfilled the formal letter of the law as laid 
out in writ. Equity pursued intentions and justice rather 
more than merely measuring actions formally against the 
lettering of deeds and agreements. Fourthly, lawyers and 
civilians each had guild-style modes of training; apprentice­
ship on the job as it were, (rendering the law 'irrational' 
immediately in Weber's terms, in the absence of special law 
schools) through which new entrants were inducted into the 
skills, competencies and mystiques of one or other branch - 
law or equity (Weber op.cit; 201). Lawyers and 'civilians'
'come to have a vested interest in the retention of archaic 
and formalistic features, and thereby constituted the major 
impediment to the rationalisation of English law' (Hunt;III).
Now this division is quite unlike say the division between 
modern corporate lawyers, criminal lawyers and constitutional 
lawyers, for here we are describing specialisms developed after 
a common grounding (in law schools and faculties under the 
guidance of academic lawyers) in a variety of forms of law (see 
Halliday 1983; 321-327). We are speaking here of exclusive 
training in one branch of law, to the extent that any outside 
colonisation, derogates not only the procedures and practice of 
law or equity, but threatens the 'vested' (read 'pecuniary') 
interest of the practitioners concerned with it.* Nevertheless, 
as we acknowledged earlier, external forces (the commodification 
of land, the development of urban based trade and manufacturing 
enterprises, the extension of overseas trade) forced the common
*Weber here is quite explicit; English lawyers, he argues, are 
not only guild but income - orientated (Weber;208).
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lawyers to innovate and adapt in order to retain the custom 
of the landed gentry and to provide services for the bourgeoisie. 
Here lies the nub of the problem, for each branch of the legal 
profession; how to retain its institutions and forms of legal 
action and procedure (which gave each branch its identity, 
mystique and claims to specialised competence) while at the 
same time innovating and adapting with sufficient speed to ensure 
that their clients' needs were met. In other words, pecuniary 
interest lay in retaining the feudal; keeping with the 'archaic' 
and 'formalistic' practices of old (in order to retain professional 
identity), but developing, adapting and innovating them (finding 
ways for example of turning the writ procedure into a form of 
contract) such that feudal procedures were appropriate to the 
development of a capitalistic economy. We have to acknowledge 
that the legal profession managed the conumdrum remarkably well; 
the formal division between law and equity was not dissolved 
until the implementation of the Judicature Acts 1873-1875, 
(Holdsworth Vol. I; 638-642). In terms of Weber's problematic, 
the English legal profession evidences the lack of 'determination 
in the last instance'; their intra-professional rivalry gives 
the law a trajectory of its own.
While intra-professional rivalry may account substantially 
for the retention of archaic and formalistic legal practices, 
we should be aware that it simultaneously produced change in 
legal forms and in legislation.
A combative Chancery effectively limited the extent to which 
the common law could 'float' its definitions and meanings into 
other branches of the law. To substantiate this claim, we shall 
refer to the Statute of Uses (1535) and Tyrrel's Case (1557). 
Largely as a result of intra-professional competition, the 
parliamentary allies of the common lawyers enacted the Statute 
of Uses, which gave common lawyers jurisdiction over all landed 
estates, some of which Chancery had earlier held to be within 
its jurisdiction. The common lawyers benefited to the extent 
that all conveyances of legal estates in land had to be conveyed 
by the rules of common law. What was enacted mean 'that whoever
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had the beneficial use or trust of land should take legal 
estate'; in short, there could be no equitable interest in 
land (i.e. no one could have the separate 'use' of land, 
separate from the feudal incidents which attached to seisin). 
Therefore, conveyancing could not fall under the jurisdiction 
of Chancery (Topham op.cit; 81-83).
Chancery was able to break the common lawyers' definition 
of 'legal estate' in Tyrrel's Case (1557), when it allowed
that land might be subject to two 'uses', the first being
the 'legal estate' (attached to which were the feudal incidents 
of aid, relief, fine etc., and rights to inherit); the second 
'use' being a beneficial interest or 'equitable estate',
(allowing someone to enjoy the fruits, in kind or rent, 
without being subject to the feudal dues) (Topham;84-85).
To illustrate:
"Jane Tyrrel, in consideration of £400 paid
by her son G, bargained and sold the land to
her son G, to the use of herself for life etc." ;
(Topham; 84). :
In effect, son G was seised of the land, while Jane Tyrrel 
occupied it and had use of its fruits and revenues. On her 
death, the land would pass to son G, for his disposal.
Technicalities aside, once the Chancery lawyers established 
that a second 'use' in land was permissible (in effect, 
creating a 'trust'), they opened the door to fathers wishing 
to convey life estates to children. It allowed them, for 
example, to convey, on marriage, an estate in land to their 
daughter 'for life' (which effectively passed, by common law, 
to the daughter's husband), whilst the 'legal estate' remained 
in the hands of the father. At the same time, of course, the 
Chancery side opened up a whole new field of business, in 
'the trust'. Chancery also effectively broke the monopoly of 
common lawyers over conveyancing; the lawyers still retained the 
conveyancing of legal estate, either by sale or will. But its 
definition of 'ownership' and 'property' were effectively limited
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It is a signal that Tyrrel's Case is 'about' land, and that 
it should involve the demise of feudal definitions of property 
and ownership. It took another 300 years for the consequences 
to work their way through, and while it could not claim to be 
the origin or root of the notion of 'the trust', the principle 
of the judgement had profound effects on property itself and 
the subjects who could own it, establishing, as it did, for 
example, the notion that married women might formally have an 
estate exclusive to their use. And this occurred while the 
common laws rules dictated that a wife could own no property, 
save that which her husband allowed her.
Acknowledging the divided character of the English legal pro­
fession in this period, we are also forced to recognise its 
location between the state and civil society, between the state 
and the economy. Lawyers are at once officers of the courts 
and are therefore bound by its rules, but they are also petty 
entrepreneurs. As such, they are private practitioners touting 
for business in the market. The legal profession could not 
therefore, be a neutral relay between the various elements of 
the social formation set out above. Pursuing a client's interest 
may well have the consequence of bringing about a change in 
direction of the law itself (though here we have to understand 
the unique position of case law and the power of judges to make 
law in the English system). Likewise, the categories of law 
within which lawyers work, shapes their responses to social and 
economic issues, a consequence of which is to surrender to 
legalism, all questions of morality, justice and conduct brought 
into the realm of litigation. Herein lies one of the unique 
powers of the law, and the unique position of its practitioners, 
rendering, as they do, all social and economic issues into a 
language - and a discursive form - which courts will recognise 
and listen to. So long as that knowledge remains exclusive to 
them, then their vested interests are secured. Suffice then to 
add, that lawyers and 'civilians' actively pursuing their own 
particular brand of law, play no small part in carrying through 
archaic and formalistic and 'irrational' forms of law into the 
earlier modern period and beyond.
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7. The last broad narrative theme concerns the legislative 
regulation of labour which is of some moment to the ages of 
infancy. A crucial theme in Marx and Engels writing on the 
transition, the period 1349 to 1601, running from the Statute 
of Labourers (when agricultural labourers were forced to hire 
themselves out - at 'open markets' - by the year, for wages 
fixed for town and country) to the Elizabethan Poor Laws (re­
quiring the incarceration and forced labour of those able to 
work but unemployed, by the parish), evidences on the one hand 
the expropriation of the peasantry and the establishment of 
new forms of disciplinary labour (see Capital 1 ; )
'The Bloody Legislation against the expropriated', Marx called 
it, detailing the whippings, floggings, brandings and executions 
written into the statutes as fit punishments for unlicenced 
beggars, vagabonds and for those willing but unable to find 
work (Capital 1 ; Chap. 28). Out of this came new practices 
and institutions on to the social landscape; the almshouses 
and hospitals for the aged and sick, the forced apprenticeship 
of poor and vagabond children, the justices of peace as the 
agents responsible for the relief of the poor, and, for fixing 
wages and prices. The secular, state authorities emerge as 
the agents for the provision of welfare, combined with their 
role as regulators of economic relations, formerly the province 
of civil society. And it is this unique combination of dis­
pensing welfare and regulating wages and enforced apprenticeship, 
tying together two discreet systems (on the one hand carried 
out formerly by the Church, on the other, subsuming the social 
regulation of wages and labour, which formerly fell exclusively 
under seigneurial or guild control) on a national basis under 
the aegis of the State which makes this new form of regulating 
the poor distinctly 'modern' and un-feudal.
For the landless infant, for children without property, who 
represent the great silence in common law writings on infancy, 
the potential consequences of all this legislation was enormous. 
Take as an example the Act of 1547, which two recent commentators 
note, was 'the most savage legislation of the century'.
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(Pinchbeck and Hewitt Vol. I 1969; 96). They note its 
provisions, quoted at length here:
"Recalcitrant vagabonds who refused to work 
were to be branded and enslaved for two 
years. A second offence brought slavery 
for life. Their children 'which might be 
brought up in idleness might be so rooted 
in it that hardly may they be brought up 
after to thrift and labour', as well as any 
beggar children of between five and fourteen 
years of age found wandering about on their 
own, might be taken away from their parents, 
or 'keeper' by 'any manner of person' who 
promised, in the presence of one of the 
constables of the parish and 'two honest 
and discreet neighbours' and a justice of 
the peace, to bring up the child in some 
honest labour or occupation, until 20 years 
of age in the case of a 'woman child' and 
24 for a 'man child'. Should the apprentice 
run away and be recaptured, the master might 
put the child in chains 'and use him or her 
as his slave at all points' until it came of 
age. During such period of enslavement, the 
child ranked as personal property and could 
be disposed of 'after such like manner as he 
may do of any other of his movable goods or 
chattels."
(Pinchbeck and Hewitt Vol. I op.cit; 96).
Subsequent legislation in 1549 and 1572 removed the 'taint 
of slavery' (replacing stocking and whipping for runaways) and 
allowed marriage to be a cause for girls to slip their enforced 
apprenticeship (Pinchbeck and Hewitt op.cit.;97).
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Besides illustrating the brutality of 'the bloody legislation' 
and serving to remind us how narrowly focussed the common 
law 'privileges and protections' were, it also introduces age 
lines in a form not previously considered, namely those con­
cerning the age of labour.
Enforced apprenticeship could begin as early as five and continue 
until the age of 24. Learning to labour clearly has different 
principles from the capacity to hold property. The Act is 
quite clear that the principle of providing care and protection 
was premised on a child becoming industrious and productive, 
even for 5 year olds. The upper age limit is taken from the 
London guild customs of not allowing anyone under the age of 
24 to become a master craftsman in their own right, to prevent 
overhasty and ill-advised marriage (Dunlop 1912; "70 ).
Paradoxically, infants could not voluntarily indenture them­
selves as apprentices until 14, at the age of discretion. On 
doing so, they received no wages, the benefits of craft 
training and board being thought sufficiently beneficial to the 
infant, and it was in this status they remained for seven years 
at least. Again, however, the age of majority in this context, 
falls at 24 in London and not at 21; at the time they are 
eligible to enter the guild as. a mas^ter, and to become a citizen 
of the borough. The informal guild regulations were consoli­
dated into legislation of The Statute of Artifices (1563) which 
allowed justices of the peace to fix wages and to enforce the 
training of young workers in skilled industry (Dunlop op.cit; 
52-70. Pinchbeck and Hewitt Vol. I; 98-99). It fixed 24 as 
the age at which apprenticeship ended on a national basis, in 
line with previous legislation on enforced apprenticeship.
The apprenticeship system was directly beneficial to the 
system of petty commodity production in small workshops, 
supplying cheap labour at a regulated cost. Moreover, not 
only did masters control the conditions of labour but also the
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private lives of their apprentices (see Dunlop op.cit.;55).
'In his indentures',for example, 'he had to promise good conduct 
and civility, and abstentions from games such as dice and cards, 
and the "haunting" of taverns.' (Dunlop ibid.)
In other respects, their labour was quite un-capitalistic in 
character; they were not free to move from workshop to workshop 
(though they could be traded), they worked for subsistence and 
not wages, nor could they easily switch from one trade to 
another.
In sum, the statutory obligations on children of the poor and 
propertyless were to work, quite the reverse of the 19th 
century factory acts. Age itself was no protection from the 
dull routine of production. Night work was expressly forbidden 
(Dunlop op.cit.) but apprentices were expected to work a 12 
hour shift from 6.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m. (with a 3.00 p.m. 
finish on Saturdays, and festivals). Again, conditions varied 
locally and between guilds, who by custom set down the con­
ditions of labour and susbsistence.
Again, paradoxically, the labour and poor laws of the late 16th 
and 17th century (the Act of 1547 being a prime example) confronts 
common law as to the custody of children. For the poor laws 
expressly permit the state to acquire the custody of children 
of parents who were not only vagabonds but also too destitute 
to keep their children. This was the outcome of the Act for 
the Relief of the Poor 1597 (Pinchbeck and Hewitt Vol. I;98).
In a terse but interesting conclusion, they add:
"Where parental rights clashed with the 
security of the State and with the welfare 
of children, as in the vagrant and criminal 
sections of the Community, they were to be 
overriden. And in principle, the State
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"accepted the responsibility for securing 
the proper treatment and training of children 
into whose care the law had entrusted them."
(Pinchbeck and Hewitt; ibid).
But there is a larger principle involved here because we can 
begin to map the considerable divergence between forms of law 
regulating the children with and of property, as opposed to 
children without families to sustain their existence. In the 
first case the common law (and later equity) holds the parental 
rights over children as sacrosanct, the very basis of good 
order, ensuring both the continuity of the family across 
generations and the destiny of the property it holds. In the 
latter case, those who are a charge upon the parish are to 
become its property, by statute, and to be set to work at the 
earliest possible moment to earn their subsistence, in spite of 
and without regard to the wishes, rights and privileges of 
their parents.
ABOLISHING 'THE FEUDAL'
To this narrative, there are perhaps two legally relevant 
capstones; both are pieces of legislation, both significantly 
'abolish' elements of the feudal past. The first is the abolition 
of the Courts of the Star Chamber and High Commission, in an 
act passed by the Long Parliament in 1641 (16 Car. 1 c*10). 
Parliament at the same moment asserted its right to be called 
at triennial intervals and asserted its authority to determine 
the form and the volume of tax collection. With the demise 
of the perogative courts, the common law's procedures in criminal 
matters (modes of proof, cross examination, trial by a jury 
adjudicating permissible evidence) map out the claimable rights 
of the legal subject 'freed' from the arbitrary forms of arrest, 
trial and punishment formerly available to the Crown. These 
procedures locate the law as the custodian of individual liberties 
against the State's arbitrary powers to curtail them. It is 
this structural location, the apparent separation of the courts 
from the legislature and of the executive, standing as the
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guardian of civil liberties which gives the law its considerable 
ideological leverage as neutral arbiter, and as power broker 
between the State and the individual. As the forum of adjudi­
cation, its definitions of justice - observing the correct 
procedures, following the set form of trial by inquisitorial 
cross-examination - became per se the guarantors of civil 
rights
The second, the Tenures Abolition Act 1660 (12 Car. 24 C.l) 
discharged all 'tenures by homage, escutage, voyages real and 
wardships incident of knight's service.' The noble feudal 
tenures held by knights service were abolished at a stroke, and 
were turned into 'free and common socage'. This legislation 
was retroactive to 1645. The Courts of Wards and Liveries, 
established by Henry VIII to soak money out of military ward­
ships was also repealed, chopping off a useful sources of revenue 
and patronage to the Crown. To argue that this marked the 
end of the feudal order of landholding would be absurd. Real 
estates of land were still 'held' but as socage land, freed 
of the more irksome feudal dues and obligations (wardships, 
marriages, escutage) but as yet, by statute anyway, not entirely 
'free'. However, the ancient fetters of feudal tenure were 
dealt a telling blow by this legislation. The statutory removal 
of feudal incidents facilitated the process already under way 
in case law and conveyance practice whereby holders of the 
old military estates were converting their holdings into private 
property for exchange on the market.
INFANCY AND ADULTHOOD; AFTER THE TRANSITION 
This Act also rewrote the age lines of infant and adult. 
Paradoxically, although each and every tenure was treated as 
common socage, the age of majority was in fact fixed at the 
chivalric age of twenty one years. The reasoning behind this 
is rather interesting, because in its efforts to protect estates 
no longer under the direct control of military guardians, the 
law rewrote and enlarged the notions of guardianship.
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With the dissolution of military tenures, the military 
guardian-ward relationship was also dissolved. The patriarchal 
authority once assumed by Seigneurial lords was assumed by the 
father. The position post-1660 as expressed by Blackstone 
was as follows:
"... guardians in socage, like those for 
nurture, continue only till the minor is 
fourteen years of age; for then in both 
cases, he is presumed to have discretions, 
so far as to choose his own guardian.
This he may do unless one is appointed by 
the father, by virtue of the Statute 12 
Car II C24, which, considering the imbecility 
of judgement of children of the age of four­
teen, and the abolition of guardianship in 
chivalry (which lasted till the age of twenty- 
one and of which we shall speak hereafter), 
enacts, that any father, under age or of full 
age, may by deed or will dispose of the custody 
of his child, either born or unborn, to any 
person, except a popish recusant ... till such 
a child attains the age of one and twenty years." 
(Blackstone I; 462; my emphasis).
Children at fourteen are too imbecilic to manage estates ergo 
they must (as was the case in military tenures) have a guardian, 
who shall now be the father. As a celebration of patriarchal 
power the Act is quite astonishing in its effects. The mother 
disappears; she cannot appoint a guardian. If custody passes 
to another person, the mother has no say in the forms and means 
of education, religious upbringing or material well-being of 
the child. Moreover, the destiny of children can now be deter­
mined from the grave, for the father could now specify who 
would be the testamentary guardian of 'his' unmarried children, 
and that individual assumed the father's authority. Or as
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Holdsworth puts it, 'this empire of the father continues even 
after the father's death', (Holdsworth II; 446), even against 
the wishes of the mother. This Act incapacitated a mother's 
right to appoint a guardian until 1886 (Holdsworth II; 459). 
so while the Patriarch changes in substance (lord to father), 
a common law relationship becomes statutory right, the effects 
remain constant, except that all infants are legally dependant 
subordinates until the age of 21.
The universal extension of infancy to 21 years is a mere ripple 
effect of standardising forms of land tenure and the writing 
of a unified form of guardianship. Having custody of the person, 
in principle, meant having control of the person's property and 
so economic and personal subordination was now to end at one 
common age. Unlike the feudal relations of wardship, where 
there existed some tension between the father's rights to 
determine the destiny of his heir and land and the lord's right 
to assume the control and use of them, post-1660 all these 
powers now vested in one person, the father. In this sense, 
the age of majority was now to signify not only the assumption 
of proprietary and civic rights, but equally, it signifies the 
passage out of the father's potestas, which post-1660, effec­
tively blocked the infant's entry into the wider public sphere^^ .
"... the power of the father", writes 
Blackstone, "I say, over the persons of 
his children ceases at the age of twenty 
one; for then they are enfranchised by 
arriving at the years of discretion, or 
that point which the law has established 
(as some must necessarily be established) 
when the empire of the father, or other 
guardian, gives place to the empire of 
reason,"
(Blackstone I; 452; my emphasis).
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Thus the age of majority, bears meanings along two axes.
Firstly, as in former times, it functions as an index, an 
arbitrary line, over which the infant passes and magically 
attains the attributes sufficient for autonomous being in 
economic and civic life as the 'full' legal subject. Second, 
the passage out of infancy concretely means the end of the 
exclusive dominion of the father or his surrogate. The meaning 
of 'adult' therefore emerges from the coupling of the acqui­
sition of reason to termination of patriarchal authority. For 
the mad and married women, adulthood is never achieved, even 
after the formal passage out of infancy; the former have their 
legal capacities suspended in favour of the Crown and State, 
the latter have their legal subjectivity suspended during the 
life of their husband.
This Act is the limit case of the father's jurisdiction over 
his children. His claim to custody is held good against 
seigneurial authority, against his wife, against his kin and 
against the State, but only so long as he was not a vagrant 
or destitute. The later law of guardianship, covered in Part 3, 
is largely the narrative of the State and mother asserting 
counter claims against the father's absolute powers. However, 
from 1660 until the 19th century, the law protected the 
sovereign powers of the father over his children and buttressed 
its position with ideological support from the clergy and from 
juridico-political theorists such as Filmer. The privileges 
and protections offered to the legal infant in this period are 
mediated through the potestas of the father. Their relationship 
with other sites constituting the social is routed through 
his consent. Without it, a father had the formal capacity to 
force his bidding by the means of the Courts.
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Post 1660, then, the infant's personal subordination was secured 
by statutory means to the will of the father. What was their 
position with regard to property relations, civil rights and 
privileges incident upon their infancy. The salient points, 
presented summarily, are as follows:
1. Infants cannot be sued except under the protection and with 
the benefit of the defence of his guardian (Co. Litt 135 b; 
Blackstone I; 464: Stephens Vol. II; 444-5). But an infant 
can sue either by his guardian or through his prochein ami
( a 'next friend' who is not his guardian).
2. Generally, an infant can neither make any conveyance or 
purchase that will bind him, nor enter into a binding contract 
(with certain exceptions stated below) (Co. Litt. 171 b; 
Blackstone I; 465: Stephens II; 455 : Anson ; H 9 ).
3. An infant cannot be sworn as a juror, nor sit in Parliament, 
nor hold any public office of pecuniary trust, or of a judicial 
kind, nor vote or act as a member of a Corporation, constituted 
for public purposes - in short, 'do no legal act'. (Stephens II; 
455: Blackstone I; 465). '
To these general disabilities there are several exceptions.
As Blackstone sums up, 'It is generally true, that an infant 
can neither aliéné his lands, nor do any legal act, nor make 
a deed, nor indeed any manner of contract, that will bind him. 
But still to all these rules there are some exceptions; part of 
which were just now mentioned in reckoning up the different 
capacities which they assume at different ages ..."
(Blackstone I; 465).
Of the except^ions, the most complex problem arises in the matter 
of contract . Two general principles hold. Infants have 
sufficient capacity to enter a valid contract of marriage (at 
14 for males and 12 years for females). Secondly, contracts
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involving the supply of 'necessities', appropriate to the 
infant's position in society, which are 'beneficial' to the 
infant (food, clothing, articles of educational necessity, 
tools of trade), are binding on the infant; they must pay for 
them under the terms set out (Anson op.cit. 125-126; Blackstone I; 
466; Stephens II; 108-109). Also, the infant may bind himself 
as an apprentice - this training being regarded as wholly 
beneficial - at the age of fourteen, for a term of seven years 
(Blackstone I; 465) , Male infants may (post 1660) by deed
or will appoint guardians for his children if they have any 
(Blackstone I; 465).
In the matter of real estate, the principle of feudal land 
law still holds good; namely, that any conveyance made in 
infancy can be rescinded at the age of majority
Generally, although,infants are to an extent exempted from 
liability for a mere breach of contract, there are no such 
privileges in injuries of other kinds. Violence against the 
person is an act for which an infant can and could be held 
criminally responsible, even though under the age of majority 
(see Part 4). Also, actions may be brought to recover damages 
for their torts (trespass, slander) - civil wrongs damaging 
the interests of other persons (Stephens II; 457).
This compendium of infantile privileges and capacities we see 
in Coke, Blackstone and Bingham - texts spanning three centuries 
and much in evidence - with few minor changes - in Anson's 
Contracts and Halsbury's Laws of England, in the 20th Century.
The capacities infants did have may be summarised as follows:
1. They had the capacity to contract valid marriages. However, 
Lord Hardwicke's Act of 1753 required the father's (or his 
guardian's) consent before infants of any age could be validly 
married (26 II Geo. C.33: Blackstone I: 436-37),
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2. They could sell their labour, subject to the father's 
consent (for he had the right to appropriate their children's 
labour, and protect that right under a writ of ' r a v i s h m e n t '
3. Certain kinds of contracts - involving the supply of ne­
cessities - could be entered and be held binding on both sides.
4. Male infants could appoint guardians for their children.
5. Infants were held to be criminally responsible for their 
crimes.
In sum, though the period of infancy was extended, the 
several capacities and incapacities constituting infancy changed 
very little post-1660. The old age lines of discretion and 
consent still continued to operate, but in respect of marriage, 
with much less force after the statutory requirement of 1753, 
requiring parental consent for any infant to be married
Nor did the law develop any coherent theory concerning the 
competency and rationality of infants. The infants' capacities 
and incapacities rested upon the antique precedents of age 
lines of discretion and consent, rather than be re-assessed 
against any measurable or identifiable unit or quantity of 
reason or skill. Only in criminal law, did judges use a test 
of rationality (see below Part 4). Being below the age of 14 
or 21 was sufficient to render an infant 'immature' and 
'imbecilic'.
We have argued in the Chapter and the one preceding, that 
capacities and incapacities of infancy, though rhetorically 
referring us to the want of reason and lack of discretion of 
infants rarely go further than citing the ancients on this 
matter. But we have also argued that the fractured and con­
tradictory character of the infant (signified by the complex 
age lines operating within infancy) is patterned, rational and 
explainable if we refer to the concepts of class and patriarchy.
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For the age lines and the capacities appropriate to them don't 
really celebrate stages in moral or psychological development. 
Rather, they function as convenient lines by which the law 
might conduct its business efficiently and even more as 'safe 
points' in the life cycle when particular economic classes are 
willing to delegate familial property to a younger, succeeding 
generation,
Now clearly, this line of reasoning must posit a subject 
bearing some qualities of rationality or competence, able 
enough to conduct (for capacity does imply agency) a modicum 
of business, however large or small. But in the absence of 
any general theory of rationality and competency in the law on 
infancy, all that we can really underline is character of the 
distribution of capacities and incapacities. The law's logic 
generally runs as follows; an infant is given various protections 
and privileges, these being consequent upon their tender years, 
lack of experience and want of understanding. On this basis, 
they are protected against themselves (and the consequences of 
'improvident ruin') and against unscrupulous adults by being 
denied the capacity to sell land, sign (many) valid contracts 
and consent to marriage without parental approval. Undeniably, 
fair and just (protecting the weak and incompetent) but equally 
undeniably paternalistic. But all infants are not equally 
protected: they could sign away their right to paid labour 
through the indenture of apprenticeship, they were free to enter 
the labour market as exploited labourers, and free to enter 
the sphere of unpaid and unprotected labour as wives. No lack 
of capacity, nor privilege and protection here. Rationality 
and competence in law do not derive from a theoretical basis 
of psychology and moral development but are determined by the 
needs and interests of social groups seeking to protect their 
property - family nexus, and to use the labour of others, 
whatever the age of the labourer.
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An overly pessimistic view, one which undervalues the 
positive side of the early entry of children as autonomous 
subjects on to the stage of social life?
An alternative reading, fashionable in writings on 'kids lib' 
and on children's rights uses the evidence of past childhoods 
as means to assert the competence and rationality of infants, 
which by recent statutory rulings, have been consistently de­
rogated. They alert us to the evidence that children in past 
times could and did get married, went out to work, became 
economically self-supporting and so on; in other words, in 
many respects they were adult-like. While this line of argument 
usefully buttresses lines of thought that childhood is socially 
constructed and subject to historical fluctuations, that child­
hood is not naturally or biologically 'given', it is also a 
little ingenuous and overly romantic. For, as we have outlined 
in the foregoing, few infants became 'adult' in the areas of 
social life which really counted - in the administration of 
justice, the formulation of laws, the owners and controllers 
of the means of production (and if Laslett is correct) few 
became formally married - except when it suited parental interests 
when very young. Their competence and rationality were defined 
in terms which in no way really challenged the wider spectrum 
of class and patriarchal interests within which inter-generational 
relations were, and are, constituted. In the end, using the 
social history of childhood in this way, to argue that children 
in the past had a larger scope to determine the conditions of 
their own existence, unfortunately ignores the multiple means 
that adults had in law for overriding the volition of infants. 
Moreover, it ignores the class specific patriarchal qualities 
of past notions of competency and rationality, which simul­
taneously protected children with and of property, but permitted 
the exploitation of the labour of those without it.
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Perhaps it is sound political strategy to argue that because 
children in past times were sufficiently competent to do 
adult things', contemporary children are equally capable and 
competent of doing them. But it is a strategy which pays the 
price of theoretical precision. For it asserts the homology 
of past and present social practices without reference to the 
structures within which social practices take place. Moreover, 
It IS blind to the discursive elements within which past notions 
of competence and rationality were embedded. We shall return 
to these issues at the conclusion of this section.
What the Act of 1660 achieved was a unified age of majority, 
a line which all infants had to cross, irrespective of their 
status as property or non-property holders, or the conditions 
under which their land was held. In this sense, at least there 
 ^ equivalence, in law, between all infants and all
adults (but not formal equality), in respect of attaining 
majority.
Equally important was the effect of synchronising the attainment 
of property rights with formal passage out of the patriarchal 
domain of the father. Materially and symbolically, the 'full' 
subject, the bearer of reason becomes signified by their 
absolute rights to property and the autonomy of self against 
the power of the father. A status which de jure all adults 
enjoy but de facto, not all achieve.
- 193 -
CHAPTER THREE; MINORS MATTER; THE LATEY REPORT
The object of our enquiry in this Chapter is the Latey Report, 
or more fully. The Report of the Committee on the Age of 
Majority (1967 Cmnd 3342). In the classic British tradition, 
this Report created, managed and amplified a particular issue 
(in this case, lowering the age of majority from its traditional 
line at 21 years) prior to legislation being introduced to 
parliament. Committees such as that chaired by the Hon. Mr. 
Justice Latey, by taking evidence from a variety of interested 
parties, or groups whose interests might be affected by its 
findings, allow some sort of consensual view of a particular 
topic or issue to 'emerge'. Its claims to authenticity (based 
on the expert evidence heard and/or reported), and the kind 
of recommendations such Committees make, stake out in advance 
the parameters of the parliamentary and public debates which 
succeed it. The discussion document - parliamentary debate - 
implementation process has long been the legitimate and legiti­
mating process of changing social policy in the UK.
The narrative in this case is disarmingly straightforward. The 
Latey Report was published in 1967. It recommended reducing 
the age of majority to 18 years. In 1969, the Family Law Reform 
Act changing the age of majority, required precisely one sentence 
to implement Latey's recommendation; changing the age itself was 
something done almost in passing.
This, of course, is not the whole story. We need to set the 
Latey Report in a slightly broader context. Synoptically, the 
Report and the Family Law Reform Act which followed ought to 
be viewed as a part of a package of legislation, which at the 
time (at the end years of the 1960's) seemed 'liberal', per­
missive, progressive - journalistically anyway - celebrating 
youthful emancipation, sexual spontaneity and greater individual 
freedom. Lowering the age of majority coincided with the 
introduction of no-fault divorce, the décriminalisation of all 
juvenile offences, abortion law reform, décriminalisation of
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homosexuality between consenting males over 21, and recasting the 
law of prostitution. Whether the legislation was as permissive 
as its opponents argued, or merely introduced new forms of social 
governance and control (National Deviancy Conference 1980) is 
a debate which need not concern us here. There is of course no 
necessary reason why lowering the age of consent need be a radical,
permissive or liberalizing policy. That it was seen to be so
speaks of the images of youth promoted and held at the time.
Perhaps it also represents the symbolic value of the age line
and the way it shapes commonsense views of maturity, discrimination
and judgement.
Changing the age of majority was a more fragmented process than 
it first appears to be. We have argued earlier that the very 
notion of infancy is itself composed of discrete elements, for­
mulated through incapacities to hold and devise property, be 
parties to contracts, the inability to marry without parental 
consent, and exclusion from judicial and political office. 
Policy-making practice in 1969 reinforces this view. Looking 
at 1969, in that year culminated (in legislation) three politico- 
juridicial enquiries focussing on the young.
1. In the 'criminal field', reports such as Children in Trouble -
preceding the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, constituted 
the juvenile offender in terms of discovering the causes of ju­
venile crime. The Act itself effectively decriminalized juvenile 
offences, raised (to 10) the age of criminal responsibility and 
laid out the ground rules for local social services to administer 
care and control. ■
2. A Speaker's Conference, assessed the claims of 18 year olds 
to be eligible to vote in local and parliamentary elections, and 
to serve as jurors. These are issues pertaining to the 'civic 
field'.
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3. Finally, the Latey Report, covered terrain more familiar 
to us; assessing at what age should young people be able to 
marry, make binding contracts, own property, and no longer be 
liable to be made wards of Court, i.e. questions situated in 
the 'private' field (as opposed to the public or civic field).
Although three separate investigations about the young took 
place, in one respect all were concerned with a common problem; 
rationality, responsibility, competence, judgement, and discrimi­
nation, and, the extent to which these attributes were or were 
not 'possessed' by infants, and at what age. In effect, each 
enquiry, in the criminal, the civic and the personal/private 
field, separately and together were concerned with the question 
of, what is an 'adult', and what is it to be adult?
Each investigation had to produce a 'difference', to differentiate 
a class of subjects with the attributes of rationality, responsi­
bility and political judgement from subjects not fully, or only 
partially possessed of these attributes. For it is on this basis 
that the law historically based the distribution of legal, criminal 
and political capacity of individuals. We have indicated that 
the relationship between legal capacity and mental or intellectual 
competency is hardly systematic or consistent; rather the poses- 
sion of competency and distribution of legal capacity each have 
to be judged in terms of class and patriarchal interests represented 
in the law of property, in family law, and as we shall describe 
later, in criminal law. Nevertheless, trying to connect competency 
to legal capacity is a principal feature of legal ideology and its 
constitution of legal subjects. It is part of the rational appeal 
of the law and as such provides a backdrop to the historical 
development of the age of majority.
Producing the difference, circa 1969, between adults and infants, 
(like preceding legislation in 1660) never simply distinguished 
between two social categories. Rather, such legislation socially
196 -
produces relations of power, positions of dominance and subor­
dination. The differences between adults and children therefore 
are not simply distinctions between subjects and non-subjects, 
but is a system of power and authority relations..which has a 
history equally as hard and concrete as the relations between 
classes and genders. Like class and gender, intergenerational 
categories are constantly reworked, contested, compromised and 
reformed. At particular conjunctures, age lines are drawn, the 
categories fixed (temporarily) in relationship to each other, 
institutionalised and protected by legal sanction and exclusion. 
What the Latey Report provides is an insight into the knowledges, 
arguments, ideologies, rhetoric and interests at play, firstly 
in producing the modern distinctions between adults and infants 
and secondly, the means by which the system of power and authority 
between generations are reproduced.
For immediate purposes, we shall postpone any discussion of the 
Children and Young Persons Act, its provisions being more relevant 
and more logically placed in the context of our later writing on 
the juvenile court. Similarly, changes in the civic field (stage- 
managing the entry of 18 year olds into parliamentary political 
participation) will be addressed obliquely at the end of this 
chapter. We do recognise, however, that the juridico-political 
investigations of youth were taking place across a broad spectrum; 
the Latey Report, however, was the one document fundamentally 
concerned with the age of majority.
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READING LATEY
Redrawing the age of majority is a constitutive process; 
constitutive in the sense that lowering the age line from 21 
to 18 years transmits to a slightly younger age cohort, legal 
capacities which enable them to participate in social and 
economic relations hitherto out of bounds to them. In this 
respect, the Latey Report, like other social policy initiatives 
has its creative aspects; in this case re-writing the social' 
to the extent of potentially expanding the population of those 
entitled to 'full' legal capacities. By arguing that social 
policies are 'creative' it should be understood that 'creative' 
does not equate with 'progress' or 'liberation' or greater 
freedom and more equality. Rather, social policies are eminently 
about changing or maintaining relations between the state and 
civil society, changing or maintaining relationships between the 
state and the individual, or between the state and the family, 
(aniL_^QUt—chanqing-or-ma-intaining- relationships-jDetween—the- 
stata._and the individual, or between the state and the family,) 
and about changing or maintaining or enforcing relationships 
between person and person. The content of such policies may 
well concern the distribution of fiscal benefits provided by 
the state but the ideological and creative aspects of the policy 
will be contained (a) within the assumptions about the social 
order implicit in social policy itself (e.g. the 'normal' family), 
(b) within the kinds of social relations, social units or groupings 
to which money will be directed or from which benefits will be 
explicitly witheld. f
Social policies are necessarily regulative; certain social 
practices and social relations are permitted, supported or 
sanctioned - fiscally or otherwise. However, this is a different 
argument from contending, as some Marxist functionalist writings 
tend to (e.g. Althusser 1971, Adams 1978) that all social policy 
is social control; whereby 'the social' is controlled via the
— 198 —
legal and administrative complex of the state, by economically 
dominant groups. Where, in other words, the state is reduced 
to a committee of management acting on behalf and in the interest 
of capitalist fractions. This line of argument ignores two crucial 
points.
1. Social policies may contain assumptions and express interests 
not reducible to class; patriarchal power and authority, generational 
relations, aspects of race and ethnicity.
2. Social policies may well be called for by and benefit directly 
subordinate groups and may well arise from long and determined 
struggles against the interests of ruling groups and fractions 
(see Corrigan 1977).
There is nothing wrong in pluralist accounts of social policy 
formation which argue that policy emerges from a contested struggle 
between a multiplicity of interest groups always providing that we 
acknowledge that not all interest groups have equal political 
power, equal access to the levers of the state bureaucracy and 
an equal voice in forming social and state initiatives (see Fitz 
1980 for a longer account). It is important that we recognise 
that we are speaking of social policy emerging in the context 
of capitalistic economy, a class-divided social formation, with 
institutional complexes such as the Church, the law, state admini­
strative bureaucracies, definite forms of political representation 
which through their presence, history and practices, limit the 
possibilities of re-writing social relations.
Situating Latey as social policy is an important step, for the 
age of majority becomes a concern to a wider audience than lawyers. 
What was predominantly a legal category is transformed into a 
political issue, too large and too important to be left to the 
lawyers to adjudicate. Moreover, the legal aspects of the age 
line, in the Report become only part of the economic,social and
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cultural ramifications which are attached to changing it.
This is evidenced in the composition of the Select Committee 
and the range of evidence and the range of 'expert' opinion 
gathered in the Committee's proceedings.
But what of the structural limitations we spoke of earlier? 
Their presence is immediate. Firstly in choice of Chairman. 
The Hon. Mr.Justice Latey, High Court Judge, author of a 
classic text on divorce (Latey 1973) senior member of bench 
concerned with family proceedings, later to become senior 
member of the Family Division of the High Court. In Latey, 
the person, two lines of meaning coalesce; the age of majority 
is still to be regarded, though not exclusively, as a legal 
matter: secondly, the age of majority is 'about' infants and 
about families. There is no necessary reason for the choice 
of a judge, nor that he be an expert in family law. Without 
being conspiratorial, the choice is and was significant. 
Secondly, the terms of reference. The subjects under consider­
ation were the following:
a) What should be the minimum age at which young people
should marry (now, i.e. 1967, 16)
b) At what age should they be able to marry without first
obtaining consent of their parents (now 21).
c) At what age should they no longer be liable to be made 
Wards of Court.
d) At what age should they be free to make binding contracts 
(now, for the most part, 21).
e) At what age should they be free to own and dispose of
property (now 21). (Latey; 16).
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capitalist economy. Adulthood equates with a specific form 
of agency in civil society, where subjectivity entails 'freedom' 
to choose but to bear the consequences of individual choice 
(be it an unbearable marriage or a disastrous commercial venture). 
By contrast, childhood is the realm of the unfree, those whose 
existence and happiness is to be secured by the mechanism of 
paternalistic protection.
On this analysis, however, the equation of 'formally free' 
subjects with adulthood should not blind us to the salient fact 
that freedom is construed with the bounds of legal ideology; 
freedom is consonant with individual agency and capacity, with 
formal capacity in the sphere of private property, and with the 
formal liberty of entering a marriage or not (for only in marriage 
do partners assume a legal relationship with formal and guaranteed 
claims one against the other; no other union bears such clear con­
tractual weight). If nothing else, the formal freedoms of adult­
hood are being demonstrably shaped by the structure of the law 
itself, by the way in which it disperses capacities over several 
fields, by the way in which the law assumes an idealistic economic 
and personal equivalence between individuals as though all are 
equally able to choose, irrespective of class and gender.
The foregoing, somewhat abstract argument, that the structure 
of the law itself is imbricated in the precise form in which 
'adults' (and conversely 'children') are socially constructed 
goes some way in demonstrating the kinds of definite limits 
within which subjectivities are fabricated. How then do we 
sketch in the other structural determinants and structural 
limitations shaping the emergence of adults and adulthood in 
the Latey Report. Are these effects observable in play on 
the surface of the Report? Do we have a method of teasing them 
out for analysis? If we use a form of discourse analysis, it 
is possible to map out the connections between elements of the 
social structure, the choice of the new age of majority and the 
emergence of the subject adult.
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LATEY AND ITS DISCURSIVE PRACTICES
The useful thing about Select Committee proceedings and 
their final reports/documents is that they 'voice' the 
interests, opinions, theories and evidence of competing 
groups, so that we can examine not only their arguments and 
claims, but also the assumptions on which they rest, and the 
forms of knowledge on which individual and collective evidence 
is based. This is the first and most observable level of the 
discursive structure; the 'authentic' voice, given through 
straight reportage, of those who chose or who were called to 
give evidence.
The second level is not quite so transparent, for this comprises 
the 'rules' of 'grid of reference', by and through which appro­
priate voices are selected, hierarchized, weighted, transformed 
and combined into an authoratative statement/report about the 
social relations and/or social practices which are the object 
of the proceedings.
In effect, Latey (and other Commissions, Select Committee Reports 
etc.) provide an interface between the state (in the figure of 
the Select Committee) and civil society (represented through 
those organisations providing the evidence, opinions and theo­
retical and ideological armoury on which the findings of this 
Report)
From a pluralist point of view, the competing evidence and 
weight of opinion, that interests are allowed to compete.and 
formally represent their views is the very stuff comprising 
the liberal democratic process in operation. The radical 
critique of this view, and one shared here, and sustainable 
in the analysis of the Latey Report, would argue that competing 
interests (a) represent only a narrow spectrum of interests,
(b) that those interests are not equal, either in their power 
to persuade or in the resources that can be brought to bear to
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The terms of reference are limited to the private field 
of civic law, explicitly deleting reference to capacity 
in criminal law and in the civic/public field, thereby 
continuing the dispersed notion of the legal subject. 
Moreover, the Report confirms the historical practice of 
non-correspondence between fields.
"Changes in the civic field are (not) 
at all likely to follow changes in the 
private field even if we wished that 
they should. It is a very different 
thing to cope adequately with one's own 
personal and private affairs and to 
measure up to public and civic responsi­
bilities."
(Latey;17)
It is, in other words, one thing to be able to marry at will, 
quite another to be a full citizen. The non-correspondence 
of capacities, the distinction between legal subjectivity 
in a private capacity and full citizen is best exemplified 
in the figure of the married woman; on the one hand histori­
cally, post 1880 being granted limited property rights, but 
not achieving adult suffrage as of right until 1929. The 
grammar of the law's history is here being recycled through 
the mechanism of dispersing terms of reference and notions of 
adulthood over three separate fields.
More immediately, the terms of reference are explicit state­
ments about what constitutes adulthood; the right to marry 
without consent, to be free of parental direction (which can 
be invoked by Wardship proceedings against errant children) 
to own and dispose of property and to make binding contracts. 
Broadly, adulthood invokes meanings along two axes; adults 
equate with subjects free to form new families and subjects 
who can actively participate (formally) in all aspects of a
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influence the reporting/legislative process. For example, 
the pluralist view would concede an equal voice to all the 
individuals and organisations giving evidence (from Birkenhead 
Technical College to the Bank of England), without conceding 
the considerable fact that the process of consultation is 
taking place within a capitalistic social formation founded 
on and requiring the reproduction of the concept and material 
existence of private property and individual ownership, existing 
as a condition and guaranteed in law.
Now the danger of letting the radical critique run its course 
lies the tendency to reduce all individuals, organisations and 
institutions representing their interests to the Select Committee, 
to a more or less complex position wherein they act or speak as 
classed agents, representing only class interests. By extension, 
the ideological field, constituted in and through the ideas, 
knowledges, theories and sciences, called into play, say, in 
questions about reducing the age of 'free' marriage (marriage 
without the consent of parents or the Court) is reduced to re­
flecting or corresponding with or relatively autonomous from 
class interests. In a word, they have no separate or distinct 
theoretical effactivity, so that, for example, the law and its 
history, the mechanisms by which legal categories construct legal 
subjectivities has no presence other than to write class relations 
into juridicial relations. The consequences for the analysis of 
Latey would render its findings predominantly (and in more extreme 
cases only) in terms of seeing state activity and either maintaining 
or reshaping the balance of forces between classes and between 
economic agents; to wit, changing the age of.majority concerns 
only and primarily economic agency, and to this extent the state 
acts to secure the interests of the ruling and dominant economic 
groups. The logic of the analysis, one step on,requires the 
state only to note the requirements of the economy; the other 
sites constituting civil society and its cultural and social 
relations and practices are banished from the analysis. For 
example, in Latey (and in much of the reforming/permissive 
legislation of the 1950's and 1960's) the Church is a major
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voice in pronouncing on matters concerning the reorientation 
of 'public' and 'private' morality (see inter alia Hall;1980).
The religious doctrines on the sanctity of marriage, its views 
of pre-marital sex, abortion, the age of consent, contraception 
allow churches (and even Althusser allowed the church historically 
to be a major ideological force) to insert their separate and 
collective voices in the formation of social policy concerning 
familial relations. Now it may well be that the Established 
Church, historically, and the Roman Catholic Church prior to it, 
and the dissenting chapels have, at one time or another, seemed 
to have been no -more-, than particular economic and politically 
affiliated groups at prayer, where a particular form of worship 
and distinctive belief in God, closely maps a particular mode 
of ownership and productive activity. But one is not wholly 
reducible to, nor corresponds with the other. Religious beliefs, 
doctrines and dogma can contradict Mammon (and. does so continuously) 
and on this basis claim to beiuniversalistic and not particularistic, 
without being purely 'epiphenomenal'. Religious sentiment has an 
effectivity in reformist political process, separate from and 
different to the balance of economic forces.
The Latey Report, in this context, functions as a surface for 
the emergence of the new adult - the 18-20 year olds - providing 
the intersection for disparate voices (for even economic interests 
have to represent themselves discursively, expressing in oral 
and written terms what their needs and interests are) inside and 
outside the ensemble of state apparatuses. In terms of power, 
the state exercises it by setting the agenda (the age of majority 
is about owning property, and, free marriage) and by arranging 
legitimate statements in a Report to the legislative body. But 
the very process of listening to and selecting evidence for the 
legislative process is an acknowledgement on the one hand of 
the state's legitimate power to do so, and on the other, an 
attempt to substantiate a claim that the,state is above civil 
society and a neutral arbiter of its disparate representations, 
and consequently its legitimate authority to announce new legal 
subjectivities.
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How then to manage the reformist dilemma; to make recommendations 
which were on the face of it, more liberal, just and progressive 
than the electorate seemed to support. ' In one sense, there is 
no real problem. Members of Parliament, are and assert they are, 
representatives, not delegates, with considerable latitude to 
act as individual conscience dictates. Advocating and supporting 
causes in the face of popular opinion does not necessarily con­
stitute electoral suicide. But this relies on the Report con­
structing a feasible basis for defending their choice. The method 
of constructing a second opinion in these matters is well-worn; 
turn to authoritative voices, the opinion makers, the opinion 
leaders, and to those groups with some expertise, knowledge or 
'real' experience of the current situation. Choose those who 
really know and those interests will be directly affected. Looking 
at the groups listed as submitting written memoranda or providing 
other evidence, (taking alphabetically B and C's), we find, 'Bank 
of England, Bar Association, Birkenhead Technical College, Prof.
A. P. Blaustein, Bow Group, British Youth Council, Centre for 
Group Studies, Chancery Bar Assn., Chartered Institute of 
Secretaries, Christian Science Churches, and the Confederation 
of British Industry' (Appendix 3; 160). Add to this, and quote 
lengthily ,learned oral evidence and you have the basis of an 
authoratative statement, not merely an expression of popular 
(and democratic?) opinion.
This exercise is not unique to Latey and this kind of analysis 
is a bit like shooting fish in a barrel. But the point is a 
serious one. Managing consensus a la Latey defines and delimits 
the scope of the political process and determines who shall be a 
legitimate participant in policy formation. Narrowing down par­
ticipatory voices, presenting their evidence as relevant and use­
ful is not regarded either by Latey, Parliament or the public as 
un-democratic, anti-democratic, nor does it threaten the social 
order. What is striking is that the Report can present itself 
(in spite of the minority coda attached) as a natural and unprob­
lematic contribution to participatory democracy, on the basis of 
which parliament can turn to the people and say 'Look, we did 
consult you'.
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Let us be clear to whom the Report was addressed. The most 
important consumers were to be parliamentarians. In the last 
they could decide its fate — either by changing the 
age line, or consigning it to the dustbin of history. And 
yet the language of the Report is directed explicitly at the 
man on the top of the Clapham omnibus, 'the right-thinging 
individual', (Hall 1980;20). Its presentation ^  straightforward, 
journalistic, non—technical with sufficient topical and popular 
references to make it quite readable. But there was a central 
problem.
To convince the politicians of the rightness of its case, 
to catch the popular and authentic voice of public opinion, 
the Select Committee commissioned a public opinion poll.
Let 'the right-thinking individuals' address the politicians 
directly; demonstrate to the elected representatives what their 
constituents had to say. However, in the NOP opinion poll 
appended to the Report (201-205), and in response to questions 
such as 'Legally you have to be 21 before you can sign your own 
Hire Purchase Agreement', 'Legally, you have to be 21 before you 
can buy or sell your own house', and 'Legally you have to be 21 
before you can get married without permission of your parents 
or a Court', (and each question suffixed by 'Do you think 21 is 
the right age or not?'), 60-70% of respondents replied 'Yes ,
21 is the right age to be able to do these things'. To the 
question as to whether 16 was the right age for marriage with 
parental permission, 50% replied that they would prefer the age 
to be raisedI Clearly, a central disparity between the Report's 
recommendations and popular sentiment (as far as it can be said 
to be represented by the NOP survey - certainly the Committee did 
not go out of its way to destroy the NOP findings nor did it claim 
they were unrepresentative). Hence the strategic point of inter­
vention was to be the MP's, regardless of mass opinion.
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It is the first rule of the game; to be in authority (so as 
to speak, and more, to be heard) and an authority (to be a 
legitimate participant in policy making process). Along these 
lines the state and civil society interface in a network of 
circuits of power, exchanging evidence for legitimation, 
knowledge in exchange for participation.
One major consequence of viewing state and civil society as 
linked and complexly related, means that the process of con­
stituting subjectivities (here, specifically demarking the 
adult from the infant) is not located purely at the level of 
state ideological practice. The sites and practices of civil 
society equally constitute human subjectivities (Laclau 1979,
Urry 1981; 72). The Latey Report brings together the public 
andthe private in a unified discourse. Disparate voices are 
brought together in harmony to reposition the age of majority, 
to bring into being new cohorts of adults. The material of 
effects of the Report is to re-produce, and reproduce differences 
between adults and others (historically labelled infants, but 
in Latey and in Family Law Reform Act, called 'minors', a term 
adopted hereafter). Note also the difference is structural, 
and non-elective (no individual over the age of majority can 
choose not to be an adult); structural in the sense that spaces 
are created to which aged individuals are allocated (much in the 
sense that gender is socially constructed, produced through dif­
ferences entailed in language, clothes, productivity activities.
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DISCOURSE AND SUBJECTIVITY; A BRIEF NOTE
Some ground-clearing propositions. From Althusser (1970) on, 
the basic proposition in one theory of ideology is that ideology 
is material; it is manifest through cultural signs, social 
practices, the existence of institutions and in the basis of 
their organisations. It does not float free as a 'cloud of 
ideas'. It is the only proposition not deeply contested by 
radical theoreticians of ideology. Secondly, ideology is always 
already with us; in the face of humanist essentialism, this pro­
position asserts that human individuals are socially created sub­
jects, located in particular classes, spatial locations, en­
gendered, ethnicised and aged-uniqued 'positiones'. Thirdly, 
positioning is not a process of role allocation (Urry op.cit;72). 
Rather, position is a site,from which through their social experiences, 
individuals make sense of the world and begin to act as creative 
and autonomous beings. However, the logic of the proposition 
suggests that individual subjects are not entirely 'free'; an 
individual's capacity to change social location runs in the 
face of structural imperatives (legal sanctions, institutional 
rules, economic structures) to remain 'in place' (as a man/woman, 
capitalist/worker, Londoner/Scot etc.). Fourthly, admitting human 
subjects are conscious, creative and imaginative admits that 
change (however limited) can take place; individuals can change 
positions (e.g. transvestism) and collectively disrupt the 
limitations of structures. Also, structural change can provide 
new and different spaces and positions, and new processes of 
allocation. Fifthly, the exact nature of the structural for­
mation of individual consciousness ; and the individual capacity 
to overcome and change structural determination has never been 
entirely settled (see part 2 below). It is entirely a matter of 
theoretical privileging (for political ends) to argue for the 
exact and precise degree to .which consciousness is formed by 
structural considerations. On the other hand, the humanist 
approach, to accord total capacity to the constitutive individual 
entirely ignores the extent to which 'free' individuals are always 
already located within language, nation, culture and a mode of 
production. In the last analysis, to address the problem of 
ideology is to mount a critique of essentialism.
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In the history of theorising ideology, the recent attempts 
by Foucault and his followers have attempted to overcome the 
problem of dualism between structure and subject. Marxists, 
highly critical of his rejection of a 'master discourse' (to 
wit, the ruling ideas are the social products of the ruling 
classes) have, in fact, taken aspects of discourse analysis 
as a means of understanding and theorising ideology. What then 
are its immediately useful and relevant propositions. Firstly, 
discourse itself, conceived here as a 'linguistic unity or 
group of statements which constitutes and delimits a specific 
area of concern, governed by its own rules of formation with 
its own modes of distinguishing truth from falsity' (Weeks 1982; 
111). Its?^relevance to Latey is quite apparent for the Report
is precisely about delimiting an area of concern, with its own 
modes of distinguishing truth from falsity, relevant evidence 
from mere opinion. Secondly, Foucaults (difficult) conception of 
'assubjetissement'; which bears the dual meaning of 'subjugation 
and ' subjectivity- creating ' , where the individual is endowed
with subjectivity - bearing such and such characteristics - and 
is subjugated (see Palmer and Pearson, 1983; 381). Subjects 
are produced through, differentiated and positioned in, discourse, 
Thus, the evidence given to and selected by the Latey Report is 
knowledge, producing subjectivities, differentiating between 
adults and minors, endowing aged-subjects with certain 
capacities and simultaneously excluding others from its dis 
tributive economy.
PRODUCING THE DIFFERENCE
To reiterate, the Latey Report comprises two major themes 
(at what age shall full ownership capacity devolve, at what 
age can the young freely marry — without parental consent), 
linked by a third. At what age are the young endowed with 
sufficient capacities of maturity and responsibility to exercise
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judiciously the status of property owners and marriage 
partners. We have already noted the limited terms of 
reference (the Report is not to enquire into matters of 
criminal and electoral responsibility), a condition power­
fully reproducing the legal ideology of dispersing capacities 
across separate fields of law, a condition which espouses 
the hidden agenda of re-creating legal subjectivities. This 
is the context for the process of production.
1. Continuities
Latey is a reformist text; it did not seek the removal of the 
age of majority, only redrawing the line at a lower age. To 
this extent, it reproduces a category of English law. Moreover, 
it sought to produce the age of majority as a line around which 
various capacities are distributed, whose possession distinguishes 
between the adult and the minor. These capacities determine the 
range of possible economic and social practices that individuals 
may freely enter (there is no imperative that either set must 
or should i.e. no role allocation). There are also no new 
capacities, rights or claims endowed on individuals, merely 
that a younger cohort might claim or exercise them. There is 
no new definition of adult and minor; the 'contents' of structural 
positions or spaces remain broadly the same.
Confronting the Committee, indeed the object of its existence 
was the historically given age line of 21. Excising it was 
premissed on locating its past and naming its origin and purpose. 
The history we receive in the Report is legal history; a precis 
of Roman Law, early English law (via a lengthy quote from Pollock 
and Maitland) through the Tenures Abolition Act to the Infant's 
Relief Act 1874. From which the Report concludes, 'the Irrelevance 
of Historical Causes'.
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"Grotesque as it may seem that the weight 
of armour in the 11th century should govern 
the age at which a couple can get a mortgage 
or marry today, the historical background of 
a subject does not of course necessarily tell 
us one way or the other about its present 
usefulness (p. 23) .
In fact, the potted history is richly sprinkled with suggestions 
accounting for the longevity and the function of the age line 
(...'to stop an infant squandering his patrimony before he was 
21' (p.22); 'elders of the 19th century were understandably
alarmed at the idea of their hard-won capital being frittered 
away by irresponsible infants' (p.23); 'stories of golden 
spooned infants, prone to horse-flesh, dog-flesh, cigars, 
sparkling drinks, swell attire, betting' etc. ... (p.23). ).
Infancy historically seems to be rendered along two lines; 
protecting the infant against his/her own gullibility and 
improvidence and, equally importantly protecting 'the estate' 
against the improvident ravages of the infant. Infantile legal 
capacity protects both subject and property. Much the same line 
of thinking explains the infant's lack of contractual capacity 
in the historical setting; the need to protect the infant and 
property itself. The representation of the infant through a 
history of the law programmes what has to be reconstructed.
Through the legal history (or at least a precis of it) infancy 
is attached to two related chains of meaning. Firstly, the 
ownership of land and property, from which golden spooned youths 
were historically parted. Secondly, the gullibility of youth and 
the need to protect them from unscrupulous money lenders. In sum, 
the aristocratic, landowning images set the age of 21 in a par­
ticular context but which in turn then evokes two observable 
strategies.
- 212 -
1. To make irrelevant an age of majority which seeks to 
protect only gilded youths, owning estates in land.
2. To construct 18, 19 and 20 year olds as more mature than 
their historical counterparts, and' therefore capable of exer­
cising considerably more dominion over their private affairs.
Interestingly, the two strategies combine in two images which 
are constantly linked in the Report; marriage and mortgage.
DISCONTINUITIES
1. INFANCY; THE LEGAL PARADOX
"There are two aspects of our changing society 
which have forcibly impressed themselves upon us 
through all our deliberations.
The first, as we have seen in Part II, is the 
steep rise in recent years in the number of 
marriages of persons under 21; whatever view is 
taken about the desirability of such a trend, it 
is occurring under and in spite of the restraints 
which the present law imposes. Much of our evidence 
in this sphere reveals that in marriages contracted 
between infants - albeit with the blessing of their 
parents - many couples soon encounter the difficulty 
of being unable to buy or rent in their own name 
a home for the young marrieds, the great majority 
would not be in that position. The hazards of 
spending the first months or even years of young 
married life with in-laws or other relatives are 
self-evident. Secondly, the change in the economic 
structure that has occurred in recent years has 
resulted in a substantial increase in the earning 
capacity of the young; it is common knowledge and 
supported by our evidence that young persons of 18
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"and upwards are earning in employment a living 
wage not so much less and in some cases more than 
their parents".
(Latey; 100).
So, the declining age at first marriage, and the considerable 
fact that the young are significant earners (and consumers) 
begins to make the old age line increasingly irrelevant (and 
contradictory to 'aspects of our changing society'). Indeed, 
the Report highlights the contradiction of the young being able 
to marry but not own property or enter contracts and the social 
consequences this entails for the 'young married life'. Moreover, 
as the Report continues 'The combined purchasing power of a 
couple both of whom are working is considerable but it is inhibi­
ted by the present legal restrictions and disqualifications' 
(Latey; 100; my emphasis). In a word, these 'restrictions' and 
'disqualifications'also have economic consequences, not only for 
married life but for the economy in general.
The image of the golden spooned youth is replaced by a notion 
of minors as earners and as consumers - major economic agents 
in modern life. Furthermore, the Report argues the need for 
the protective legislation of the Infants Relief Act is to 
be sought for 'in the social history of the Victorian Ages (p.87) 
Its purpose of preventing heirs being relieved of their estates 
by unscrupulous moneylenders is largely irrelevant to present 
day circumstances because:
" ... our present day society and its problems
are far removed from those of the 1870's. Indeed, 
borrowing money on a mortgage to buy a house is 
today regarded as commendable, not disastrous.
Moneylending is no longer the social evil it then 
was, and the activity of moneylenders are now 
regulated by the Moneylenders Acts 1900 and 1927.
(Latey; 88 my emphasis).
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Within the changing structures of modern capitalism, with 
the growth of new forms of credit (hire purchase, mortgage, 
retail credit cards and the like) the question of infancy 
turns away from protecting the young against their own gulli­
bility and protecting the estate against interlopers, to the 
more contemporary issue of credit worthiness. The new definers 
of responsible economic agency are no longer the conveyancing 
lawyers but the Hire Purchase Trade Association and the Building 
Societies Association. For it is the latter who stand to 
benefit most by an expansion of the number of individuals 
potentially able to borrow money (and pay interest on iti).
The figure of the Victorian money lender reappears in the evil 
guise of the slick door-to-door salesman, the smooth shop 
assistant and in the glossy promises of the mail order catalogue 
so that the very young still need protection. But the other 
side is positively encouraged; the 18 plus group are marrying, 
are earning and consuming and are responsible and ought to be 
on stage as full participants in economic life.
In the light of these observations, it is hardly surprising 
that the Report specifically recommended the repeal of the 
Infants Relief Act (which for all practical purposes had 
hitherto eliminated the possibility of a minor raising a loan 
on mortgage) and strongly recommended that persons over 18 should 
be able to hold an estate in land (99-101). In these matters, 
the crucial evidence came from the Building Society Statistics
(p. 100-101).
The legal paradox of minors being able to marry but unable to 
own or dispose of property reappears in the Report's discussion 
of wills and testamentary capacity.
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"the case for allowing young people of say,
18 to make wills is a strong one. With many 
more people of that age marrying it seems 
only fair that they should be able to make 
provision for their families in the event of 
death. With their greater earning power they 
have more to dispose of and should they be 
enabled to make contracts and own houses as a 
result of the recommendations of this Committee 
there would be an even stronger case for giving 
them the power to dispose of property thus ac­
quired. While the intestacy provisions would, 
of course, look after the young wife and children 
for the most part, there may be people with 
equally good claims or a dying youngster about 
whome he could do nothing - a fiancee or, for 
example, a foster-mother'.
(Latey; 104).
The observable demographic determinism of the Report (the 
steep rise in the numbers of minors marrying) deters any 
simple reading of Latey in terms of pure economic determinism; 
the demographic and the economic constantly interconnect. 
Reducing the age of majority in response to capitalist interests 
in expanding the size of market for consumer goods, and credit, 
has to be seen in the context of the other strand of thinking 
in the Report, namely, that the economic advantages of being 
adult will help secure and preserve that other building block 
of the social order, the sound marriage. Note how the Report 
refers not only to individuals as owners and consumers, but 
constantly refers us to the couple with its combined earning 
power, needing a house and having property to dispose of (though 
the Report can never quite throw off the implication that 
familial property and the dependants are 'his' - see 104 above). 
The two arguments, that minors are important earners and con­
sumers, and, that minors are marrying, come together as the most 
powerful argument against the retention of the age of majority
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at twenty one, because the legal paradox of infancy, simultaneously 
undermines the sound marriage, and more,prevents its economic 
power from being fully realised.
2. 'FREE MARRIAGE'
"Almost all our witnesses had a view about 
the age to marriage without parental or Court 
consent (which for convenience we call "free 
marriage"). (Latey; 46)
"Marriage was the most difficult and the most 
important of all our subjects. It is the most 
important, because of its consequences: make 
the wrong contract and you suffer for a year or 
two, and perhaps make an adult trader miserable 
for a few months; make a wrong marriage and you 
may suffer for life and spoil the lives of your 
children after you ."
(Latey; 43).
Why should Latey consider lowering the age of free marriage 
as such a tricky and fraught business? Seen in the context 
of contemporary legislation (divorce, birth control, abortion) 
the issue was located precisely on the plane of changing boundaries 
between the public and private, concerned with the extension of 
personal freedom in the face of ancient imperatives and institu­
tional social control. It is difficult to see now why lowering 
the age of marriage - encouraging the young to embark on the 
most respectable form of social and sexual liaison, marriage - 
could be regarded as radical measure and indexical of a rising 
tide of permissiveness.
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The Committee discursively presents three crucial problems:
1. Rising divorce, highest for those marrying earliest, 
even amongst those who married with parental consent 
(Latey; 46 and Appendix 8).
2. Free marriage seriously undermines the authority of 
parents to control the marriage of their offspring.
3. Responsibility; were minors sufficiently mature and 
responsible to contract free marriages.
It was along these lines that the Committee brought its 
arguments and organised its evidence to bear to reconstruct 
the 18 to 20 year olds as mature and responsible subjects, 
fit to bear the greatest responsibility of adulthood, marriage.
a) 'Marriage is no longer today a permanent condition'
(Chancery Judges, in Latey; 46). Marshalling demographic 
evidence, Latey recorded the evidence of early marriage, and, 
the high failure rate of early marriages. Against the latter, 
however, the Report revealed that the divorce rate overall was 
only 10%, which meant that 90% of marriages were lasting (p.46).
It did not go on to add that most divorcees actually go on to 
re-marry. Rather, it went on to assert that, for the most part, 
marriage was a permanent union for the young, and that the law 
should facilitate that social process and hot stand in its way.
In a sense, Latey stands social science against legal prejudice; 
allowing statistics to argue against judicial pessimism, social 
science to mitigate legal precedent. The authoratitive evidence 
came from the Registrar General, not the judges in Chancery. The 
framework of legal realism (which argues that the law must take 
account of and work within the evidence presented by social 
scientists) permeates the Latey Report. For example, its ex­
planation of the cause of early marriage is founded in the earning 
power of 15-24 age group (p.44). This kind of evidence marks a 
considerable shift away from the other traditional source of
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authority on marriage matters, namely the Church. Ecclesiastical 
opinion is never absent, in fact it is carefully sought and 
presented (see p. 48 and 58); however, the authoratative discur­
sive elements are the 'social facts'.
The strong argument here would be to see Latey in terms of the 
secularisation of the family; the state marshalling 'objective' 
data about the social formation in order to assert the rights 
of new age cohorts to form new families. Latey therefore expresses 
a 'state' concern for the problem of young marriages, thus marking 
a further shift away from the ecclesiastical regulation of the 
private sphere. Such a claim might be too strong, for we have 
argued that this is an implicit recognition for the clerics to 
speak on family matters. However, there is a discursive shift 
away from the Church(es) as the sole and final arbiters of family 
policy.
b) 'She's leaving home'.
Sergeant Pepper was primarily entertainment; the Beatles probably 
never made any great claims about their standing as social com­
mentators. It is touching, however, to see the sentiments expressed 
through the medium of pop culture (sneaking downstairs on Wednesday 
morning, scarpering off with somebody from the motor trade, leaving 
a sad little note - a narrative of youthful rebellion, but making 
no great claims to be so) emerging as a tale of fear in official 
discourse, whose abiding image and organising principle was Gretna 
Green (p. 48). An instantly recognisable parental horror story?
The uncontrolled marriage to an undesirable partner.
The effect of lowering the age of majority on parental authority 
per se was not a contingent matter but a crucial issue that 
Report had to resolve. The argument for retaining parental 
permission to marry until the age of 21 ran as follows. Firstly, 
'the very test of having to convince two intransigent parents of 
the worth of the person you want to marry can be a good index to 
your maturity; the young pair passing, as it were, an ordeal 
by argument before arriving at the altar', (p.47). Secondly,
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not all young people are ready, or mature enough to marry at 
the same age. Parent permission allows some flexibility, some 
discretion (i.e. parental) in the face of the law's inability 
to take into account all relevant personal factors (p. 48).
On these arguments, parental permission is construed as protec­
tive; wise old heads providing sane restraint during the head­
long rush of young love.
Such an argument was easily disposed of; demography indicated 
more parents anyway were happily agreeing to minors marrying; 
minors were taking things into their own han*ds, either by 
starting babies, fleeing to Gretna Green or applying to the 
Courts. Moreover, the Report went on to argue (p. 48) (using 
evidence from the Letters and Advice section of the News of the 
World!) parents always acting in the best interests of their 
children was 'an idealised view' (see Leonard 1980; 99-102).
There were such things as intransigent p a r e n t s . Furthermore, 
factors such as social mobility, and the British practice of 
minors leaving home to pursue higher education meant that parents 
were often no longer directly in charge of their children (Latey;48)*
In these deliberations, it is difficult to discern the real object; 
was it the interests of minors or rights of parents to withold 
consent in order to control the marriage of minors. It is illumi­
nating of the nature of intergenerational relations in the extent 
to which it reveals marriage as a rite de passage to adulthood 
and the way in which marriage still operated as a point of conflict 
between generations. Gretna Green, pre-marital sex and pre-marital 
pregnancy materially reject the rights of parents to control 
marriage and conversely celebrate the minors' capacity to take 
their life chances in their own hands, to act and be autonomous 
individuals. They represent symbolically private and public 
affronts. On the one hand, they evoke the personal response;
'How could you do this to "us"', on the other, they represent 
the worst conservative fears - loosening of the moral bonds of 
the family. And this in turn runs against the grain of legal
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and ecclesiastical tradition, two of the institutional bulwarks 
of patriarchal authority over the young. Private shame and 
public concern meet on the grounds of power relations within the 
family.
One of the effects of discourse is to create new norms and new 
forms of social control which play upon the normalities and 
abberations the discourse itself produces. In this report, 
elaborating the grounds on which 'free' marriage at 18 ought 
to be accepted and institutionalised, Latey reduces one potential 
source of inter-generational conflict, without seriously disrup­
ting the power relationships between parents and children. 
Dependence continues by other means. Parents remained free to 
determine at what age children would inherit familial goods.
Or, in more routine matters, 'children' (even those over 18) are 
absolutely reliant upon parents signing educational grant forms 
in order to receive anything over the minimum subsistence 
allowance. In all sorts of small ways, young couples are and 
were reliant upon parental goodwill for setting up house (see
Leonard 1980; 233-34). On these points, 'new adults' have no
absolute rights; parents assume different modalities of social 
control. Whereas Latey sanctifies early marriage (by making it 
formally possible), local and customary strategies to prevent it 
occurring could still prevail. As Lawrence Stone's social 
history of the family in England reveals, the weight of parental 
economic power is a difficult obstacle for children to overcome, 
be it 1667 or 1967.
In sum, it is interesting to see how the Latey Report hammers
home our earlier arguments (in respect of the 1660 legislation) 
about the extent to which being adult is a status deriving 
from rights to marry freely and the right to set up home.
Minority in contrast implies the ineligibility to contract valid 
marriage, or, to marry only.at the behest of parents. Changing 
structural spaces (minor to adult) is as much concerned with the 
legal right to change places, construed in terms of personal
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rights to flee the parental nest and having the contractual 
and possessory capacity to do so.
More complex is the problem concerning the wider ideological 
effect of elaborating structural spaces, of discerning the 
extent to which the positioning of a boundary evokes behavioural 
expectations. If being adult formally corresponds with the 
right to marry, are there social and cultural implications 
that all adults should marry, that the 'normal' adult does 
marry? There is considerable evidence that diverse sources, 
from Jackie to sermons from the pulpit prepare for this expec­
tation. State social policies, ranging from the distribution 
benefits to the allocation of public housing certainly 
assume the connection ( see Land; 1978 ). There is a sense,
however tacit, that unmarried mothers, gays, bachelors and 
spinsters (all bearing derogatory connotations) are not normal, 
and/or unfulfilled. Conversely, the adult with child-like 
attributes, may well be regarded, generously, as innocent or 
^^ive, or just plain mad. Minors too well acquainted with 
'adult' social practices soon find themselves embraced by the 
Protective network of the caring state and defined as being in 
need of care and control because they are delinquents or in 
moral danger. The act of 'leaving home', for example, is 
strictly an 'adult' practice. In the USA, it is a major status 
offence (Garbarino and Gilliam 1980; 198—202), rendering the 
runaway liable to automatic'treatment'. In the U.K., running 
away is not an offence per se, but it certainly leaves minors 
under 16 dangerously exposed to a care o r d e r W h i l e  this is 
not directly an effect of the age of majority, construing adult 
and minor, (separate legislation accounts for the welfare of 
children), nevertheless such categories materially contribute 
to a moral universe which requires that the young have to be 
protected against themselves.
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c) 'Young people nowadays are more mature' (Latey; 47)
A conclusion born of two lines of construction. The first, 
familiar to us, is the acknowledgement that the 1967 age of 
majority ('designed mainly to protect children of the well-to- 
do'), is hardly appropriate 'for the majority of young people 
earning their living at 15 or 16' (Latey; 47). They are mature 
because they earn a living and are on the way (if not already) to 
being economically independent. But as a group, minors of the '60s 
were different, economically,from minors in the past. They had 
'real earnings' not dissimilar from adults (p. 45) and, there is 
a 'decline in the proportion of young people employed as messengers, 
roundsmen and bus conductors'(i.e. they are doing adult jobs) ergo, 
'they have economically come much closer to being adults ... '(p.44)
Moreover, one prominent witness noted (she runs a larger secretarial 
agency) 'there is a new type of employee now emerging, who shows 
signs of having a greater capacity than young people have previously 
had, and is being assigned to increasingly important and responsible 
secretarial and office positions' (p. 44). The Report here is 
silent about gender, but given the nature of 'temp' agencies, the 
'new employee' with 'greater capacity' and 'responsible' silently 
acknowledges the increased opportunities for young women and their 
location in service occupations. The point here, however, is that 
allied to a rise in real disposable income, there is an assertion 
that minors are more responsible than in the past; the young are 
now responsible and important producers as well as consumers.
Minors are now clearly responsible enough to accept the mantles 
of responsibilities that goes with the age of majority.
The second line of arguing for the increased maturity of the young, 
is carried through explanations of earlier marriage. One possible 
reason for younger marriages, the Report records, 'is earlier 
physical maturity, for which there seems to be considerable, if 
debated evidence' (p. 45). Evidence from the B.M.A. indicates 
that boys and girls have been maturing at a progressively earlier 
age . ('The average at which girls now reach menarch?-is a little
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of 13 years ' ; p. 45). Quite how this causes earlier marriage,
or indeed relates to it, is not made clear.
The B.M.A. do not pronounce on the relationship between physical 
maturity and judgemental capacity or moral development, but it 
is the medical profession's evidence which is a key element in 
arguing for earlier maturity (albeit only physical).
It is a Professor Tanner, author of 'Growth at Adolescence' (1962) 
who provides the link.
"It is a good deal more difficult to measure 
earlier psychological maturity but Prof. Tanner 
claims that children who are physically advanced 
for their age do score higher in mental tests 
than their less mature contemporaries, so that 
there would appear to be a link between the two".
(Latey; p. 45).
Quite how biology determined psychological development is never 
made explicit. More interestingly, however, is the kinds of 
psychology that this line of biological determinism precludes.
The Report does not call on Piaget; there is no deployment of 
his elaborate theories which map out the systematic relationship 
between cognitive structures and age. Nor indeed is there any 
systematic link made between the work of Piaget and his follower 
Kohlberg and their work on cognitive structures and stages of 
moral development. While this tradition is by no means unprob­
lematic, it is a coherent approach, in psychology, which does 
investigate precisely the problem the Report addresses - namely 
the relationship between age and maturity.
The relevant 'science' seems to be medicine, not psychology; 
the proper authorities legitimating a shift in the age of 
maturity are doctors even though the B.M.A. eschews any necessary 
link between biological and psychological maturity. What is
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evident in and through the deployment of biological maturity 
(in relationship to 'responsibility') is the circularity of 
the whole argument. Earlier physical maturation appears to 
be a cause of earlier marriage, and a justification for it - 
or at least for earlier 'free' marriage. 'Readiness' in terms 
of moral development, judgemental capacity, emotional stability 
or whatever - the psycho-social justification for earlier free 
marriage - remains unargued and untheorised. The approach might 
properly be presented as 'Well, they already do it, so let us 
pass on the formal right to do so unhindered'.
CONCLUSION
To bring together disparate strands, let us consider the major 
themes in the Latey Report.
1. As social policy, it does not reconstitute the ensemble 
of social relationships which comprise the social categories 
adult and minor. Rather, the Report reaffirms the character 
of each category, and the relationships between them. Adult­
hood remains a legal status comprising the right to own and 
dispose of property, to sign and be held to valid contracts 
and the right to marry without consent. Minority is to be 
excluded from the possession of these rights.
2. However, and this is of signal importance, there is in the 
Report, a recognition that economic agency is more than simply 
owning property. Latey explicitly recognises that minors are 
producers and consumers (signified by the rise in real disposable 
incomes, changes in the labour market and changes in the occupa­
tional location of the young, and the question of credit-worthiness), 
and as such the Report argues, ought to be given formal recogni­
tion by lowering the age of majority.
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3. This implicitly means a considerable shift in the modality 
of distributing subjects to either side of an age line. Res­
ponsibility is not to be judged solely on whether the young
are fit and proper owners and managers of estates, but is evalu­
ated in terms of (a) their location in the labour market, (b) 
whether or not they earn a living wage - and therefore (potentially) 
economically independent, (c) whether or not they are sufficiently 
capable of exercising responsibly new forms of credit.
4. It is tempting to conclude that feudal definitions of 
majority finally collapse in the face of capitalist definitions 
of economic agency (labourers 'freed' to enter both the sphere 
of production are now free to enter the sphere of circulation 
and exchange). Or, that Latey facilitates the expansion of 
potential markets and provides new forms of exploitation (where 
collecting interest is added to the collection of surplus value 
as a means of accruing capital) by providing the legal means to 
make full use of the spending capacity of youth. The problem
is why (if one accepts the base-superstructure metaphor - however 
relatively autonomous the latter may be) should changing the age 
of majority be so long out of synchronisation with capitalist 
interests?
5. The age of majority has never been determined in a unilateral 
fashion by economic requirements: the age of majority has been in 
law a line which formally celebrates parental rights over children. 
The status of the formally free labourer never necessarily entailed 
the formal freedom to leave the patriarch. While Latey deploys 
the arguments for earlier free marriage and the evidence that
the young are more economically independent than in past times, 
in a mutually supportive manner (because they are independent, 
they ought to be able to marry; because they are marrying young 
they ought to have rights to economic independence), we should 
not forget the weight of tradition (or inertia) - legal, customary 
and ecclesiastical - that Latey had to dispose of, in the matter 
of earlier free marriage. It is not a contingent issue in the
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Report but an equally formidable obstacle that had to be 
argued against before the 18 to 20 year old could achieve full 
legal subjectivity. The issue concerned parental authority 
not capitalist interests. Quite simply, it is quite possible 
for capitalist economies to develop and change without any 
necessary developments of changes taking place in the formal 
structures of family law and without necessarily disturbing 
the customary practices of family life. It is quite possible 
therefore for 'feudal' chronological lines to continue into 
the present, where these entail major changes in power relations 
of family forms.
6. This not to argue that capitalist interests do not benefit 
from changing the age of free marriage; clearly young couples 
by taking on hire purchase agreements, home loans, setting up 
house and bearing children, in no way harm the process of capi­
talist accummulation. New households are new units of consum­
ption.
7. We find in Latey no profound philosophical arguments on the 
rights or capacities of minors and scant regard for developmental 
psychology. Neither is it legalistic, quoting at length the 
judgements of the ancients. Its appeal to reason lies in its 
deployment of demographic statistics and descriptions of economic 
changes taking place in the U.K. in the late '60s. Herein lies 
the 'science' of its discourse, mapping out social trends which 
had already rendered 21 as an obsolete age line, and as an ob­
stacle to changes already underway in the social structure.
8. Minority was historically, and post-Latey, an excluded 
status; where substantial areas of public and private life 
remain out-of-bounds. The existence of the boundary provides 
the means of regulating youthful social practices; precocious 
youth prematurely adopting adult life styles may well find 
that agencies which seek to protect them, also have regulative
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powers. Latey reproduces the strong association between 
minority and the need for protection. Because minors 'lack' 
capacity, and judgement, the need to protect, grounds.not only 
their exclusion from economic life and political participation 
but validates the need for moral regulation.
However, the need to protect the young becomes an organising 
principle for all manner of interventions, not only into the 
social practices of minors, but with the lives of adults. 
'Protecting the young' is used to validate the claims of 
pressure groups moving against the free circulation of 'video 
nasties' and 'video naughties' for example, or to attack the 
medical profession's freedom to prescribe the contraceptive 
pill to school-age girls. This not to argue that minors don't 
need protection for clearly they can become subjects of exploi­
tation, but we raise the point to highlight how age lines can 
be used to extend the range of moral regulation and social 
control over aspects of adult life. How the existence of 
minority status can be taken up and used to justify the right 
of the state to intervene into the private sphere of family 
is a theme we shall explore in Part 3.
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CHAPTER FOUR
COMPETENCE AND CONSENT
"The concept of justice carries with it not 
only notions of fairness and impartiality, 
but also the idea of individual legal 
autonomy, the right of a person to be heard 
on any issue which affects him or her and on 
which he or she feels aggrieved. A person 
who is forced to remain silent while others 
make decisions is denied justice."
(King M., 1981; 113).
What are the grounds for denying minors justice, denying them 
'legal autonomy' and 'the right to be heard'. Here we shall 
explore the basis of the excluded status of minors, seeking 
to understand some of the arguments deployed by philosophers 
and lawyers.
For analytical purposes, we may identify two contrasting 
approaches; paternalistic arguments'broadly concerning the 
exclusion of minors from the democratic political process 
and from the legal process, because they are incapable of 
looking after their own best interests, and, the more liber­
tarian arguments, broadly associated with 'kids-lib', which 
suggest that children should be given all the rights and 
privileges enjoyed by adults. Within each approach there are 
shades of difference so that some paternalist arguments accept 
that some of the prohibitions applied to children are perhaps 
arbitrary and questionable. Likewise, some advocates of kids- 
lib would want to raise the age of exclusion, rather than do 
away with prohibitions and protections applied to children 
altogether. The paternalist and libertarian arguments will be 
considered in the context of recent philosophising about the 
status and competence of children in liberal democracies.
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In order to explore how competence and questions about it 
have a material presence in current legal issues, we shall 
look at the notion of consent as it applies to minors, and 
the kinds of social issues it generates. We look particularly 
at the Gillick case. We shall explore the way consent has 
been reformulated over time and the tensions it generates 
between claims for minors individual autonomy and the claims 
made for parents to oversee the moral welfare of their children. 
Consent usefully illustrates some of the politics of 
the intergenerational relationship between parents and their 
children, and between parents and other professions concerned 
with the physical and moral well being of minors. We shall 
begin with some grounding-clearing considerations of capacity, 
the way it is theorised and the implications it has for 
philosophers and lawyers.
a) Capacity
Capacity presents us with a problem of terminology, so here 
we have to make a distinction between 'legal capacity' and 
'capacity' used in juridico-political theorising. By legal 
capacity is generally meant the legal right to pursue a certain 
course of action through the courts (on this basis, minors lack 
legal capacity), the right to enter agreements and to commit 
acts as an autonomous person and to be held responsible in courts 
of law, for these actions (e.g. contractual capacity, criminal 
capacity - both of which minors lack, but to differing degrees). 
One simple message we argue throughout is that legal capacity 
is not a homogenous entity; it descends on individuals at 
different ages in different legal circumstances. Thus, con­
tractual capacity with regard to property descends at 18, the 
capacity to marry at 16 or 18 (depending on parental consent), 
and criminal capacity at any age over 10 years, to some degree. 
Why this is so is one of the foremost objects of this research. 
Possessing legal capacity therefore means the right to be a party 
to some legal suit, the right to be heard in a legal dispute.
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the right to request a trial by jury, and in other circumstances 
being in the possession of the right to vote in or at local or 
national elections. Whether or not that right is exercised does 
not deny an individual's capacity to do so. And it is right 
that we acknowledge that legal capacity permits an individual's 
autonomy to choose a course of action; the assumption of legal 
capacity is oblivious to a person's exercise of it.
Capacity used in the politico-juridical sense is closer to the 
common-sense use of the word as descriptive of volume, size 
and content, and the relationship between them. In respect of 
children, the question turns, practically, on the amount or 
degree of competence they do or do not possess. To illustrate, 
Schrag's discussion of the child's status in a democratic state 
contains the following:
' "The reason for according children marginal 
membership (of the polity) is this: children 
lack not merely wisdom which would be in­
sufficient grounds for excluding them, but 
capacity to be participate fully; * something 
necessary for the completion of personality - 
reasonable maturity or rationality*- is just 
missing."
(Schrag 1975, quoting Cohen; 343).
So children do not have a 'full tank' - either of competence, 
maturity or rationality. On this basis, children are excluded 
because of lack or incompleteness. And it is on these grounds 
that kid-libbers come into conflict with paternalist theoreticians 
The political and personal stakes are these. If it can be demon­
strated that children only partially possess the attributes of 
competence, maturity or rationality ascribed to adults (who, by 
definition, have a 'full tank'), then there is good reason
a) to exclude them from the legal process and participation in 
polity, b) to act towards them in a paternalistic manner, by
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directing their social and personal lives so as to protect 
them for their own best interests. On the other hand, if 
it can be demonstrated that children possess these attributes 
to the same degree as most adults, the grounds for exclusion 
are extremely flimsy and overtly arbitrary . Politico- 
juridical 'capacity' then works upon the differential possession 
of 'cognitive goods' possessed by adults on the one hand and 
children on the other. Their problem resides in measuring how 
full each tank is, and what instruments are available to measure 
the qualities of competence, rationality, maturity or judgement, 
and the extent to which these are acquired with age. It is 
precisely these problems that Latey avoided, preferring to remain 
on the ground of legal capacity - except in one issue - consent 
(see below).
Legal capacity differs in one further respect; it is a status 
ascription. Minors, by definition, are legal subjects denied 
rights to do certain things; other illustrations are blacks in 
South Africa being denied the right of residence in white suburbs; 
a married woman finding it impossible to bring a case of rape 
against the husband. These are simple illustrations of status 
ascription in relationship to legal capacity. Legal capacity 
determines the ascription of status, and speaks the social 
consequences for those who lack it.
However, particularly in the case of minors, the absence of 
'legal capacity' and hence their excluded status, rests upon 
the putative and often questionable grounds of their lack of 
'capacity'.
What we have tried to spell out in the foregoing chapters is the 
sociological aspects of the relationship between 'capacity' and 
'legal capacity'. The distinctive move we have made, away from 
the idealist theorising of politico-juridical writers is to
232 -
underline the class and patriarchal interests concerned 
with and written into the legal definitions of 'incapacity' 
of minors. To reiterate, the legal capacity of infants, then 
minors, is defined along two axes; a concern with the protection 
the person, and, probably more emphatically with the property 
that some minors possessed or were about to become possessors of. 
We are constantly made aware of the extent to which the law is 
invoked to protect minors as a person within a family, but also 
as a member of a family capable of owning and controlling familial 
goods. The minor's lack of legal capacity enabled family elders 
to control not only the person but also the infants' possessions. 
We would argue then that 'legal capacity' and politico-juridical 
'capacity' have to be held as conceptually different and that 
philosophers in general have thus far had only minimal impact on 
the judicial imagination. Nowhere is this more evident than in 
the redefinitions of the age of majority where the material 
concerns have been with property, contract and marriage, with 
only scant respect being paid to philosophical issues about the 
capacity' of minors, and even a superficial reading of Latey 
confirms this.
b) Competence
Rs-tionality, maturity, judgement — these are the constitutive 
elements of competence and the means by which 'capacity' is 
understood and measured. By legal ascription, the adult, the 
legal subject of 'full' age (again the terminology of the tank) 
is said to be possessed of these cognitive goods, unless by 
ascription, they are deemed to be mad.
Here we must distinguish between lack of 'capacity' because of 
age (which locates the minor) and loss of 'capacity' through 
legal ascription (e.g. historically, the married woman, the black 
in South Africa). By the doctrine of couverture, whereby a wife 
passed into the care and protection of her husband, and because
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she did so, by common law, did not need to retain the legal 
means to treat with the world outside the marriage, married 
women were reduced to a status homologous with that of infants 
(no possessory or contractual capacity in law). Homologous 
with, but not reducible to; for single adult women (femme sole) 
retained these capacities as adults. Therefore a widow assumed 
the capacities originally denied her by marriage, not by age.
We must retain this distinction between infants and married 
women, even though the social and economic consequences arising 
from the loss of legal subjectivity were broadly similar, con­
sequences which reduced both to dependants. Likewise, a dis­
tinction must be made between minors and the mad (who may be 
’adult' in age but not in competence) while holding on to 
similarity of their positions in law. In other respects, all 
adults may have the capacity (in terms of competence and right) 
to vote but this is not all-embracing; we may be electors in 
the constituency of Hampstead, but not in Birmingham Ladywood - 
an effect of legal ascription. This distinguishes between 
individual adults, but also distinguishes between all 'free' 
adults (who can vote) and all minors, who cannot. That difference 
in all liberal democracies rests upon age, and by extension some 
notion of competence. Here we shall consider some of the philo­
sophers’ arguments about competence, its acquisition and relation­
ship to age.
1. 'The philosophy of exclusion'
In a very perceptive review essay on children's rights. Bob 
Franklin (1983) remarks :
"By seeking to answer the question 'what is man?' 
and attempting to define those characteristics 
essential to securing full citizen rights, 
philosophers have persistently excluded certain 
groups in society from effective political 
participation", (p. 16).
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In effect he argues 'political philosophy can be viewed as 
a philosophy of exclusion' (p. 16). From Locke, through 
Mill, to present day writers on children's rights (Schrag,1975,1977; 
Cohen, 1980;Scarre, 1980 ) he argues that 'this philosophy 
draws much of its inspiration from the prevailing Liberal 
philosophy with its over-emphasis on reason and rationality 
as the hallmarks of the complete human being' (p. 21). Those 
presumed to lack these characteristics are therefore precluded 
from consideration as full human beings, and, consequently,
'women and blacks have been excluded by this philosophy but 
children are its most persistent and long suffering victims'
(p. 21). On this account, the polity is to comprise those 
possessing rationality and reason, therefore according to Mill 
for example, children are 'incapable of government' (quoted 
in Franklin op. cit.; 21).
Now, while Franklin is justified in pointing out the victims 
of exclusion in prevailing Liberal political philosophizing, 
we should acknowledge that at least it does provide some basis 
for mass participation in the polity, and was written against 
Classical philosophies of government by the 'aristoi' (the best) 
and against the political claims contained within the doctrine 
of the divine rights of Kings. To be adult and sane were 
sufficient conditions for inclusion in the polity, according to 
the Liberal view, and, perhaps Franklin is being unkind to Mill 
in claiming that this philosophy is responsible for 'excluding' 
women. Children, however, pose a more difficult problem, for 
this tradition explicitly excludes them precisely because they 
lack competence which is circularly secured by reference to age; 
because of their youth they lack maturity, they lack rationality 
because of their chronological age and so minors should not be 
participatory members of the polity.
r 235 -
Franklin's riposte is to the point:
"Why not leave age entirely out of the picture 
since it is irrelevant and more importantly 
obscures the argument. No-one really believes 
that children should be excluded from voting 
because they are children; this is not an ar­
gument but mere assertion .... The adult 
concern is that children may lack rationality 
and sufficient knowledge. Once the grounds of 
the argument have shifted to this terrain, they 
are easier to refute. It is then clear that 
those to be excluded from participation are 
those who, without regard to age, lack the 
relevant competence" (p. 18) my emphasis).
Two comments. Firstly, we cannot leave age out of it.
Chronological age defines the organisation of numerous 
institutions and and the ascription of legal status.
Secondly, precisely who, and on what basis shall determine,
'without regard to age', which individuals lack the relevant 
competence, and therefore be denied political/legal participation? 
A committee of mandarins allocating points on the basis of occu­
pation, educational credentials and moral virtue, or what? Or 
shall it be participation on the basis of some criterion referenced 
test (like a driving licence). The latter suggestions entail the 
disqualification of some children but also some adults (not only 
the prisoners, the mad, but also presumably the illiterates?).
On the grounds that the latter course reduces the claimable rights 
that adults already enjoy, more narrowly defines the social demo­
cracy we now participate in, and allows political litmus tests 
to be inserted into questions of adult competence (one can imagine 
the ease with which anyone espousing revolutionary politics could 
be deemed as 'incompetent'). The last course of action derogates 
further, civil and political rights already under threat and 
therefore can hardly be taken seriously. If this is the price
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of including minors, then the cost may be too high, for its 
effects may well include an increased surveillance of, and 
intervention into, the social relations of adults - a state 
of affairs already endured by children, which theorists such 
as Franklin are seeking to ameliorate!
Franklin's identification of a liberal tradition of philosophy 
producing 'victims'; where an over-emphasis on rationality 
provides the grounds for excluding certain individuals on the 
basis of a 'lack' tbf rationality, competence) broadly describes 
the legal process of classifying legal subjectivities. What 
he doesn't stress are the positive attributes of the liberal 
tradition, as a bastion against arguments supporting monarchical, 
dictatorial or oligarchic political forms. What he further 
identifies are the kinds of 'cognitive goods' which matter, both 
to legal theorists and liberal democratic philosophers. The 
reservation we have about exchanging the chronological age as 
an index of competence for some other kind of selection of com­
petence may well reduce the size of the population allowed to 
participate in the polity, not merely change its character in 
terms of age profile.
We must acknowledge that Franklin's essay brings home the 
salience of competence, putting it centre-stage, as it were, 
and spelling the basis on which children are 'excluded' as 
legal subjects and political actors. But the process entails 
competence being mediated through age; because minors are below 
the age of majority, they are all 'incompetent'. Herein lies 
the rub ; chronological age, used as an index is arbitrary, is 
9-ll”eïhbracing and may well be unjust in the assumptions it makes.
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2. Age and competence
The cognitive goods (reason, rationality, judgement, 
discretion) which collectively constitute the field of 
competence are tacitly acquired and (as generally agreed 
by all those cited above) only gradually so . How we 
recognise or quantify tacitly acquired qualities, such as 
'maturity' is incredibly contested and necessarily imprecise. 
Moreover, because the acquisition of these qualities does 
not map with biological development, and because the process 
of acquisition is differentially distributed amongst individuals, 
not everyone reaches the same stage of 'maturity', 'reasoning', 
and so on, at the same age. Age lines, however, make the assum­
ption that all those on one side of it are similarly endowed 
with 'competence'; those on the other, are similarly homogeneously 
grouped by their 'lack' of it. Age lines then are blind to the 
individual distribution of competence: in this sense, they are 
arbitrary insofar as no 16 year old is held to be as competent 
as any 'adult'.
So in seeking to ameliorate the lot of minors, in exploring 
a new basis for participation in the polity, what are philosophers 
such as Schrag (op.cit.), Cohen (1975), Scarre (op.cit.), Franklin 
(op.cit.) and Schoeman (1983) looking at, and looking for? What 
counts as competence in their diverse accounts. The secret is 
to look beneath their sophisticated arguments about the relation­
ship between the possession of rationality and the right to 
participate as 'full' subjects, to referents common to them all.
The claims that maturity, rationality, reason or competence 
are gradually acquired, differentially distributed amongst 
individuals and acquired at different ages (therefore it is 
impossible to distinguish between some minors and some adults - 
ergo age lines are unjust) are based on the works of Piaget and/ 
or Kohlberg (e.g. Scarre op.cit; 122, Schoeman op.cit; 270,
Schrag op.cit. 475).
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In all these accounts (even Franklin, who is actually quite 
critical of the 'liberal' tradition - see inter alia p. 17- 
18) what is sought is some evidence of the ability to think 
abstractly; the ability to consider issues beyond the level 
of analysing them only in terms of an individual's self- 
interest. To illustrate, take the following passage from 
Cohen (1975).
"... I reach a conclusion similar in structure, 
though not in detail, to Schrag's: that ration­
ality, in a broad and powerful sense of that 
term, is a presupposition of any democratic 
community, and that that rationality is to be 
understood as the capacity of the members to do 
certain fundamental kinds of thinking. The 
absence of such rationality is the reason it 
makes little sense to talk of democracy among 
brutes, or infants. It is not just that they 
cannot operate a democracy well; they cannot 
operate one at all."
(Cohen op.cit; 460).
One further illustration, this time from Franklin.
"If the argument for excluding children is 
really based on their assumed capacity for 
rational thought and a knowledge of the 
relevant issues, then it is not children as 
such who should be excluded but those in­
capable of rational thought and sufficient 
knowledge of the issues".
(Franklin, op. cit.: 17).
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"Fundamental kinds of thinking', 'sufficient knowledge of 
the issues', to be fair are first approximations, preliminary 
statements in the explorations of what children are assumed 
to lack. Schrag is more focussed.
"Unlike the concrete-operational child, whose 
thought is tied to the concrete, the adolescent 
can transcend the immediate here and now."
(Schrag op.cit: 172)
Schrag's principles here are derived from Piaget (see his 
footnotes 171-172). Kohlberg pops up two paragraphs later 
(ibid).
We suspect that with reference to Kohlberg's scheme of things, 
(detailed and tabulated for easy reference by Weinreich-Haste, 
1983; 8), 'fundamental kinds of thinking', 'sufficient knowledge 
of the issues' and the transcendence of the here and now 
equates with Kohlberg's Level.II, Stage 4 .
The problem is that there is general agreement that adolescents 
may well move to this stage at 15 or 16. On the other hand, 
many adults are still not operating at this level of moral 
development.
On the evidence, the philosophers' notion of competence seems 
to equate with the ability to assess issues, make judgements 
in abstraction; to assess how their decisions will affect the 
lives and liberty of others. The philosophers' referents are 
Piaget and Kohlberg, who suggest that this kind of cognitive 
attribute is acquired during adolescence. Not all philosophers 
however (e.g. Scarre) go the next step to advocate the inclusion 
of adolescents in the polity.
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There is a fundamental problem with an over-reliance on 
Piagetian-Kohlbergian 'stages' of moral development approach, 
are not readily acknowledged by the philosophers but are 
recognised by fellow developmental psychologists such as 
Weinrich-Haste (op.cit.). Indeed, it is a problem which 
resides in philosophers like R. S. Peters (1959) and it is 
this. The stages of moral development approach is usefully 
descriptive, fundamentally analytic; both descriptive and 
explanatory of observable phenomena. But it too easily 
becomes programmatic; because children cannot do certain 
kinds of thinking at specific ages, certain kinds of knowledge 
should not be made available to them. One obvious example 
which comes to mind is political education. Far from being 
a necessarily emancipatory project for minors, the stages of 
moral development referent, has also its counter-tendencies.
One can conceive of Kohlberg's work being used to limit the 
kinds of knowledge allowed to be transmitted in schools, 
because children aren't 'ready' for it. It can be just as 
prescriptive about what constitutes childhood and the sub­
jectivity of children, about what children are competent to 
do, receive or perform, as the operation of the legal system.
The philosophers' debates about capacity, competence, rationality 
and stages of development signal ^yst how far our way of 
thinking about intellect and reason is saturated with categories- 
of chronological age. We constitute the social with generational 
categories as much as we think and analyse it in terms of gender, 
class and race. Perhaps with one exceptional difference; for 
most there is a potential of release, a near certain promise 
of emancipation. To be able to vote, serve on a jury, get 
married without parental consent, get a telly on H.P., all we 
have to do is attain the magical age of majority. This may well 
be the best defence of all for using chronological age alone as 
the only necessary condition for becoming a 'full' subject, 
wherever it is drawn, at least in conditions of universal suffrage
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3. Legal Subjectivity and Competence
By comparison, the philosophers' competence is pitched at 
a higher level than the law's practical concerns. 'Sufficient 
knowledge of the issues', 'fundamental kinds of thinking' in 
law, to borrow Piaget's phrase is actually 'concrete-operational'. 
Latey's concerns focussed on the gullibility of the young; were 
they smart enough to discriminate between contracts which would 
be in their interest or fulfil their need, against those which 
were exploitative. Criminal law requires a knowledge of right 
or wrong, firstly of the actus reus. Secondly, did they under­
stand the implications of the oath? The significant equation 
of the age line and the acquisition of competence in law tells 
us much about the history of what the law valued, protected and 
what it was prepared to punish. The law makes no claim to the 
universality of competence or reason, insofar as it was prepared 
to place the age of criminal responsibility at the age of 7, and 
the age of marriage at 12, 14 and 16 and the age of majority 
at 21.
The law's diversity of competencies precisely opposed the notion 
of the philosophers' competence. It does not seek evidence of 
thinking in abstraction across a variety of moral issues, only a 
practical understanding of one situation at a time. We argued 
in the foregoing chapters moreover that the stage-easing of minors 
into the legal process does not refer to the complexity of the 
issues at hand as the principle determining when minors are thought 
to be competent, but to the material goods and possessions at 
stake. We have yet to be convinced that the competence required 
to be a party in a criminal case necessarily requires less 
'cognitive goods' than to be a party to a contract. In effect, 
this is what the law determines the position to be.
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In practice, we have two kinds of logic in operation. The 
philosophers seek the means to differentiate children from 
adults by looking for a point at which 'certain kinds of 
fundamental thinking' differentiate between age cohorts.
The problem they openly acknowledge, is that individual 
differences mitigate against anything other than arbitrary 
age lines unless or until we are willing to discriminate 
between individual competencies. We have already acknowledged 
the negative social consequences of the latter course. Lawyers 
have been less concerned with a notion of generally applicable 
competence. For them, age lines have the merit of certainty 
when confronting individual cases. Justice equates with 
equality of treatment across similar cases, so at least the 
law they would argue treats all minors equally, firstly by 
exclusion, either from certain kinds of responsibility, or 
from some kinds of legal capacity which may work to their 
detriment. Yet the age lines the law draws are value-laden.
They refer not to the complexity of the issue so much as to 
the value the law places on the object or relationship brought 
to its attention.
While certainty may well be of some merit and a prime reason 
for the legal ascription of minors as wholly or partly 'incom­
petent', nevertheless, the legal process also confronts the 
problem of individual differences. One aspect of this problem 
can be illustrated by reference to the legal conception of 
a minor's capacity to consent.
For reasons that we shall make clear, the issue of the consenting 
capacity of minors, has been and is, constructed primarily around 
girl minors. That this is so is itself a significant message 
about gender and sexuality. For clarity, therefore, we shall 
be discussing consent primarily as it applied to girls. We 
then discuss this capacity as it affects boy minors.
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CONSENT AND AGE
The first thing to grasp about the age of consent is that it 
has been transformed over historical time and refers to quite 
different things. Schematically, there are three different 
ages of consent, none of which closely map one with the other.
1. In its earliest usage, the age of consent was a stage in 
the process of becoming married. By common law a boy under 14 
and a girl under 12 could be married, but at those ages 'they 
may disagree and declare the marriage void, without any divorce 
or sentence in the spiritual court. This was founded in civil 
law.' (Blackstone I; 436). It was an age at which verbal agree­
ments became hard contract. At 14 and 12 respectively, boys 
and girls were given the legal capacity to confirm or remit 
earlier agreements about marriage. They had acquired sufficient 
discretion in law to be capable of entering a contract of marriage
2. The age of consent also refers to sexual relations. The 
second usage, which makes it illegal for males to have sexual 
intercourse with girls under the age of 16, was legislated into 
existence through the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, subse­
quently confirmed by the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (see Bevan 
1973; 220-227). This is the most commonly used meaning of the 
'age of consent', understood in terms of the protection it offers 
to girls under 16.
The law has offered its protection to young girls since 1275.
The Statute of Westminster I of that year made it an offence 
punishable by two years imprisonment and fine, to ravish 'any 
maiden without age', regardless of her consent. In 1285, the 
Statute of Westminster II made it a felony, punishable by death 
(Bevan, op.cit.; 222). The term 'without age' is somewhat im­
precisely known; it seems to have referred to girls under 12, 
that being the age of discretion. Gradually, it became estab­
lished that if the girl was between 10 and 12, it was not a
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felony of rape to have intercourse with her if she consented 
(Bevan; ibid). A Statute of 1828 (9 Geo.4, C.31) both 
repealed and clarified the earlier principles; it distinguished 
between the felony of carnal knowledge of a girl under 10, and 
the misdemeanour of carnal knowledge of a girl over lO but under 
12. W. J. Stead's 'purchase' of a 13 year old girl as part of 
his campaign to expose the exploitation of child prostitutes, 
which led to the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act (for an 
excellent account of the context, see Goreham 1978) raised the 
age of consent to 16 years (whilst retaining the degrees of 
offence by allowing a mitigating plea that a girl over 13 but 
under 16 could 'consent' to sexual intercourse). In practice, 
a consenting girl over 13 but under 16 'saves' her male partner 
from a charge of rape and battery, but not from the statutory 
offence of unlawful intercourse (see R. V. Howard (1965) 3 All 
E.R. (CCA) and Skegg 1973;373). Moreover, case law takes account 
of the age of the male committing unlawful sexual intercourse 
Statute and case has consistently constructed girl minors with 
a capacity of consent, with implications on the next kind of 
consent discussed below.
3. It may seem curious to refer to the capacity of minors 
to consent to medical treatment as a separate form of consent 
but its recent topicality suggests it raises some issues worth 
serious consideration.
Latey (op.cit.) recommended 'that without prejudice to any 
consent that may otherwise be lawful, the consent of young 
persons aged 16 and over to medical or dental treatment shall 
be as valid as the consent of a person of full age', (Latey;118).
If
This recommendation was written into the Family Law Reform Act 
1969, Sect. 8. Materially, this means that minors over 16 can 
sign the consent forms required, say, before a surgical operation 
is performed, and no further consent is required from parents or 
guardians. Prior to 1967, Latey admitted, the position was
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somewhat obscure; in principle, parental consent was required 
before medical treatment was allowed to be performed on minors, 
but in practice, hospitals and the medical profession had 
accepted the consent of 16 year olds as being valid (though no 
direct judicial authority had in fact established that such 
consent was valid) (Latey;117). Latey grounded 16 as the age 
of consent to medical procedures on four points ; a person of 
16 or over could choose their own doctor (N.H.S. Regulations 
1962) ; a person of 16 or over could voluntarily place them­
selves in a mental hospital (Mental Health Act 1959); 16 is 
the age of sexual intercourse; widespread practice of accepting 
16 year old minors' consent as valid (Latey; 117-8).
Unlike the age of consent in relationship to sexual activity 
which was statutorily regulated, consent to medical procedure 
derives from common law definitions of capacity and consent.
For example, doctors performing operations on 16 year old 
minors (prior to 1969) without parental consent, risked (in 
theory) a charge of 'trespass of the person' (Skegg op.cit.;
371, Latey; 117), and an action for damages.
However, in common law a separate principle concerning consent 
and capacity emerged from the criminal law and the tort of 
battery. Simply put, if a minor by age alone was incapable of 
consenting, then a charge of battery could not be brought against 
someone assaulting a minor, because a minor could neither consent 
to or resist battery or other touchings. How could it be shown 
that a minor had consented or not to an assault if they had not 
the legal capacity to give their consent anyway? How could it 
be shown that an offender had acted against the consent of a 
minor, when a minor had neither consent to give or withold?
(see Skegg;372). Clearly, the common law was obliged to grant 
minors some capacity of consent, that could reasonably be 
witheld, simply for the protection of minors at law. In principle, 
the common law adopted the line that no minor is incapable of
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reason by age alone, but that everything depends on their 
capacity to understand and come to a decision about battery 
or other touchings^?. By extension, if minors were thought 
to be aware of the implications and effect of medical treat­
ment, and that practitioners took reasonable care to explain 
procedures and outcomes of treatment and took reasonable 
measures to ascertain that a minor understood what was to 
happen, then a minor, autonomously could consent to treatment, 
without parents being involved.
For minors over the age of 16, after the passing of the 1969 
Act, their position was secure. Not only could they seek 
medical treatment as if they were an adult, they could seek 
treatment which their parents or guardians may not approve of, 
and moreover, their parents could not force medical treatment 
on them against their expressed wishes.
Providing minors with the capacity of consent is important 
in two respects:
a) Consent allows for the assertion of an autonomy of 
self, it accepts that minors are capable of thinking about, 
reflecting upon and being able to understand and make decisions 
about important areas of their social being.
b) Allowing minors a consenting capacity places limitations 
of the rights of parents (natural or surrogate) to control 
and intervene in, important aspects of the lives of their 
children.
In this respect, capacity of consent sets up a considerable 
tension within intergenerational relations, potentially 
shifting the balance slightly in favour of minors legally 
being able to control small but important aspects of their
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being and existence. But these tensions are not limited 
simply to relationships broadly in the domain of the family. 
For a consenting minor has the capacity to establish a direct 
relationship with medical practitioners and other para-medical 
organisations, most notably family planning clinics. In this 
instance, the tension lies between parents and members of the 
medical profession and members of personal caring services as 
to whether parents should be or need to be consulted about 
treatment being offered to girl minors. And it is broadly at 
this point that the politics of intergenerational relations 
opens out into conflicts in public domain, between competing 
groups of adults. All the competing interests, rhetoric and 
ideologies, about consent, medical treatment, the rights of 
minors as opposed to parents, and the competing claims of 
parents against the professions seeking (they would claim) to 
act in the best interests of minors, has most recently been 
highlighted over the issue of providing girls below the age 
of consent (under 16) with contraception and termination of 
pregnancy. It is to this situation we now turn.
MORALS AND MRS GILLICK
The Gillick Case (Gillick vs West Norfolk and Wisbech Area , 
Health Authority, TLR 2 July 1983) temporarily settled some 
legal questions known to exist by the D.H.S.S.', the medical pro­
fession, family planning associations and the legal profession 
for about 20 years. This case finally tested before the High 
Court :
a) the quality of consent of girl minors under 16.
b) the right, and discretion of the medical and para-medical 
profession to dispense advice and treatment in the area of 
family planning.
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c) the claims of parents to be consulted about, and to 
give their consent to treatment for their daughters 
below the age of consent.
d) the legal status of guidelines issued by the Department
of Health and Social Security in 1974 and 1980, in matters 
concerning reasonable practice in dispensing contraception 
to young girls.
More difficult is the description of the field of forces 
which required a social and moral problem to have a legal 
resolution. For in effect, the way of 'managing' the relation­
ship between sexually active young girls, the profession and 
parents, for the last 20 years anyway, had been to give all 
parties some discretion, some latitude in their dealings with 
each other. 'Management'^ at heart, meant not making legally 
binding relationships between the parties but allowing all 
kinds of accommodations, compromises, discretion and common 
sense to prevail. So it was until Mrs. Gillick forced the 
issue. We must add that her motives, character and biography 
play only a small part^^. In short, had it not been Mrs. Gillick, 
someone else would have put the issue before the courts. Such 
an outcome was always implicit because the area of practice was 
so fraught with uncertainty and conflict. Going to court had 
always been the last resort; it was a matter of time before 
some party played that hand.
What follows is a brief account only of the social forces 
dynamically constituting the pre-history, as it were, of the 
Gillick case.
Firstly, we have to register the demographic presence of 
school girl pregnancy; the fact that girls under 16 were and 
are sexually active.
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According to the National Council of One Parent Families;
"In 1977, 3,625 girls under 16, or 1 in every
500 girls of 11-15 years of age, were known
to have become pregnant. This represents 
2.4% of known conceptions to single women of 
all ages. Of these 3,625 pregnancies, 63%
(2,300) resulted in legal terminatio-s, 36%
(1,299) in live births, and 1% (26) in still­
births . "
(NCOP, Pregnant at School; 1979; 57).
The NCOP further note an increase in known pregnancies
for girls 11-15 from 1971 to 1975 of 32% (1971; 2,846,
1975; 3,736, and a small decline thereafter to 3,625 in
1977) (NCOP; ibid). Legal termination of known pregnancies
for girls 11-15 has increased from 53% in 1971 to 63% in
1977 (NCOP; op.cit.: 58). This data drawn from OPCS sources
makes no claims about being indexical of the sexual activity
of girls under 16 (i.e. those sexually active but not becoming
pregnant), nor does it claim to include any illegal terminations,
nor cases (if any) where the pregnancy runs full term and the
baby is simply given away and brought up by someone else. The
number of pregnancies is tiny in the context of all known
pregnancies. The percentage of terminations (63% compared
with 41% for all single women) is sufficient to alert us to
the unique predicament faced by under-aged girls, their parents
19
and the professions counselling them
Secondly, we have to comprehend known demographic statistics, 
in terms of the legal aspects of such practices. To repeat, 
it is unlawful to have sexual intercourse with girls under 16.
We also have to be mindful of the 1956 Sexual Offences Act, 
which makes it criminal for any other person to aid, abet, 
incite to commit, any girl under 16 to participate in unlawful
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sexual intercourse (see Bevan 1973; 223, 226). Like the 
age of consent, the provisions about aiding and abetting 
are principally protective clauses, seeking to prevent the 
exploitation of young girls. To this we must add the legal 
condition of medical consent. While girls 16 and over may 
consent to medical treatment, without parents or guardians 
being consulted or being required to give permission, for 
girls under 16, matters are not quite so clear, either for 
them or for those providing treatment. Where consent is 
obtained from parents, either for termination, or the pro­
vision of contraceptives for under-age girls, such practices 
are legally défendable. The 'grey' area lies in providing 
these services without parental knowledge or consent (see 
Skegg 1973).
Schoolgirl pregnancy on the one hand and research reported 
by the NCOP (studies by Farrell (1978) and Schofield (1965), 
the former reporting that 12% of her sample had had sexual 
intercourse before the age of 16, the latter reported only 
2%) indicates that though under-age sexual intercourse may 
be illegal, it nevertheless goes on. Its extent, and the 
degree of sexual activity (no reference is made here to 
fondlings, petting or touchings which also constitute sexual 
activity, but do not constitute sexual intercourse ) though a
'field of social relations, which, like any other needs to be 
explored by researchers, will not concern us here. It is 
sufficient for our purposes to register the tensions between 
legality and practice and the social consequences arising from 
it.
A third aspect is the network of professionals associated 
with the dissemination of sex education, advice and counselling, 
and provision of services, which together constitute the field 
of family planning. The organisations involved include the
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National Health Service, which provides contraception and 
termination services, the Health Education Council dissemi­
nating information in 'educational' packages, and a variety 
of charity-funded clinics (Marie Stopes, Brook Advisory Centre, 
Family Planning Association etc.) providing services , but 
also acting as data-collecting and lobby organisations. 
Originally, the latter organisations functioned in opposition 
to state policy, to meet a popular demand from women for family 
planning advice and medically supervised family planning. To 
an extent, the service they provide allows women to go outside 
the sphere of the 'family doctor' for private and anonymous 
counselling and 'treatment'. Though professions working in 
the National Health Service and the clinics outside have long 
been permitted to provide both contraception and abortions, 
the practical problem of providing a 15 year old girl with the 
Pill, without her parents' consent placed all those involved 
in a legally disputatious position. The provision of the Pill, 
which can only be obtained on prescription from a medical 
practitioner, confers on it the status of 'medical treatment'. 
Likewise, inter-uterine devices, diaphragm (though not condoms 
or contraceptive gels)
Fourthly, in these matters, what are the rights of parents?
Do they have to give their consent to medical treatment for 
children under 16? It has been argued that (a) there is, in 
fact, no law requiring parental consent, and (b) parental 
rights and wishes in these matters are not inviolate (Children's 
Legal Centre, 1983;6). In the first case, obtaining written 
consent has been held to be good and reasonable practice 
(Children's Legal Centre ibid. DHSS 1974,1980). In the second 
instance, courts have overruled parental consent, most notably 
in Re D a minor 19 76 1 All ER 326, where a child suffering De 
Sotos syndrome was about to be sterilised in accordance with 
her mother's wishes.
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The practice of obtaining written consent from parents prior 
to medical treatment assumes of course that minors are inca­
pable of fully understanding medical procedures and the likely 
outcomes. It also assumes that parents always act in the best 
interests of their children, and indeed are the final judges 
of what those best interests actually are. Both assumptions 
are, to say the least, questionable.
Those, like Mrs. Gillick, 'the pro-life' organisations and 
the political elements of the 'new right' who want to assert 
the primacy of parental authority, confront in opposition 
(a) any claim that under-age minors have any capacity for 
competence and consent, (b) the discretionary power of pro­
fessions to assess and ascertain the competence and consent 
of minors and act on the basis of that assessment. Both were 
allowed for in the DHSS Guidelines 1974 and 1980 (DHSS Family 
Planning Service - Memorandum of Guidance May 1974; Health 
Notice HN (80) 44, 1980). In 1974, the DHSS advised:
"It is for the doctor to decide whether to 
provide contraceptive advice and treatment, 
and the Department is advised that if he does 
so for a girl under 16, he is not acting unlaw- 
fully provided he acts in good faith in protec­
ting the girl against the potentially harmful 
effects of intercourse. The Department is also 
advised that other professional workers who refer, 
advise or persuade a girl under 16 years of age 
to go to a doctor in his surgery or at a clinic 
or elsewhere for purposes of obtaining contra­
ception and treatment would not, by such act 
alone, be acting unlawfully."
(DHSS 1974 Guidelines, quoted in NCOP 1979;48
my emphasis)
-  253 -
Similarly, the Medical Defence Union's view stated that it 
was advisable for doctors to see a (young) patient's consent 
to inform parents about contraceptive advice. Where such 
consent was not forthcoming, her wishes should be respected 
(ibid). Given the DHSS's Guidelines outline, which constituted 
on the one hand good and reasonable medical practice, on the 
other, some legitimacy for widely accepted and adopted medical 
and para-medical practice, it was not surprising then that 
these Guidelines should be overtly challenged in the Gillick 
case
Finally, the constitutive elements of the case's pre-history 
would be incomplete without some acknowledgement of the politi­
cisation of the family in general and parent-child relationships 
in particular by the Thatcher government, most notably represented 
in the leaked report of the Family Policy Group's deliberations.
In that, other Prime Ministerial statements and structurally 
embedded in social policy, we find the familiar litany of the 
elements of the well ordered family (male breadwinner, non-waged 
wife, dependant children whose character and well-being are 
crucially shaped by parental values and authority). The political 
climate in the early 1980's was appropriate for 'those who wished 
to see moral certainties embodied in law' (Naughton, Observer 
Sunday 4 March 1984), particularly with respect to the rights 
of parents to supervise their children's moral welfare.
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THE GILLICK CASE
Heard before Mr. Justice Woolf, in the Queen's Bench Division 
of the High Court, Mrs. Victoria Gillick, mother of 10 children, 
including 5 girls under 16, asked the Court;
a) to declare the DHSS Health Notice HN (80) 44 and the 
advice contained therein to be unlawful.
b) request the Area Health Authority that no doctor or 
other professional person employed by them might give 
any advice or treatment on contraception or abortion 
to any of Mrs. Gillick's children below the age of 16 
(TLR 27 July 1983).
Mr. Justice Woolf in his judgement, said there were two limbs 
to the argument on behalf of the Plaintiff. First, that DHSS 
Guidelines 'advised doctors to commit offences as principals 
of causing or encouraging unlawful sexual intercourse with 
girls under 16 ..., or of being an accessory to unlawful 
sexual intercourse ...'.Secondly, the guidance 'authorised 
doctors to give advice and treatment to children under 16 
without their parents' consent which, if it was not an offence 
under the above provisions, was inconsistent with the rights 
of parents and their ability to discharge their duties of 
supervising the physical and moral welfare of their children'.
In both instances, he rejected Mrs. Gillick's claims.
Summarily, his judgement ran as follows;
1. For a doctor to prescribe contraceptives with the intention of 
encouraging sexual intercourse to take place, then the practitioner 
is guilty of an offence, but, this is not usually the doctor's
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motive for prescribing. Rather, the motive is to prevent 
either unwanted pregnancies or sexually transmitted disease, 
so without the necessary intent, they cannot be accused of 
aiding or abetting. Moreover, the offence of unlawful sexual 
intercourse could take place, either without the doctor pre­
scribing contraceptives, or even where he prescribed them with 
parental consent. Finally, the doctor prescribes contraceptives, 
knowing only that there is 'a risk of intercourse taking place 
at an unidentified place and time with an unidentified man'.
Not knowing the specific 'material circumstances' does not 
therefore render the doctor an 'accessory before the fact'.
The judgement here assumes that doctors are motivated by the 
desire to protect, to act for the best interests of their 
patients, to seek to prevent the 'harmful' effects of unlawful 
sexual intercourse.
2. In the matter of parental consent, the guidelines, the 
judge argued, that patients wanting advice and treatment without 
parental consent, would be the 'exceptional cases'. He acknow­
ledged, "There was not previous authority of the English Courts 
as to whether a child under 16 could consent to medical treatment". 
However, because a minor was under 16, it did not "automatically 
mean that she could not give any consent to any treatment". Rather, 
the quality of the consent was critical; did the patient understand 
the nature of the consent required, was she mature enough to appre­
ciate the nature of the treatment?
Mr. Justice Woolf's decisions certainly were positive declarations 
to the medical and allied professions, and for minors under 16. 
Parental authority in matters of moral welfare were held not to 
be paramount. The established practice of counselling girls to
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go to their parents first but respecting their wishes if 
they felt they could not, or didn't want to, and acting on 
the girl's consent alone was found to be not unlawful. It 
also upholds the practice of family planning clinics to send 
girls to medical practitioners other than the family doctor 
(at her request) for the sake of privacy. Also, it allows 
under-age girls to request a termination of pregnancy, and 
her wishes to be met, even if her parents oppose it (Childright 
Oct. 1983) . Moreover, it places in case law the right of all 
minors under 16 to consent to medical treatment of any kind 
always providing they show they have the capacity to understand 
the nature of the consent they give and the implications of the 
treatment. It also retains a space for parental consent, albeit 
somewhat unspecified. In sum, the old, practical and working 
concensus was found not to be unlawful. Yet a cautionary note 
is appropriate for several reasons. Firstly, there is no 
statute to make the under 16's right to give consent to medical 
treatment even more secure than at present. Secondly, Mrs. 
Gillick has been granted legal aid to take the judgement to 
the Court of Appeal (Observer 4 March 1984, Childright Oct. 1983) 
Thirdly, 'pro-life' and 'new right' groups have organised a 
petition, which it is claimed, has 'over a million' signatures 
appended to it. The petition has received 'an enthusiastic 
reception' from the Tory benches at the House of Commons. 
Consequently, Mrs. Thatcher and Dr. Gerald Vaughan have begun 
talking about 'revising' the DHSS Guidelines (Observer, op.cit.) 
thereby effectively outflanking the courts.
In the meantime, one group of children especially vulnerable 
to the exercise of 'parental authority' in medical matters, 
the children in care of local authorities should receive 
respite. The Children's Legal Centre has collected considerable 
evidence to show that 'problem' children have been forcibly 
drugged to make them more manageable (Childright Oct. 1983) .
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At present, local authority officers and parents who have 
customarily viewed children as 'legal chattels' in matters 
medical (Naughton, Observer 4 March 1983), now find they 
have no automatic right to ordain medical treatment for 
their charges because if they are mature and capable of 
giving consent, that consent can also be witheld by the 
under 16's themselves. If Mrs. Gillick's case is dismissed, 
in the Court of Appeal, and if the Tories do not interfere 
with existing DHSS Guidelines, the autonomy of sel^ grudging 
granted through the notion of 'consent' to under 16's will 
have taken a positive step forward. A small but important 
step towards recognising their competence, albeit in a limited 
area of the complex of social relationships they sometimes 
encounter.
'BOYS WILL BE (MASCULINE) BOYS'
Questions about consent effectively subsume questions about 
capacity and competence. If minors may consent, or withold 
consent, effectively they are granted capacity and competence. 
Questions about consent, and the age at which consent is 
effective, i.e. the age of consent is discursively ordered 
around girls under 16. For clarity we have left boys out of 
the frame of reference. But so does the law, in matters 
relating to heterosexual intercourse. For boy minors, there 
is no age of consent, only capacity. Effectively, boys have 
a fornicating capacity only after the age of 14 years (boys 
under 14 cannot be charged with rape, though could be charged 
with assault). In the case of homosexual relations, however, 
boy minors have no consenting capacity; 'consent' here is 
postponed until the age of 21 years. These ages are revealing 
of the assumptions, values and prejudices inscribed in law.
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If we relate age to the protection of bodies, and what is 
protected longest is most valued, then the law's assumptions 
about what is 'normal' and 'natural' sexuality (choosing the 
most apt phrase) stands naked, revealed in a series of striking 
paradoxes. These are best understood in terms of the law's 
ascription of masculinity to boys and femininity to girls.
At the simplest level, girls consent (acquiesce, accept, agree). 
Boys do not have a consenting capacity in law in heterosexual 
relations (boys initiate sexual relationships). Girls require 
statutory protections (e.g. the age of consent) from predatory 
males, boys do not require the same protection from older girls 
or women, nor do they get pregnant. Where unlawful sexual 
intercourse occurs, certain protections exist, for men under 24 
not previously charged with that offence and if they believed 
in good faith that the girl was 16 or over (Bevan op.cit.; 223). 
Again, the assumptions are masculine/feminine in form; men make 
advances on the basis of physical appearance and the girl's 
willingness to participate.
Boys don't have a capacity to consent, but they do have a 
capacity for fornication (or, if under 14, a 'lack of it').
Boys under 14 therefore presumably do not have erections, 
and legally cannot commit rape. Boys over 14 are capable of 
achieving both (Halsbury, Laws Vol II;33). The age line for 
boys celebrates the age of sexual activity; the age of consent 
speaks of the age of acquiescence.
Girls are offered protection from male advances until the 
age of 16, boys are offered protection from older males until 
the age of 21. The punishment for the offence of unlawful 
sexual intercourse is two years, the maximum penalty for gross 
indecency (when one of the consenting males is under 21) is 
five years. Clearly, boys require more protection against 
'unnatural' sexual practices than girls require from 'normal' 
and 'natural' male advances! Boys and girls however are equally
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protected by statute (Indecency with Children Act) from men 
and women, inviting children to touch parts of their body 
(Bevan; 233-34). Finally, we should add that because women 
can't commit rape, adult women having a sexual relationship 
with boys under 14, can be charged only with indecent assault. 
The charge here, however, is discretionary, not a statutory 
offence.
The masculine/feminine assumptions underlying the legal 
regulation of sexual activity gives rise to a diversity of 
arguments about the utility and necessity of protective age 
lines in the sphere of sexual relations. Why males can become 
adult in every other respect apart from becoming a 'consenting 
male in private' in a homosexual relationship has no other 
grounding other than blind prejudice against what are legally 
and popularly construed as 'unnatural' sexual practices. There 
is no real argument against reducing the age to 18, for example, 
when in every other respect males are endowed with full legal 
capacities. Even at 16 the law allows minors sufficient com­
petence to negotiate with medical practitioners.
On the age of consent, opinions are quite contradictory.
Groups such as the National Council for One Parent Families 
have advocated reducing the age of 14 years, on the grounds 
that this would enable family planning associations, doctors 
and other professionals to alleviate the problems of schoolgirl 
pregnancy. Another approach suggests 14 as an age which would 
put girls in parity with boys, and in line with the Indecency 
with Children Act 1960. Yet a further approach suggests that 
because the age of consent is applicable to girls and not to 
boys, girls are subject to controls and interventions that boys 
are not, and as such, this age line discriminates against girls. 
Some groups, such as the Paedophile Information Exchange, have 
advocated doing away with the age of consent altogether, for 
both sexes.
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The approaches are critical of various aspects of the 
current legislation, and at least have the merit of asking 
what purpose such legislation serves; do we privilege its 
protection provisions or its potentially coercive effects.
Is it just another means by which adults require minors to 
fit in with the adult world-view of good conduct?
Broadly, we share the view that the age of consent in sexual 
matters, is predominantly protective, both in its history and 
operation. Unless it could be demonstrated conclusively that 
the repeal of the age of consent would benefit girls under 16, 
by reducing their anxieties about sexual intercourse if and 
when it occurs, encouraging them to seek advice, be partly 
responsible for taking precautions in contraceptive matters, 
we are not convinced there is a case for the repeal of a 
consenting age.
The age of consent does offer protection to young girls, in 
a social formation with a legal system that has a somewhat 
curious view of what a woman's consent is, let alone a girl 
under 16. Women are located in a cultural frame where it is 
hard to convince lovers, husbands, casual male acquaintances, 
and sometimes judges that 'no' means 'no', not 'yes, I want 
sex but you'll have to try harder'. At least the age of 
consent deflects the form of resistance from an inter-personal 
rejection to a more formal plane, where it is legitimate to 
say 'I'm under 16, what you ask is illegal!'. It actually 
gives young girls the right to say no, and adds the force of 
law to make the rejection authoritative. She can always say 
yes, enjoy the experience,but her male partners are left in 
no doubt where they stand vis a vis the commital of an offence 
Moreover, they have no real purchase on girls to automatically 
return for more of the same. In the case of P.I.E., one could 
argue that their real interest lies in expanding the available 
pool of partners for adult males.
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Perhaps those who want to see some liberalisation of the 
age of consent forget the context in which these regulations 
work. Sometimes, to be too concerned with individual liberties 
at the expense of recognising coherent structures, such as the 
way in which sexual encounters actually take place, the assum­
ptions underpinning statute and case law (too often assuming 
that women victims of sexual offences, had been asking for iti), 
that old males and young girls do not meet face to face on equal
terms.
For the time being, at least, case law now provides a more 
secure basis for the medical and allied professionals to provide 
care, treatment and advice. Should this be overturned with the 
Gillick appeal case in the Court of Appeal, the lowering of the 
age of consent is one strategy which will then have some merit.
CONCLUSIONS
It is not our intention here to bring strands together, rather 
to let the diversity of views of competence, capacity and consent 
lie, as divergent approaches to a complex, unresolved issue. 
Comparing the philosophers' views with the way the law constitutes 
consent allows us to view the bounded nature of the legal con­
structions .
Where philosophers and lawyers sharply differ lies in the fact 
that the law has never successfully integrated into its procedures 
the research and findings of developmental psychology. Psycholo­
gists such as Sutton (1981, 1983) and Michael King, who is also 
a practising lawyer, and academic lawyer (1981), are 
able to demonstrate in the context of the juvenile court, the 
hotch potch of theories, notions and practices which constitute 
developmental assessments. At a grander level, even Latey took 
little or no notice of the elaborate theories concerning moral 
development. While it cannot be claimed that Kohlberg and Piaget
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are uncontested normative systems,they do at least provide 
a coherent and rational means of looking at competence and 
capacity which philosophers have at least recognised. The 
law's approach is rather more ad hoc and this quality is 
materially observable when we turn to a practical and working 
legal capacity such as consent.
Consent derives from several diverging species of law; common 
law rulings which allow (in the old voir dire tradition) officials 
to determine on an individual basis degrees of understanding, 
from statutory definitions which provide certain and precise 
but arbitrary lines (the age of consent) and from recent case 
law which took civil service guidelines of practice as a 
legitimate statement about consent in limited practical situations 
(i.e. administrative rules rather than 'law' per se). Moreover, 
consent or the capacity to give or withold it, is for minors, 
gender-specific. The socio-cultural assumptions of 'masculine' 
and 'feminine' sexuality create the necessity for gender-specific 
forms of consent, which on the one hand seem to create socially 
divisive lines between boys and girls, seemingly disparaging the 
civil liberties of girls. This is not wholly the case,though, 
as we have earlier argued. At the present moment, the protection 
the age of consent offers outweighs the arguments about the 
abridgement of girls' civil liberties. Changing the age of 
consent will not enhance girls as social actors, only increase 
their vulnerability. The danger is more victims not more 
pleasure, or less anxiety.
That being said, there is also no necessary reason for tying 
the age of (sexual) consent for girl minors, to the same age 
line operative for minors consenting to medical procedures. 
Firstly, these are unlike social negotiations; consenting to 
sex involves a quite different set of emotions, considerations 
and practices, from consenting to surgical procedures or the 
administration of drugs. The ethical procedures and guidelines
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(which admittedly can be abused) set down for the medical 
profession, the intent and purposive end-point, all are quite 
different from the pleasures and consequences of a sexual 
encounter. Secondly, the sexual age of consent, and the medical 
age of consent have quite different historical trajectories; 
the former founded in statutory protection against exploitation, 
the second arising from common law rulings (and later, statutory 
initiatives) which allowed some measure of competence and capacity 
to minors, based on the premise that the degree of competence 
be ascertained before consent was accepted. The two kinds of 
consent are not only discursively different, constructed around 
quite different social encounters, but as they stand, offer some 
defence against parental authority. Indeed the tactic of Mrs. 
Gillick and her supporters is to conflate two discrete kinds 
of consent, in an attempt to reduce the already limited powers 
of discretion that the law attributes to minors. We fail to 
see how the moral and physical well-being of minors is actually 
enhanced extending the realm of parental authority. For this 
logic assumes that all parents know what is, and always act, in 
the best interests of their children.
The ultra-libertarian stance unfortunately forgets the 
historical conditions which brought about the age of consent 
and the offence of unlawful sexual intercourse. It has to 
remember it was a legal construct to prevent old males buying 
the sexual services of young girls in prostitution, to prevent 
masters preying upon young serving girls and so on. The fun­
damental conditions of class and patriarchy, the relations of 
power and authority which inhabit them, still pattern our social 
relations. We have yet to be convinced that the cause of 
individual pleasures and liberties of girl minors would be 
enhanced one jot by the removal of the protections afforded 
by the age of consent. The cause of civil liberties is not 
served by forgetting the enduring inequalities and social 
divisions of class, patriarchy and generation and their diverse 
effects in creating potential victims.
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At present, local authority officers and parents who have 
customarily viewed children as 'legal chattels' in matters 
medical (Naughton, Observer 4 March 1983), now find they 
have ^  automatic right to ordain medical treatment for 
their charges because if they are mature and capable of 
giving consent, that consent can also be witheld by the 
under 16's themselves. If Mrs. Gillick's case is dismissed, 
in the Court of Appeal, and if the Tories do not interfere 
with existing DHSS Guidelines, the autonomy of self^ grudging 
granted through the notion of 'consent' to under 16's will 
have taken a positive step forward. A small but important 
step towards recognising their competence.
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NOTES
1. Slomnicka (1982; 84-85).
2. A useful compendium of relevant ages (at which infants 
can buy tobacco, guns, enter public houses, drive on 
public highways etc.) can be found in Latey (1969).
See also a more technical list in Halsbury (1979; Vol. 24,
4th edition; 165).
3. Infancy and majority are not elective categories. The 
age of majority actually descends on the anniversary
of the date of birth; in law, this is the day before the
18th (or formerly 21st) birthday - for the law cannot 
partition a day. The one striking ambiguity is the 
Sovereign, who though under 'the age', is never an infant 
(even though a regent is usually appointed). See Halsbury 
(op.cit.; 166) .
4. The most authoratative modern compendium of case law and
state, Halsbury's Laws of England, refers us back to Coke;
Bacon's Abridgements on Age and Infancy, Roll's Abridgements 
on Infants, and to the relevant adjudications in common law 
courts.
5. The feudal incidents collectable on tenures in chivalry 
included aids, relief, primer seisin, wardship, marriage 
fines for alienation and escheat (see Blackstone II; 63 ff; 
Topham, 22-23).
6. 'By marriage, the husband and the wife are one person
in law, that is the very being or legal existence of the 
woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated 
and consolidated in that of the husband; under whose wing, 
protection and cover, she performs everything;' (Blackstone I, 
441). The statements Blackstone derives from Coke (Co. Litt 
112). For the technical details on the husband's assumption 
of property, see footnotes at p. 445, also Bromley, 1976;
429-30).
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7. Sommerville (1982), Postman (1983).
8. See Hatcher (1981), Hyams and Brand (1983), Searle (1979) 
and Faith (1983).
9. Samuel (1980), Hill and Dell (1969).
10. Holdsworth cites negotiable instruments (cheques, promissory 
notes etc.) as an example. The first reported case upon 
negotiable instrument in common law courts come from 1603 
(CRO. JAG. 6). In commercial courts, however, negotiable 
instruments had'been ^mecognised fifom the 13th century. 
(Holdsworth I; 543-44).
11. See Holdsworth Vol. I (p. 454-459). Chancery 'interfered 
in a class of cases where owing to the rigidity of the 
law, the enforcement of the strict legal right was clearly 
contrary to equity. Fraud, forgery and duress were some
of the chief grounds of (its) interference', (Holdsworth I; 
457). Partnership, the administration of estates of 
deceased persons and suretyships also fell under equitable 
jurisdiction.
12. Schochet (1975) writing of family relations in Stuart 
times records;
"The family was represented to the larger 
community by its head - its patriarch as it 
were - and those whom he commanded were 'sub­
sumed' in his social life. Thus, the father- 
master of each family was both its link with 
society as a whole and its authority, and his 
status was universally recognised." (Schochet 
op. cit.; 66-67).
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13. A note on contracts and infancy. The technical issue 
which had to be resolved in law concerned whether contracts 
entered into by infants were void,(i.e. because of their 
initial incapacity, contracts entered into by an infant 
were void ab initio - that is, they had never taken place), 
or merely voidable (i.e. contracts stood, but if enforced, 
could be avoided by an infant pleading incapacity). For 
the technical writings on infancy and contract, see 
Blackstone (Vol. I; 460-466), Bingham (1816; 4-98), 
Macpherson (1842; 447-473), Simpson (1875; Chapter 1), 
Stephens (1914, Vol. II; 107-110), Anson (1937; 119-32), 
Halsbury's Laws (Vol. 24; 168-176).
14. Cases of fathers suing for the loss of a daughter's services 
are cited by Holdsworth; Terry vs Hutchinson (1868) LR 3QB 
and Hedges vs Jagg (1872), LR 7 Ex 283.
15. Setting down the role of the Official Solicitor, Latey 
noted; 'In cases where wardship proceedings are started 
by parents to break up an association which their child 
has formed with a man or woman, who in their view, is 
undesirable, the objectives of the Official Solicitor are 
broadly the same. These cases have become increasingly 
common during the past 15 years or so, the ward being
a girl'. (p. 61) (my emphasis).
16. Grounds for such action exist within the Children and Young
Persons Act (1969) 5 1. (2); (c) being exposed to moral
danger or (d) being beyond the control over his/her parent 
or guardian.
17. Tattooing of minors (other than by qualified medical 
practitioners) falls into the category of 'other touchings'.
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18. Mrs. Victoria Gillick has been involved with Right-wing 
politics other than the 'pro-life' campaigns, for which 
she is best known. John Naughton, writing in The Observer, 
reports ;
'Years ago, for example, she was much exercised over the 
problem of coloured immigration, joined in a group called 
'Powellight' and complained in her local paper about how 
'immoral and unjust' it was 'to crowd our once beautiful 
and fruitful cities with peoples whose cultures and pattern 
of life is so different from our own'.
The Observer, Sunday 4 March 1984.
19. Anne Murcott (1980) takes up another aspect of teenage 
pregnancy; its construction as a 'social problem'. 
Discussing ideologies of childhood, she highlights the 
very bounded character the differences between 'adulthood' 
and 'childhood', where the latter is generally construed 
as the negative of the former. She continues:
" ... teenage pregnancy constitutes a 
problem precisely because it expresses 
an ambiguity not catered for in the sharp 
conceptual contrast. It is a contradiction 
in terms and carries overtones of a 19th 
century horror of precosity. Child and 
adult are mutually exclusively conceptualised.
It is impossible simultaneously to be adult 
and child. What is more, it is adults who 
bear and beget children. Yet that is what 
a pregnant teenager is about to do. Teenage 
pregnancy offends a morality which can 
identify children only by separating them 
from adults".
(p. 7).
PART TWO
MINORITY; TRANSMISSION AND INHERITANCE.
"Nature gives man no power over his 
earthly goods beyond the term of his 
life. What power he possesses to prolong 
his will after death - the right of the 
dead hand to dispose of his property - is 
a pure creation of the law - and the State 
has a right to prescribe the conditions 
and limitations under which that power shall 
be exercised."
(Harcourt 1894; quoted in Pond 1983).
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INTRODUCTION
The following chapters address an area of social practice 
curiously neglected by British sociologists - the system of 
succession and inheritance. The transmission of property over 
time, from one generation to the next, has been the ambit of 
economists, social and legal historians and anthropologists 
(the latter broadly focusing on societies other than their own)
Earlier, we saw how the law makes the initial separation 
betwen adults and minors. We argued that the crucial divisions 
between adult and minor articulates to the law of property.
The purpose of the following chapters is to give that initial, 
synchronic analysis a diachronic dimension by pursuing the 
legal rules of inheritance in order to demonstrate how the 
statuses of adults and minors are sustained, reworked and re­
produced over time. We shall argue that the rules of inheri­
tance not only provide a framework for the secure and predic­
table transmission of property over time by providing a regu­
lating framework of relationships of ownership and possession, 
but that these relationships are themselves crucial repeaters 
of hierarchies and statuses which are allocated simultaneously 
when the destiny of property is fixed and determined.
As excluded subjects, in the law of property, minors can only 
ever be recipients in the process of inheritance and this has 
considerable implications for any analysis of the personal 
relations between adults and minors especially within 'the 
family'. To this extent, the following chapters will try to 
ground the personal relations of parents and children 
inscribed in family law, in the economic framework of family 
property, goods and resources. Necessarily then 'the family' 
will be at centre-stage through this discussion, though not 
in its guise as a necessary institution for re-creation of 
populations, nor as the haven of personal, nurturant, loving 
and affective relations, but primarily as an economic system.
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entailing material differences in power and authority inhabiting 
a system of statuses and positions of economic significance.
But this no more than mirrors the discourse of the legal texts 
on the laws of succession and the rules of inheritance. They 
are simply obsessed with 'the family', determining in minute 
detail who, and who is not of the family - the parentaletic scheme 
or the legal 'family tree' is but a summa of this obsession.
The legal obsession with 'blood' only has meaning if we under­
stand that the destiny of land and personal property in English 
law is indissolubly linked with the possession of the right 
genes and chromosomes and nowhere is this more clear than at 
the death of a property owner.
Even where the familial property is of no great substance, 
perhaps the odd household chattel and/or small amounts of cash, 
lives are inflected by the laws of succession and the rules of 
inheritance. One prime and topical instance is the whole notion 
of legitimacy. Broadly it can be claimed that the legitimate 
offspring (as opposed to the bastard) had a necessary function, 
the feudal transmission of land, securing for the lord a certain 
social destiny for his lands from which aids, fines, reliefs, 
recoveries and services could be raised with a measure of pre­
dictability, in a system where land had only one destiny - 
the legitimate 'line'. However, these old common law rules 
materially shaped the character of social relations which have 
nothing to do with feudal tenancies; for example, the rights 
and claims to maintenance of mothers in one-parent families.
To return to our original claim about the sociological neglect 
of inheritance, there are several problems arising from it, 
that the following chapters fall well short of resolving in any 
adequate manner. The principal issue, simply stated, is that 
while we know a great deal about the formal system of inheri­
tance (inscribed in the laws of succession), a great deal about 
the changes in the rules of inheritance over time - all of 
which have been made quite explicit by social and legal 
historians, we are still in the dark ages when it comes to 
inheritance practices, especially contemporary practices.
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This is true for both ends of the wealth scale: the rich bury 
property in a welter of tax-avoidance schemes, trusts and 
transfers inter-vivos; the least wealthy either have nothing 
to pass on, or, chattels are routinely distributed amongst 
family and kin by principles we can only guess at. Because 
we are in the dark about customary, informal and tacit forms 
of distribution of property which take place at death, we 
have been obliged to stay firmly within the realm of the legal 
rules.
Similarly, we are somewhat inadequately provided for in the 
realm of theory. The sociology of education has advanced 
ambitions and rigorous theories of social and cultural trans­
mission via the writings of Bernstein (1975), Bourdieu (1977) 
and by Althusser (1971) and his neo-Marxist followers which 
we may draw on. The tradition of 'reproduction' expressed 
in a rich variety of concepts, such as the code, habitus, 
cultural capital, ISAs, generally considers the transmission 
of values - symbolic goods, attitudes, dispositions, mental 
structures, competencies (linguistic, cultural, educational) 
and subjectivities. Quite unlike the laws of succession and 
legal rules of inheritance, which are promised on death, social 
and cultural 'reproduction' is promised upon transfers inter 
vivos (between the living). Furthermore, 'inheritance' 
narrowly conceived, refers primarily to the transmission of 
property;'reproduction' constantly refers us to the symbolic, 
ideational elements of the ideological 'superstructure'.
Given these analytical distinctions, there are considerable 
homologies between 'inheritance' and 'reproduction'. Both are 
appropriate to the analysis of the creation, maintenance, 
cartenuance and durability of structured patterns of inequality 
in capitalist societies. Both focus on 'the family' as the site 
through which 'objective structures' and 'individual strategies' 
met to produce discernible patterns of unequal possessors of 
property and cultural capital. Both are profoundly 'economic' 
in function and consequence.
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Within the 'reproduction' framework we are constantly referred 
to the school which acts as the crucial mediator - by distri­
buting universal values in the form of educational credentials - 
between 'the family' and the reproduction of a class divided 
society. The school system has 'a logic of its own', containing 
feudal sedimentations, while existing within a capitalist mode 
of production (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1981). Its 'autonomy' 
from the express interests of any one class - for it awards 
and distributes universal credentials exchangeable at the 
labour market - precisely serves those classes whose academic 
culture pervades, permeates and imbues the school ethos, because 
those particularistic values are reworked by the school's 
anonomity into 'universal' credentials. In other words, 
'reproduction' theorists assert the family-school couple as a 
crucial repeater of olass divisions in capitalist societies, 
the main beneficiaries being the 'new middle classes'. We 
recognise the brevity and simplification here of the complex 
and rigorous theories of 'reproduction', but our purpose is a 
limited one; to highlight the centrality of 'the family' (in 
articulation with state apparatuses) as a means of identi­
fying and explaining the durability of class divisions without 
any simple, unmediated reference to change(s) in modes of 
production.
'Inheritance' reproduces class divisions in a more direct 
unmediated way. Simply put, the laws of succession propel 
property 'down' the family. The legal rules facilitate the 
concentration of wealth (and the means of production) which 
may change in form over time in the 'families' that have 
managed to accumulate it by 'primitive' or 'capitalist' means 
of accumulation. There are no imperatives for the dispersal of 
property held by any one person at death to the realms of 
common ownership; its dispersal is limited to 'family' members. 
Economists have long recognised that the uneven distribution 
of wealth could be radically interrupted by the forced dispersal 
(by various taxation devices) of large accumulations of wealth
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at death. So long as this is inimical to capitalist interests, 
states in capitalist societies are severely limited in the 
strategies available. To this extent, capitalist classes draw 
upon the inheritance system, largely written by feudal land­
holders, to ensure to maintenance of uneven distributions of 
wealth and property, which simultaneously ensures unequal 
divisions of political power and authority.
But this form of analysis leaves us primarily on the ground 
of 'reproduction' theories, with the stress being placed on the 
family's contribution to the maintenance of class-divided 
societies. Of equal importance, 'inheritance' reproduces 
'the family' as an economic system, designating who is to own 
familial property, who has the right and under what conditions 
it may (but need not) be disposed of and to whom and for what 
purpose. The family conceived as an economic system, is quite 
undemocratic as will be argued at length in these chapters.
For what the rules of inheritance determine is the patri­
archal ownership of familial property; married women and 
minors have limited claims to the ownership and control of 
family property.
This remains the case even when we consider the transition from 
the feudal mode of production to capitalism. For the family as 
an economic system draws its character not directly from the 
means by which surplus value is extracted, but from the tenets 
and ideologies of family law. To misrecognise this, generally 
has the consequence of searching, in vain, for 'correspondences' 
between modes of production and family forms. In practice, the 
search for 'correspondence' wanders away from 'the family' into 
the jousting field of 'household' size, structure and composition 
on to the terrain of historical demographers and Marxists still 
concerned to show that Karl was right (see Seccombe 1983).
These points will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 3 
below.
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In some, (but only some!) respects, family law is the analogue 
of the school in reproduction theory: the regulating institution 
was first the Church, succeeded by the state, and like the school 
Christian principles provide the moral and hierarchical frame­
work and ethos even after 'secularisation'. Family law promotes 
universal values - coupledom, heterosexuality, patriarchy, 
romantic love, sexual fidelity and legitimate children, and 
'universal' forms of social relations - dependence, filial 
subordination - which take place within a contract which 
historically privileged the husband; values which the state 
has deployed in a variety of fiscal and social policy measures. 
The extent to which family law expresses a class interest - 
though in truth there is nothing in family law inimical to the 
economically dominant groups under Feudalism or Capitalism - 
is less important than the way male interests are secured.
While working class and peasant families enjoyed conjugal 
relations without the blessing of the Church, and forged their 
own system of divorce (Meneffee 1981), there is little evidence 
that customary relations in common law marriages for us to 
suppose that these were any different from those propounded by 
formal marriage. The codification of marriage by the Hardwicke 
Act 1753 certainly protected the interests of the propertied 
classes by protecting heiresses from abduction and seduction 
into unsuitable marriages. But equally, in the scheme of things, 
the Marriage Act also secured the rights of patriarchal owners 
of family property, to control the marriages of minors. Finally, 
like the school, family law has a logic of its own, and even 
in capitalist societies, can retain elements of feudalism 
(e.g. the Pauline doctrines of marriage) which do not 'reflect' 
directly the needs or interests of any one class.
'Inheritance' then can tell us a great deal about the family 
as an economic system and the minor's status within it.
Because 'inheritance' celebrates the primacy of the family as 
a transmitter of material goods, and because the legal rules 
lay out what constitutes the relations of family members to
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each other and to familial property, we shall use inheritance 
in an enlarged sense to encompass both the transmission of 
property and symbolic values across generations. Inheritance 
covers both the formal and tacit (customary) transmissions of 
goods and values across generations, but more importantly, 
specifies the location of minors in the family conceived as 
an economic system, thus allowing us to understand the con­
tinuing economic dependence of minors over time. We shall 
discuss in the following chapters the divergence of the minor's 
status away from the other 'dependent' - the married woman - 
pointing up the points of departure across time.
Addressing the legal rules of inheritance in English law is 
complicated in two ways. Firstly, the English law of property 
broadly recognises two forms of property, personal and real.
At death, each form of property passes by two different sets 
of principles (thus the intestate rules of succession attaching 
to personal property and real property). To this end. Chapter 1 
outlines the broad distinction between personal and real property 
The significance of the real-personal property distinction 
for us, lies not so much in the form of goods transmitted, but 
the social relations of ownership and possession which law 
determines to be appropriate to each form of property. These 
social relations will be described in Chapters 3 and 4. We shall 
demonstrate the durability of the legal classifications of 
property and the durability of the two systems of transmission 
which were established as early as the 12th and 13th centuries, 
but continued to operate more or less intact until 1926. These 
legal classifications survived the shift from land to industrial 
and finance capital as the major forms of producing wealth, 
this analysis allows us some purchase on the family as an 
economic system which has temporal rhythms and determinations 
which cannot be 'read off in any mechanical fashion from 
changes in mode of production.
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The second complicating factor lies in the fact that English 
law celebrates the right of testamentary power; the power of 
an individual to designate, by will or testament, the destiny 
of property held by him, after death. So the 'templates' or 
'plans' of family ownership laid out in the rules of intestacy 
are in some tension with the existence of testamentary power.
One theme therefore is how these conflicts and tensions are 
resolved, hedged and worked out in practice. However, it is 
at this point that the lack of empirical research limits 
what can be said about the relationship between testate and 
intestate succession. Currently, less than a third of the, 
estates passing at death are secured by a proved 'will'. The 
major thrust of research on wills has been focussed on the in­
heritance practices of the very wealthy. Little attention has 
been paid either to the small estates or on intestate trans­
missions. Again, we can state with some clarity what the 
principles of intestate and testate succession are, but we can 
only speculate what the practices might be. The focus of our 
concern remains with what the legal rules facilitate and coerce 
and what family forms are enshrined within these rules.
Clearly though, the tension between testate and intestate 
succession, necessitates some conception of agency. The rules 
of inheritance are no empty, self-reproducing principles, un- 
problematically engaged in reproducing structural inequalities 
of property, wealth, status, and power. There is a constant 
interaction between the rules and practices of transmission;
on the one hand testate succession necessitates agency; a con­
crete decision to devise property one way and not another. But 
also, simply to let the rules of intestacy run their course, can 
also imply an active decision. In order to engage with some of 
the issues arising out of a 'formal' and 'customary' division 
of transmission, we shall now turn to some writings which are 
concerned with these theoretical problems.
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Inheritance systems have a dual character. Firstly, inheritance 
systems provide rules for the orderly transmission of goods - 
material and symbolic - from one generation to the next.
Secondly, inheritance systems provide a structured form of 
statuses and positions, defining who is permitted to transmit 
goods, and who shall inherit, take or receive goods to be trans­
mitted, and who shall not. Inheritance is a diachronic social 
process, intimating the passage of goods, and the system of 
positions and statuses moving, over time.
Our concern here is not to write a general theory of inheritance, 
but to indicate how the legal rules of inheritance function to 
sustain and reproduce considerable distinctions between adults 
and minors over time. In the previous chapter we discussed the 
synchronic form of that separation in law, based on notions of 
property and ownership. We shall return to these questions below. 
The peculiar character of English legal rules of inheritance 
discursively position infants/minors in relationship to parents 
and familial property in a manner uniquely different from 
infants and minors, say, taking goods under Continental systems 
of inheritance.
Were we to pursue it, any general theory of inheritance would 
have to be adequate in theorising the following complex 
relationships: /
a) the form and function of property and goods - material 
or symbolic - to be transmitted.
b) describe and explain who has the power to determine the 
passage of goods, and the moments of their transmission.
c) describe and explain who shall take goods, and who shall 
not.
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d) the system of transmission itself; whether formal 
(guaranteed by enforceable rules) or customary in 
practice.
e ) the range of strategies or tactics available to defeat 
both the formal and customary practices.
f) the structuring effects on inter-personal relations which 
are an inherent part of inheritance systems.
g) in whose interest do inheritance systems operate.
Because this chapter is concerned primarily with legal systems 
and because it is concerned to illustrate the structural nature 
of adult/minor relations, we shall limit our investigations to 
the legal rules of transmission of goods at death. This 
reservation must be stated because we are sensitive to the 
network of tacit, informal processes'of transmission i.e. cus­
tomary practices, which undoubtedly play a large part in the 
circulation and transmission of familial property (see, for 
example, Thompson 1976, and Bourdieu 1976). We are also sensi­
tive that the transmission of goods does occur at points other 
than death (e.g. gifts inter vivos, marriage settlements, the 
provision of unequally distributed forms of private education, 
occupational preferment, the on-going differential distribution 
of cultural and symbolic capital), all of which must be con­
sidered to be constitutive of 'inheritance' in the widest sense 
At this point it would appear necessary to outline some of the 
theoretical implications of consciously privileging the 
legal rules over customary practices.
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INHERITANCE PRACTICES: FORMAL AND CUSTOMARY
We are confronted here with the old theoretical problem of 
structure and agency, manifest in the difference between the 
legal rules of inheritance and the customary, informal, tacit 
practices of transmission.. On the one hand, we have an 
institutional complex comprising the courts of law, legis­
lation and a tax system which operate through a set of legal 
rules and statutory requirements, to regulate the process of 
transmission of forms of property from one generation to the 
next. On the other hand, we have a 'dense bundle of social 
practices' of transmission, of which very little is written or 
codified and yet whose pervasiveness we are (like all 'lay 
members' of the social formation) aware. Legal texts state 
with clarity what the legal rules are. However, there is no 
guarantee that these actually correspond with what individuals 
or groups actually do. Yet we cannot render legal rules/ 
customary practices as a simple dichotomy. The existence of 
legal rules may evoke certain transmission practices because 
the existence of the rules guarantees a desired outcome; on the 
other hand some practices may be a reaction to rules in order 
to defeat outcomes nominally secured by the rules. Making a 
will or marriage settlement, for example, assumes that institu­
tional means are available to secure the conditions of that will 
or settlement. Dying intestate, or making gifts inter vivos 
defeats the rules of testate succession but evokes either a 
different set of rules (rules of intestate succession at a 
court of law) or informal, tacit principles of distributing 
property amongst successors. It follows then that we must be 
sensitive to what Bourdieu (op. cit.;120) calls 'anthropological 
legalism' which
"regard(s) practices as the execution of 
an order or a plan, as if practices could 
be directly deduced from expressly consti­
tuted or legally sanctioned rules or from 
customary prescriptions coupled with moral 
or religious sanctions ..." (op.cit; 117).
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He further argues that 'historians of law'
"... when they base their work on the 
study of notarial documents, which provide 
them with no more than actual or potential 
failures of the system, are still very far 
from showing how these practices really 
worked." (op.cit.; 119)
We must be cautious in accepting Bourdieu's critique of 
legalistic determinism however . Bourdieu renders inheritance 
practices as a series of 'strategies' designed to keep intact 
the familial patrimony. Practices, in Bourdieu's scheme, 
result from 'a whole system of "predispositions" ', 'consciously 
or unconsciously reinvented' which structure decisions 'without 
ever becoming completely and systematically explicit', and is 
the end result of 'strongly interiorised principles of a par­
ticular tradition' (op.cit. p. 118-120). For Bourdieu, the Bearn 
peasant's (the context of Bourdieu's particular study) recourse 
to law arises from some aberration in the habitus (i.e. the 
legal historians' study of notarial documents are no more 
than investigations of systems failure).
The problem which Bourdieu fails to resolve is the relationship 
between habitus and strategy. The habitus in Bourdieu's theo­
retical scheme affirms and reproduces structures. The peasant's 
recourse to law, which invokes the regulatory and arbitrational 
powers of the court, could well be one 'strategy' in the reper­
toire, not a necessarily pathological or aberrant practice.
The end point as 'strategy' may well be to secure the survival 
of the patrimony; the outcome as practice is to reproduce the 
structure, by reaffirming the hierarchy of courts over customary 
practices, and reaffirming the position and status of Monsieur 
Notaire, in the circulation of inherited property. Bourdieu's
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structuring of legal rules and customary practices as 
mutually exclusive, either one or the other system, but not 
both, misses the inter-relationship of the rules and practices 
and thereby denies the concept of strategy some of its potency. 
For practices are only designated as 'strategy' if the genera­
tive mechanism is the habitus; therefore practices which refer 
to something outside the habitus (i.e. the legal system) do 
not have the status of strategy, but of systems failure. Thus 
the space for familial agency is reduced to customary practices 
only, whereas the legal rules also provide space for 'strategy' 
and agency.
In the English context, of a class-divided society, in which 
families transmit differentiated forms and quantities of 
property, the two systems, the legal rules and customary prac­
tices exist side by side, but it is sometimes difficult to 
determine which system is being invoked. For example, if we 
agree with the legal historians, by following the legal rules, 
the landed aristocracy do no more than follow their customary 
practices which are inscribed in the legal rules themselves.
For working class families, who historically transmit little 
but customary rights, the privilege of selling waged-labour, 
perhaps a council house, and personal goods of inestimable 
sentimental but of little exchangeable value, the legal rules 
are of little consequence. But, it may well be that families 
transmitting but little property, distribute the total patri­
mony, however tacitly and unconsciously, by the same principles 
and assumptions which are embedded in the legal rules. How 
exactly the. distribution of the patrimony is played out, 
however, must depend on a number of factors; the size of the 
patrimony (if any), the form of the inheritance (land, personal 
possessions, tools of trade, assumption of a 'family business'), 
the personal and affective relations between family members 
between and within generations. The formal boundaries between 
the legal rules of inheritance and the customary processes of 
transmission therefore should not hide the shared assumptions, 
principles and ideologies which couple one system to the other.
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When we turn to the history of English land law we do have to 
take the power of custom seriously. As much is evident from 
John Hatcher's (1981 ) reassessment of English serfdom and 
villeinage. The thrust of his argument suggests that while 
common law rules gave lords and superior tenants considerable 
rights over the property and personal lives of villeins and 
serfs, in practice, village and manorial customary practices 
in respect of tenure and service severely limited lordly 
depredations and controls, reducing the 'scope of arbitrary 
seigneurial action' (p.23). He argues that oral, customary 
bargains often become claimable rights to the extent that as 
the 13th century progressed, estate officials carefully re­
corded with every increasing precision the obligations and 
rights of customary tenure, thereby enhancing the stability and 
status of customary bargains .
It may well be that one of the principles of peasantry, evident 
in Bourdieu's work on the Bearn peasants practices at the begin­
ning of this century, and in Hatcher's work on 13th century 
serfdom and villeinage, is the regulation of social and property 
relations (rights in land, marriage and inheritance practices 
which disperse or concentrate land, etc.) by customary practice 
rather than legal rules. But there are significant differences 
between the above peasantries. Firstly, English custom did 
not have to deal with the complexities of adot or any other birth­
right claims to land, such as is found in Bearn. Secondly, 
and more importantly, customary practices were closely super­
vised in England in customary courts (the seigneurial tribunal, 
the manorial court etc.). That villeinage fell under the cus­
tomary court system, rather than the perspective of common law, 
at once signifies a status, but at the same time, villeins had 
an institutional framework in which rights and guarantees 
could be pursued and adjudicated (Hatcher op.cit.;8 ). From 
Pollock and Maitland we learn:
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"The rolls of manorial courts bear witness
to a great deal of litigation concerning
villein tenements; it seems to be conducted 
with great regularity; the procedure does 
not err on the side of formlessness; it is 
rigid, it is captious, the court is no court 
of equity which can overlook the pleader's 
blunder and do natural justic; it administers 
custom". (BK II;361).
What is conceived as 'custom' has legal dimensions, separate 
and different from Bourdieu's perspective of inherited pre­
dispositions. In one respect, however, both systems are
joined by the practice of allowing past practices to determine
what happened in the future.
Thompson's essay on the grid of inheritance, part of his larger 
concern with the diffuse and neglected history of local and cus­
tomary social practices, catches the tensions between the 
common law regulation of land and the customary legal regulation 
of it, in the 18th and 19th centuries. To a remarkable extent
he has caught the process of the demise of peasantry through
the transformation of their customary tenures and use rights in 
and over the land. He argues:
"By the early eighteenth century, we have the 
sense that there was a deepening (albeit sub­
merged and confused) conflict as to the very
nature of landed property, a widening gap 
between the definitions at law and in local 
custom - and by custom I do not mean only 
what the custumal may say but the denser re­
ality of social practice."
(Thompson 1976; 337).
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The customary tenant, he notes, inherited not only a pro­
prietary interest in land, but use rights both on and extending 
beyond it to the common, the forest and the pond, and also, a 
customary grid (tacit, informal, psychology of ownership) 
which validates the exercise of customary rights. But law's 
action in the matter of customary practice is contradictory; 
on the one hand confirming the customary rights of copyholders 
(thereby reifying copyhold as alienable property with a cashable 
equivalent), on the other, either demolishing the fringe 
benefits of gleaning, grazing, timbering.or turbage,or trans­
forming them into cashable equivalents. The very process of 
capitalising land through commodification - reducing customary 
claims to capitalist definitions of ownership - extinguishes 
the communal grid of inheritance.
Thompson's subtle and complex analysis of a historical moment, 
the process of transformation of notions of tenure, and of 
inheritance, signal the intertwining of the institutional frame­
work of inheritance of and 'the social or communal psychology 
of ownership' (337). Like Bourdieu's habitus, the social psy­
chology of ownership is something of a black box - we can't 
exactly specify what goes on inside it - both are attempts to 
signal the necessity of appropriating human agency to theory 
of social process as a balance to self-reproducing 'structures'. 
Thompson's essay however does accomplish the articulation of 
power and authority to the processes of transmitting real and 
symbolic goods, by situating customary practices in the wider 
framework of legal institutions.
Perhaps this is the most serious problem arising from Bourdieu's 
critique of legal historians and his consequent theoretical 
privileging of the customary processes of transmission; that the 
legal system and customary practices are equally valorised.
Doing this, Bourdieu discounts the coercive power and hegemonic 
effects of the legal system, which in turns blinds us to the
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articulation of class interests and state power. Questions 
such as, why the needs and interests of specific groups 
becomes the law of the nation, why the laws of inheritance serve 
a landed elite both in form and content, why some forms of 
property are counted as more important than other forms, are 
not really open to analysis. Further, though the durability and 
importance of customary practices is beyond dispute, Thompson 
and others have demonstrated that when the legal system is in­
voked against customary practices, historically, the law has 
smashed customary practices. Finally, what each generation 
acquires is not simply deeply interiorised sets of predispo­
sitions which unconsciously and tacitly structure decisions, 
but also a complex set of legal and administrative institutions 
with powers to define the possible and allowable forms of 
social intercourse, including a formal system of inheritance.
These observations suggest that the systems of inheritance are 
not merely mutually exclusive, but are in fact structured in 
degres of importance. Customary practices in England are always 
subject to and qualified by the legal rules. A dissenting 
family member can override the customary practices by appeal to 
the law. Where customary practices are invoked to get around 
principles embedded in the legal rules, this simply affirms the 
overarching principles with the rules which customary practices 
hope to defeat. As Bourdieu argues, the existence of 'strategies' 
merely confirms that there are rules of the game, even though 
these rules may not be made explicit.
Whereas Bourdieu's analysis of familial transmission points up 
the importance of civil society (which may be initially con­
ceived as the 'commonsense', routine habits of thought, customs, 
morals, standards and practices), Thompson directs our attention 
to the changing interface between the state and civil society. 
Concepts of the order of state and civil society usefully sharpen 
our perception of what has so far been called 'formal' and 
'customary' practices. Because (the unstable and contested)
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theories of the state have been dealt with earlier, we shall 
direct our attention primarily to the concept of civil society, 
and its relationship with the state.
What we term 'formal' practices and processes of transmission 
are those which have their point of origin, and are regulated 
by various apparatuses of the state (these include legislation 
arising out of struggles between Parliament and the crown, and 
between different factions represented in Parliament, and case 
law handed down by the judiciary). More problematic are the 
conveyancing devices used by lawyers to secure the direct 
interest of individuals or families. We shall return to this 
point below. 'Formal practices' have these properties; a) being 
universally applicable even though in practice, they may well 
secure the interests of a few dominant groups, and in practice 
regulate the transmission of certain types of goods, which 
larger sections of the community may not possess; b) claims, 
rights and interests are pursued and enforced using the coercive 
power of the state; c) the effects are both economic and 
ideological: in the first case, definite distributions of 
property are carried out, in the second, formal systems constitute 
statuses positions and subjectivities which by the claims of 
universality announced in 'the force of law' extend beyond the 
interests of those practices directly regulated by formal systems, 
and may well at the same time conceal the interests upon which 
the system is founded; d) the 'formal' system is maintained and 
reproduced only so long as the system of power, institutional 
framework, bureaucratic and policing functions of the state 
remain - as these change, so will what counts as 'formal'
e) change can occur by a changing balance of forces, between the 
crown and Parliament (e.g. 1660 Abolition of Tenure Act), 
between Parliamentary factions (Whigs and Tories), and by groups 
within civil society subverting the formal system (e.g. family 
lawyers undercutting the common law rules pertaining to married 
women owning property). So it is against the state (whose form 
is determined by the set of publically funded institutions of 
which it is constituted and whose power to act is determined by 
the balance of forces, struggling for dominance within it and 
through it).
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that we must consider the practices of civil society, for if 
'customary' means anything it must refer to practices arising 
outside the ambiance of state regulation, though symbiotically 
related to it, with the consequence that neither is wholly in­
dependent of the other, though it may have effects which are 
similar to 'legal' directives.
Civil society embraces a wide range of sites, social relations 
and social practices; its heterogenity stands in marked contrast 
to the state, formally limited and unified to the extent of its 
institutions and power that can be exercised . The practices 
of civil society arise outside the ambit of the state, on a 
variety of sites, sometimes though not necessarily in response 
to state action. Though the neo-Marxists over the last decade 
or so consigned civil society to a residual category (all that 
was left over after elucidating the properties of the Capitalist 
Mode of Production and theorising the State e.g. Althusser (1971) 
Poulantzas (1968), more often than not subsuming large parts 
of civil society as state apparatuses), the neo-graniscian 
critique of Marxist functionalism, the Women's Movement, black 
studies, to name but a few schools of thought , have steadily 
forced its theoretical reinstatement.
The 'noisy sphere' of 'Freedom, Property and Bantham' (Marx) 
of personal and 'private' relations seems to have been reinstated 
(with the neo-Marxist tradition) for the following reasons: 
a) the character of the state could not be adequately described, 
let alone analysed by reference to one variable - namely its 
function as sustaining class relations, b) the changing nature 
of capitalist states could not be adequately accounted for 
without reference to the balance of forces outside it i.e. 
within relations of production and within civil society,
c) individuals are constituted as subjects within sites 
other than the state and other than as economic agents within 
the CMP; sites constituting civil society (geographical locality.
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within the family, religious affiliations, ethnic affiliations, 
as members of trade unions and professional associations, and 
as generations) are equally effective in constituting subjec­
tivities ( op.cit: 70), d) these affiliations account for
the diversity of politics, points of mobilisation and sources 
of resistance, which cannot be reduced to nor subsumed by an 
individual's class location. C) and d) together constitute the 
foundations of critique of 'functionalist' theory, ideology 
and the critique of 'economistic' politics. The above alerts 
us to the fact that the sites and practices of civil society 
must be taken seriously and to an extent separate from overarching 
theories of the CMP and the State.
To develop the concept of civil society further, we shall now 
address the constitutive elements of it; sites and practices.
Site has the useful connotation of 'particular social space' 
(locality, building) (Johnson 1981;18). But it is also 'a 
cohesive area of social life characterised by a specified set 
of characteristic social relations or structures', (Bowles and 
Gintis 1981; 49). This may equally apply to the state, the 
school,the family etc. Sites are complexly connected and inter­
dependent, each has a character multiply determined. Within civil 
society, sites do not correspond to the institutional framework 
of the state, but neither are they totally free from its 
influence or regulation: the family does not arise purely from 
personal and affective relations of love and devotion with 
desires directing the dynamics of relations within it, for 
those relations have positions and statuses set out in law.
Practices develop within sites but the character of the site 
does not determine each and every aspect of the social relations 
within it; at best it may set limits to the variety of social 
intercourse within it; at best it may set limits to the 
variety of social intercourse possible. Customary practices are, 
par excellence, practices arising within sites constituting 
civil society; popular (in the broadest sense), heterogenous.
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perverse, contradictory and material. Customary practices may 
well arise as activities confirming the structure of sites (in 
defence against intrusions from other sites inside and outside 
civil society, or in mere celebration of the structure, they 
may well continue to exist in spite of changes of social policy 
arising with the state, or, changes in the CMP) in order to 
meet the perceived needs or interests of some or all of its 
members.
Not all of this inertia should be read as romantic 'resistance'; 
the resistance to change can equally promote relations of in­
equality, oppression and exploitation. Customary practices are 
necessarily local in effect (geographically and in terms of 
individuals influence^ by them), though diverse sites may share 
common principles.
But we must stress the constant interplay between sites within 
civil society, the institutions of the state and the relations 
of production. Men become citizens and husbands and workers or 
capitalists at one and the same time, as women become (later) 
citizens, women wives, domestic labourers/wage workers/ 
capitalists simultaneously, through the interplay of practices 
within diverse sites. Some customary practices are written into 
the legal system, attaining 'the force of law', others are not 
(compare anulment of marriage with the selling of wives).
Formal and customary practices exist side by side, with multiple 
points of cross-over so that it can be impossible to decide 
which is what.
The limits to the effectiveness of customary practices can 
only be known, when those practices are adjudicated in a site 
other than its own. Thus a dissenting family member in order 
to overturn the customary system of inheritance within a 
particular family may well draw upon the superior coercive 
power of the state to reclaim a particular part of the estate; 
workers appeal to a trade union, or move to arbitration to
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upset exploitative relationships on the shop floor; battered 
women remove themselves (and children) from the family to 
prevent further abuse. Equally, customary practices are most 
powerful when there is no other site of adjudication; or where 
the formal system acknowledges, however tacitly, the veracity 
and propriety of customary practice: the notable instance here 
being (historically) the relationship between personal re­
lationships within the family, and family law enunciated in 
statute and case law.
Thinking through concepts such as 'formal' and 'customary' 
inheritance then, necessitates appropriating theoretically a 
complex relationship between the state (where formal systems 
are secured, regulated and provide the means for enforcement) 
and civil society (where customary practices, strategies and 
grids of inheritance are seen to be effective). The site of 
the connection between the two,the terrain on which rules and 
practices are played out in the family. But the social rela­
tionships imbricated in the meeting of 'objective structure' 
(formally, economic divisions, family law and legal rules of 
inheritance promulgated by legislation and the courts) and 
tacit, informal social processes (implied in concepts such as 
'the habitus' and 'the grid') are concrete relations between 
husbands and wives, parents and children, and possibly a wider 
range of kin and dependents, such as domestic servants. In 
this respect the family system plays a considerable part in 
durability of the 'lumpy' quality (economically speaking) of 
the British social structure, in which few individuals possess 
large concentrations of wealth). Processes which at first sight 
seem internal to family relations produce and reproduce con­
centration of property and wealth. But these 'lumps' are not 
simply 'classes', but are significantly engendered and genera­
tional in quality, and this characteristic is fundamentally 
derived from the material existence of family law.
In this analysis, the family simply cannot be consigned to 
'the superstructure'; the relations between husband and wife, 
parents and children are not simply inter-personal relations.
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because as inheritance rules and practices point out, at 
crucial times in the life cycle, inter-personal relations are 
also profoundly economic relations (in terms of ownership and 
possession), which are of significant importance to any under­
standing of class divisions. The wealth or property held by 
families does not imply all family members being equal and 
'free' stockholders. As we shall demonstrate below, the laws 
of inheritance work quite to the contrary, impelling an unequal 
distribution within families, unless otherwise disturbed by a 
will, or by a family members, or members, overturning the rules 
by going to court.
How the meeting between the rules and the practices is actually 
played out will depend upon a number of factors, which we shall 
try to indicate in the following chapters. However, some con­
sideration will have to be given to the kind of property being 
transmitted, to individual judgements about the needs and 
abilities of successors to hold and manage property, and to 
the effects of death duties. Moreover, what the rules- 
practice couple mitigates against is any simple reduction of 
inheritance laws to the needs-interests of one class, though 
inheritance laws were clearly written by a land-owning elite. 
To reiterate, there is nothing inimical to the interests of 
economically dominant groups in the inheritance laws, but in 
operation inheritance secures both the interests of a class 
and families within it. We shall see that where conflicts 
occur, between what the legal system designates as the appro­
priate form of transmission, and family interests, time and 
again lawyers are called in to secure the family-property nexus. 
This will be apparent when we discuss the use of the trust, and 
the married women's separate estate. The fact that inheritance 
rules secure 'family' interests and reproduces the family 
system of ownership of property accounts for the resilience 
the rules show towards major changes of shifts in property 
forms comprising the prime means of production, and, to signi­
ficant changes in the mode of production itself, that is the 
changes from feudalism to capitalism,and for the resilience 
of the family.
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Our purpose now is to provide some description and analysis 
of what the rules of the generational game of inheritance are, 
and this entails outlining the diverse but connected elements 
constituting the.legal discourse of inheritance. We shall 
consider the specific designation of forms of property which 
can be transmitted at death and their historical context, then 
consider at some length, the legal rules which designate a 
particular structure of statuses and positions which define 
the social relationships of the family and of the relative 
position of family members.
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CHAPTER ONE
PROPERTY, REAL AND PERSONAL
As a preliminary we must register some of the elements of 
a discursive order, the law of property. This is necessary 
because of the determinant position of the law of property in 
the English legal system. We are not concerned here to write 
anything like definitive statements on the law of property, 
but we limit our remarks to the classification of categories 
which operate in the legal rules of inheritance.
In order to establish the general field of inquiry, we have to 
make some formal distinctions, between wealth and property, 
real and personal property, testacy and intestacy, precisely 
because these classifications are important to the form and 
process of the familial circulation of goods.
Wealth, conceived here, as the quantity of alienable, exchange­
able goods, is a deceptive category, in so far as it can hide 
important qualitative distinctions. Marxists carefully dis­
tinguish between productive and non-productive wealth, between 
use-value and exchange value, between wealth and capital .
In practice, there is considerable difference, say, between 
£25,000 cash in the bank and £25,000 worth of stocks and shares; 
between an owner-occupied mortgaged house and a house used 
purely for rental income, where each house is of equal exchange­
able value. Wealth in English law is crucially mediated by 
the concept of 'property', where a basic division between real 
and personal property is elaborated. This basic division is 
important to our theorising about, not only of inheritance 
practices, but to any institutional analysis of the English 
legal system. Thus, the state for example, raises taxes not 
simply on wealth per se, but on quantitites of particular 
forms of property, and does so through separate and different 
institutions (personal property was declared at Probate, real
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property through Inland Revenue). The form of property de­
termines what taxes will be raised, creates the possibility
for tax avoidance and, the means by which property will be 
transmitted down through the family. What the law means by 
'property' has undergone considerable historical flux. We shall 
only sketch the barest outlines here. One legal primer reports
"... the word 'ownership' is not found in 
use before the year 1583, and the word
'property' is uncommon in English before
the nineteenth century; people got on 
quite well by talking about 'possessions' 
and 'estate'."
(Hood Phillips and Hudson 1977; 288-89)
Aylmer (1980) agrees that the earliest English law books 
'contain no definition at all of property' (p. 87), but the 
word certainly appears in 16th century texts (p. 88). The first 
explicit definition appears., in John Cowell's dictionary of 
1607(p. 88). Cowell's definition,
"Propertie signifieth the highest right 
that a man hath or can have to anything; 
which is in no way depending upon any 
other man's courtesie. And this none in 
our kingdom can be said to have in any 
lands, or tenements, but onely the king 
in the right of his Crowne."
(quoted by Aylmer op.cit; 89).
was controversial at the time (James 1 demanded its revision) 
because it signalled real divisions between the Crown and 
aristocratic landowners - all land was held of the king as 
Ultimate Owner - and because it foreshadows the seventeenth 
century debates on individual liberty and political rights, 
which were to be grounded in the notion of property. There is 
little support for Hood Phillips and Hudson's assertion that the 
word property was uncommon before the nineteenth century.
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Property was of crucial concern to Locke, Filmer and other 
juridico-political theorists for it was precisely through the 
conception of property that they tried to establish who were to 
be participants, as bearers or political rights, in the polity. 
(Richards, Mulligan and Graham 1981, Knieper 1980, Beitz 1980). 
Furthermore, Neale (1975; 96) argues that the concept of property 
was part of the popular culture as early as 1700.
The discursive order of the law of property is structured "on 
the basis of a relationship between an 'owner' (individual or 
corporate) and a 'thing'. Property in modern law signifies 
both the thing capable of being the object of interest (Jackson 
1967;10) and the relationship between the thing and the subject. 
For example, the statement ,"This pen is my property", expresses 
both meanings (i.e. the pen, and my relationship to it). More 
strictly, modern lawyers refer to the relationship thus:
"The word property when strictly used, does 
not refer directly to things, but to certain 
kinds of rights in respect of things. ... A 
person's property is best described as his 
proprietory rights in rem."
(Hood Phillips and Hudson op.cit.;287)
Historically, the law has divided 'things' into particular 
categories; real property (land) and personal property (chattels, 
moveables, incorporeal things such as leases, financial instru­
ments) broadly arising through the forms of action available from 
mediaeval times to recover their possession (Topham 1947; 9 :, 
Blackstone, op.cit. Bk. II, Chap. II). As Blackstone elaborates:
"Things real are such as are permanent, fixed 
and unmoveable, which cannot be carried out of 
their place; as lands and tenements: things 
personal are goods, money, and all other moveables, 
which may attend the owner's person wherever he 
thinks proper to go." (Blackstone op.cit.;16)
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Pollock and Maitland note,
"We have every reason to believe that in very 
remote times our law saw differences between 
these two classes of things (lands and tenements, 
goods and chattels); but the gulf between them 
has been deepened and widened both by feudalism 
and by the evolution of the ecclesiastic 
jurisdiction'.'(Vol II;2).
The division of things into classes, real and personal, is 
long-standing, but the nexus of possessor and the possessed 
has been subject to considerable histbrical flux. The modern 
notion of proprietary right (use, enjoyment, disposal), coupled 
with the notions of enforcement and protection - where owners 
are given 'remedies for dispossession' - arises from a 600 year 
process of allocating 'things' to persons and the struggles - 
legal, parliamentary and customary - to determine the conditions 
of ownership. The law of real property, viewed broadly, can be 
seen as a range of strategies for tenants involved in a struggle 
to obtain the right of disposal - either by sale or inheritance - 
over land. And conversely, the legal process - at court and 
parliamentary level, illustrates the devices used by superior 
tenants to protect the fruits of tenancy by delaying, hedging, 
blocking and contesting any moves to make land like any other 
commodity, so that it became freely disposable and devisable. 
That all land was held of the Monarch - the Ultimate Owner - 
by forms of tenure, gives English property law its peculiar 
characteristics and much of its complexity.
Changes in the concept of property cannot be dealt with in any 
adequate manner here. Macpherson (1975) provides a usefully 
succinct account of the major changes observable over time and 
it is worthwhile to record his observations here. He notes 
three broad changes which arise with the emergence of capitalism.
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a) Whereas in pre-capitalist society property was 
understood to comprise common as well as private 
property, with the rise of capitalism the idea of 
common property drops virtually out of sight and 
property is equated with private property - the 
right of natural or artificial persons to exclude 
others from some use or benefit of something.
b) Whereas in pre-capitalist society a man's property 
had generally been seen as a right to a revenue, with 
capitalism property comes to be seen as a right in or 
to material things, or even as the things themselves.
c) There is a change in the rationale or justification
of private property: before capitalism, various ethical 
and theological grounds had been offered; with the rise 
of capitalism, the rationale came to be mainly that 
property was a necessary incentive to the labour required 
by the society.
(Macpherson; 105-106)
Macpherson notes in passing the demise of the concept of property, 
held by Cowell, Filmer, Locke et al, the broad meaning of property 
('one's property including a right in one's life, liberty and 
honour, conjugal affections, etc.') and its narrow definition 
to'one's right in material things and revenues' (Macpherson;106) .
Macpherson usefully couples the changes in the concept of property 
to changes in the mode of production. If much of English property 
law is concerned with the redefinition of land as a disposable 
alienable commodity, then we need to reassess the role of the 
aristocracy in the emergence of modern capitalism. For what we 
have in English property law is the heavily documented account 
of the manoeuvres of a landed aristocracy, in conflict with
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Crown(and in turn, their inferior tenants contesting the 
great fief.) gradually dissolving the power and privileges 
of the Ultimate Owner. In the process, productive wealth 
in the form of land, was dispersed to individual private 
owners, free of feudal dues and obligations. In this 
respect, the new bourgeoisies - the industrialists and 
bankocracy - had very little to do with the formation of 
modern notions of property (Neale op.cit; 95). Furthermore, 
as Neale argues, it was the aristocratic land-owning class that 
'provided a good deal of the legal and institutional frame­
work which alone made possible the development of industrial 
capitalism in England', (Neale ibid). While Neale certainly 
overstates his case here (where are the technological forces 
of production?), he does identify the significance of necessary 
legal pre-conditions of capitalism, which are of aristocratic 
origin . We shall develop this below.
We have to consider here, albeit briefly, categories of ownership 
and possession and their relationship to notions of property.
The complementary categories of 'ownership' and 'possession' 
are similar but not completely mappable. Various commentaries 
on Marx's theory of law (Cain and Hunt 1979, Phillips 1980) draw 
attention to the theorising of property. For example, when 
Marx theorises property, he argues
" society itself - the fact that man lives in 
society and not as an independent, self-supporting 
individual - is the root of property, of the laws 
based on it and of the inevitable slavery."
(Theories of Surplus Value 1; 346 quoted in 
Cain and Hunt op.cit.;98) .
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The 'independent, self-supporting individual' is not the 
basis of property, nor ownership; they are at best possessors, 
which entails a physical relationship between the individual 
and that which is possessed. Ownership entails the powers to 
use, enjoy and dispose (proprietary rights); these powers are 
regulated and protected by the state, the legal system or 
customary practices; that is a social not physical relationship.
These general remarks on the distinction between ownership and 
possession are thrown into some disarray by one of the basic 
categories of English land law; the notion of seisin. For while 
Roman law accepted the ownership - possession distinction, the 
English law of real property effectively conflates them. One 
book of authority puts it
"seisin .... is an enjoyment of property based 
upon title and is not essentially distinguishable 
from right. In other words the sharp distinction 
between property and possession made in Roman Law 
did not obtain in English law; seisin is not the 
Roman possession and right is not the Roman 
ownership. Both of these conceptions are represented 
in English law, only by seisin, and it was the 
essence of the conception of seisin that some seisins 
might do better than others."
(Plunknett: A Concise History of Common Law; 358 
quoted in Cheshire 1962; 28).
Cheshire continues:
"Seisin is a root of title, and it may be said 
without undue exaggeration that so far as land 
is concerned, there is in England no law of 
ownership, but only a law of possession."
(op.cit;28)
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For example, property per se was not sufficient for individuals 
to participate in the polity, nor participate in the judicial 
process as jurors. 'Men of property' narrowly encompassed 
land-holders and owners only, not necessarily men who held large 
amounts of cash or financial stock, so parliamentary represen­
tation for example, historically, was through and for land­
owners. While the 17th century juridico-political theorists 
contested the Divine Right of Kings and celebrated the equality 
of all men, the practical political consequences were in fact 
limited to land owners and holders.
In other respects, proprietary interests in land, as set out 
in English law, determined proprietary rights in all that lay 
below it (minerals) and all that rested on its surface (not 
only buildings, but also the trees and feral animals). In the 
first case, the dispersal of land away from the sovereign 
necessarily.implies the dispersal of the materials which were 
to become the basis of the industrial revolution in England, 
mineral deposits. The ownership of land supplied some land 
holders and owners with the means for further accumulations of 
wealth in the face of the declining importance of agriculture 
as a productive source of great wealth. In the second case, as 
proprietary rights in land included the ownership of trees, 
turves and animals, it is here we find the sharpest conflicts 
between the sense of individual ownership. And it is at this 
point where we find the clearest expression of a class de­
ploying the criminal law against interlopers on landed estate. 
Thompson, Hay and Linebaugh (1976) give us a practical demon­
stration of the measures (the game laws and the Black Act) 
brought in to ensure that the privileges of land ownership 
went undisturbed. Most of the offences against a landowner's 
privileged usufruct of his property were deemed to be capital. 
The rights that kings formerly enjoyed were simply redistri­
buted to 'lesser' landowners but the principle of privileged 
access and use remained largely undisturbed and indeed more 
severely protected.
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On the other hand, forms of property, which concretely existed 
as notarial documents proclaiming rights to present or future 
incomes, and indeed the very important species of property - 
the lease - enjoy less certainty within the common law, and 
was afforded less protection by the criminal law. Until the 
19th century for example, many notarial documents were deemed 
to be worth only as much as the paper on which they were 
written. These differences were not inconsequential; real 
property enjoyed the protection of common law courts, while in 
the absence of the common 'laws' protection, the equity courts 
had to develop elaborate means to secure the interests of 
property owners whose proprietary interests lay in 'things' 
other than land. Indeed, part of our narrative will point out 
how patriarchs were to play upon tensions between common laws 
rules and equity, to ensure the continuance of the family- 
property nexus.
Much of the complexity of the history of land law derives from 
the struggles in case law and conveyancing about turning 
possession into ownership, turning conditional occupancy of a 
physical space into absolute rights over its use, alienation 
and its destiny on death. We shall develop this argument 
further when we consider the notion of the estate.
Generally speaking, the law privileges ownership over 
possession; the first bearing the weight of absolute rights 
over things as opposed to conditional rights in them. The 
distinction is of considerable importance historically.
Thompson (1976) demonstrates for example that the extension of 
proprietary rights held by large landowners, meant effective 
'dispossession' of customary rights which had been held from 
time immemorial, by a large number of smallholders in the 
capitalist agricultural grid. Rights of commoning domestic 
livestock, turbage, and taking timber, fell away through land 
holders using the courts to announce their ownership of, and 
proprietary rights - thus exclusive use - in land.
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These observations on property have attempted to signal that 
it is not a free-floating abstract category, but a concept whose 
material existence and effectivity is bounded by the institutional 
framework of the legal system. Nor is it a unitary category.
The division of things into real and personal, land and goods 
and chattels, corporeal and incorporeal, illuminates the 
material basis of the feudal order in England. Land was the 
basis of wealth, authority and political power. The legal 
struggles to defend the concentration of land and the obliga­
tions that went with it are significantly about the distribution 
of wealth and power and it is for this reason that English 
property law so profoundly affects the legal subjects with 
interests in property.
The divisions between real and personal property, constituting 
as they do, material distinctions between the owners of 
property, requires further elaboration. Moreover, the distinc­
tion is central to our field of investigation here, because 
in the process of transmission by inheritance, of real and 
personal property, each diverges along dissimilar paths.
REAL PROPERTY: A TIME IN THE LAND
"In law, real property refers to the proprietary 
interest in land with the definition of land 
bearing a wide meaning; land includes land of 
any tenure, and mines and minerals, whether or 
not held apart from the surface, buildings or 
parts of buildings whether the division is hori­
zontal, vertical or made in any other way, and 
any other corporeal hereditaments; also a manor, 
an advowson, and a rent or incorporeal hereditaments; 
and an easement, a right of privilege or benefit 
in, or over or derived from land.
(Law of Property Act 1925 S 205(1) )
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The description of 'land' differs very little from Blackstone's 
'things real' - things 'such as permanent, fixed and unmoveable 
which cannot be carried out of their place; as lands and tenements', 
(Commentaries II; 16). 'Land hath also', he says, 'in its legal 
signification an indefinite extent upwards as well as downwards', 
(Commentaries II; 17), so including the buildings above it and 
the mineral deposits below it. Blackstone's sources of his 
definition of 'land' refer us to Littleton's 15th century writings 
by way of Coke's commentaries. We can infer the ancient origin 
of this definition, unchanging for some 500 years. What is 
distinctly 'modern' about the above definition of real property
is the relationship between the owner and 'the thing', expressed
in terms of 'proprietary interests', (conceived here as use, 
enjoyment and disposal). The law of medieval and early modern 
England conceive the relationship somewhat differently 
expressing the relationship in terms of the complementary 
notions of 'fee' and 'estate' (Pollock and Maitland Vol I and 
II, Blackstone, Commentaries II op. cit., Topham op.cit.).
The fee expresses a complex of personal and real rights. For 
Pollock and Maitland, the English fee :
"is one of the words which came in with the 
Conqueror, and perhaps for a short while it 
carried with it a sense of military or noble
tenure; but very soon it was so widely used
as to imply no more than heritability. This 
is its settled sense in the thirteenth century.
To say of a tenant that he holds in fee ... 
means no more than that this rights are in­
heritable. He does not hold for life, he 
does not hold for a term of years, he does 
not hold as guardian of an heir, or as one 
to whom the land has been guaged as security 
for money; he holds heritability and for his 
own behoof." (Bk II 234).
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The expression of fee includes that of tenancy, 'holding of' 
somebody, but as Pollock and Maitland are careful to point 
out, the ancient 'tenancy' is more secure than we commonly 
suppose, carrying as it does, heritable rights in the object 
of tenure. However, tenancy is conditional both in the ancient 
and modern usage of the word. Pollock and Maitland again:
"... when regarded from the standpoint of 
modern jurisprudence, ... perhaps the most 
remarkable characteristic of feudalism (is); 
several different persons, in somewhat dif­
ferent sense, may be said to have and to hold 
the same piece of land. We have further to 
conceive of the service due from the tenant 
to his lord as being a burden on the tenement.
It is service owed by the tenement."
(Bk II, 237) .
While considerable latitude was allowed between person and 
person, as to whether dues, obligations and services should 
be met, and indeed, how they should be met (by service or 
cash equivalent), 'all the same the land itself is burdened 
with duty and the lord's overlord may have his remedy against 
the land', (237; my emphasis).
If the usage of fee expresses the conditional side of land 
holding, (even though there is considerable security afforded 
ly holding land in fee - heritability), the complementary idea 
of 'estate' expresses the person-thing relationship in terms 
of time. For the doctrine of estate 'comprises an analysis of 
the quantum of interest of the landholder in terms of time', 
(Simpson 1979). One of the clearest expressions of the doctrine 
is found in Walsingham's Case (Plowden, Commentaries 555;1578).
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"The land itself is one thing and the estate 
in land is another thing; for an estate in the 
land is a time in the land, or land for a time: 
and there are diversities of estates which are 
no more than diversities of time; for he who hath 
a fee simply in the land has a time in the land 
without end, or land for a time without end; and 
he who has land in tail has a time in land, or 
the land for a time, as long as he has issue of 
the body; and he who has an estate in land for 
life has no time in it longer than his own life; 
and so of one who has an estate in land for the 
life of another, or for years.
(quoted in Simpson, ibid. my emphasis).
Estates - tenure structured, divided and hierarchically 
arranged by 'time in the land' - bears upon the social structure 
through its articulation to status. Legalistically, estates 
posits 'rights in land', but because rights in and over land 
vary (between say free or villein tenure, between land held 
by tenants in knights service, and socage tenancy), the tenures 
of land thrust on us the statuses of persons, arranged and 
shaped according to their relationship (by tenure) to land 
(Pollock and Maitland I lOff, II 408: Topham op.cit.;5)^. The 
feudal conception of estate binds up rights in land with 
personal status (villein and free man for example). Modern 
conceptions of estate speak only of the interest in land 
(and later other goods including intangibles), without its 
determination, in law, of status and the services, obligations 
and exclusions it originally entailed.
For brevity, and by way of summary and without dwelling on 
the complex history of the land law, we can note that until 
1660, the larger part of the land was not 'owned' as we 
generally understand it (in the sense of freehold land), but 
held for use, by more or less complex forms of tenure and it
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was only conditionally devisable either by gift inter vivos 
or testamentary disposition. Rights of occupation, use and 
limited disposal (by creating sub-tenancies) of small parcels
of the globe entailed the recognition of the superior status
and authority of the Sovereign, made material and manifest 
through the payment of fees or provision of services. Military
tenures involved the supply of armed men for military duty (or
a cash equivalent), agricultural tenures (socage) meant the 
provision of labour or goods in kind. The passage cf land from 
one generation to the next therefore demanded the conservation 
of the material and symbolic basis of kingly authority and 
power; not only was land to be transmitted but also the status 
and all the obligations that it entailed.
The terms 'fee' and 'estate' each bear economic and political 
import. Economic, because they entail relations of ownership 
and occupancy as basic conditions under which production for 
subsistence and production of a surplus take place (in peasant 
economies under feudalism this means primary production). 
Political, because each term specifies the rights of superior 
tenants to claim - either by outright violence or by judicial 
means - a fixed proportion of goods (or the equivalent in labour 
or cash), and the obligations the direct producers have, to 
provide a transfer of the surplus. Note, it is 'the land itself 
which is burdened with rights and duties irrespective of occu­
pants. But who ever occupies it (by ownership, tenancy, posses­
sion) is encumbered with obligations (military service, agricul­
tural labour, payment of rent, fines, aids, reliefs, escheats 
etc.) to transfer something upwards. We should add immediately 
that land holders actually took some care to limit the range 
of potential occupants (this is the function of primogeniture 
in a feudal economy based on land) in order to ensure that the 
obligations attaching to the land, were met efficiently and with 
a degree of predictability and certainty.
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In the same context, the familial event had economic consequences 
for the superior lord. Death meant entering a new tenant to 
the land with the advantage to the superior lord of claiming 
his heriot and raising cash by demanding payment of 'the relief' 
which fell due when a tenant was entered as a new land holder. 
Births can be construed as a means by which the obligated 
family would produce more efficiently the necessary surplus. 
Marriage signalled both advantage and danger. Advantage, in 
that it could be the means of recruiting labour power; danger 
in so far as labour power, and perhaps the land itself could 
be diverted away from the superior lord. We should not wonder 
then that the commonplace familial events were regulated with 
some precision by common law rules and by manorial courts (see 
Middleton 1981, Searle 1981, Faith 1983).
So as 'the land itself passes down, in medieval times and for 
much of the land in the early modern period, the occupancy of 
it (a necessity for the majority of individuals in order to 
subsist) was premised upon a tenancy which speaks the individual's 
status; designated by the 'term in years' and, through the notion 
of the fee, to whom was owed service, surplus and deference, 
the form of tenancy and system of vassalage determined to which 
courts subjects could remove themselves in pursuit of claims or 
arbitration. The 'fee' and the 'estate' condense meanings of 
'the land itself, the conditions of its occupancy and the 
personal relations of authority, obedience and deference. In 
this sense we can appropriate the intertwining of the familial 
event, births, deaths, marriages, succession etc. into repro­
duction of the relations between lords and peasants, though not 
in terms of the familial being subservient to 'reproduction' but 
an integral part of it.
Through 'fee' and 'estate' we catch some sense of the continuum 
of the sovereign exacting his silver by much the same means as 
the lesser gentry extracted their pence from the free and servile 
peasant. The exactions of surplus, though secured in law.
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were never merely routine, as studies of the marriage rolls show. 
They were contested by peasants using the available legal machi­
nery allowed to their status, and by outright resistance, for 
example, in the rebellions of 1381 (Hilton 1973). The problem 
for the peasantry and lesser landlords alike was that those who 
sat in judgement on their claims were those who. benefitted from 
the.upward transfer of the surplus product.
What we might call the other side of the law of real property, 
which extends its complexity, and deriving from the character 
of land, held not as 'property', but as 'estates' formally tied 
by feudal dues and obligations, is the multitudinous legal devices, 
used by aristocratic and lesser landed families to break down 
the doctrine of estate. Unbinding of the personal relations of 
tenure, from the proprietary rights in land - the process of 
transforming land into a commodity - thereby creating an un­
fettered relationship between subject and object is part of the 
larger process of the transition from feudalism to capitalism.
A signficant part of that process is recorded in the case law, 
in conveyancing devices, and in parliamentary manoeuvres. The 
capitalising of land - turning it into a commodity, free for 
the market not only transformed the doctrine of estate but re­
wrote the relations of personal dependency that existed between 
superior and inferior tenures.
The complexity of this transformation has been detailed by 
lawyers such as Blackstone (op.cit.), Holdsworth (1903), Maine 
(1917), Pollock and Maitland (op.cit.), but we shall only register 
the barest outlines here. The means of effecting the trans­
formation were manifold and simultaneous. There was the statutory 
path; where statutes such as de Donis (1285), Quai Emptores (1290), 
Statute of Wills (1540) and perhaps, most significant. Abolition 
of Tenures (1660) allowed landowners freedom to devise the land 
as they saw fit. The second strand involved the re-interpretation 
of tenures; of the great feudal tenures (for example, socage, 
sergeantry and knights fee, or military), by far the most
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burdensome was the military tenure. Considerable efforts were 
made to have tenures converted to those which allowed some 
lands to be devised (i.e. socage and fee simple). The effect 
of 1660 was the dissolution of military tenures and their trans­
formation into socage tenures. The third device was the use of 
legal fictions (fines and recoveries, barring entails) which 
provided limited means of alienating land. The latter involved 
the conversion of dues and obligations from service (by labour 
or donation of game, livestock etc.) to cash equivalents.
This went hand in hand with the transformation of sub- 
inf eudination to sub-tenurial relations. In this sense, the 
great fiefs were caught in a two way stretch, for on the one 
hand they were engaged in unbinding themselves from Crown pero- 
gatives (escheat, wardships, military service, relief etc.) 
while on the other re-writing the form of tenure through which 
sub-tenants were bound to and by the great fief. Lastly, the 
long term process of converting feudal dues and obligations from 
service to cash equivalents undermined the practice of sub- 
inf eudination , creating sub-tenants and allowing 'substitution'
Q
providing a more flexible lord-tenant bond (see Hatcher 1982)'.
What was contained in the doctrine of 'estate' and a character­
istic that was never entirely broken, was that land was held of 
a superior lord, and on the failure to meet the obligations which 
went with the land, the land would revert (by escheat) to the 
superior tenant. The original grants of land went to holders 
and the heirs of the body; the failure of the lineage equally 
meant the reversion of the land to the superior tenant. In this 
sense then the feudal tenure necessarily involves the destiny 
of the land and the destiny of the line (the production of heirs) 
The destiny of the land has two paths; down the line, or, by 
reversion, back to the superior tenant. Here we have the 
beginnings of the possessory family, for the destiny of the land 
was secured in and through the family. What was to constitute 
'the family' was elaborated in conflicts between the Church and 
the Crown, the common law courts and the ecclesiastical courts.
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and in common law cases involving several branches of one family 
claiming the inheritance. Broadly, the constitution of 'the 
family' was fought out on the terrain of bastardy. While canon 
law took a sanguine view on bastardy, at least to the time of 
the Reformation, maintaining that the bastard had rights to 
maintenance and support from putative parents, and retaining the 
doctrine of legitimation by marriage, the common law took a 
different course, defining the family more rigidly by technically 
denying not only the bastards claim to patrimony, but also any 
rights to maintenance (Pinchbeck 1 954 ; 314-316). In effect, the 
common law defined the family in terms of those who could 
inherit land; those born in wedlock.
Precisely because land had limited destinies under feudal tenure 
(much of it could not be freely sold or devised by will), crucial 
familial events - births, deaths and marriages are key points 
in the dispersal of landed property. Points when superior 
tenants took care to preserve their interests by ensuring that 
the family events of their sub-tenants did not remove property 
from seigneurial ownership and control. Furthermore, because 
land moved over time through the family system, especially by 
the rules of inheritance, it is hardly surprising that eccle­
siastic and common lawyers took considerable trouble to deter­
mine who was 'of the family' (determined by reference to the 
marital relation and the blood line). For family membership 
itself presented a potential claim to an estate (though for the 
younger male, and most female descendants, this was a claim 
never entered). In one sense, the rules of inheritance in 
combination with doctrines such as 'estate', serve seigneurial 
and sub-tenurial interests equally. In the former case, the 
fruits of superior tenancy (aids, reliefs, fines, rents, labour 
services) can with some certainty continue to be appropriated 
from the sub-tenant family whose conditions of tenancy and the 
tenancy itself passes down the line in a guaranteed fashion 
under a known and specified set of rules, which require only 
that the family line continues in order to retain the family 
property nexus.
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If the transformation of land from 'estate' to 'property' registers 
the breaking of feudal ties between the crown and the great fiefs, 
and between the great fiefs and its sub-tenants, it is equally 
the case that not all persons were qualified as potential owners 
of real property. The infant, the mad, and married women were 
radically disqualified from holding land, as outlined in the 
previous chapter. The laws of real property, though, did not 
construct the family' as an entity capable of owning property 
(in other words the family is not the equivalent of corporate 
entity such as the trust or a joint stock company) through its 
historical exclusion of the infant and the married woman. The 
law construes the family-property nexus in openly patriarchal 
lines. In the feudal mode where the destiny of property is inter­
twined with the preservation of the line, the law of real property 
posits two potential owners - the husband or the superior lord, 
who hold the land instead of or on behalf of the married woman 
and the infant.
Where land was granted to the original tenant and his heirs of 
the body, the law of real property independently functions to 
arrange familial relations by privileging the adult male as the 
owner/holder of real property; therefore, the family in posses­
sion has its internal relationships fundamentally ordered by 
reference to property, where de facto ownership (i.e. in the case 
of the infant or married woman possessing real property in their 
own right) is overturned by de jure property relations. The 
lin^itations on who can own real property in the family is re­
inforced by the laws of inheritance which in turn limit those 
who can transmit property by will or testament.
Real property then has meanings beyond the proprietary rights 
in land. For the term real property exists in a matrix of other 
related terms of ownership and possession, particularly notions 
of feudal estate and 'fee' which had to be dissolved in law 
and in practice to enable real property to circulate as if it
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were any other commodity. The fee and the estate specify the 
time and conditions under which the prime form of productive 
property were to be held. But more, the fee and the estate speak 
of the limitations on dispersal of the land away from the supe­
rior tenant. With a limited amount of land 'freely' disposable 
at the market (medieval historians acknowledge the existence 
of a market in land, though its size and the volume of land 
moving through it is disputed e.g. Macfarlane 19-78,
1981), fees and estates moved through the mechanism of the family 
Key points in the family cycle of events, births, marriages and 
deaths, became key points for the limited shifts of productive 
property from one family member to another. Family membership 
established a potential claim to property, a claim to some 
portion of the product derived from land (usually determined 
by the patriarch) and significantly, usually entailed recruit­
ment into a family-based system of production.
Though 'estates' and 'fees' remain with us as commonplaces 
within customary and legal usage, the post-1660 commodification 
of land, where landholders were granted extensive rights of sale 
and devising by will or testament, the family-property nexus - 
that the destiny of property is 'the family', remains with us, 
within circuits of capitalist relations of production, distri­
bution and consumption. The rules of inheritance through which 
real property moved through the family did not change abruptly 
at 1660, the rules retaining an inertia of their own, well beyond 
the Civil War settlement and beyond the change in the forms of 
property which yielded greater wealth and income.
Legal rules and classifications have a history not easily 
reducible to macro shifts in to modes of production. The laws 
of motion of the legal terms real property, fee and estate 
refer us to something other than shifts in means which surplus 
value is extracted. Firstly, they are relevant categories for 
a land-owning class, whether the land is used for agricultural 
purposes or not (e.g. where wealth is derived from minerals).
- 311 -
Secondly, the fee and estate to provide the means for the secure 
transmission of property down the line, retaining both the 
legal and common sense of property belonging to the family. 
Thirdly, where rights in the polity are attached to particular 
categories of property (e.g. real property as the basis of 
rights to political representation) there are considerable 
class interests at stake working to preserve what appear to be 
formal distinctions between forms of property. Lastly, the 
category real property, has proved adaptable to both feudal 
landowners and capitalist entrepreneurs (economic groups not 
easily distinguishable, nor mappable one on the other) as a 
means of securing the accumulation of wealth and capital.
Real property qualitatively distinguishes between the land and 
any other 'thing' which of itself may be of little import.
Where its cutting edge lies resides is that proprietary rights 
in land entailed social relations beyond mere ownership of it, 
for extrapolated from this subject-thing nexus, came rights over 
nature's abundance on its surface and below and, the network 
of statuses, and relations of authority, unequal participation 
in the polity.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
The definition of personal property is in effect defined by 
the definition of real property; property not in the form of 
proprietary rights in land may be considered as personal property 
Personal property is sub-divided between personal chattels in 
possession or chattels personal in action.
Personal chattels cover (but not exhaustively listed here):
"Carriages, horses, stable furniture and 
effects (not used for business purposes), 
motor cars and accessories (not used for 
business purposes), garden effects, domestic 
animals, plated articles, linen, china, books, 
pictures, prints, furniture, jewellery, 
articles of household or personal use or
T.312
"ornament, musical and scientific instruments 
and apparatus, wines ..., but they do not 
include chattels used at death of the intestate 
for business purposes, nor money or securities 
for money.
(Bromley 1976 ;616-617) my emphasis.
Chattels used for business purposes are included in a separate 
sub-category of personal property collectively called chattels 
personal in action. These include'debts, negotiable instruments, 
stocks, shares and debentures, patents and copyright, trade 
marks, trade names and business goodwill, and sums payable under 
policies of insurance', (Hood Phillips and Hudson op.cit.; 296 ), 
much of which objectively falls under the rubric of productive 
assets and forms of capital.
Blackstone's text is a concrete example of the difference of 
degree of importance of real as opposed to personal property 
in English law. Volume II of his Commentaries (Of the Rights 
of Things) devotes three hundred and seventy odd pages to real 
property and the complexities thereof ; personal property receives 
less than one hundred and fifty pages. By his own account
"Our ancient law books, which are founded 
upon the feudal provisions, do not therefore 
often condescend to regulate this species of 
property ..."
But he continues
"... of later years, since the introduction 
and extension of trade and commerce, which 
are entirely occupied with this species of 
(personal) property and have greatly augmented 
its quantity and of course its value, we have 
learned to conceive different ideas of it".
(p. 385).
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inheritance (which we shall now consider in some detail) than 
anything else, for what was at stake was not simply the secure 
transmission of property but also the transmission of political 
power.
It has become something of an economic and sociological orthodoxy 
to describe the 'decline' of the British economy by reference 
to the long-term absorption of the new industrial and banking 
bourgeoisies into the leisure, culture and style of the land­
owning aristocracy (e.g. Dahrendorf's journalistic view of Class 
on ITV 5.1.82) ^ . There is considerable evidence of industrial 
and financial entrepreneurs investing considerable sums in estates 
for their own use, and buying substantial estates for their heirs 
(Rubenstein 1974), and certainly a long term process of integration 
between the old landed aristocracy and industrial financial entre­
preneurs, using the same education service (the public schools), 
the same clubs, and sharing the same electoral allegiance (the 
Whig and Tory Parties), and forming economic and personal alliances 
through strategies such as cross-investment, the distribution of 
company directorships, and by marriage (Scott 1982). While this 
is no way accounts for the late 20th century crisis in the British 
economy, it does signal the importance of property forms, espec­
ially where these forms are unequally valorized in terms of access 
to political power and social and cultural status. The culture 
of the 'gentleman' is inhabited by notions of the right connections, 
the right pursuits of leisure, the right schools and clubs, but is 
materially based on the ownership of real property. But in acqui­
ring real property, bourgeoisie also acquired more than a physical 
property for real property was embedded in a network of legal and 
social relations which still owed much to the doctrine of 'the 
estate', wedding the family to the land and the land to the family.
The categories of real and personal property address something 
more than the differential qualities of 'things' possessed by 
property-owning subjects. The categories themselves are invested 
by qualitative differences in the relations of possession. Real 
property exists in a matrix of other referents, such as 'fee' 
and 'estate' which, until 1660, denied any notions of absolute.
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unfettered possession. Occupancy of real property as we have 
noted, entailed certain conditions being fulfilled, and holding 
of land for specified quantities of time (the exception being 
'freehold').
Unlike real property, personal property can be conceived as 
always-already 'loose' for the market. The 'objects' could be 
alienated, by sale for profit, given away, or devised by will 
and testament, within or outside family relations. Even 'chattels 
real' (especially 'the lease') though expressed in terms of time 
could be sold to another person or corporate body for the remain­
ing time the lease had to run.
We can conceive the distinction between real and personal property 
as a feudal expression of the difference between productive and 
non-productive property, but the categories retained their effec­
tiveness until well into the 20th century. In legal terms, the 
whole edifice of finance capital, stocks, shares, different forms 
of credit etc., which are premised on some rights to income as 
well as proprietary interest in a unit of capital of exchangeable 
value, fell strictly under the rubric of personal property. As 
a property form, it was amenable to new forms of capitalist orga­
nisation of the economy - the organisational units of joint stock 
companies, unincorporated and incorporated mercantile, mining and 
railway companies. In other words, there is nothing about 'personal' 
property, paradoxically, requiring a relationship between 'the thing' 
and human individual as possessor. Corporate bodies could operate 
with the category as well as named individual economic subjects.
In this respect, much of the early operation of real property 
implies a particular human subject, from whom dues and obligations 
could be collected with certainty. In fact, the parentelic scheme, 
the legal 'family tree', itself demanded such a subject-object 
relationship. What else could primogeniture be but the process 
transmitting property to a human subject, in occupancy of a place 
or status?
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What the real-personal property categories suggest then is not 
universal subject-object relationship, but a diversity; a 
diversity which posits not only different kinds of 'things' but 
originally a diversity in the relationship itself. The division 
of real and personal property ultimately broke down under the 
impact of new legal devices, which effectively dissolved the 
real and personal categories as differences between proprietal 
interests, so that although 'things' continued to be classified 
as 'real' and 'personal', the proprietal relations which were 
appropriate to each, where necessary, could be legally diminished. 
It is to this process we now turn.
For inheritance purposes, the distinction between real and 
personal property, survived until the implementation of the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925 (Topham 1947; 129), from 
1 January 1926. The statutory dissolution of the real/personal 
property distinction, long after land ceased to be the major form 
of productive property could be explained by the old property - 
political power alliance retaining sufficient parliamentary 
support to block (even in the negative sense of simply not intro­
ducing a Bill) the statutory path to reform. More compelling is 
the argument advanced by Neale (1975) that the substantial dis­
tinctions between real and personal property, writ large and 
secured by the common law, were largely a dead letter after 1660, 
for the aristocracy, and after them the financial and industrial 
bourgeoisies. By converting old feudal tenancies to trusts, and 
through the use of settlements, providing limited rights to 
alienate to heirs of the body, regulated through the equity courts 
(Chancery), land effectively became a financial commodity. While 
the Statute of Uses (1535) represents the last throw by parlia­
mentary factions to retain the old feudal dues and obligations 
attaching to feudal tenancies, the Act of 1660 and elaborate con­
veyancing devices turned landed estates into something not unlike 
the joint stock company (Neale op.cit.; 100). Where land was held 
in trust or settlement, each occupant becomes a tenant for life, 
with limited rights of alienation, but able to benefit from 
rents etc... However, the law also now 'recognised the divisi­
bility of property titles and recognised legal titles to present
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and future income as property (Neale; 98). From the 18th
century, these paper titles, like mortgages and bills of exchange 
were aid. regarded as property. And moreover, like bills of ex­
change, mortgages - forms of credit - paper titles provided
necessary capital for projects such as industrial enterprises. 
Importantly,
through the creation of life tenancies, 
ownership was distinguished from manage­
ment and use, the claims of investors 
(mortgages) were given preferences, while 
the claims of all beneficiaries put pressures 
on the salaried estate managers and agents to 
maximise income 
(Neale; 100).
The trust then became the means by which claimants, other than 
direct (familial) beneficiaries, could claim against the landed 
estate. Once this was established, loans could be secured by 
titles to land, and land became a useful source for raising 
capital to invest in home and overseas projects.
The trust however did more than transform real property into
that 'mongrel and amphibious species' of property which gave a
champion of the common law like Blackstone so much trouble.
Note, for example, this passage from a standard legal text on 
real property:
"TRUST FOR SALE:- So far we have concentrated 
attention upon the strict settlement of land, 
but an entirely different way of applying the 
principle of the settlement to land was by means 
of a trust for sale, a method that has been com­
mon in wills for some 500 years and in deeds since 
the early nineteenth century. This transaction, 
which is extensively employed at the present day
falls into two parts ..." (we delete the technical 
details here).
- 318
"of the execution of this deed is that in 
the eyes of equity the land is immediately 
converted into money, for that doctrine based 
on the principle that equity looks on that as 
done which ought to be done, insists that an 
imperative direction to turn land into money 
shall impress the land with the quality of money 
no matter how long the sale may be postponed.
The important point to note, therefore, is that 
a trust for sale relating to the fee simple and 
containing a succession of beneficial limitations 
is a settlement of personalty, and not realty. 
(Cheshire 9th ed. 1962; 78-79, my emphasis). *
The magical transubstantiation of 'land into money' by the 
device of the trust is significant in itself but has several 
interesting consequences. Firstly, the property passes inter- 
generationally by the rules of personal succession, not as 
realty. This avoids the rules of primogeniture; it allows 
surviving spouses a claim on the estate. Secondly, it was a 
useful device for fathers settling property on daughters at 
marriage; husbands assume a life interest only, they could not 
alienate the property without the consent of the trustees, 
nor could they easily disinherit any offspring of the marriage. 
The so-called 'traders settlement' (counterposing the trust 
for sale and personal settlement against the strict settlement - 
see Note 30.) was not limited to estates in, or settlements of 
land, but could be applied to financial instruments as well.
* TRUST FOR SALE: a deed of trust allowing two or more parties 
to own jointly, say a house and land, as 'tenants in common'
(a useful device employed in contemporary joint mortgages); 
each party has rights to proportions of the income from rents 
or, a fixed proportion of the sum raised by sale of the property 
(For technical details see Cheshire op.cit.; 78ff, 148ff).
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The trust has proved to be a serviceable and adaptable legal 
device, such that property in the form of land or finance 
(stocks, shares etc.) may be settled under its protection, 
serving the owners of the means of production, to maintain 
their exclusive possession of property, in a variety of guises, 
for several centuries past. By limiting the claims of benefi­
ciaries, whether the substantive basis of the trust be in the 
form of land or financial stock, the equity courts at once pro­
vided a flexible means for the realisation of capital, and, 
the means by which concentrations of wealth and capital could 
be sustained and reproduced.
The rise of the corporation (from the mid 19th century) signified 
in Capital primarily, but not exclusively, by the joint stock 
company, as the predominant means of the organisation of capital, 
did not sweep away the old categories of property law, nor did 
it disrupt the traditional means by which landed and commercial 
c^l^sses secured their own interests and those of their families. 
While some manufacturers and mercantile enterprises, family 
owned and controlled, did convert themselves to limited lia- 
^llily companies by the (controlled) release of shares through 
City institutions (Francis 1980), not all of them did, nor did 
they find it necessary. Numbers of enterprises, especially 
mining companies raised capital by other means (Hirst 1979), 
no doubt including using existing assets as guarantees for 
loans, and the network of kin and marriage alliances as sources 
of new money.
As Hirst notes, that while the Companies Act posits a notion 
of the Corporation as a 'republic of shareholders governed by 
their elected representatives', in practice, 'most large companies 
are run by a self-replacing professional management and direc­
torate whose policies and nominations receive formal assent 
at shareholders meetings (op.cit.; 133). Unfortunately, he does 
not pursue the system and mode of 'self-replacement', nor its 
effects. However, what is clearly being alluded to is that 
significant feature of the British social structure - the con­
centrations of wealth and privileged access to key positions
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in capitalist corporate organisations which correspond with 
clusters of family and kin. In other words, while lambasting 
Marxists for not paying due attention to the corporation as 
means of effective 'exclusive possession', continuing the 
pursuit of profit by other means, and directly effecting the 
range of goods and services which are to be produced. Hirst 
himself is forced to admit the existence of older forms of 
'exclusive possession' inhabiting the legal-organisational 
system of capitalist enterprises. Family trusts can 'own' large 
portions of corporations; benefits accrue through the sale of 
shares, through dividends which shares (variably) yield, and 
through salaries (as Chief Executives, consultants, directors, 
etc.) which mere family membership may confer.
If the corporation signals the increasing importance of an 
'owner' which cannot be reduced to the identity of a human 
subject, marking a decisive shift away from the property- 
owning subject posited by real property law under feudalism, 
there is also nothing essentially 'collectivist' or 'socialist' 
about the modern corporation, as Hirst correctly argues.
Given the shifts we have identified in the nature of real 
property, it is a commonplace to find, in the realm of 'agri­
business' (the vertical organisation of modern agricultural 
production and food processing), corporate bodies owning 
estates of land - perhaps a sign of the ultimate dissolution 
of the practical distinctions between real and personal property, 
in the face of continuing de jure definitions. Buying a house, 
a commonplace in the U.K., for example, takes place within a 
legal language that would probably be familiar to medieval 
lawyers. We still use the notion of 'seisin', though in 
practice most lay people would not distinguish between it 
and ownership.
The long duree of the legal classification of property into 
things real and personal emphasises the importance of conceiving 
legal relations, processes, forms of action and legal dis­
courses as irreducible to modes of production, having instead 
multiple determinations which requires an analysis of struggles 
over legislation, case law and the ingenious devices of common
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and equity lawyers dreamt up to secure the interests of their 
clients. One of the long term practical effects of the classi­
fication, and no doubt one of the prime means by which the 
legal classification of property itself was maintained and 
reproduced, was the systemic separation of transmitting real 
and personal property by inheritance. We shall refer directly 
to these consequences in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO
INHERITANCE AND THE FAMILY; TESTATE SUCCESSION
Much as the concept of property can only be understood by 
reference to the legal categories which it inhabits, the social 
relations of property ownership are riven by legal rules setting 
out the means of its devising and alienation across generations.
We should state directly that classes do not reproduce themselves 
willy-nilly, but do so within the limits of definite economic 
institutional and cultural frameworks. It is worth noting that 
the familial unit is a significant element of class reproduction. 
Indeed the laws of inheritance, in the absence of wills or 
testaments devising property elsewhere, propels property down the 
familial line. Hedged only by claims against estates by creditors, 
and by the state (probate duty etc.), the legal system requires 
familial inheritance in instances of intestacy, as the 'normal' 
means of transmitting property at death. In its wider effect, 
the inheritance laws are crucial, economic, social and cultural 
repeaters.
We shall be concerned in this chapter with two fields of enquiry. 
Before we proceed further with our discussion of inheritance 
laws, it is necessary here to signal - albeit briefly - the 
conception of the family that we are working with. We shall 
defer any lengthy discussion of family law (the regulation of 
marriage, and the regulation of parent-child relationships) until 
the next Part (though we recognise that laws of succession are 
a part, but only a part, of the wider field of family law).
Secondly, we shall discuss the laws concerning testate succession; 
the system by which property is transmitted by will or testate.
We do so to signal the importance of testacy as a system of trans­
mitting goods, too often overlooked as an area of power, strategy, 
negotiation which has considerable effects on the relations of 
family members, especially minors.
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THE FAMILY: SYSTEM, FORMS AND RELATIONS
Firstly, we should say directly that we are concerned with 'the
family' constituted by the formal and customary relations of 
husband and wife, parents and children, and not with 'households'.
By household, we mean the conception of persons - blood related
kin, servants, labourers, lodgers - living together, generally 
under one roof (or in geographically immediate residences), 
usually subject to one structure of authority . The debate 
about the size, composition, and social relations of the household, 
and its (putative) changes over time, is the subject of intense 
academic discussion (see generally Laslett (ed) 1972, 1977, 1980; 
Anderson, 1971, 1972; Chaytor 1980; Hacker 1982, Harris 1982;
Hill,1430 ; Stone 1977, 1981; Flandrin 1976; Forster and Ranum 
(eds) 1976; Macfarlane 1978) . What inheres the laws of
succession is the radical disqualification of some co-residents 
kin, live-in servants, labours and lodgers to any claims in 
'familial' property. This will be demonstrated at length below. 
Secondly, 'the family' as defined in the laws of inheritance, 
is by no means, now or historically, co-terminous with residence, 
nor therefore, are the power and authority structures inscribed 
within the laws. Thirdly, though the household is generally 
organised along the same principles of power and authority which 
inhere 'the family', those same principles are observable on a 
canvas much larger than the day to day processes and interaction 
of the household. For example, there are aspects of the capitalist 
state, which may be construed as profoundly 'familial' - in social 
policies privileging the distribution of fiscal benefits to male 
heads of households, for example. A similar principle applies 
to the labour market and places of work
To advance this argument one stage further, we could take as an 
example the 19th century laws regulating the employment of domestic 
servants and apprentices (see Davidoff 1974). These laws conceived
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the relationship between the master and his subordinates much 
in the same way as family law structures the relationship between 
a father and his children, or his wife. On entering employment 
in a household, (and in one sense 'constituting' that unit in 
broader meaning of term advanced by historical demographers), 
sihordinates entered the patria potestas of the master, enjoying 
his protection but subject to his authority. While for most 
servants and apprentices this also implied 'living in', where 
this did not obtain (i.e. not being of 'the household'), the 
principles of familial power and authority still obtained during 
working hours, and often outside them. In other words, the 
'formally free' labourer (in Marx's sense) enters an economic 
relationship which is overwritten by 'unfree' relations of personal 
dependence and familial subordination . Clearly, there is an 
overlap between conceptions of 'the family' and 'the household' - 
we might venture to say that individuals routinely lived and 
interacted in 'households' in a variety of class-specific ways, 
and may well have (and still do) experienced 'the family' directly 
through the household - however, 'the family' in the enlarged sense 
we use here, extends beyond and subsumes the household. The way 
forward then is to consider 'the family', 'a system of differen­
tially distributed power and status relations' inscribed within 
formal institutions and customary practices, and observable in 
sites including, and other than, the household (the work place, 
the system of social policies promulgated by the state, for 
example). The boundaries between the positions of power and 
status, which determine the social relations of individuals within 
'the family', constitute the family form.
Drawing on the work of Delphy and Leonard (1980, 1982, 1983), 
and on my earlier work with Hood-Williams, what follows is an 
attempt to sketch 'the family' in terms of its economic and 
social characteristics in order to demonstrate the centrality 
of familial relations in any understanding of the dependency
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of minors. We shall proceed by advancing a series of theses 
about the family, each followed by discussion, in order to de­
lineate a field of enquiry. Those taken directly from Fitz and 
Hood-Williams (1982) are acknowledged in quotes.
a) The family both historically and currently, constitutes 
a form or system of producing and consuming goods and services 
and transmitting property, in the broadest sense, according to 
a logic quite different from that of capital' (op.cit.: 68).
To elaborate; to argue for a familial system of producing goods 
and providing services (for the benefit of other family members) 
and a capitalist system of producing goods and providing services 
(as commodities to be exchanged at the market) is to argue that 
there are two 'economic' systems (both concern production, distri­
bution and consumption), and not one 'economic' system and 'a 
family' system (i.e. 'un-economic'). The distinction is between 
capitalist circuits of production-distribution-consumption and 
familial circuits; the distinction between productive (capitalist) 
and non-productive (familial) labour, intensely debated within 
the 'housework' controversy, necessarily denies the family system 
any significance
Some comments on the housework/domestic labour/household labour 
debate. One defence of the Marxist protagonists; unlike classical 
economists, they were at least prepared to conceive housework/ 
domestic labour as 'labour'. While their attempts to theorise 
this specific form of labour has its problems (and we shall 
pass on to these below), there is considerable merit in the 
attempts to conceive the isolated labour carried on in the private 
sphere, in the context of capitalistic relations of production 
(e.g. Seccombe 1974, Gardiner 1977, Hummelweit and Moliun 1977, 
Folbre 1982). But the attempts to lift housework/domestic labour 
into a continuum of labour, from which capitalists benefit, on 
the other hand failed to address the problem of housework/domestic 
labour per se, its specific location within the household and 
its articulation to the family as an economic system.
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The fundamental problem arises from Marxists analysing housework/ 
domestic labour in terms of the labour theory of value outlined 
in Capital Vol. I. The logic of the discourse traps them into 
a position of assessing domestic labour in terms of a) whether 
domestic labour is a commodity, b) whether it produces a surplus,
c) whether or not it is subject to the law of value, d) whether 
not domestic labour is socially—necessary labour time devoted 
to the reproduction of labour power, e) whether or not household 
labour is productive, and so on. These terse remarks give some 
flavour of the nature of the 'debate' but also clear the way for 
us to make some theoretical observations
Now as we understand it, the labour theory of value in Capital Vol.I 
has the purpose of 'uncovering', 'laying bare', 'revealing'
a) the laws of motion of capitalist economic systems, b) the 
necessarily exploitative nature of capitalist relations of 
production (the capital-labour relation) and the moral/political/ 
ethical consequences of exploitation. The theory posits through 
its concepts, two fields of enquiry; the first is considering 
relations of production not of the same order as familial relations 
of production; so there are problems of applicability. The second, 
the discussion of exploitation does have direct relevance to 
housework/domestic labour. So there is a case for deploying 
the labour theory of value in the analysis of housework/domestic 
labour, in so far as it might be regarded as exploited labour.
Given that the field of enquiry is exploitation, we are not yet 
out of the wood. The labour theory of value (Vol. I) is a mere 
analytical tool, appropriating in thought, a concrete economic/ 
political/moral-ethical relationship. Heresy! However, the 
epistemological frame set up here attends to the basic of the 
Marxist method. In terms of polemics, the labour theory of value 
achieved its ends i.e.'laying bare' etc..
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However :
a) There are fundamental problems, internal to the discourse of 
Capital with the labour theory of value, arising from:
1. The abract formulations of Vol. I and the attempts to 
'operationalize' it in Vol. III. This has been demonstrated 
at length by bourgeois economists such as Samuelson (1972,
1977) who can cite for his argument an impressive provenance 
amongst Marxist and socialist economists such as Sraffa; by 
Marxian economists, but most forcefully by Joan Robinson 
(1945, 1960, 1964, 1978); and by a collection of Marxian 
sociologists and economists, (Cutler, Hindness, Hirst and 
Hussain 1977 Vol. I).
2. The ambiguous term 'value', causing confusion more than 
acting as a searchlight on 'the laws of motion' and exploitation 
Basically, 'value' in Vol. I cannot be made to correspond
to 'prices' in the discourse of Vol. Ill (nor for that matter 
does 'value' address the price regime of the material world 
of capitalist societies).
3. The Vol. I. schema which allows only socially necessary 
(and living) labour to determine the 'value' of a commodity;
the formulation traps the uncritical into assessing all labour 
only in terms of whether or not it produces 'value' (which 
itself is of uncertain status) (e.g. see the above domestic 
labour debate). Furthermore, the money-value of commodities 
is determined not only by labour, but also by scarcity, the 
laws of demand and supply, changes in technology and so on.
4. The language in which the theory is expressed. Joan 
Robinson writes:
'The awkwardness of reckoning in terms of value, 
while commodities and labour-power are constant 
by changing in value, accounts for much of the 
obscurity of Marx's exposition and none of the 
important ideas which he expresses in terms of 
the concept of value cannot be better expressed 
without it.' (Robinson 1967; 20).
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5. The fact that little of the rest of the Marxian economic 
scheme derives from the labour theory of value. Joan Robinson 
again, 'no point of substance in Marx's argument depends on 
the labour theory of value (op.cit.; 22). The derivation 
of the relations to the means of production (possession/non­
possession) is logically prior to any labour theory of value; 
it is therefore possible to devise a theory of class without 
recourse to 'value'. Rates of exploitation can be discussed 
outside the terminology of the labour theory of value, as 
can rates of profit.
b) It is therefore possible to demonstrate the exploitation 
of wage-labour by capital, without recourse to the labour 
theory of value; neo-classical economics have the concepts 
and algebraic formulations for quite another form of demon­
stration (see Samuelson op.cit.). That these tools were 
not widely deployed until post-1945 requires separate analysis. 
In other words (in Samuelson's term) 'erase and replace'; 
erase the labour theory of value and replace with the bourgois 
economics of wage bills and prices, but exploitation remains 
constant. To reiterate; the exploitation of wage-labour by 
capital exists outside the theoretical framework of the labour 
theory of value - independent of it - and moreover, the labour 
theory of value is an imperfect tool for describing and explain­
ing the material and concrete process of exploitation taking 
place. We do not now need a labour theory of value to discover 
exploitation; though this does not deny its salience in the 
history of thought. Again, this statement in no way offends 
the precepts of materialist or realist social scientific 
epistemology.
What then is the significance of these comments in the context
of the economic analysis of domestic/household labour and house­
work? Some observations:
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a) One is led to wonder about the nature of the ideological heat 
generated by the domestic labour debate, and what it is that 
Marxist writers cited above are trying to discover or defend - 
the character and relations work carried on within the family, 
or the canon of the labour theory of value? It would seem
a curious theoretical and political practice, a curious 
economic and sociological form of analysis to situate an 
analysis of non-waged labour in the context of canon which 
primarily addresses the problem of waged-labour (and the 
case of the Vol. I formulation), a framework which needs 
considerable revision before it can be operationalized. It 
can be said that whether domestic labour is commodity or not, 
whether or not it produces a 'surplus', whether it is or not 
socially-necessary etc. is irrelevant to the necessary proof 
of exploitation. Domestic labour does not necessarily have 
to fulfil all the precepts of the labour theory of value in 
order for it to be considered an exploited form of labour, 
productive labour, etc.. We shall consider the effects of 
sticking with the labour theory of value verbage below, but 
it is quite clear that its language acts as a block on a 
materialist account of the economics of the family.
b) A materialist economic analysis is not co-terminous with 
social relations and processes analysed in and through the 
Vol. I formulation of the labour theory of value. It is not 
even a necessary starting point for investigating the economic 
relations between husbands and wives, parents and children 
(those statuses and positions are given not only by relations 
of possession/non-possession of patrimony and relations of 
production - about which Marxism has a great deal to say which 
is of 'use' and 'value' - but also by formal legal institutions, 
customs, habits and predispositions; for example,ecclesiastical 
and state familylaw, peasant inheritance customs, attitudes
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to the relative values of boy and girl babies etc.).
'Not a necessary starting point', however, does not mean 
that all Marxian economic formulations are redundant.
c) In one sense, 'we are all Marxist' (Robinson 1965); we cannot 
conceive what a materialist economic analysis might be like 
without say a concept like possession/non-possession and what 
flows from positing that relationship in economic and political 
terms. But it is a disservice to think through, say possession/ 
non-possession only in terms of capital-labour relations.
Nor would we wish to disturb the formulation that without 
labour there would be no product (a formulation which holds 
equally good for both the gas cooker and the home-baked apple 
pie). Economists may differ as to how the value of a commodity 
is established (by the value of labour power embodied in it - 
Marx; by wage costs and scarcity of primary products and the 
law of demand - the more sophisticated bourgeois economists' 
account), few if any would disagree that commodities/products 
are unequally distributed in capitalistic economies. Both 
Marxist and bourgeois economists write into their formulations 
a form of 'simple reproduction'; that labour power must receive 
in wages, at the minimum a wage for subsistence, or, in reality 
a wage sufficient to ensure the reproduction of labour power/ 
labour force. While these formulations are generally made to 
apply to macro-economic theory, they can be transferred to 
the micro-economic sphere; there is no real need to re-invent 
the wheel, in order to explore the familial system of production 
and consumption. But it is also not necessary, to take up 
our earlier point, to attend to all the niceties of the labour 
theory of value, in order to discover the order of the relations 
of possession/non-possession, the relations of production, 
distribution and consumption within the family system. A formal 
deployment of its concepts does not itself constitute the 
boundaries of 'economic analysis'. A point all the more poignant 
when it is realised that Marx deliberately wrote out of the 
Vol. I formulation, the labour power of women and children 
(FolLre 1982 ;31 8 ) .
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d) In sum, Marx's economic system is not redundant to the analysis 
of the family system. Indeed it is a crucial link between the 
family system and the capitalistic economy in which it is 
an embedded part. Something of the character of the family 
system can be judged by highlighting the differences between 
capitalistic economies and the family system. But what we 
are positing here is that there is a tendency to subsume, 
via the precepts of the labour theory of value, the family 
system as an extension of, or an appendage to the 'fundamental' 
relations of production (capital-labour).
One writer catches the tension nicely:
"I would argue that the approach of Marxists 
to an analysis of class has tacitly acknow­
ledged the dependant relationship of men 
to women without addressing any of the 
problems this relationship poses either 
theoretically or politically. For example, 
women's class position has generally been 
equated with that of their husbands and the 
family implicitly taken as the unit for 
analysis of the class struggle."
(Gardiner 1977; 158, my emphasis)
Any attempt to describe and analyse the family system has to 
make the 'tacit' formal, and the 'implicit' explicit. The fact 
that Gardiner continues in this article to subsume women-wives 
as a sub-set of the class struggle makes the above all the more 
ironic.
In sum, we need somewhat different concepts and a different 
language to avoid the tendency to subsumption; to adopt this 
position does not necessarily entail dislocating the family as 
an economic system from capitalist relations. No-one will deny 
that unpaid domestic labour reduces the cost of the reproduction 
of labour power to a capitalist class; it is another matter, 
however to argue that capitalists are either the chief or the 
only beneficiaries.
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In order to take familial production, distribution and consumption 
seriously, we need to examine it on its own terms. One way to 
delineate its character is to compare and contrast it with 
capitalistic circuits; to indicate the points of connectedness and 
difference. To this end, we shall use an extended quote from Delphy 
and Leonard as means of moving forward to a material analysis of 
the family as an economic system.
"In sum, in the model market system, the worker exchanges his or 
her labour power for a fixed wage which depends on the services 
which he or she performs. These services are also fixed, limited 
in quantity (hours of work) and in kind (qualification). The 
equivalents are determined according to a fixed scale (that is, 
a price determined globally on the labour market in the capitalist 
system) which is little influenced by the wishes of either party.
The labour which is performed has a universal value and it is 
this value which the employer buys and which the worker can sell 
because it is possible for him to work elsewhere (for one of a 
large number of employers). The fact that he is selling certain 
pre-determined services enables the worker to increase his earnings 
by improving his services, either in quantity or in kind."
"In contrast, the work which family members provide is not fixed, 
in hours or in kind: it depends on the desires of the head of 
the family; and this work is not paid for according to a fixed 
scale. The maintenance provided for family members depends not 
on their work, but on the wealth and the goodwill of a particular 
individual: the head of the family. Since the benefits which they 
receive have no relationship to the work they do, it is impossible 
for them to improve their own standard of living by improving 
their work. The only solution, within the family system, is to 
be the dependent of a richer head. The logical consequence of 
the non-value of family labour for women is to hunt for a good 
marriage, but most of the time, there is no possibility of 
choosing whom to work for (none at all for sons or daughters), 
and very little for wives : compare the number of women who divorce 
and remarry with the number of workers who change jobs within a 
given year). While the paid worker sells his or her labour, the 
family member ...)."
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"While the meeting and interaction of actors in the market depends 
on their having goods to exchange, patrimonial transmission is 
independent of the goods transmitted, and is on the contrary 
regulated by the status of persons. Exchange is based on recipro­
city, patrimonial transmission does not involve counterpart and 
equivalence. The origin and forms of exchange find their raison 
d'etre in the satisfaction of particular needs, while patrimonial 
transmission is due to ascriptive criteria based on family roles. 
Finally, exchnage depends on individual volition while the transmissior 
of patrimony is a (legal) obligation. (Delphy and Leonard 1980;9-10)."
We summarise and develop the above argument below. The differences 
are signalled by the beneficiaries of each system, and, in the 
social relationships of producing-consuming. The capitalist mode 
posits wage-labourers 'freely' contracting to produce commodities 
for the owners of the means of production (who benefits at the 'unfree' 
labour market, at the market when commodities are 'freely' exchanged, 
and from the surplus value appropriated in the very production of 
commodities). The phenomenal form of 'exchange of equivalents'
(labour for wages, money for commodities etc.), rests upon legally 
'free' subjects exchanging and contracting goods and services, formally 
'free' to find new markets or different employers. As Marx suggests, 
(Capital l;Part 1), the constraints of reality erode 'freedom' at 
every point. The contractual equivalence and equality between 
capitalist and producer, inscribed in the legal form, is undermined 
by the necessity of subsistence.
Quite unlike the contractual 'quality' of capitalist means of 
producing and exchanging, the familial contract (marriage) cele­
brates inequality. Goods and services produced (either for the 
market or for direct consumption by family members), by the 
operation of customary practices and family law, belonged to 
the husband. In exchange, the husband (who in law can only be 
male) owes to his spouse (who formally is female) obligations, 
which can only be enforced to a limited degree. The form of 
exchange then is unwaged, and is reinforced by relations of 
obligation, personal dependence and personal obedience (to be
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enforced if necessary by violence). The familial system of 
producing is not based in any sense upon any contractual ex­
change of equivalence between husband-wife, husband children.
The system of producing - be it goods of exchange, or goods or 
services of use value - is quite unlike the form of capitalist 
producing. Indeed, the significance of the status wife and 
minor arises from their legal exclusion from entering contracts 
in their own names.
The difference extends beyond the system of producing as des­
cribed by the character of the labour relation. In matters of 
ownership and control, there are considerable differences be­
tween capitalist property relations and family property relations 
Capitalist property assigns a relationship between a 'thing' and 
an individual or corporate body capable of exercising pro­
prietary rights in it. A dog and a joint stock company may 
equally hold capital. Not so within the family system. For 
historically, married women and infants are excluded from owning 
and controlling 'family' property. Likewise, the married woman 
and the minor could not alienate or devise by will, 'family' 
goods (because they didn't own them!). Given these legal ex­
clusions, it should be clear that familial property has only 
one owner, the husband-father.
b) "... there are two modes of recruitment to the family system. 
Firstly, the marital relationship which recruits women-wives and 
is of 'primary importance' in explaining the 'multiplex nature 
of women's oppression'. Secondly, the kinship and/or lineal 
relations."
On marriage, women-wives enter the couverture of their (male) 
husbands. Couverture offers both 'protection', and an obli­
gation to maintain, but also, material and symbolic subordination 
for married women. The Pauline doctrine ^  of marriage, and the 
English ecclesiastical conception of 'one flesh', allots a 
husband rights in and over the body and the labour of his spouse.
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Social policies further assign the subordinate status of the 
married woman, offering as it does the prime forms of fiscal 
benefits (tax benefits, health and social security benefits), 
to the male head of households.
Likewise, fathers have 'natural' rights over the children of 
his lines; rights to their labour, rights to determine a wide 
range of social practices (visible at particular points such 
as marriage, the age of majority - when the destiny of aristo­
cratic landed property was resettled, entry to occupations, 
professions and family businesses), balanced by obligations 
(in exchange?) to provide food, clothing and shelter. Kinship 
affiliation is not simply a biological relationship (father and 
children 'owning' the same chromosomes), but is reinforced and 
sustained by social practices - the working of family law, and 
the laws of succession. To a limited extent, children can be 
conceived as the property of the patriarch. Principles which 
might constitute a concept of children as property are:
a) Adult power over familial offspring, stemming from an 
initial/prolonged physical dependence of children on 
adults (usually the male head of the family).
b) The notion of ownership and possession; parents having the 
exclusive rights in their child's labour; or rights of 
disposal (marriage alliances, apprenticing out, hiring out).
c) the exclusive authority to use (and abuse), raise, mould, 
develop according to parental ideologies, through the denial/ 
restriction of social practices, experiences and ideas.
d) The notion of transferability, whereby the exclusive authority 
outlined above, can be switched from the biological family
to the State or other surrogate 'families'
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The characteristics of exclusive authority of use and disposal 
and transfer are legally guaranteed and customarily practiced.
We recognise, however, that child protection legislation arising 
in the 19th century severely curtails patriarchal authority 
over, and rights in children.
c) 'The family is not a unit but a complex system of 
differentially distributed power and status position and 
relations'.
We have signalled the major divisions comprising the family 
by speaking of heads and subordinates. Typically, the family 
comprises the male head with subordinate women wives and minors. 
The family is patriarchal - but we use patriarchy in the sense 
commonly used by anthropologists and by the juridico-political 
theorists of the 16th and 17th century  ^. By patriarchy, we 
speak of power and status relations celebrating both maleness 
and seniority; women-wives are subordinate to male husbands, as 
minors are subordinate to adult parents. We would argue that 
the characteristics extend beyond the immediate social rela­
tionships of kin and household, and is observable in the labour 
market (differential job opportunities, rates of pay, career 
and promotional prospects), in a wide variety of social policies, 
and in institutions such as schools, colleges etc..
Family law celebrates both the positions and statuses and 
the power and authority relations between them as we shall 
indicate at length in the next chapter. As Delphy and Leonard 
suggest however, distributions of power and status arise sig­
nificantly from the family system of producing, and from that, 
the distribution of benefits and rewards accorded to each status, 
are determined. We have already suggested one line of force; 
the patriarchal ownership and control of familial goods (the 
patrimony). The other line of analysis is to consider the 
distribution of tasks, and the control over them, the time
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taken and the conditions under which they are carried out. The 
general principle that applies is that family subordinates do 
low status tasks, and, conversely, the work done by subordinates 
is low status. Anthropological studies (Delphy 1977; French 
peasants; Schildkrout's (1982) study of child labour in Kano, 
Nigeria) suggest the cross-cultural perspective of this principle 
In the British context, child care is largely women's work 
(mothers, minders, playgroup leaders, women relatives), is 
predominantly unpaid or poorly paid (Coulter 1981) and residual 
to the main (male) business of working full-time for wages.
In every sense it is low status, low paid, and residual work, 
affirming the residual and subordinate status of women in the 
system of producing (see Hood Williams and Fitz 1983). Like 
housework, cooking and running the kids to school, child care 
is relegated to realm of the 'non-essential', 'non-productive', 
therefore unimportant.
Though child labour was a key element in the economy of working 
class families, since the introduction of full time compulsory 
schooling, it is of decreased significance. However, research 
being carried out in London, Luton and rural Bedfordshire 
suggests that child labour is still with us, on a scale that 
is surprising. Though the jobs available for children vary with 
the regional and local context, within agricultural enterprises 
and smallholdings run by families, the significance of child 
labour should not be underestimated. Our interviews with the 
children living on smallholdings suggest that they spend con­
siderable amounts of time, before and after school, doing tasks 
such as making up vegetable boxes, cutting and packing produce - 
all for minimal reward ® . We should add that this form of 
direct appropriation of child labour by the family head, may 
not make up a significant proportion of the employment relations 
under investigation. What is evident (though impressionistic 
at this time) is the extent to which parents actively parti­
cipate in the recruitment of their children to available jobs
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on the market. The size and cultural significance of this re­
cruitment pattern has yet to be explored. The character 
of jobs for which children receive payment however (part-time, 
low-pay, on the margins of production) confirms the principle 
sggested above.
To reiterate, what is presented above is a sketch, an outline 
requiring detail and elaboration and this will be part of the 
work undertaken particularly in this chapter and the next.
In presenting the family as a complex system of positions and 
statuses imbued with relations of power and authority, we have 
attempted to move away from several theoretical positions 
evident within the social science. It contrasts, for example, 
with functionalist theories of the family where the family as 
a unit is conceived in terms of roles and imperative processes 
(especially 'biological imperatives') . There is a second 
variety of functionalism evident in Althusser (1971) where the 
family is .regarded as one of the key mechanisms for the repro­
duction of the relations of production. Again, through Althusser, 
we find a second line of approach which consigns the family to 
the superstructure, resting upon the 'primary' mechanism of the 
mode of production. This approach admits very little space 
for the analysis of the family as an economic system, with its 
independent history and system of producing. Thirdly, we are 
unwilling to consign the family to the realm of social relations 
which are primarily constituted by personal and affective rela­
tions. It is of course imperative that we map the psycho-social 
relations of the interior of the family and the changes which 
occur in personal, affective and sexual relations, but we can 
only do so in the context of understanding that these relations 
are shot through with structures of power and subordination
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As it stands, the family as a system presented here is somewhat 
abstract, referring to principles and lines of analysis without 
detailing the ebb and flow of the relations between positions 
and statuses. It is certainly ahistorical, presenting as it 
does a 'de-historicised' system, blind changes in the mode of 
production and changes in the relationship between the state 
and civil society. What is offered below attempts to enlarge 
and elaborate on this schematic presentation, illustrating the 
necessity of locating the subordinate status of minors within 
the family. The laws of succession provide a useful instance 
of the family operating as a system.
TESTATE SUCCESSION
The law provides that on death, for the distribution of property 
held by a dead person to devolve through two separate systems; 
by testate succession (where the intention of the testator is 
made known through the legal instrument of the valid will or 
letters of administration ^, or, by intestate succession (legal 
rules invoked in the absence of legal instruments). We shall 
consider first testate succession of real and personal property; 
the rules concerning the intestate succession of real property 
and personal property are significant differences and will be 
dealt with in the following chapter.
The current position on testate succession put simply, is as 
follows :
"By his will a testator may dispose of all 
his property as he wishes. Under English 
law a testator's spouse and children have 
no legal right to inherit a fixed portion 
of his estate. But whether the deceased 
dies testate or wholly or partially in­
testate, the court has power to order 
provision to be made for certain appli­
cants out of the deceased's net estate."
(Clarke 1977 ; 190) .
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For Blackstone, 'this power of bequeathing is co-eval with the 
first rudiments of law; for we have no traces or memorials when 
it did not exist (Vol. II; 491). The power of a testator to 
devise his personal property has been continuous from the Conquest 
to the present; the power to devise land was incident upon the 
particular form of tenure by which land was held. The Statute 
of Wills (1540) and The Abolition of Tenures (1660) extended 
testamentary capacity to include land holders.
These broad trends however must be elaborated further.
"In case of personal property, in the 12th 
and 13th centuries, at death, a man's 
(personal) goods were to be divided into 
three equal parts of which one went to 
his lineal descendants, another to his 
wife, and the third only was at his own 
disposal."
(Stephens, Commentaries Vol. II, 1914;306).
The rule of thirds, with wife and children having common law 
rights to pursue their claims seems to have held until the 
middle of the 14th century (Blackstone Bk. II, 491-493 :
Pollock and Maitland II, 314-363). Blackstone and legal his­
torians such as Stephens are unable to tell us when the rule 
of thirds disappeared, giving men absolute rights to dispose 
of all personal property by will; certainly local custom in York, 
Wales and London which retained the old rule of thirds were 
overturned by statute in the 17th and 18th centuries (Blackstone 
Bk. II; 430-33, Stephens Vol. II; 307). By common law, then 
for a considerable period of time, possibly from the 14th century, 
the claims of widows and children and other relations were to­
tally barred. By custom, however, a testator was obliged to 
remember the Church and a superior lord by leaving them his two 
best chattels (the heriot and the mortuary) (Stephens ; 308 ) - 
one of the fruits of superior tenancy.
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Testamentary power in the matter of real property is somewhat 
more complex. As Pollock and Maitland outline the situation, 
succinctly it is worthwhile noting their words:
"In the twelfth century it became plain that 
the Englishman had no power to give free­
hold land by his will, unless some local 
custom authorised him to do so. A statute 
of 1540 (Statute of Wills 32 Hen.VIII.C .1.), 
which was explained and extended by later 
statutes, enabled any person who should 
'have' lands as tenant in fee simple to 'give , 
dispose, will and devise', the same 'by his 
last will and testament in writing'.
(Bk. II; 315).
The Tenures Abolition Act of 1660, which effectively put an end 
to military tenures and the restrictions on their devising, 
effectively meant that all landed property except copyhold tene­
ments, could be devised by will (Blackstone; Bk. II, 375). How­
ever, copyhold tenants did have considerable claims to pass 
on land to their successors. This was always conditional upon 
local custom, and the performance of certain rights and services 
due to the lord which had been fixed by the custom (e.g. fines 
payable on entry, etc.) (Hatcher, op.cit;9; Topham op.cit; 242-245 ) 
The customary claim depended to a large degree firstly upon the 
antiquity of the line holding the copyhold, and secondly upon 
the superior tenant's willingness to enter copyholders' descen­
dants without raising the entry fine above the means of the new 
tenant (c/f Thompson op.cit.). In matters of inheritance, then, 
there is nothing to suggest that customary tenures could not be 
devised by will and testament, always providing, the incoming 
tenant was able to pay the entry fine on taking the new tenancy 
ad was willing to observe the customary obligations and services.
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wxdoWs customary, and later common law right to dower abridged 
the male testator’s absolute right to dispose of land held by 
freehold. If she survived her husband the widow was entitled 
to one third of the income of the land of which he had held the 
fee (Stone 1977;159). This customary right to dower had become 
the rule of common law in the 13th century (Pollock and Maitland 
I, 420 26). The right to dower could not be defeated by the 
husband if he had once acquired freeholds of inheritance- this 
meant he could not sell the land or dispose of it except subject 
to his wife's right to dower. Her claims to dower had preference 
over the claims of his creditors (Topham op.cit. 176; 225-227).
In the earliest times, the widow had physical possession of one 
, t ird of the estate, though this seems later to be commuted to 
rights to one third of the income; the land itself being ’owned’ 
and administered by others (usually the male heir) (stone ibid.).
But dower was always something of a contingent right; it could 
always be barred. Customary and local provisions provided for 
dower to be barred if the widow was unchaste (Pollock and Maitland 
,422). As early as,the 13th century, there were conveyancing 
evices enabling dower to be barred (Pollock and Maitland II - 424) 
The Statute of-Uses (1535) included devices for barring the widow’s 
right to dower (Stone ibid.). The process of ’freeing’ the land 
rom obligations included freeing the land from rights of dower.
It IS significant therefore that it was during and after the 
civil war and the settlement of 1660 that we find Bridgeman’s 
Conveyances, and ’a method invented by Mr. Fearne increasingly 
deployed as conveyancing devices to bar dower (stone ibid; Topham;
6). Furthermore, the widow was dependant upon heirs, admini­
strators of estates or the courts to make over a reasonable 
third of the estate.
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The Dower Act of 1833 gave male testators the statutory right 
to bar his widow's right to dower. Dower and curtesy were both 
abolished in 1925 (Stone ibid.). As Stone concludes:
"Total freedom - or irresponsibility - of 
testation as against dependants thus formally 
reigned for just over a hundred years in England 
and Wales, from the Dower Act 1833 until the 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 came 
into operation."
(Stone op.cit.; 159).
The 1938 Statute allowed a narrow class of dependants (surviving 
unmarried spouse, children under 21, unmarried daughters of any 
age, mentally and physically handicapped offspring) to apply 
to the courts for maintenance to be claimed from the net estate 
(Stone;159). But family provision here was limited to narrowly 
defined range of descendants (no mistresses nor illegitimate 
issue), and it was discretionary, at the behest of the Court.
Dependants were limited to marital partners of and offspring 
born in wedlock, of the deceased's last marriage. The purpose 
of the Act was to protect the lawful spouse and children from 
being 'disinherited' by mistresses and illegitimates (Stone op. 
cit. 162). The 1938 rules privilege the family, narrowly con­
ceived in earlier custom and law where the family and its de­
pendant members were described by the marriage contract and by 
blood-relations. But the rules also acknowledge the dependency 
of family members on the deceased male head. So while abridging 
the patriarch's right to disinherit totally, the rules simulta­
neously confirm 'his' past power to do so, and, the subordination 
and dependence of surviving kin. Furthermore, family members 
have claimable rights only to maintenance and not to the whole 
of the estate, leaving the principle of testamentary power 
significantly undisturbed.
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However, the concept of 'family provision' and the concept of 
dependency were rewritten by the 1975 Inheritance (Provision for 
the Family and Dependants) Act. The 1975 rules extend the notion 
of 'the family' to include any person 'who immediately before 
death, was being maintained wholly or partly, by the deceased.
This will include the mistress or cohabitee, even of the same 
sex as the deceased.' Also included are illegitimate children, 
as well as former spouses and children of earlier marriage(s) 
(Stone op.cit;162). The concept of dependence spreads the net 
of 'family' more widely, moving away from the primacy of the 
marital relation and offspring born within it. So what the 
law now recognises as a legitimate claim against the estate, is 
not a claim advanced through the 'old' principles of marriage 
and legitimacy, but a claim advanced by persons because they 
were dependant on the deceased. The family is thus constituted, 
not so much by (the limited) contract of marriage, but by personal 
relations of dépendance. On the one hand, the 1975 rules hark 
back to the customary rules of 'the obligation to maintain' 
pre 1834, on the other, they chime in with post 1945 social 
policies directing fiscal benefits to male heads of household, 
at the expense of direct claims against the state by women co­
habitees and their children (see McGregor 1974).
The latter pieces of legislation we suggest, abridge only 
slightly the testator's 'power of bequeathing' while at the 
same time underscore the character of the patriarchal family 
relationship as one of personal dependancy. It will be useful 
at this point to consider some of the formal properties of 
what we shall call testamentary power. Testamentary power, 
where a testator is able to devise 'his' property as 'he' wishes 
(though the estate is subject to the claims of creditors pur­
suing debts, the state pursuing duties, and dependants pursuing 
maintenance) holds as a principle of transmission of property 
from medieval times through to the present day. It is perhaps 
the overarching principle of the legal rules of inheritance.
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For only in the absence of the exercise of testamentary power, 
are the rules of intestate succession called into play. As 
we shall argue in the following chapters, the evidence suggests 
that in practice only a minority of estates pass by testate 
succession. However, this by no means alters the material 
existence of testamentary power, for it is perhaps most effec­
tive through the threat of its potential use. Those potentially 
most threatened by it are dependant descendants. There are, 
however, several other dimensions of testamentary power deserving 
comment.
Firstly, the patriarchal mode of expression ('his property', 
as 'he wishes', the claims of spouses and children) goes beyond 
the mere legal convention (where he and his encompasses both 
genders) to the common law reality of the exclusion of married 
women from exercising testamentary power. The married woman 
could not freely devise by will until the passing of the Married 
Woman's Property Act 1882, followed by the Married Women and 
Tortfeasor's Act 1935, when she gained 'full power to dispose 
of all her property as if she were feme sole ' (Bromley 1976;603) 
It was through the equity courts (dealing principally with those 
'mongrel and amphibious' property forms, the lease, the trust 
ec.) against common law presumptions, that the testamentary 
powers were retrieved.
Secondly there were other classes of persons excluded from the 
exercise of testamentary power, persons 'absolutely obliged to 
die intestate'. These included boys under 14 and girls under 
12, madmen and idiots, traitors and felons whose property was 
forfeit to the crown (Blackstone Vol. Ill; 496-498). Whether 
minors can at present transmit property is somewhat vague.
There is an assumption that minors own little property of great 
value so the question is somewhat 'academic' (Bromley op.cit;572). 
Were a case to go to the courts, the validity of a will would 
probably turn on the question as to whether the minor possessed 
sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will.
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Thirdly, when we consider testamentary power, legal assumptions 
and presumptions constantly refer us to the adult-male-father- 
husband exercise of that power. What the law construes as un­
reasonable exercise of that power gives us further purchase on 
the relationship between the family and property. The law con­
siders that power to be unreasonably exercised if a testator 
totally disinherits his family, that is, there is an embedded 
assumption that wives and children will not be left penniless. 
Hence the court's power to make provision for wives and children 
out of the estate.
Lastly, this does not disturb the testator's power to disinherit, 
provided grounds exist for the 'reasonable' act of disinheritance 
Alongside the assumption that families have claims on the testa­
tor's property (i.e. an implicit notion of family property), 
we also have (through the possibility of disinheritance) 
testamentary power which concedes to the patriarch the levers 
for the control of familial relations. Disobedient children, 
adulterous wives, unwanted marriages bear the threat of dis­
inheritance. "This victory for unfettered testation and indi­
vidual control of property", writes Cooper, "can be seen as the 
culmination of the process of asserting paternal power."
(Cooper 1976;226). Testamentary power is power in a familial 
form, whose field of operation is local, interpersonal, 
engendered and intergenerational. Though testamentary power 
was forged historically by land owning classes in dispute with 
the Crown, while it is backed by statute and guaranteed by the 
courts, the practice of a deceased's 'last will', however 
informally communicated, being respected, extends beyond the 
formal institutional framework, into everyday social practice.
It may be disputed; often it gives rise to familial ruptures and 
turmoil, but still bears substantial customary weight.
De jure, all adults now may devise property by testamentary 
succession, but as we have indicated, within the familial system 
of ownership and production, for it is within families that 
inheritance has its mode of operation, the prime testator 
corresponds with the position of the patriarch. The formal
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The Dower Act of 1833 gave male testators the statutory right 
to bar his widow's right to dower. Dower and curtesy were both 
abolished in 1925 (Stone ibid.). As Stone concludes:
"Total freedom - or irresponsibility - of 
testation as against dependants thus formally 
reigned for just over a hundred years in England 
and Wales, from the Dower Act 1833 until the 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 came 
into operation."
(Stone op.cit.; 159).
The 1938 Statute allowed a narrow class of dependants (surviving 
unmarried spouse, children under 21, unmarried daughters of any 
age, mentally and physically handicapped offspring) to apply 
to the courts for maintenance to be claimed from the net estate 
(Stone;159). But family provision here was limited to narrowly 
defined range of descendants (no mistresses nor illegitimate 
issue), and it was discretionary, at the behest of the Court.
Dependants were limited to marital partners of and offspring 
born in wedlock, of the deceased's last marriage. The purpose 
of the Act was to protect the lawful spouse and children from 
being 'disinherited' by mistresses and illegitimates (Stone op. 
cit. 162). The 1938 rules privilege the family, narrowly con­
ceived in earlier custom and law where the family and its de­
pendant members were described by the marriage contract and by 
blood-relations. But the rules also acknowledge the dependancy 
of family members on the deceased male head. So while abridging 
the patriarch's right to disinherit totally, the rules simulta­
neously confirm 'his' past power to do so, and, the subordination 
and dependence of surviving kin. Furthermore, family members 
have claimable rights only to maintenance and not to the whole 
of the estate, leaving the principle of testamentary power 
significantly undisturbed.
-  34-4 -
However, the concept of 'family provision' and the concept of 
dependency were rewritten by the 1975 Inheritance (Provision for 
the Family and Dependants) Act. The 1975 rules extend the notion 
of 'the family' to include any person 'who immediately before 
death, was being maintained wholly or partly, by the deceased.
This will include the mistress or cohabitee, even of the same 
sex as the deceased.' Also included are illegitimate children, 
as well as former spouses and children of earlier marriage(s) 
(Stone op.cit;162). The concept of dependence spreads the net 
of 'family' more widely, moving away from the primacy of the 
marital relation and offspring born within it. So what the 
law now recognises as a legitimate claim against the estate, is 
not a claim advanced through the 'old' principles of marriage 
and legitimacy, but a claim advanced by persons because they 
were dependant on the deceased. The family is thus constituted, 
not so much by (the limited) contract of marriage, but by personal 
relations of dépendance. On the one hand, the 1975 rules hark 
back to the customary rules of 'the obligation to maintain' 
pre 1834, on the other, they chime in with post 1945 social 
policies directing fiscal benefits to male heads of household, 
at the expense of direct claims against the state by women co­
habitees and their children (see McGregor 1974).
The latter pieces of legislation we suggest, abridge only 
slightly the testator's 'power of bequeathing' while at the 
same time underscore the character of the patriarchal family 
relationship as one of personal dependancy. It will be useful 
at this point to consider some of the formal properties of 
what we shall call testamentary power. Testamentary power, 
where a testator is able to devise 'his' property as 'he' wishes 
(though the estate is subject to the claims of creditors pur­
suing debts, the state pursuing duties, and dependants pursuing 
maintenance) holds as a principle of transmission of property 
from medieval times through to the present day. It is perhaps 
the overarching principle of the legal rules of inheritance.
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For only in the absence of the exercise of testamentary power, 
are the rules of intestate succession called into play. As 
we shall argue in the following chapters, the evidence suggests 
that in practice only a minority of estates pass by testate 
succession. However, this by no means alters the material 
existence of testamentary power, for it is perhaps most effec­
tive through the threat of its potential use. Those potentially 
most threatened by it are dependant descendants. There are, 
however, several other dimensions of testamentary power deserving 
comment.
Firstly, the patriarchal mode of expression ('his property', 
as 'he wishes', the claims of spouses and children) goes beyond 
the mere legal convention (where he and his encompasses both 
genders) to the common law reality of the exclusion of married 
women from exercising testamentary power. The married woman 
could not freely devise by will until the passing of the Married 
Woman's Property Act 1882, followed by the Married Women and 
Tortfeasor's Act 1935, when she gained 'full power to dispose 
of all her property as if she were feme sole ' (Bromley 1976; 603) 
It was through the equity courts (dealing principally with those 
'mongrel and amphibious' property forms, the lease, the trust 
ec.) against common law presumptions, that the testamentary 
powers were retrieved.
Secondly there were other classes of persons excluded from the 
exercise of testamentary power, persons 'absolutely obliged to 
die intestate'. These included boys under 14 and girls under 
12, madmen and idiots, traitors and felons whose property was 
forfeit to the crown (Blackstone Vol. Ill; 496-498). Whether 
minors can at present transmit property is somewhat vague.
There is an assumption that minors own little property of great 
value so the question is somewhat 'academic' (Bromley op.cit;572). 
Were a case to go to the courts, the validity of a will would 
probably turn on the question as to whether the minor possessed 
sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will.
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Thirdly, when we consider testamentary power, legal assumptions 
and presumptions constantly refer us to the adult-male-father- 
husband exercise of that power. What the law construes as un­
reasonable exercise of that power gives us further purchase on 
the relationship between the family and property. The law con­
siders that power to be unreasonably exercised if a testator 
totally disinherits his family, that is, there is an embedded 
assumption that wives and children will not be left penniless. 
Hence the court's power to make provision for wives and children 
out of the estate.
Lastly, this does not disturb the testator's power to disinherit, 
provided grounds exist for the 'reasonable' act of disinheritance 
Alongside the assumption that families have claims on the testa­
tor's property (i.e. an implicit notion of family property), 
we also have (through the possibility of disinheritance) 
testamentary power which concedes to the patriarch the levers 
for the control of familial relations. Disobedient children, 
adulterous wives, unwanted marriages bear the threat of dis­
inheritance. "This victory for unfettered testation and indi­
vidual control of property", writes Cooper, "can be seen as the 
culmination of the process of asserting paternal power."
(Cooper 1976; 226). Testamentary power is power in a familial 
form, whose field of operation is local, interpersonal, 
engendered and intergenerational. Though testamentary power 
was forged historically by land owning classes in dispute with 
the Crown, while it is backed by statute and guaranteed by the 
courts, the practice of a deceased's 'last will', however 
informally communicated, being respected, extends beyond the 
formal institutional framework, into everyday social practice.
It may be disputed; often it gives rise to familial ruptures and 
turmoil, but still bears substantial customary weight.
De jure, all adults now may devise property by testamentary 
succession, but as we have indicated, within the familial system 
of ownership and production, for it is within families that 
inheritance has its mode of operation, the prime testator 
corresponds with the position of the patriarch. The formal
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creation and recognition of testamentary power within the state, 
concedes within civil society the rights of elders (at the 
expense of any notion of birth-right) to disinherit their 
direct descendants. Dependants (spouses and blood-related chil­
dren) have only limited claims on the estate of a deceased and 
not an absolute claim to a whole or any fixed proportion of 
the estate. Dependent descendants are powerless to determine 
the destiny of family property by formal processes. Testa­
mentary power in this sense, continues by other means the his­
torical character of family law which conceived the father as 
knowing best what was in the interest of his family and thus 
leaving him to rule his little kingdom as he will. It is of 
note here that testamentary power is patriarchal in character 
(in the broader sense of patriarchy used here): a power exercised 
predominantly by males and seniors.
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CHAPTER THREE
INHERITANCE AND THE FAMILY; INTESTATE SUCCESSION
"The law of succession is an attempt to 
express the family in terms of property."
(J. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of 
the Common Law, 5th ed.; 711)
Nowhere is this more evident that in the legal rules which 
apply to the transmission of property, in the absence of a 
valid will or testament. The destinies of personal and real 
property have had significantly different paths in English law 
so we shall deal with them separately. In this much, however, 
they are joined; at death the legal rules impel intestate 
property down the family line. The legal rules therefore ex- 
tricably define 'the family' and the destiny of intestate 
property. The family is defined as those who have claims on 
intestate property (apart from creditors and the state). The 
rules of intestate succession provide a template of family 
membership; those who will secure an interest in a deceased's 
property in the absence of a will or testament.
The distribution of property amongst family members tells us 
a great deal about the legal relationships, between spouses, and, 
between parents and children, but, simultaneously, the legal 
rules themselves constitute particular relations amongst 
family members. Moreover, the legal rules may propel intestate 
property in directions which may not accord either with the 
individual or collection wish of a family members, or members.
But firstly, a cautionary note. We cannot claim to know a 
great deal about the transmission of intestate property. Much 
as we have only a limited knowledge about the transmission of 
large amounts of wealth by individual estate, daily, small goods
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and possessions are distributed, on the death of some relative, 
amongst family members. We do not know the rules by which these 
possessions are divided; we do not know the informal bargains 
and the tacit rules which define the passage of possessions not 
declared at probate or deemed not to be part of an estate, and 
therefore not regulated by courts or state officials . We are 
speaking here of goods and chattels, not estates in land or in 
stocks and shares where good title has to be proved. Histori­
cally and currently, perhaps for most working class families, 
their inheritance of mrf material goods, was ami is probably in 
this form, as household possessions, tools of trade, small 
personal momentos, and cash assets.
This problem is by no means new. The Registrar of Births, Deaths 
and Marriages commenting on the Calendar of Wills and Admini­
stration for 1858 records that of the 210,972 deaths that year, 
only 30,823 left wills or letters of administration on personal 
property. In other words, on personal property, only 14% of 
owners devised it by testacy. He continued:
Sons and daughters, as well as many wives possess 
no property, but undoubtedly a large amount of 
property passes to successors in small portions 
untaxed."
(p.p. 1861 XVI, XVIII;2-3).
This much may be argued about the unregulated transmission 
of property at death; that custom follows the legal rules in so 
far as property is transmitted within the family. We might argue 
that family descendants, historically having claims on intestate 
property could always remove themselves to the courts in pursuit 
of claims, were impelled to retain a customary mode not dis­
similar from legal rules. We know little about the actual dis­
tribution within families; whether goods and chattels were dis­
tributed amongst nearest kin, amongst all relatives, or des­
cended as one bundle to the eldest son remains an open question 
in the matter of intestate personal property.
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The current position is extremely difficult to comprehend.
Statistics from the Inland Revenue suggest that from the 
total of 660,000 deaths recorded in 1980-81, approximately 
301,000 estates were declared for tax purposes (Inland 
Revenue Statistics 19 82); Appendix D, 107 and at Table 4.5 
p. 64-65). Can we infer then, that the other 359,000 dying 
left no property? The answer is no. They probably fall into 
three classes.
a) Those leaving no property or property of such little 
value that it is not registered for taxes at death.
b) Those leaving property in forms (e.g. National Savings 
Certificates) where transfer does not require taxation 
at death.
c) Those whose property lies in discretionary and beneficial 
trusts, or exists in the form of agricultural land or 
industrial plant for example, so that it too does not 
require the imposition of death duties.
It is impossible to say with any exactitude and without a 
great deal of specialised research, what the proportions are 
of each of these classes.
Neither can we determine with any precision what proportion 
of estates pass by wills, to descendants because not all 
wills are recorded in official statistics (estates of less 
than £1,500 in 1982, and less than £5,000 in 1984, did not require 
Probate registration; estates not involving money or financial 
instruments (sovereigns kept in a box under the bed!), lodged in 
an institution can be 'willed' without Probate certification).
The number of estates moving by will, but not recorded by Probate 
registration remains a 'dark figure' unknown. Of the estates 
requiring Probate registration and therefore appear in official 
statistics, 279,127 in 1982 (Judicial Statistics, 1982;43), approxi­
mately two thirds were 'willed registrations' (testate estates) (pers 
comm. The Record Keeper, Principal Probate Registry, Somerset House). 
This means that approximately 28% of those dying (660,000) left a 
will, proved by the Probate registeries.
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Perhaps one 'customary practice' is to (Let the laws 
of intestacy run their course. What does this mean concretely? 
Under the Family Provision (Intestate Succession), Order, 1977 
where a deceased is survived by spouse and children the 
distribution is:
a) to the spouse — all personal chattels, but not property 
used for business purposes, plus the first£25,000, plus 
income of half remainder for life.
b) to children, half the remainder held for deceased's 
children on the statutory trusts.
We shall not pursue all the other permutations (spouse but 
no children) except to say that property is destined for the 
family (parents, sisters, brothers).
In principle, we can say that 'customary' practices, if that 
word now really bears any great significance given the operation 
of the legal rules,are in accord with the older rules of 
intestacy.
The concept of 'family provision' severely hedges the rights of 
testators to direct property outside the family but does not 
destroy it absolutely. Only sufficient to maintain dependents 
can be claimed against the estate, not necessarily the whole of 
it. Perhaps the most radical change has been the widening of 
the concept of dependence. For under the provisions of the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, 
mistresses and illegitimate children are entitled to apply for 
provision (Stone op.cit.; 162). Certainly, for the rich, 
testamentary power still bears the weight it has enjoyed 
historically. But to reiterate, we are still relatively blind 
to the fine detail of transmissions at death.
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INTESTATE SUCCESSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
The law of succession here general!^ falls into three chief (and 
overlapping periods, a) the old customary rules of division,
b) the ecclesiastical administration of intestate personal 
property, c) present rules founded on the Statute of Distribu­
tion (1670) and the secular administration intestate personal 
property (1857 onwards) (see Holdsworth and Vickers 1899 ; 129; 
and generally Blackstone op.cit.; Clarke 1977; Plucknett 1956; 
Mellows 1977; Stone 1977; Bromley 1976; Halsbury's Laws of 
England 1981, Vol. 35 at para 1164).
The old customary rules, probably settled in the 12th and 13th
centuries (Holdsworth and Vickers op.cit.; 7) actually survived 
in a mediated form, through to the present day. The system of 
distribution was essentially a rule of thirds; one third of 
gooch passing to a surviving spouse; one third devolving on chil­
dren with the remaining third devisable either by will, or 
devolving on the Church or superior tenant, generally to settle 
outstanding debts (Pollock and Maitland II - 361ff). These 
rules are clear where a husband pre-deceases his wife but con­
fused in the case of a wife pre-deceasing her husband (Pollock
and Maitland II 428-431), though on balance the customary rules 
seem to have applied. The rule of thirds was so widespread 
that they had the de facto status of common law (Pollock and 
Maitland 11:428). The ancient law then recognised the prior 
claims of spouses, children and (through the mediation of the 
clerics) creditors on personal property - a system quite unlike 
the destiny of real property. A surviving wife had absolute 
claims to her 'paraphenalia' (clothing and jewellery etc., 
suitable to her rank) (Blackstone II - 435).
From the 13th century, intestate property at death, devolved 
directly to the ecclesiastical courts; the relations of the 
deceased then claimed from the administrator the shares to 
which they were, by custom, entitled (Holdsworth and Vickers 
(op.cit.; 131-132). Debtors could claim against the estate
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through common law courts. The characteristics of intestate 
succession here; the ecclesiastical administration of customary 
practices, remained until 1857 (Bromley op.cit.;615). The 
principle of the deceased's dependants being provided for out 
of the personal estate became somewhat chaotic but was put on 
a more rational footing by the statutory provisions of the 
Statute of Distributions (1670). On death, a husband took all 
his wife's personalty (earlier settled by common law rules con­
cerning the destiny of leaseholds etc.). On the death of her 
husband, the wife took one third of the estate if issue of the 
marriage were alive; in other cases she was entitled to a half 
of the estate, with the remainder being distributed among the 
deceased's next of kin (Bromley;615). These were the provisions 
of the statutory rules concerning personal property, post 1670, 
and remain largely intact, at the present day, in so far as 
the chief claimants are the spouse, the children and creditors. 
The distinction between the claimable rights to intestate 
property, of husband and wife are considerable but follow the 
general principle of family law of 'one flesh'. The ecclesi­
astical rendering of this doctrine in terms of property meant 
ffectively that a wife had no property - on marriage it became 
the husband's - therefore on death, the wife's property was not 
conceived as having any destiny other than her husband's posses­
sion. On the other hand, on the death of the husband, a wife 
became only one claimant amongst others to property which
wasn't (legally) hers. We shall pursue these matters in more 
detail in the next chapter.
We should mention in passing the intervention of the state in 
the transmission of personal property at death. Firstly, the 
state has assumed the regulation of intestate property, suc­
ceeding the Church in these matters. Administering estates of 
personal property passed to the Chancery courts at the same 
time as the system family law devolved from Church to state. 
Secondly, the state, through the device of Probate (collecting 
taxes on personal property) became a claimant on estates; Chancery 
courts acted not only as administrators but also as tax collectors.
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We have only schematically presented the process by which custom 
became fixed rules but the process is real enough. And the 
power of custom, mediated by the legal system is observable in 
the current transmission of intestate property.
The Administration of Estates Act 1925 radically changed the 
law of succession, in two respects. Firstly, personalty and 
realty has been put on the same footing (demolishing the ancient 
separation between real and personal property); in this sense 
we can properly speak of 'intestate property'. Secondly, the 
distribution of estate was transformed, giving the surviving 
widow a greater interest than she had prior to 1925 (Bromley 
op.cit.; 616-617; Stone op.cit.; 148-149).
Principally, the statute announces the following rules:
1. The surviving spouse (widow or widower) takes:
a) all personal chattels
*
b) £15,000 statutory legacy with interest at 4% per 
annum from date of death (*now £25,000)
c) a life interest in half the residuary estate.
2. The children take:
a) one half of the residuary estate on the statutory 
trusts, sons and daughters taking equally.
b) interest on the remainder at the death of the 
surviving spouse.
3. Where there is no issue:
a) the surviving spouse takes all personal chattels, 
£40,000 statutory legacy at 4% per annum and half 
the residuary.
b) the deceased's parents (if alive), brothers and sisters 
have claims on the remainder.
(Stone; op.cit.; 148-151. See also Bromley op.cit.; 616-620).
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We can note here the principles of distribution. Firstly, the 
equal claims of surviving husband and wife (unlike the customary 
privileging of the husband). Secondly, that all surviving chil­
dren of either gender have equal claims. Thirdly, property may 
devolve 'up' the line (to surviving parents), sideways (to 
brothers and sisters of the deceased) as well as the customary 
'downward' devising. We shall comment on other aspects of 
this radical reorientation at the end of this chapter.
Providing we recognise the existence of testamentary power, the 
succession laws applying to intestate personal property are the 
closed English law comes to accepting the rights of descendants. 
That it was administered firstly be ecclesiastical, then by 
Chancery courts, signifies its specific difference from real 
property (administered by the rules of common law). Its patri­
archal aspects are visible in the differing claims on intestate 
property which attach historically to surviving husband or wife; 
the only absolute claim the widow had was to her paraphenalia. 
Furthermore, because of the existence of common law rules appli­
cable to any interests in land (leaseholds, rents etc.) which 
strictly speaking was personalty, the rights of a husband to 
control personal relations (especially of his children) were 
considerably greater than those of a surviving wife, who could 
lose control of half such property (unless it was secured to 
her as her separate estate) directly to her offspring. Moreover, 
personal property, which passed on marriage, to the dominion 
of the husband, unless it was secured to a wife as her separate 
estate, could be devised quite freely, inter vivos, by the 
husband, to his privileged descendants, without the consent of, 
or without consulting, his wife, or children. The rules of 
succession also recognise the partibility of intestate personal 
property, which in practice signifies its difference in destiny 
from real property. Finally, we should acknowledge that minors 
do not take personal property directly; it is held and admini­
stered for them in the absence of a surviving parent, until 
such time as they reach the age of majority.
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If we consider the temporal passage of the customary rules, we 
are struck by their resilience. Statutory interventions in 1670, 
and 1925, make the distributions more certain, perhaps fix the 
destiny of personalty in now-familiar paths. The significant 
transformations which occurred in 1670 and 1925 put into statu­
tory form, case law and conveyances being fought out at Chancery: 
these principally involve the increasing rights of married women 
to assume possession of their deceased's husband 's personal 
property. The development of complex forms of conveyancing 
(by settlement, trust, and through the notion of separate 
estate) and judgements at Chancery were precursors to develop­
ments in the wife's rights over her deceased husband's personal 
property, and signal the long-term defeat of the common law 
rules, made concrete in provisions of the Administrations of 
Estates Act 1925, when both real and personal property were to 
devolve according to the rules of personal succession.
INTESTATE SUCCESSION: REAL PROPERTY
We begin with the rules of intestate succession because these 
rules, invoked independently of familial or individual choice, 
represent a class view, expressed through legal forms,of what 
the appropriate familial order was and should be. The legal 
rules on the intestate succession of real property are succinctly 
stated:
The first class of persons called to the inheri­
tance comprises the dead person's descendants; 
in other words if he leaves an 'heir of his 
body' no other person will inherit. Among 
his descendants precedence is settled by six 
rules.
i) a living descendant excludes his own 
her own descendants
ii) a dead descendant is represented by 
his or her own descendants
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iii) males exclude females of equal degree
iv) among males of equal degree only the 
eldest inherits
v) females of equal degree inherit together 
as co-heiresses
vi) the rule that a dead descendant is represented 
t*y his or her own descendants overrides the prefer­
ence for the male sex, so that a grand-daughter by a 
dead eldest son will exclude a younger son. (Pollock 
and Maitland, II, p. 260. See Blackstone II; Chap. 14)
Some preliminary comments. Firstly, these rules were settled 
by the early thirteenth century (ibid). They remained operative 
until 1926, when statute law (the Administration of Estates Act) 
effectively merged real and personal property. In the same 
year, by statute law, marriage could retroactively legitimate 
children born to a couple prior to wedlock. Secondly the rules 
were invoked at the death of a landowner who did not leave a 
will; at the death of those absolutely disqualified as testators 
(the infant, the married woman and the mad); and, significantly 
where the form of tenure precluded a land holder transmitting 
by will, a category including numbers of major land .holders 
pre-1660. Our interest lies in the family form constituted 
by the rules because they concretise some of the arguments 
we advanced concerning the differences betwen capitalist and 
familial property relations. Fundamentally, the rules not 
only assign a destiny to property, but they are expressly 
concerned with who is 'of the family' and the hierarchy of 
status of those in the family.
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ELEMENTS OF THE LINE 
Lineal Consanguinity
Through the notion of lineal consanguinity (Blackstone II;
1976, p. 203) land was destined to proceed along one of two 
paths; either it descended to blood relations of the original 
grantee, or passed by reversion back to the superior lord. The 
legal rules thus provided definite limits to the dispersion of 
productive property. Familial practices required the production 
of an heir in order to retain the family-land nexus and in order 
to defeat the second destiny. The pivotal position of the heir 
in continuation of the land-line nexus was perfectly clear and 
much hung on it for the interests of the family and the superior 
lord. The family was required not only to produce children, but 
to produce legitimate issue, that is, an heir of the body of 
the married couple, for the bastard, the nullius filius (the 
child of nobody), which is no more than a legal construct, 
could not legally take the inheritance. The bastard per se 
represented no real threat to the family but did present a 
threat to the superior tenant. The changeling, or the sup­
positious child was land-line nexus. When we look at common 
law cases concerning inheritance (Nicholas, 1836), they are 
obsessively concerned with problems of legitimacy.
HEIRS AND BASTARDS
The common law definition of the heir conceived the status 
in terms of an heir of the body of known parents, with known 
parentage conceived as a married couple, thus distinguishing 
the heir from the nullius filius. However, problems about 
known parentage stem from the wide interpretation given through 
ecclesiastical courts. For the Church, nuptials were prima 
facie evidence of legitimacy, for it regarded all children born
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to a married couple, prior to or during wedlock as legitimate. 
The Church's attitude in effect denied the King's Courts of 
Common Law any say in the destiny of the land. Furthermore, 
it was the ecclesiastical courts which determined the validity 
of marriage, a criterion at the heart of common notions of 
legitimacy, so the common law was doubly distanced from the 
regulation of inheritance.
The tensions resulting from the possibility of land proceeding 
along two paths is evident in the struggles around the defi­
nition of the heir which proceeded throughout the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries. In effect, the issue was worked out 
in two ways, a clash between ecclesiastical notions of the 
family and common law notions, and, through cases involving 
adulterine bastardy. The fullest account of the tensions and 
the settlement is probably in Nicholas, Adulterine Bastardy 
( 1 8 3 6 ) .
Strictly, the term heir is used only in relationship to real 
property and is a term used to designate the first claimant 
on property of a dead ancestor. Generally speaking, the 
feudal allocation was to the land holder and his heirs, with 
the destiny of the land indicated at the time of its allo­
cation. What the law considered as heir was that they should 
be an heir of the body of known parentage, thus distinguish­
ing the heir from the bastard - the nullius filius - the child 
of nobody. Problems about known parentage stem from the wide in­
terpretation given through the ecclesiastical courts. For the 
Church, nuptials were prima facie evidence of legitimacy, for 
it regarded all children born prior to or during wedlock to be 
legitimate. A child born of the wife was considered as a 
child of the husband.
Bastardy presented no real problems to the Church, nor to the 
family per se. The bastard and the suppositious child (a child 
adopted by parents to secure the inheritance) were pawns in
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the inheritance strategy of families against the claims of 
the superior lord and could be the means of preventing the land 
reverting back to the lord. There are cases, for example, where 
village children were smuggled into the lying in chamber to 
secure the inheritance.
The bastard did present a threat to the superior lord and did 
present a threat to other potential heirs, particularly chil­
dren of second wives, for example, brothers and other cadet 
branches of the dead landholder, (Nicholas op.cit.;33-35).
What ws at stake in bastard-heir dichotomy though is the destiny 
of the land, and on this point the ecclesiastical courts and 
the common law were at odds, as were lords and their sub­
tenants, as well as other potential claimants within the family.
The Church's attitude in accepting all children born before 
and during in wedlock as legitimate and therefore at law, 
heirs of the body, in effect denied the King's courts of common 
law any say in the destiny of the land. Furthermore, on ques­
tions of legitimacy, it was the ecclesiastical courts which 
determined the validity of marriages, a criterion at the heart 
of common law notions of legitimacy, so the common law was 
doubly distanced from the regulation of inheritance. The 
tensions between the Church and the Crown is evident in the 
following exchange between the King and the Archbishop of 
Dublin in 1236.
" . . .  if a person born before marriage, against 
whom a question is raised, acknowledges that he 
was born out of wedlock, he neither can, according 
to the custom of England claim the inheritance, 
nor having claimed it, retain it; and if he alledges 
that he was born out of marriage, the case was not 
to be referred to the Ecclesiastical Court, because 
the clergy would hold him legitimate" (quoted in 
Nicholas op.cit.; 7)..
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The King's refusal to submit questions of legitimacy to the 
clergy seems a moment of resistance, for the law adopted the 
strong presumption which had been enunciated by the clergy, 
given in the pungent aphorism so beloved of early jurists, 
that 'whoso bulls the cow, the calf is your'. Bracton (1262) 
was quite categorical:
"... if a husband and a wife have cohabited
together and are both capable of procreation,
and she becomes pregnant by another man, 
whether the husband acknowledges or repu­
diates the child, it is legitimate because 
he is born of the wife." (quoted in Nicholas 
op.cit.; 13).
But Nicholas indicates that Bracton here is enunciating 'civil' 
not common law. In effect, the differences between the common 
law and the ecclesiastic courts turned on allowing marriages 
retro-active power, where marriage legitimated offspring 
produced prior to the nuptials. Pollock and Maitland see the 
common law and clergy differing in little but this single 
point but much turned on it.
The second but relatfid issue is adulterine bastardy, or at 
least the formation of the legal notion of adulterine bastardy;
for in the Church's view no such thing could be said to exist.
Bastards in the ecclesiastical sense described children born 
by single women or born in invalid marriages; all children 
of validly married women were legitimate and therefore poten­
tial heirs.
We can say that common law shared this strong presumption but 
in a series of cases, beginning in the thirteenth century, 
elaborated rules by which this strong presumption could be 
challenged and rebutted, thereby establishing the notion 
of the adulterine bastard.
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Customarily, a husband might challenge the paternity of his 
wife's children by repudiating the child at the moment of 
brith and, by removing it from his house immediately after 
its birth (Nicholas, op.cit.; 13). Matters of legitimacy were 
decided by juries in earlier times, but the challenge could be 
on two grounds only; a husband's impotence, or non-access to 
his wife - though this was narrowed to a plea of 'extra quator 
maria' - absence from the kingdom or dominions of the kingdom 
(Nicholas op.cit.; 29). Bastardising children was a male perog- 
ative; women could hot go before the courts to bastardise 
children because this was considered as a perverse threat to 
the inheritance.
Those most susceptible to having their pregnancies examined 
in detail seemed to be widows. The writ of 'de ventre inscipiendo' 
allowed 'Everything connected with the pregnancy (to be) an 
object of investigation' (Nicholas op.cit.;15). If the period 
of gestation exceeded the time allowed by law for the birth of 
a posthumous child the excess rebutted the presumption of 
legitimacy (Nicholas ibid.). Thus, for example, Britton reports 
a case where a widow claiming to be pregnant by her dead husband, 
could be examined by a panel of matrons, confined to a castle, 
visited only by women of the plaintiff party; and if after 
ten months she had not given birth, then she could be fined and 
imprisoned for disinheriting heirs (or at least attempting to 
do so) (Nicholas op.cit.;19).
Common law cases, beginning with Foxcroft (10th Edw. 1) 1282, 
had by the early fifteenth century settled the grounds by which 
paternity could be challenged and rebutted. These were a) a 
husband under 14 years of age (who was considered incapable of 
procreation), b) non-access (extra quatuor maria was prima 
facie evidence of non-access), c) impotence, d) divorce (Nicholas; 
52). Nevertheless, the common law presumption that children 
born in the couverture of the wife were legitimate and the 
proofs required so stringent that in two cases (Lady Parr 34
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Hen VIII 1542, Lady Burgh 34 Hen VIII 1542), statute law was 
invoked as a means of bastardising the offspring of adulterous 
wives (Nicholas 59-63). These Acts failed in so far as the 
children of the women'notwithstanding they were notoriously 
begotten in adultery, they would nevertheless be inheritable' 
(Nicholas; 59). The House of Lords was presented with bills in 
1543 to the effect that 'women lawfully proved guilty of adultery 
should lose their dower lands, goods and all other possessions'; 
the bills got no further and in fact were construed as attempts
to secure female chastity by Acts of Parliament.
The bastard per se was not a threat to the family or to the
inheritance. The child born outside the marriage of a husband,
born to a single woman or a married woman other than a husband's 
wife, was a bastard and incapable on inheriting because of the 
prima facie evidence of the absence of nuptials.
The absence of nuptials in each case protected the husband 
against possible claims on the inheritance; he could in fact 
acknowledge paternity with the certainty that the law would not 
entertain any claim against the inheritance. In this sense, 
the philandering husband also presented no problems to the 
common law, for his only legitimate children are those born of 
his wife. This directly confirms the strong presumption that 
all issue of any marriage was legitimate. However, arising out 
of this strong presumption that all children of a wife in 
couverture of her husband were legitimate, there is one species 
of bastard which presented a threat to the husband, his repre­
sentatives and cadet branches of the family; the adulterine 
bastard, the child whose paternity is other than its mother's 
husband. The sexually promiscuous wife was, in law, a danger 
to all parties in the inheritance system. The philandering 
husband could acknowledge the paternity of children fathered 
outside the marriage, for the absence of nuptials prima facie 
protected the inheritance against claims by bastard children of 
single or married women other than his wife. Adulterine bastards 
presented a threat in so far as they would be the means by 
which land would be removed from 'the family' and diverted
—  364- —
elsewhere. The adulterine bastard has further significance in 
our analysis. Its very existence as a category (formulated in 
case law from the thirteenth century) establishes that 'the 
family' is coterminous with the paternity of a particular male.
The maternity of a child establishes no positive claim to be 'of
the family', nor to the inheritance.
We have focussed on the issue of the heir and the bastard in
English law of earlier times but this does not mean it is 
irrelevant today. We retain the strong presumption of legiti­
macy of children of a marriage, we retain the procedures (though 
they have been refined and expanded to include procedures such 
as blood tests) by which paternity can be contested, we retained 
until 1926 the principle that children born out of wedlock, 
could not be made legitimate by the marriage of their parents.
Legitimacy is an arbitrary category fixed in place and set in 
motion by the common law as a means of protecting the secure 
transmission of property along one of two paths. Simultaneously, 
it unequally valorises the sexual practices of husbands and wives 
The philandering husband is protected by the nuptials to the 
extent that no offspring fathered outside the marriage can claim 
against the estate. However, the sexually active married woman 
presented threats to her husband, to the law and to the 
superior lord in so far as her adultery might divert property 
away from the allotted destiny of the land by the production 
of putative heirs (the adulterine bastards), and it is at this 
point of greatest danger that the common law establishes a) the 
possibility of challenging paternity, thereby b) disinheriting 
the adulterine bastard and c) the procedures for inspecting 
the sexual life of the married woman, in and through the legal 
system.
The assumption embedded in adulterine bastardy is, we have 
argued, that the property shall devolve only on the legitimate 
offspring of the husband, not simply the legitimate children 
of the marriage. In this sense, the law asserts the primacy 
of the husband as transmitter of real property, down the line, 
which is constituted by the laws of inheritance as his 'line'.
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Of bastardy in general, the medieval nullius filius, though 
deprived of the right to inherit - they were after all the 
'heir of no-one' - was a status without the social stigmas 
associated with the pejorative use of 'bastard'. Those seem 
to have arisen in the 16th century (Pinchbeck 1954, 314-315).
The Poor Law Act of 1576 substituted the status filius populi 
(child of the community), in cases where poverty or the 
increasing ecclesiastical attack on extra-marital sexual inter­
course, caused the illegitimate to be abandoned. The Parish, 
where parents could be identified was empowered to charge the 
cost of maintenance of the child to them, not for the benefit 
and the welfare of the child, but to punish the sexual mis­
creants. What has been subsequently transferred is the 'moral 
guilt' of the parental license to the status of the illegitimate 
(Pinchbeck; 315).
The social stigmas of bastardy were considerable and of long 
duration. Pinchbeck, in 1954, was able to list the following 
catalogue of disabilities:
English law is still based on what has been 
described as the 'outrageous and unnatural 
fiction that the illegitimate child has only 
a mother'; legally he has no kinship with his 
father (except for a few specified purposes) 
or with any other child of his mother, or with 
relatives of either parents, and has no right 
of succession to, or claim against their 
estates. He is unable to inherit titles or 
certain estates which attach to titles, nor 
can he inherit from intestacy at all, except 
from his mother and then only if she leaves 
no legitimate descendants. The latter dis­
ability, but not the former, is removed 
by legitimation through subsequent marriage 
of his parents under the Legitimacy Act of 
1926. An illegitimate child cannot inherit
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British nationality if born without the 
dominions of the Crown, since he has no father 
and consequently, he is an alien. He is en­
titled to no name at birth, though he usually 
acquires his mother's name by reputation.
... Again, while no obligation is laid on the 
father unless an Affiliation Order is in force, 
recent law has aimed at improving his lot by 
recognising a parental relationship under the 
later Workmen's Compensation Acts, to receive 
'dependants' benefits in connection with 
military service, allowances and pensions, and 
other social service benefits. A relatively 
small proportion of illegitimate children 
are, however, benefitted by these concessions, 
and for the great majority the social and 
economic effects of defective birth are still 
disastrous.
(Pinchbeck; 317).
Those disabilities remain largely in tact some thirty years 
later; moreover, the most recent legislation confirms the 
structuring principles that illegitimate must look primarily 
to the mother for aid, care and support. Illegitimates can 
enter claims^on intestate estates of parents, along 
with legitimate children (under the principle that they are all 
dependants), but, illegitimates cannot claim on the intestate 
estates of grandparents or collateral kin (Bromley 1976;621).
The British Nationality Act 1981 allows both parents to transmit 
British citizenship; however, a father transmits citizenship 
only to legitimate offspring. Illegitimates obtain citizenship 
by descent through the mother (Blake 1982; 192). Claims for 
maintenance still proceed through the medium of the Affiliation 
Proceedings in the magistrates courts, along with all the 
routine business of police prosecuting criminals.
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Looked at historically, however, categories such as the heir, 
the bastard, legitimacy and illegitimacy and paternity can 
only be considered as categories which emerged in and through 
the law's concern to regulate the transmission of real property. 
These categories, however, have a much wider application. Thus, 
Finer and McGregor (1974) indicate that the Poor Laws, and local 
customary practices, presumed that even in the absence of nuptials, 
the putative father had obligations to maintain his offspring 
The unacceptable face of paternity still resides in the procedures 
of the paternity suit where claim for maintenance still means 
the inspection (judicial in court, administrative in the case 
of benefits) of the sexual life of unmarried mothers, and in the 
concern over custody of children.
The outlines of the family form constituted by the legal rules 
of intestate succession of real property should now be clear.
Real property moves down the line, not sideways to the wife or 
upwards to parents. It is propelled along the axis of blood 
relations. The claim is advanced by the possession of genes 
and chromosomes, not stocks, shares or capital interests, and 
thus the protracted struggles to exclude the bastard serve to 
define the family and secure the destiny of real property.
However, the functioning of lineal consanguinity is never 
simply a mechanism for tying real property to the family; it 
is also a crucial reproducer of the blood related family it­
self. For what is inherited by descendants is not only the 
family property, but also the system by which it devolved on 
them, which in turn includes positions and statuses (the heir 
and the bastard) and which stands one descendant in relationship 
to another. That relationship is clearly elaborated in rules 
(iii) and (iv), where primacy is accorded the eldest male and 
the younger and the female descendants are allotted a destiny 
of subordination.
—  368 —
PRIMOGENITURE
Primogeniture and the allied notion of impartibility (i.e. 
that property should devolve as an unbroken bundle) is sometimes 
regarded as the English system of inheritance, in contrast to 
the continental system of morcellation (enshrined in the Code 
Napoleon) where all sons (of in the absence of sons, daughters) 
have an equal claim on familial property . Foreign observers 
have in past times commented on the pervasiveness of primo­
geniture and its malign effect of impoverishing younger sons 
(Thirsk 1976). Despite its privileged position in the legal 
rules, however, the significance of primogeniture needs to be 
reappraised.
Firstly, primogeniture is not the overarching principle of 
the legal system of inheritance. It is always subject to the 
principle of testamentary power (i.e. that land holders and 
owners won the right to dispose of real property by will or 
testament). Testamentary power signals an important difference 
between the English and continental systems in that heirs in 
English law have no birth right (property could be alienated 
without their consent) and that there is no legal notion of the 
family as a property-owning entity, even though the gentry 
conceived land as belonging to the line and took great care to 
preserve the nexus. The contradiction between the legal ex­
istence of testamentary power and practice of preserving the 
land-line nexus was settled by the device of strict settlement. 
Without pursuing all the technicalities, the strict settlement 
was a bargain struck between males of two generations and impli­
cating a putative (and perhaps yet unborn) grandchild. The deal 
left the land in the hands of the father, with annuities to the 
son for the life of his father; on the death of the father the son
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assumed control of the estate. But it exacted from the 
son a promise to resettle the land on the heirs of his 
body in the same manner (Robertshaw and Curtin, 1977,
Lawrence, 1878). Taltrum's Case of 1472 and the difficulties 
encountered by this system of strict settlement in meeting 
extraordinary needs demanding cash (marriage portions, 
investment opportunities) led to a more flexible system of 
strict settlement (a portion of the estate, e.g. rent charges, 
was set aside to meet contingent liabilities).
It will be apparent that strict settlement granted only a 
limited economic existence to potential heirs until the death 
of the father. In the case of younger descendants their 
dependence is first on the father, and then the heir, for 
marriage portions and the other forms of economic provision. 
Strict settlement underscores the age of majority, marriage 
and the death of the patriarch as the crucial moments when 
familial property is propelled down the line, but these moments 
do not signal the end of parental control.
Secondly, Thirsk (op.cit.) argues that although primogeniture 
was to be found commonly in the seventeenth century as an 
inheritance practice among the yeomanry and lesser landholders, 
it was by no means the only one. Elsewhere we can find 
examples of primogeniture as an imposed practice, especially 
on the villein tenants of knights' fees (Pollock and Maitland, 
op. cit. p278) where the superior tenant was probably more 
interested in the impartible nature of the tenancy: property 
was to be held by one person who was in turn liable for the 
dues and services. There were also considerable regional and 
local variations to primogeniture: Kent Gavelkind, Borough 
French and English systems provide for the youngest descendant 
to be entered as heir. Ultimogeniture benefits the parents 
to the extent that the youngest member was the one still left 
in the home; on taking the inheritance they were expected to 
provide free bench for any surviving parent.
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Thirdly, studies indicate that although the legal rules suggest 
that the eldest was advanced as the heir, the inheritance was 
hedged so that provision was made for the younger descendants.
Only the wealthiest could provide separate parcels of land for 
younger descendants, but in the case of lesser landholders, 
some provision was made in cash, goods or beasts (Cooper, 1976, 
Spufford, 1976, Thompson, 1976).
With these caveats in mind, why the persistent interest in 
primogeniture? Firstly, primogeniture plainly exists in the 
common law rules of intestate succession of real property.
However we may conceive common law, it applied to great and 
small at times when land was the prime form of productive 
property. Great landowners defeated the rules through the 
equity courts, lesser landowners got round it by local 
customary practices, but in both cases the strategies merely 
confirm (Bourdieu,1976) that certain hard and fast rules did 
exist, and clearly embedded in them is the principle of 
primogeniture. Secondly, if we consider the manoeuvre of 
the landowning gentry, strict settlements were bargains 
between fathers and, where they existed, eldest sons, or 
eldest daughters. Land in the 'agrarian grid' was not 
equally distributed but was held in the hands of a few families, 
and their practices (strict settlement, marriage alliances etc.) 
privileged primogeniture. Thus, in 1848, two-thirds of all land 
in England was tied up by strict settlement (Robertshaw and 
Curtin, op.cit.p.298). The correspondence between the concentration 
of productive property and a particular form of inheritance is 
difficult to dismiss. That the process of accumulation of land and 
its maintenance in the hands of a few families involved a 
particular familial form (given in the legal rules and the system 
of strict settlement, the customary practice of the great land­
owners) suggests that the familial system of transmitting property 
should be central to our understanding and analysis of the repro-
n - ■
duction of class, political power and state action.
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While the system of primogeniture is not inimical to capitalist 
accumulation and concentration of the means of production, 
there is no capitalist requirement that property should devolve 
only on eldest sons (as continental systems prove). That it did 
so is a function of particular notions of the family embedded 
in marriage laws, the common law rules of property ownership 
and the rules of intestate succession of real property, some 
of which we have tried to tease out here. Capitalist property 
relations, developing through the commodification of land, the 
classification of 'things' into real and personal property 
(subject to different inheritance systems) the apportioning of 
things to owners (the concept of private property), of themselves 
signal no necessity for individual, gender or age specific 
ownership. They are, of course, destructive of communal property 
and collective ownership. However, the significant fact that 
'things' are allotted to, and owned by, male adults is a product 
of familial relations, structured by legal rules, customary 
practices and state action. This might be compared to the 
similar process of the exclusions of women and minors from the 
labour market in the nineteenth century. There was nothing in 
the changes in the labour process that necessarily precluded 
the employment of women and minors, as fractions of the bour­
geoisie pointed out, rather, the expulsions were accomplished 
by legislation arising from agitation by male combinations for 
a family wage (of. Hussain, 1976; Hartman, 1979).
In one sense, the legal rules of intestate succession announce 
the 'plan', or 'template', for the transmission of real property 
down the line. In the absence of a will, in the case of an 
invalid will, or where land is held by those absolutely excluded 
from testamentary power, then the rules take effect. The elements 
of the plan describe the valid inheritance of property, and also 
define the familial relations necessarily associated with its 
secure transmission. We have said that they are rules of social
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order, elaborated for and by a land-owning class, which, 
by their presence in the common law, have a wider application.
The principal concerns of the rules, as we have discussed them 
are:
i) The centrality of the marital relationship in defining 
who is considered to be the heir of the body and promoted as 
claimant to the inheritance. By the same process the marital 
relation is central in defining who is counted 'of the blood' 
for in the absence of nuptials the common law provided for the 
asbolute exclusion of some biological children: the bastards.
ii) The destiny of land is 'down' the line, to descendants, 
not sideways or upwards. Although this is taken to be obvious 
and unremarkable, descent is a historically and culturally 
specific inheritance practice. As we point out later, changes 
in the form of productive property entailed a system different 
from descent.
iii) By common law, the eldest was advanced as heir,
though there were local and regional variations (ultimogeniture).
The practice of primogeniture was partly in the interests of 
transmitting the inheritance as one unbroken parcel. But it was 
a system which not only entailed the unequal distribution of 
property to descendants, but also, the unequal distribution of 
political and social advantage.
iv) Women were, by the rules, merely ‘postponed males'.
They took the inheritance until such times as a male heir was 
produced (cf. Bourdieu, op.cit.).
v) The familial form announced by the rules (the male - 
adult head of house, the privileged eldest son, the subordinate 
position of the younger and female descendants and the equally 
distanced and subordinate position of the married woman) is actually 
transmitted and reproduced at the same moment as property is passed 
on down the line.
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The relationship between the family and the land is a complex 
and subtle one. There is a constant intertwining of the economic 
and the familial event. Simpson catches it nicely:
"To the wealthy landed classes, real property was 
the essential endowment not of individuals but of 
the family, a continuing but constantly changing 
entity forming and reforming around the basic 
family events - birth, the attainment of majority, 
marriage and death - and rendered continuous by 
the concepts of blood and inheritance (Simpson 1979, 
p.x., our emphasis).
But it is precisely at these 'basic family events' that land 
is not 'of the family', for the family does not democratically 
decide the destiny of the land, this is determined by the 
patriarch. In its devising the place of minors was often 
no more than as pawns in the matrix of alliances and settlements. 
Even in the case of strict settlements, where the patriarch's 
control over the inheritance was somewhat restricted, the 
settlement was a bargain struck between him and his father, 
between him and his eldest son. Moreover, the basic family 
events were occasions in familial life most strictly controlled 
by adults, often by the application of violence , or by threats 
of disinheritance. The crucial family events are, in fact, the 
points at which the minors' dependence and subordination are 
most naked.
PATRIARCHAL PROPERTY
We understand the significance of the Abolition of Tenures Act, 
1660, in the light of the commodification of land as 'property' 
and, with it, the transformation of landholders into potential 
owners. This is an important moment in the capitalising of the 
property relations, and yet, the statute hardly disturbs familial 
property relations. The systematic exclusion of married women 
and minors from the ownership of property was continued in two
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different ways. In the case of the minor, the Act of 1660 
marks their extended separation from the ownership of real 
property. Prior to 1660 it was possible for minors to assume 
control of socage tenures at the age of fourteen, after 1660 
the 'military' age of the majority of twenty-one was extended 
to all minors.
The exclusion of the married woman from property ownership was 
somewhat different. Women, feme sole, divorced or widowed, 
were never excluded from property ownership. However, in common 
law, the principle was that on marriage, a husband assumed pro­
prietary interests (use, enjoyment and disposal) of any real 
property brought into the marriage. This has to be seen alongside 
marital rights to the body of the wife herself, and rights over 
minors, given through guardianship laws. In the case of land 
after 1660 the appropriation of real property by the husband pre­
sented a threat to the married woman's father, in so far as it meant 
the alienation of land from 'the line'. To prevent husbands 
assuming control and disposing of ancestral property, the landed 
classes through their lawyers developed the elaborate and complex 
legal instrument of the strict marriage settlement (Graveson and 
Crane, 1958, pp.14-15). Family lawyers used the Court of Chancery
i.e. the system of equity. During the seventeenth and eigheenth 
centuries, equity developed the doctrine of a wife's separate 
estate, whereby property could be endowed on trustees for the wife's 
exclusive enjoyment. While this ensured a married woman's limited 
independence, her status was similar to that of a minor; 
she had no rights to the capital, only claims on the income. 
Furthermore, she could not devise any gift or will any of the 
property held in trust. In fact, the married woman could not 
devise real property at all, for such property was owned either 
by the trust or by her husband. It was not until the Married 
Women and Tortfeasers Act, 1935, that she acquired 'full power 
to dispose of property as if she were feme sole (Bromley 1976; 
p. 603) .
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It is significant that the landed classes, drawing on private 
resources, protected their interests through the equity courts 
in the face of the state, which by merely allowing the common 
law rules to lie unaltered until the nineteenth century, 
severely disadvantaged the lot of all married women, as with 
the power of their fathers to prevent ancestral land being 
alienated from 'the line' by common law rules (Dicey, 1914, 
pp. 371-98). And yet as we demonstrate in some detail below, 
the common law concerning the familial transmission of real 
estate was by no means immaterial to the needs and interests of 
landed classes, for the rules of intestate succession served 
to tie land to the family and the family to the land. The 
common law and statute law, post 1660, celebrates a patriarchal 
family form (adult male owner, the excluded and dependent wife 
and minor) which stands in some contradiction to the 'free' 
capitalist relations of property and labour of the period.
The historical specificity of this family form stands in relief 
when we consider the important changes it underwent during the 
nineteenth century. An earlier paper (Fitz op.cit.) indicated 
the manner in which the equity courts, through the doctrine of 
parens patriae, provided the state with the legal basis to 
intervene in the familial sphere in the interests of the 'wel­
fare of the child'. It suggested that the doctrine of parens 
patriae rewrote the relations between parents and children 
in so far as the state assumed the mantle of the supreme 
parentage of all children. We are concerned here with some 
other dimensions of the state regulation of family form.
What is striking about familial property relations in the mid 
and late nineteenth century is the resurrection of the married 
woman as a property-owning subject. Interestingly, it is the 
equity courts which provide a point of departure. Recognising 
a significant shift in the form of productive property from 
land to investment in stocks, shares and bonds they enter­
tained a new form of marriage settlement, the personal settlement.
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which grew in importance from the middle of the century 
(Crane 1957, p. 235). Strict settlements did not disappear, 
but the personal settlement took a place alongside them. The 
difference between the forms of settlement resides in the dif­
ferent forms of property held in trust (crudely, land in the 
first case, industrial and finance capital in the other). Crane 
generally argues that the wife's property was either held for 
her separate use (in trust, from which she had the income) or 
she took a joint interest in the trust alongside the husband.
In terms of transmission, he argues; 'Hereby the parents could 
determine distribution of capital among the children or remoter 
issue as they saw fit, even to the total exclusion of some'. 
(Crane op.cit., our emphasis).
What he fails to say is: a) while the husband could not alienate 
the wife's capital, neither could the wife, for it is 'owned' 
and controlled by trustees appointed by the father; b) whereas 
he could devise or alienate his own property, the wife could 
not; c) the destiny of 'her' property was not of her devising 
but of her father's representatives. Therefore, the point 
that 'parents' determined the distribution is misleading. As 
in the case of strict marriage settlements the intention is to 
ensure that, in the absence of children, the wife's property 
goes back to her family (i.e. to her father), or if there is a 
son, the contract is between the grandfather and the grandson, 
to the exclusion of the feckless husband. At the same time, 
the settlement represents a contract, over time, reaffirming 
the continued existence of the patrilineal form.
Strict and personal settlements were, at best, class-specifically 
advantageous for a minority of married women. Those unable to 
use the equity courts, were by common law, still required to 
surrender any property or income to the male head of household, 
the Married Women's Property Act put into statutory form 
an already existing legal practice in which wives were able to
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control and dispose of property which fell to them by inheritance 
The feminist struggles of the period centred on something quite 
different. This was property, in the form of cash income, 
earned by married women through labour and talent (celebrated 
examples involved women authors and actresses whose income was 
spent or squandered by feckless husbands). The Acts gave 
married women something denied by common law and early property 
statutes, the right to dispose of property without the consent 
of the husband or her father (or his representatives). The Acts 
do not construct a formal legal parity between husband and wife 
in relationship to property until 1935. This point marks the 
end of the historic similarity between the married woman and 
the minor in property law.
With respect to property, married women and minors part company 
in 1935, but with respect to their abilities/inabilities to 
contract, their paths ran different courses.
Minors have, historically, had only limited ability to contract 
and this remains the case today. At the age of majority, the 
significance of the sexual division comes into play. While 
adult sons could contract, wives could not. De facto, therefore, 
many women were never able to contract. As we have suggested, 
the step from daughter to wife is short.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS
"It is clear, for example, that legislation addressing 
particular forms of patriarchal legal relations in the 
nineteenth century, governing property and inheritance, 
is a much determined by the structures of its own 
history prior to the shift into industrial capitalism, 
as it is by the specific historical developments in the 
period.' (Harrison and Mort 1980; 81).
This part has broadly argued that the transmissions of 
property over time is intimately bound up with the reproduction of 
positions and statuses within property owning families. This 
necessarily entails it is argued, the transmission of the structured 
dependency of minors, for what the inheritance laws systematically 
privilege is patriarchy; in the sense we defined earlier as maleness 
and seniority. We have indicated, albeit briefly, that categories 
developed within the law of real property, and the common law rules 
determining its transmission - categories such as the heir, the 
bastard, the blood related family, legitimacy, the line and primo­
geniture - have considerable effects outside the realm of landed 
families. They have become an embedded part of the system of 
family law, therefore, more generally applicable to non-propertied 
families. Moreover, legislation such as Poor Laws of 1834 contained 
policies about the obligation to maintain in which familial relations 
are conceived much in the same way as family form is constructed 
through common law rules of succession.
What is striking is the durability of the classifications of 
property (real and personal) and the separate rules (common law 
and ecclesiastic and equity) by which each species was transmitted, 
remembering that these classifications were forged as early as 
the 13th century and did not formally expire until 1925. It was 
the landowning aristocracy and gentry, by the devices of conveyancing 
(trust, settlement, and entail) who used equity to defeat the 
rigidities of common law, and at the same time created forms of
379 -
ownership and transmission, which the bankocracy and the 
industrial bourgeoisie were able to use and adapt to their 
separate processes of capital accumulations.
This may well be a partial explanation for the persistence of 
what were essentially feudal classifications of property and 
transmission, long after land had ceased to be the prime form 
of productive property, and giving indeed the British capitalist 
economic structure some of its shape and form. The laws of 
succession were intensely patriarchal but contained little that 
presented any real problems to latter forms of capitalist 
accumulations; the contradictions between the common law doctrine 
of 'one flesh' where the husband assumed rights in and over his 
wife's property, as against the wishes of other 'lines' to retain 
property within them, had been fought out at least a hundred and 
fifty years prior to the massive accumulations of industrial 
wealth in the 19th century. Testamentary power anyway guaranteed 
the rights of property owners to devolve their wealth in paths 
where its continued accumulation could be best protected. As 
Harrison and Mort (1980; 92-93) point out, in a sensitive essay 
which covers some of the ground in this chapter, historically 
capital benefited from the legal relations of patriarchy in 
general, and the subordination of bourgeois women in particular.
"Firstly under certain circumstances, the appropriation 
of a wife's property on marriage aided capital 
accumulation in that it augmented the husband's capital 
resources. Secondly, the transmission of property to 
male heirs facilitated the economic stabilization and 
political legitimization of the ownership of the means 
of production by individual named families."
Generally, the laws of succession contain a sufficient repertoire 
of categories of property, forms of ownership and legal instruments 
to guarantee secure transmission, that property owning families
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could use the appropriate strategy best suited to their 
interests. What the laws best facilitate, is the transmission 
of property along 'the line'.
The extent to which the legislation of 1925 transformed the 
laws of succession, by breaking down the old distinction between 
realty and personalty, and by combining the separate rules of 
inheritance with one unified system^is indisputable. The destiny 
of intestate property (real and personal) was codified into a 
broadly similar set of rules, to that earlier applicable only 
to personal property. The division of property, devolving on 
surviving spouse and all surviving children of the marriage, 
signals a shift towards partible inheritance (away from the old 
system of primogeniture and notions of impartibility). For 
reasons we mentioned earlier (tax avoidance schemes on the one 
hand, the amount of property which is of so little value that 
it is not liable to duties, lack of research ), the actual 
practices of transmission at death, of property, are very 
difficult to describe with any confidence. There are scattered 
clues which evidence some of the continuities and changes, without 
giving us anything like the whole picture.
Data collected by the Committee on the Law of Intestate Succession 
(Cmnd 8310 1951), showed that in wills executed from 1940
a) 73% of male testators leaving less than £2000 left the whole 
or most to their surviving spouse
b) 65% of those leaving between £2000 - £5000 did likewise
c) as did 43% of those leaving more than £5000 (Stone 1977; 148)
Male testators who left a life interest in the whole or major 
part of their estate to their widows indicates that on sums of 
less than £2000, 11% of male testators did so, on sums between 
£2000 - £5000, 21% did , and for estates over £5000, 45% did 
(Stone ibid). The first set of figures suggest that, the larger 
the estate, the less likely the surviving spouse will inherit the 
estate directly. This should not be interpreted either as a
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process of wealthy men disinheriting widows, rather that 
transmission practices of the wealthy as opposed to the common 
people are somewhat different. For the very rich, the direct 
inheritor is the beneficial trust, set up to avoid the payment 
of death duties (see Thomas 1979, Blackburn 1973). Indeed, as 
one writer in the Economist put, 'It is clearly misleading to 
classify with the genuine poor the wives and children of 
millionaires merely because they have little property in their 
own right.' (quoted in Urry and Wakefield 1973; 57). In contrast 
a husband with an owner-occupied house generally wills it to his 
wife. For the rich anyway, death duties have become a 'voluntary 
tax' (Rubenstein 1981; 227-31). So much so that Titmuss noted:
"The British fiscal system is almost unique in 
the western world in its generous treatment of 
wealth holders in allowing them to use family 
settlements, discretionary trusts, gifts, family 
covenants and other legal devices for redistributing 
and rearranging income and wealth." (quoted in 
Blackburn op.cit. 24).
Not only do the rich deploy devices such as the trust in passing 
on large quantities of wealth untaxed, moving away from the notion 
of the individually named heir, they also pass on qualitatively 
different forms of assets (dwellings, land, shares, company 
securities) as opposed to the ordinary forms of property transmitted 
(cash and bank deposits, national savings bonds, life assurance 
policies, and other cash assets), passing along to different 
destinies - the trust, and the surviving spouse. The increasing 
use of the trust as the means both of transmitting and holding 
large and valuable assets is prompted not so much by a will or 
desire to remove property from the direct control of descendants, 
as to avoid the estate duty payable on all estates passing at 
death, introduced in 1894. The net effect, however, means that 
(predominantly male) testators of large estates, still exercise 
considerable economic power over surviving widows and children.
For it is their power to determine the conditions and provisions 
of the trust, by indicating what annuities are to be paid, for 
example, and at one point in the life cycle, minors are heritable.
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Two more and related characteristics. Firstly, there is 
a variety of evidence now available, from economic historians 
and economists that few individuals become self-made millionaires 
or multi-millionaires in their own life time. The odd individual 
who climbs from rags to riches hides the more general process 
that the rich become so by inheritance (Wedgewood 1929, Thomas 
1979, Harbury and McMahon 1974, Harbury 1962, Burghes 1979, 
Blackburn 1973, Rubenstein 1974, 1981, Scott 1982, Pond 1983) .
Secondly, Rubenstein's work Men of Property is no sexist misnomer, 
but a fair reflection that major wealth-holders (and therefore 
chief inheritors) are men. 'Women', argues Rubenstein, 'were 
not often very wealthy in their own right', (Appendix; 250). 
Moreover, if few men actually accumulated great wealth in their 
own lifetime, almost no women do so (p. 250-251). And, 'It would 
seem that both commerce and landed society were more likely to 
grant women large fortunes absolutely than were beneficiaries 
of the Industrial Revolution.' (p. 251). These general points
are confirmed by Rubenstein's tables on the top wealth-leavers 
(i.e. those leaving more than £3 million, 1940-69; £5 million or 
more, 1970-9); of the 39 names listed, only three are women 
(Rubenstein 228-229).
A cursory inspection of the Inland Revenue Statistics on estates 
passing at death, referenced by value and gender, confirms this 
general trend (Inland Revenue Statistics 1982; tables 4.13, 4.14). 
These figures suggest that the old rules still obtain; female 
claims are postponed in favour of male inheritors, when the estate 
passing at death is of considerable size and value and comprises 
in the broadest sense, productive property. In contrast, our 
earlier figures suggest that widows have benefitted directly when 
the property was either the matrimonial home or cash assets, 
where inheritance practices conform to the principles set out 
in the 1925 Act. Rubenstein's evidence suggests that full-blooded 
primogeniture, where the eldest son takes all, is not a universal 
principle amongst leading wealth-owners, at least from the opening 
decades of this century (Rubenstein 1974; 155-60).
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One characteristic of British social science is its over­
riding concern with poverty and lives of the poor. One of the 
few reversals of this trend is to be found in the above studies 
wealth and the processes of its transmission, though it is 
notable here that the substantive work has not been done by 
sociologists, even though these studies appear in works edited 
by sociologists, (e.g. Stanworth and Giddens - Urry and Wakefield) 
Contradictorily, we remain woefully uninformed about the pro­
cesses of familial circulations of goods, cultural and material, 
amongst families whose main assets are chattels and small cash 
assets. For this reason, it is difficult to assess the importance 
of transfers inter vivos as opposed to transfers occuring (by 
will or intestacy) at death. There are hints in the studies 
of the wealthy that in order to defeat estate duty transfers 
inter vivos have taken on an increased significance (see Harbury 
1962). In the case of the new middle classes picked out by 
Bernstein (1975) and Bourdieu (1977), the significant transfer 
may well be transmission of the appropriate codes, predispo­
sitions and educational creditation (though these rest on the 
possession of some material goods) and this transmission is 
wholly inter vivos - the dead may pass on assets, but are 
hardly in the position to transmit the sets of dispositions and 
codes which rely on personal communication and interaction. At 
best they may provide the wherewithal to provide a public school 
education which might do the job in a delegated way. The extent 
to which the eldest child ,is familially sponsored through the 
education system at the expense of younger siblings, and the 
extent to which girls are 'postponed' in favour of boys (mea­
sured for example, by length of schooling, the choice of boarding 
as opposed to day schooling, being sent to fee or maintained 
schools, or directed into 'high' or 'low' status, vocational 
or generalist education subjects, and being permitted to 
pursue higher education), is something we have yet to map.
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Our lack of knowledge in the fine detail of the transmissions 
of cultural capital derives in no small part from the way of 
field of survey work has been traditionally defined in the 
sociology of education. Large scale surveys, from Douglas 
(1964, 1968), through to Halsey, Heath and Ridge (1980) are re 
markably sex-blind; 'origins and destinations' have broadly 
been conceived in terms of relating educational achievement 
and occupational stratification tothe class backgrounds of male 
recipients of schooling. While the absence of women from the 
landscape in Douglas's study is fairly indexical of the whole 
field of sociology at the time, prior to the impact of feminism 
on social theory, no such half-apology can be sustained on be­
half of Halsey et al. For in the interim, the women's move­
ment has been concerned with the complex relationship between 
contents of educational knowledge (e.g. Anyon 1481), the boun­
daries between subjects celebrating gender difference (especially 
say, between home economics and craft skills, between rates of 
success in literature and language and the sciences amongst boys 
and girls, and, with the class-room processes which both create 
and sustain gender identity and difference . Against this 
canvas, it is almost inconceivable that Halsey et al should 
pursue a study of the process of schooling in relationship to 
the origins and destinies of one sex only (on the basis that 
this allowed their research to be viewed comparatively with 
earlier studies).
Given these lacunae it will be appreciated that no general 
conclusions can be drawn about cultural capital transmissions 
in relationship to other inheritance practices. But it is 
clear that if we are to think through these different forms of 
transmissions comparatively, then we have to take categories 
such as gender and seniority seriously. For what the laws of 
succession detail is that it is precisely these axes along 
which family structures are defined and along which familial 
goods circulate, and, that these axes might well be the lines 
along which cultural capital flows.
1
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With these problems in mind, is it possible to assert the 
emergence of a new family form within the rules of inheritance? 
The issue is complicated by the increased significance of 
transfers inter vivos (for the rich to escape death taxes, for 
the new middle classes, the significant transfers of cultural 
capital, concretely realised in educational creditation and 
occupational placement), as opposed to the transfer of family 
gods taking place primarily at death. However, this registers 
a change in the process of transmitting; we do not know about 
the interior privileging of spouses and minors (divided by age 
and sex), which would give us the clues to understanding whether 
the old principles of patriarchy and primogeniture (eldest 
male privilege) still persists, even after a qualitative change 
in 'the goods' being transmitted. Research here would need to 
embrace not only the network of transfers of cultural and 
social capital (i.e. contemporary customary practices of civil 
society), but also the transfers of cash, household goods etc., 
passed on to family members as loans, goods needed to set up 
new households and as gifts advanced at various points in the 
life cycle (e.g. the age of majority).
We are on more certain ground with the rules of succession.
Does the one system of inheritance, post-1925, significantly 
change the family forms visible under the old rules of testacy? 
The implacability of testamentary power, though little invoked, 
stll remains with us, so the power to disinherit and the power 
to direct property in paths quite contradictory to the destinies 
set out in the rules of intestacy, also remains. Taken together 
with the considerable difference between the number of men 
passing on estates at death and the number of women doing so, 
and, the fact that men pass on larger estates than women at 
death, testamentary power is predominantly male in its exercise. 
To this extent, the old sense of 'patriarchal' property remains.
The post-1925 rules of intestacy certainly limit the claims of 
the male heir to succeed to (real) property as of right; those 
rules now privilege the surviving spouse. Male offspring take
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equally with female descendants after the death of a surviving 
spouse. The intestacy rules therefore formally ends the system 
of primogeniture embedded in the old rules of the transmission 
of real property. The moiety system (half the property descen­
ding to the surviving spouse, half to surviving issue of the 
marriage) directly descends from the rules of personal intestate 
succession. The main beneficiaries here have been married 
women, to the extent that they have been accorded legal parity 
with surviving male spouses. Unlike minors, they now take the 
deceased husband's property directly; minors claims are post­
poned (though guaranteed by trust and executors) until the age 
of majority. The rights of minors to claims on the inheritance 
are guaranteed against surviving spouses (male or female) and 
to this extent, they cannot be 'disinherited' under the rules 
of intestacy. What the post-1925 intestate rules, that is, 
the Inheritance (Family Provision) Acts of 1938 and 1975, 
primarily defeat is the 'male to male' line of succession 
(though this may continue by custom or testacy). These statutes 
are good proofs for the argument that it is possible de jure, 
to re-write what constitutes family membership, without neces­
sarily disturbing the power relations of the family system. 
Indeed, the 1975 rules confirm the principles of personal, non­
contractual, relations of dependence, obligation and subor­
dination, which separate family relations from capitalist re­
lations. It is on this basis, precisely because 'family' members 
(in the widest sense) were personally dependent on the deceased, 
that courts entertain claims against the estate for maintenance, 
by persons inside and outside the last marital relation of the 
deceased. The principle of dependence therefore extends beyond 
the grave and does not necessarily end with the death of the 
patriarch, but with the change in status (remarriage, marriage 
or coming of age) of the descendants. For the majority of women, 
and girls, this implies merely changing one form of dependence 
for another.
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In conclusion then:
"An individual's inheritance cannot be mea­
sured solely by the financial benefits he 
receives. Numerous advantages are also con­
ferred by education, life styles, contacts 
and all that these imply and which are vir­
tually unquantifiable. Furthermore, the value 
of a father's estate at death is only a very 
inadequate proxy for the financial advantages 
a son receives from his father". (Harbury and 
McMahon, 1974; 123-124).
The 'grid of inheritance' thrown down the line at the same time 
as the familial assets are transferred (however great or small 
these might be) clearly extends beyond immediate financial 
benefits. Ceri Thomas' (op.cit.) brilliantly mischievous study 
of 'family and kinship in Eaton Square' beautifully maps the 
contours of the privileges and advantages conferred on the elite 
through a whole network of 'contacts and connectivity'. Whereas 
the studies of the wealthy elite generally are written to show 
the structured inequalities of wealth between economic groups 
and that these inequalitites are far from diminishing (for there 
is no effective legislative apparatus which forces the disper­
sion of wealth), we have tried to map, through a study of the 
inheritance laws and the categories through which it operates, 
the economic significance of the institution of the family, 
within the framework of a classed social structure. For part of 
our total inheritance, are the laws of succession, and with them 
the categories which are an integral part of their history, and 
the extent to which these categories operate to provide limits 
and possibilities of social intercourse, then our past presses 
upon our present.
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Their significance for the study of minority status resides 
in the manner in which patriarchy (both maleness and seniority) 
operates within the framework of modes of production. To this 
extent, the laws of succession signify not only difference 
(between adult and minor, male and female) but actually sustain 
and perpetuate these differences in a structured way. Any social 
formation has symbolic systems which classify, differentiate 
and hierarchize individuals and social groups. In this context 
we have tried to indicate how property and wealth articulate to 
the exercise of power and authority. The laws of succession 
make visible the wider distribution of property, power and autho­
rity in a classed society, operating through the more local, 
private and personal relations within the institution of the 
family. Familial relations are at once economic and personal, 
intertwined and largely inseparable, where statuses are hierar­
chised by gender and generation. The laws of succession provide 
considerable leverage for parents to exercise both economic and 
personal control over their direct issue, and we are arguing 
that any understanding of familial relations in general, and 
inter-generational relations in particular, must take account 
of the presence of these laws of structured inequalities, for 
in the matter of familial goods, power flows one way; down 
the line.
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NOTES
1. Bourdieu's 1976 essay was in fact a critique of a field 
of enquiry established in France which had a strong 
legalistic bias. As Lawrence Stone notes, "The strongly 
legalistic bias of much French scholarship on family 
history has also done a good deal to illuminate these 
questions, although few of these publications have probed 
very deeply beneath the surface of the law". (Stone 1981; 
67). Strictly speaking, Bourdieu is writing about marriage 
strategies and not about inheritance at death. However,
he is dealing with the destiny of land and the shaping of 
social relations involved in the redistribution of property 
so his concerns are very close to the field of investigation 
here. Moreover, Bourdieu does pose problems about customary 
practices and their relationship to legal rules which must 
be addressed.
2. Serfs and villeins are terms about which there is no 
general agreement. See Hilton (1973, 1976) and Hatcher 
(1981), for an extended discussion.
3. Brought in under the Succession Duty Act 1 8 5 3 , confirmed 
by the Finance Act 1894, (Topham 1947, chap. 35; Stephen's 
Commentaries II, 672-673).
4. The beginning of this orthodoxy probably lies in the 
attempts generated in the middle 1960's, to specify the 
'peculiarities of the English', both in terms of dominant 
political ideologies and dominant cultural values e.g. 
Anderson (1965), Nairn, (1964), Thompson (1965). The 
impact of the aristocratic values, liberal education, the 
culture of the gentleman, the derogation of expertise and 
trade was mapped out by Raymond Williams (1961). More 
recently, the impact of the old order upon the British 
economy has been explored by Weiner (19 81) and by Esland 
and Cathcart (1981). See generally. Field (1979) , Urry 
and Wakeford (1973) and Stanworth and Giddens (1974) .
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5. Delphy's (1977) analysis of the family system of producing 
on French peasant farms has significance beyond the 
agricultural grid; it could well be applied to family 
systems of petty commodity production and to the early
days of the factory system. For patterns of recruitment
took place through the family (father employing children
as factory workers) and tasks being assigned in the familial 
manner (subordinates allotted the unskilled occupations of 
cleaning and fetching). For this reason, we can argue 
that the family as a system extends beyond 'the household'.
6. St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians Chap. 5, 22- Chap. 6,
9. Just for flavour;
"Wives submit yourselves unto your own 
husband as unto the Lord. For the husband 
is' the head of the wife, even as Christ is
the head of the Church".
7. See for example Meillasoux (1972), Rodgers and Standing 
eds. (1981) for anthropological versions of elders and 
subordinates. For juridico-political theorising of 
patriarchy, especially in the 17th century, see Schochet 
(op.cit.).
8. These were interviews carried out in mid-Bedfordshire 
in January 1983, by Roger Dale and myself, as part of 
a survey of the employment of school children. The 
case here involved a 14 year old girl living with her 
family on a Land Settlement smallholding. She routinely 
picked at packed vegetables before and after school and 
at weekends. Asked about wages, she replied she received 
none: however. Dad did pay her weekly judo fees (50p) and
used petrol to run her to judo class. A weekly recompense
of about 75p. The children from the Land Settlement small­
holdings presented an image of family production and con­
sumption not unlike Delphy's French peasants.
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9. Two comments here. Firstly, as Rubenstein (1981; 195) 
notes, "the great landowners remained the richest group 
of men in Britain until the late 19th century". But 
their vast economic power was matched by the political 
leverage they exerted through various state apparatuses, 
occupying directly, or by delegation, key ministries and 
crucial positions within the civil service. Secondly, 
Bateman's publication. Return, the Great Landowners of 
Great Britain and Ireland, ran to a 4th edition
in 1883, because it revealed with startling clarity, the 
concentration of large tracts of the British Isles, in 
the hands of very few wealthy families. Called at the 
time of the new Doomsday Book, it was based on an official 
Return to the Owners of Land. No similar compilation is 
available today. For a detailed discussion of landed 
wealth, see Rubenstein (op. cit. Chap. 7).
10. Stone, L. (1977; 130-136, 207-214). Note also Sir Edward 
Coke's kidnapping of his daughter in order to secure a 
marriage which would have placed him well with the Court 
(in Hill, 1965).
11. For example, Macdonald M. (1981) Class, Gender and 
Education, O. U. Course E353, Units 10 and 11; Deem, R. 
(1978) Women and Schooling, Deem, R. (1980) Schooling 
for Women's Work, Wolpe, A. (1976) The official ideology 
of education for girls. Acker, S. (1981) No-women's 
land; British sociology of education 196p-1979.
P A R T  T H R E E
PARENS PATRIAE; THE STATE AS THE 
WISE AND SUPREME PARENT
'And the evidence of reason teacheth, 
that there is a stronger and higher 
bond of Duty between Children and the 
Father of their Countrey, than the 
Fathers of private families.'
Richard Mocket (1615) God and the King, 
quoted by Schochet (1975;89).
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INTRODUCTION: PARENS PATRIAE
The legal doctrine of parens patriae simply stated 
acknowledged that:
"The sovereign, as parens patriae had a kind of 
guardianship over various classes of person, who 
from their legal disability stand in need of 
protection, such as idiots, infants and mental 
patients." (Jowitt 1977: 131).
We have already established the nature of the infants'
'legal disability' so we shall concern ourselves here with 
two related notions; parens patriae and guardianship, which 
will put into play a complex relationship between the state, 
parents and children. It is impossible here to write a full 
account of the complex 'history' of guardianship, and the 
related categories of custody and wardship; guardianship 
remains a notoriously difficult construct, even for legal 
historians and commentators to trace through all its various 
paths and byways. Medieval law recognised ten different types 
of guardianship (Pollock and Maitland Vol. II, 444), while 
Coke lists four categories: his 19th century editor footnotes 
nine different types (Thomas 1818: 151). Legal commentaries 
on guardianship may be bracketed in two ways; those accounts 
which read its legal history as a series of successive blows 
against the absolute authority of a father over his children 
(see the various contributions to Graveson and Crane; 1957) ; 
and those accounts which privilege the growing concern of the 
courts to enact judgements - in custody^ wardship, divorce 
proceedings, etc., - which would be of benefit to the child 
(e.g. 0. Stone, 1978). The first seeks to establish the 
grounds on which married women emerge as legal subjects in 
their own right;the second brings together the parents and
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the state in constellation, through the doctrine of "the 
welfare of the child". The emergence of married women as 
full legal subjects, and, the doctrine of the welfare of 
the child were possible only after the partial demise of 
the figure in dominance in family law; the patriarch and 
his paternal power.
In the historical development of family law, the declining 
empire of the father is a key discursive element. Yet it 
is too easily overlooked that the principles on which his 
government of family members was based have not been entirely 
extinguished; rather, his position has been assumed by the 
state. Particularly, this is so in respect of minors. For 
what can be traced out, by reference to case and statute law 
is the transformation of the government of children in 
families, to the government of children through the family.
At the level of narrative, it becomes important to understand 
how the near absolute rights of a father to the couverture 
of his wife and custody and control of his children were de­
constructed, and how the state claimed a basis in law to 
intervene, supervise and if necessary, remove children from 
families. It is then possible, for example, to account why 
over 100,000 children are currently in the care and custody 
of local authorities, whose administrative power to direct 
and control the lives of those children, is super-ordinate 
to the rights of parents , and to account why it was possible 
in the past for a charity such as Dr. Barnardo's to resettle, 
between 1870 and 1914, nearly 25,000 children in overseas 
colonies and dominions (Pinchbeck and Hewitt Vol. II; 19 73; 
575) .
Modern definitions of guardianship display firstly its field 
of operation in social relationships, and secondly, indicate 
its homology with the doctrine of parens patriae. Halsbury's 
Laws, for example, defines guardianship as follows:
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"Minors, both naturally and at law, are 
subject to incapacities which make it 
necessary for their interests to be safe­
guarded by persons of full age. In its 
widest sense, the relationship of guardian 
and ward may arise by nature, for nurture 
or by parental right. It may be created 
by appointment, whether by a court of 
competent jurisdiction or out of court, 
in which case the appointment may be by 
parent or by the minor himself".
(Halsbury's Laws, Vol. 24; paras 527 and 
223) .
Note the similarities between the general superintending 
power of courts in parens patriae to provide protection for 
those with 'legal disabilities' (including infants) and, 
the more specific, individual-orientated provision of guardian­
ship, to offer protection to minors who 'naturally' and 'legally* 
are subject to incapacities. The common assumption is that 
minors are incapacitated,need protection; responsibility best 
given by persons of full age, generally parents to whom minors 
are naturally related. But guardianship also entails powers; 
it may be over the minor's property, over the minor's person, 
or both (Halsbury, op.cit; para 527). Both guardianship and 
parens patriae entail the governance of minors, and specify 
who has claims, rights,* duties and obligation, both to govern 
and protect them. And here lies a subtle and complex conflict 
between the general superintending power and the specific 
governance of individuals. For guardianship has evolved a 
normative set of rules and obligations applicable to guardians 
themselves, which, if not met, or if challenged, ând cannot be 
adequately defended in the courts, the 'natural' claim to 
guardianship can be displaced and superseded by the more general 
superintending powers of a wiser 'parent'.
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These intertwining themes are best understood in the context 
of the historical development of the doctrine of parens 
patriae and in the struggles to transform guardianship. The 
périodisation we suggest (as any périodisation must) is an 
implicit theorization of historical change. What will be 
paramount here, are changes in the guardian-minor relationship, 
always understanding that in law, who was to be the guardian of 
a particular child could always be a matter of legal contest. 
The general principles along which the law worked, however, 
have a considerable unity and longevity. Contesting the 
guardianship of children took place within those rules, and 
judicial outcomes of contested cases served either as practical 
re-affirmations of the rules, or in some more important cases, 
modified and transformed the general principles.
The périodisation we shall adopt is grounded in the 'decisive' 
shifts, generally statutory in form, from prior legal practice, 
where a crucial shift in discursive practice materialises in 
and through the guardianship rules. The historical development 
we suggest for analytical purposes is:
a) Pre-1660, where common law rules are pre-eminent; where 
guardianship is construed predominantly as a profitable 
right to superintend a minor's property, and where, in 
the general conspectus of family law, paternal power is 
the protected privilege and organising principle of it.
b) 1660-1839, which begins with the statutory affirmation 
of the supremacy of the father over all his children, 
but is also the crucial period where equity courts become 
the site of struggle against the near absolute rule of 
paternal power, where equity elaborates the doctrine of 
parens patriae.
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c) 1839-1886, a signal period of time where successive 
statutory initiative recognise a mother's right to 
custody, often in response to cases where justice 
was clearly seen not to be done. Here also we begin 
to see the elaboration of the principle of the welfare 
of the child.
d) Post-1886 and the consolidation of the modern principles 
of guardianship, and the elaboration of the state's 
concern with children.
The historical transformations which take place in the 
governance of minors, take place within a turbulent, unceasing 
conflict between three main branches of English law; where 
common-law rules are the focus of challenges through the Chancery 
Courts; where ecclesiastical law is undermined by the appropriation 
of family law (of marriage and its dissolution, for example), 
by temporal officials on the basis of developing statutory law. 
Periodization is made more complex by the traditions of judge- 
made law operating as precedent, making observable continuities 
over analytically separate historical phases.
So, for example, we find modern definitions of different kinds 
of guardians, set out in Halsbury (op.cit.), citing cases from 
the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries (e.g. guardian by nature is 
founded on Ratcliffe's Case (1592), Thorp (1697); guardianship 
for nurture cites Hasfield (Parish) v. Furley (Parish) (1740) 
and so on; Halsbury's Laws ; Vol. 24; footnotes para 527 ).
The interaction of case law with statute, equity with common 
law and parliamentary initiative in opposition to ecclesiastical 
law, over the question of family law in general and guardianship 
in particular provides us with an interesting dynamic, elsewhere 
observed and noted, of the law transforming itself as it trans­
forms the object of its operation. The question of which branch 
was to have legal jurisdiction over the family is as much of 
interest as to who was to exercise power, authority, custody 
and control over minors in families. In this respect, we may
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apprehend the sense in which formal structures - the 
language, doctrines, procedures and fissures within the 
legal system, constantly interact with practices of families; 
where individuals located in structural spaces which the law 
sets out, constantly struggle to redefine the limits and 
boundaries the law sets to their individual capacities.
A final note on périodisation. The kind of historical 
transformations we focus on here, concerns temporalities 
in the development of patriarchal relations, the shifting 
balance of forces and social relationships entered into by 
men and women (as husband and wife), between adults and minors 
(as parents and children). We are looking at categories not 
necessarily governed, in Marxian terminology, by the ebb and 
flow of modes of production. As Connell (1983) argues, "A 
theory of patriarchy must gain its historical intelligibility 
from nowhere but itself, its own transformations", (p. 61). 
There are important implications here for the way in which 
we conceive, not only the historical developments in family 
form, but, the way in which we periodise the burgeoning insti­
tutions comprising the modern state. It makes little sense 
here to conceive the state in forms (bourgeois, liberal, 
corporate etc.), which describe and analyse it in terms of its 
relationship to capitalist accummulation, for example.
Of course, there are points, particular conjunctures which 
are of considerable significance, for economic relations 
and familial relations; the Abolition of Tenures Act 1660 
is a case in point, where class and patriarchy inseparably 
intertwine in a seamless web. These moments cannot be 
ignored. But it would be wrong to insist that each and every 
shift in the balance of forces, between husband and wife, 
parent and child, takes place in response to changes in the 
balances of forces between classes (functionalism in extremis),
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CHAPTER ONE: FAMILY STATUSES, PRE-1660
a. Husband and Wife
Before we consider more specifically the relationships 
between guardians and minors, an aside, a telling insight 
into the way the common law viewed the relationship between 
husband and wife. It explains much of the character of
how law anciently regarded the marital relation. It also
explains a great deal about the primacy of the father in 
relationship to other family members. From the notes and 
additions to Blackstone's Commentaries I , by Edward
*
Christianson, added in 1809, we find the following:
"Husband and wife, in the language of the law, 
are stiled baron and feme: the word baron, or 
lord attributes to the husband not a very
courteous superiority. But we might be inclined
to think this is merely an untechnical phrase, 
if we did not recollect, that if a baron kills 
his feme, it is the same as if he had killed a 
stranger, or any other person; but if the feme 
kills her baron, it is regarded by the laws as 
a much more atrocious crime; as she not only 
breaks through the restraints of humanity and 
conjugal affection, but throws off all subjection 
to the authority of her husband. And therefore 
the law denominates her crime as a species of 
treason, and condemns her to the same punishment 
as if she had killed the king. And for every 
species of treason, (though in petit treason the 
punishment of man was only to be drawn and hanged), 
till the (statute) of 30 Geo III C48, the sentence 
for women was to be drawn and burnt alive."
(Blackstone, Commentaries Vol. I.; 445, f.n. 23, 
my emphasis).
* For the reference to petty treason, I am grateful to
W. G. West of Ontario. One of his students. Sherry Gavigan,
is doing further research into the legal history of this 'offence'
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Petty treason, beautifully condenses the marital relation 
as seen in the common law; the enormity of the punishment 
celebrates the king-like superiority of the husband over 
his subject wife. A wife killing her husband transcends 
all the laws of god and man, offends against the natural 
order of things.
Without apology for the Foucault-like introduction, and his 
reference to Damiens the regicide (Discipline and Punish 
1977 ), petty treason usefully serves to introduce an 'ancien 
regime' in family law. 'Baron' and 'feme'; lord to serf.
These were not 'untechnical phrases' but meaningful legal 
terms with concrete effects and consequences. Familial 
relations are connoted in feudal terms; couverture, in return 
for services and obligations; holding of the lord, but in 
return for aids, reliefs, fines and the other incidents of 
feudal obligation. A wife is subject to the personal 
authority of the husband; killing him 'condemns her to the 
same punishment as if she had killed the king'. It was 
Blackstone himself who was to state, 'our (common) law in 
general considers man and wife one person', (Commentaries I; 
443) - that person being his. Likewise, children of the 
marriage entered the couverture of the patriarch, in much 
the same style of relationship and system of authority; 
subjects of his will and subject to it.
Petty treason speaks a relationship between husband and wife, 
and a relationship between the family and the state. Power 
is construed in terms of personal rights, duties and obli­
gations; between the king, greater and lesser nobles; between 
the husband, his wife and children. Good and stable government 
rests upon each knowing his or her claims and dues. The family 
is but a microcosm of the wider network of individuals owing 
allegiance to a person of superior status in the hierarchy.
The attitudes and values condensed in crime of petty treason
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may be feudal in character but not in time-span; it was 
an offence, on the books, from 1352-1790 (Pollock and 
Maitland II; 504: Blackstone I; 445 f.n.). Personal sub­
jection, vassal to lord, lord to king, wife to husband are 
founded in the doctrines of homage, fealty and liegeance 
(Pollock and Maitland I); 298-300). Vassalism demanded 
every man to owe faith to his lord of life or limb. To 
kill one's lord 'is compared to blasphemy against the Holy 
Ghost ; it is a crime to be punished by a death cruel enough 
to seem a fitting beginning for the torments of hell', (which 
originally meant flaying alive) (Pollock and Maitland I;300). 
Protecting the king against his lords, lords against vassals, 
husbands against wives by violent displays of judicial power 
tried to preserve notably the person of superior status but 
sought to protect the system itself and the system of power 
and authority imbricated within it. Individuals and the system 
were enveloped, held together by the same technique of control; 
verbal obligations backed by judicial terror. The same technique 
subjugated serf to lord, servant to master, wife to husband; 
the sublime revolt was petty treason.
Homage, fealty and liegance, the constitutionals of vassalism 
provide a first line of force; the second derives from the 
ecclesiastical control of marriage. 'When we ask', wrote 
R. Law, 'what the law of marriage was in England prior to the 
reformation, we shall find no answer in local constitutions, 
nor in the glosses of the English canonists, for the law was 
to be determined only by the Decretals, the codes of the lawyer- 
popes'(Law 1952;36). The rules of affinity and consanguinity 
(could you marry your first cousin, a deceased wife's sister?) 
derive from this source. And they in turn derived from an over­
literal reading of Genesis 2.24, 'Therefore shall a man leave 
his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and 
the twain shall be one flesh ', (quoted in Law op.cit.; 38, 
my emphasis).
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A third constituent of the family of the ancien regime, of 
signal importance to and ran in parallel with vassalism, was 
the material force of land-based wealth; the efforts to secure 
passage of estates 'down the line' provided the rules of 
legitimate issue as opposed to bastards, the degrees of con­
sanguinity, the testament - any power of the patriarch and 
the honoured position of the eldest male child (for an extended 
discussion, see Part 2 below). The relationship between the 
family and the estate; the need to preserve both the line and 
its hold on the estate provides our first insights into the 
complex rules of guardianship and of the particularity of 
paternal power as an aspect of patriarchy,
b. The nature of guardianship
While feudal law recognised ten different kinds of guardians,
'It had been thinking almost exclusively of infant heirs, and 
had left other infants to shift for themselves' (Pollock and 
Maitland II; 444). Fathers had absolute custody over infant 
heirs, but not their other children. Of heirs apparent, to have 
their custody was a 'profitable right'; their marriage could 
be sold. On the death of the father, his superior tenant 
profited both from the sale of wardship and marriage; but was 
under the obligation to protect his ward during the ward's 
infancy. A transmutation of the relationship between adult 
lord and adult vassal, profit in exchange for protection, along 
lines of age. Paternal power was made material in the exercise 
of the father's protection and his ability to 'sell' his heir 
apparent in marriage. Feudal law sanctioned both his right 
of the heir's person (his claim to protect) and his 'profitable 
right' to sell it in marriage, and protected this right as it 
would protect any other 'thing', against interlopers.
The temporal law did not seek to provide guardians for children 
without property, or at least provide them with any permanent 
guardian (Pollock and Maitland II; 444) . For those with 
property, the kind of property they were to inherit determined
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the character of the guardianship, its length and who might
stand as guardian. We can dispose immediately of illegitimate
children; being illegitimate they passed to the custody of the 
mother. Thus, they were formally denied membership of the 
putative father's family, any claim on his estate, and claim 
to his protection, though the courts could force his obligation 
to maintain his children born outside marriage. A brutal 
reminder of the sanctity of legal relations between the family 
and the estate.
Classification of the types of guardianship provides considerable 
problems. We speak here only of the kinds of guardianship 
generally applicable in the period we focus on. In his com­
mentaries of Littleton, for example. Coke notes:
"It is to be observed that in the laws of England,
there are three manners of guardianship; viz by
common law, statute law and by custom. By common 
law, there are four manner of guardians; viz guardian 
in chivalry, guardian by nature, as the father of 
the eldest son, guardian in socage and guardian in 
per cause nurture".
(quoted in Simpson 1875; 112).
We are chiefly concerned at this point with the common law 
definition, and the common law rules wherein lie the construction
of paternal power, only later to be confirmed by statute law
and equity. We refer here to definitions offered by Stephens 
(Commentaries Vol II 16th ed.; 1914;458-59) in matters relating 
to guardianship by nature, nurture and socage (who draws on 
cases and commentaries relating to the situation pre-1660).
In the last case, where the king is guardian above all guardians,
we refer to Pollock and Maitland II; 445):
"1. Guardianship by nature ; this is said to belong to the 
father in respect of the person of his heir apparent, or of 
his heiress presumptive; there being, properly speaking, no 
other kind of guardianship by nature than this. And the term
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'natural guardian', as applied to the father or mother 
with reference to all their children, is rather a popular 
than a technical mode of expression. For when a father's 
right to the person of a child who is not his heir apparent 
is intended, his guardianship is properly that next to be 
noticed. It has been doubted whether, since the abolition 
of tenures in chivalry, guardianship by nature can exist 
at all, in the strict sense of the term.
2. Guardianship for nurture - this is a species of guardianship 
that applies to all the children, extending to the person only. 
It belongs to the father, and, at his decease, to the mother; 
and it lasts both with males and females only to the age of 
fourteen. The two species of guardianship above described, 
a^ distinguished from the parental right to the control and 
custody of an infant child, appear to have no practical 
importance at the present day.
3. Guardianship in socage - this is a species of guardianship 
which extends to the estate as well as to the person; and it 
occurs only where the legal estate in lands held in socage 
descends upon an infant, in which case the guardianship devolves 
upon his next of blood to whom the inheritance cannot descend.
For though proximity of blood is a natural recommendation to 
the office of guardian, the law judges it improper to trust
the person of an infant in his hands, who may by possibility 
become the heir. Guardianship in socage, like that for nurture, 
continues only until the minor is fourteen years of age; except 
in the case of lands held in gavelkind, where the office lasts 
a year longer." (Stephens; 458-459).
4. Pater patriae - a doctrine acknowledging that the king 
should protect all who have no other protector, that he should 
be the guardian above all guardians (Pollock and Maitland II;445) 
His protection materialised in institution through the Courts of 
Wards and Liveries (to the profit of the monarch and those who 
administered wardship) and through the king's courts.
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c. Parents and Children
Paternal and parental power is founded in the rules on 
guardianship (Simpson op.cit; 3). Parents are guardians 
of their children by nature and nurture; it is the source 
of their rights, duties and obligations. But already we can 
see the subsumption of the mother, the construction of her 
lesser role as guardian. In law, the relationship between 
parents and children is founded in nature. In Blackstone 
we find it as the core principle; 'the establishment of 
marriage in all civilised states is built on the natural 
obligation of the father to provide for his children' 
(Commentaries I; 447). It is a principle of law that there 
is an obligation on every ma^ to provide for those descended 
from his loins (p. 448). A mother's duties and obligations 
it seems end with birthing. And, paradoxically, children 
seem to spring from loins and were not heaved out of wombs I
Here we have the discursive distinction between the 'natural' 
guardianship of parents (or de jure, the patriarchy) and other 
kinds of guardianship. Guardianship in chivalry and socage 
announces the absent father; a situation where children of 
property pass to the care of others. Heirs to military tenures 
fell under the control of superior lords, while guardians in 
socage came from the heir's mother's family. In short, guardians 
were chosen from those who had no chance of inheriting; the 
law protected wards against those who might be persuaded to kill 
them for the inheritance. Guardianship in socage was no more 
than an early form of the 'trust'. We may safely assume that 
the king s general superintending power as guardian over all 
guardians was exercised only in cases, where there was profit 
in it for the crown; a protection only exercised over children 
with property (Blackstone I; 461). But what did the parent- 
child relationship entail?
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'The power and reciprocal duty of guardian and ward are 
the same ... as those of a father and child', wrote Blackstone 
(Commentaries I; 462). For parents, these were the obligations 
to maintain, protect and educate their charges (Blackstone I;446) , 
at a level suitable to their station in life. But note, these 
were obligations falling on the father not the mother. Case 
law and commentary, when his supreme power was tested, confirmed 
his common law right as the sole possessor of the right to 
determine the kinds of social relationships his children may 
enter, enjoy or participate (e.g. R v de Manneville (1804)
5 East 221; R v Greenhill (1836) 4 Ad and E 624; Re Agar-Ellis 
(1883) 24 Ch. D. 317). Because the father was the sole guardian 
of the children and the sole possessor of obligations, he 
therefore gave absolute rights to the custody of his children.
One later commentator sums up the position:
"A court of common law can only have regard 
to the legal right of the father; it has no dis­
cretionary power to control the right of the father
in the exercise of his rights (except in extreme
cases).'
(Simpson 1875;129).
And this applied even if the father acted outrageously towards 
his wife and children. His rights to the custody and control 
of his children could be enforced either by habeus corpus (a 
common law writ) or by application to Chancery(Simpson ibid.).
A Mrs. East, for example, left her husband because of his 
extreme cruelty, taking with her the child of 8 months, whom 
she was still breast feeding. East broke into the house, 
kidnapped the baby and carried it away. The courts were 
powerless to intervene (see O. Stone 1977; 55 f.n.). Greenhill's 
(see above) adulterous behaviour and consorting with prostitutes 
was still not sufficient for the courts to refuse his application 
for custody (Stone ibid). By the same token, courts could and 
did, as late as the 19th century, return wives to the couverture 
of husbands after application to the courts (R v Leggatt (1852)
18 QBD 781).
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d. Patriarchal authority and the state 
The transformation of the obligations of guardianship 
into the rights to custody (of wives and children) illustrates 
the character and the security of the authority patriarchs 
wielded over family members, and which by extension could be 
exercised over other members of the household. His authority 
and his rights to custody, are founded in religious doctrine, 
his 'natural' right, and in common law rules, each working in 
a mutually supportive ideology, creating and maintaining 
that good government was consonant with the absolute exercise 
of paternal power. We cited here 19th century cases, but this 
amplifies how normal and natural, how commonsense 
and hegemonic the organising principles were; and their 
durability both in the law and in the family. Equity had 
yet not established its right to intervene and supersede 
paternal power.
Separately and together couverture and guardianship establish 
the patriarch's supremacy over the persons of other family 
members. But the same doctrines provide the foundation for 
his claim to the services of and the labour of his spouse 
and children. The non-personages of his wife and children 
deliver into his hands their property and wealth, for his 
use (if not ownership). Interconnecting authorities, which 
constitute his headship of the familial personal relations and 
his headships of economic relations into a single system.
A legal form not inappropriate in an economy on the one hand 
dominated by land based wealth, on the other where production 
is predominantly organised along the lines of family enter­
prises (Sachs and Hoff Wilson 1978 ). A legal form which sets 
down the relations of domination between lord and serf, 
patriarchs and other family members in a co-mingling of 
personal and economic subjugation.
Fundamentally, the monarchical state was prepared to leave 
the family well-alone in routine and mundane matters. To an 
extent the monarchy laid claim to its own legitimacy in and 
through the family; king was to subjects as father to son -
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superior all-powerful but with obligations to maintain, 
protect and if necessary chastise. But the state was not 
absent. How could it be when the king's judges actively 
supported the rules of the common law which subjected and 
subjectified husbands, wives, children and policed the 
powers of the father by allowing writs of habeus corpus, 
and offences like petty treason to stand as custodians of 
his status and will?
Statutory limitations on the father's exercise of his 
authority were few. He could award moderate chastisement 
to his wife and children (Blackstone I; 444), a dictum not 
formally overturned until 1891 (O. Stone op.cit; 55), but 
he could not be savage in the extreme by killing or maiming 
(unlike Roman law; see Blackstone I; 452). While the law 
makes no specific provision about the duties that children 
owed to parents, it did elaborate certain principles in common 
law. 'For to those who gave us existence we naturally owe, 
subjection, honour and reverence', wrote Stephens (Vol II; 448), 
echoing Blackstone. Moreover, the duty children owe to parents 
enables parents to more effectively fulfil their duties and 
obligations (Blackstone I; 452).
The paternal obligation to maintain however was primarily a 
moral obligation; the common law supplied no means of enforcing 
it (Stephens Vol II; 440). A deficiency, in legal parlance 
(see Stephens ibid) met in some measure by the Poor Relief Act 
1601 (43 Eliz. 02). However, the conditions of existence 
of the Poor Relief Act cannot be understood by legalistic 
explanations, nor what was at stake in that particular statute. 
Whereas common law principles supply us with a father's 
obligation to maintain, it does not describe why the poor in 
general needed relief, and why at this particular time the 
statute was enacted and whom it was designed to police. Most 
of all, it fails to apprehend the extent to which the state
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assumed the custody of children through the Poor Laws, 
at the expense of fathers. By statute, the general 
superintending power of the king was paralleled by an 
interventionist state - not replaced or transformed - 
through the Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601. In effect, the 
Poor Laws required church wardens and overseers of the 
poor to set to work wandering vagrant and delinquent 
children so by their labour they would provide for their 
own upkeep (Pinchbeck and Hewitt Vol I; 98). Children 
were apprenticed; training and work combined under some 
local master. The later statute (1601) provided that not 
only children, whose guardians could not be identified, but 
also children belonging to vagrants, the poor and the infirm 
who could not afford to support them, were to be taken into 
forced apprenticeship (ibid). Effective custody of the 
person,, rights to the products of a child's labour, and the 
obligation to maintain and educate children of the 
poor were thus transferred to agents of the state, via local 
magistrate. A significant shift in the development of 
guardianship and a significant moment in the development of 
the state exercising power to intervene in families.
Pinchbeck and Hewitt conclude,'in principle the state accepted, 
the responsibility for securing the proper treatment and 
training of children into Whose care the law entrusted them' 
(Vol I; 98). A liberal and generous reading. But it was also 
the means of managing a critical problem, a means of rounding 
up children who were dangerous; wandering, fending for them­
selves on the margins, dislocated from their allotted place in 
the system. These were children loosed from the familial 
setting, or children the family simply could not afford (see 
Dingwall, Eeklaar and Murray, 1983; Chap. 10). The state 
was as equally concerned with controlling as preserving the 
destitute child, to the extent that it was prepared to confront 
one of its own maxims, the sanctity of paternal power. Parish 
relief was to be a last resort; any relative was first obliged
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to assume custody of a destitute child. After that, the 
local authorities were prepared to delegate a willing master 
to stand in loco parentis, as if he were the guardian. A 
critical extension of guardianship, along class lines. The 
security of children in propertied and wage-earning families 
(where those wages were sufficient for a modicum of existence) 
still lay with the family.
It is worth noting that this was not an extension of the 
general superintending powers of pater patriae; the sovereign 
did not stand as the parent; that mantle he was assumed by agents 
of the state, a responsibility given to them by parliament.
We have so far tried to set out the field of effects of 
paternal power, sought to locate wives and children as objects 
of its operation. Lastly, we have noted a significant moment 
of its dissipation. Fathers were the natural guardians of 
minors; in their absence, other individuals acted in loco parentis 
as if they were fathers with the obligation to protect, maintain 
and educate their ward. Guardianship entailed custody of the 
person and control of a minor's property; claims set out protected 
in common law and (when necessary) in Chancery. Only statutory 
intervention provided the means for paternal power to be curtailed 
in respect of children and then only in the case where obligations 
were visibly not being met. We now turn to our second period, 
where the absolute powers of the father were seriously challenged 
by and through the courts, wherein Chancery sought to activate 
and make effective a general superintending power of the sovereign 
in doctrine of parens patriae.
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CHAPTER TWO: PARENS PATRIAE AND FAMILY PATRIARCHS, 1660-1839
1. Statutory Guardianship
"The undoubted law of this country (is) that the father
is entitled to the sole custody of his infant child"(Sir. G.
Turner 1839). R C Halliday 17 Jur 56.
That where any person hath or shall have any 
child or children under the age of one and 
twenty years, and not married at the time of 
his death, that it shall and may be lawful and 
the father of such child or children, whether 
born at the time of the decease of the father, 
or at the time in ventre sa mere, or whether 
such father may be in the age of one and twenty 
years, or of full age, by his deed executed in 
his life time, or by his last will and testament 
in writing ... to dispose of the custody of such 
child or children for such a time as he or they 
shall respectively remain under the age of one 
and twenty years
Abolition of Tenures Act 1660 
12 Car. II C. 24
The Abolition of Tenures Act manifestly expanded a father's 
custodial power over his children, beyond the powers he 
previously held in common law. In the absence of any reference 
to a mother's claim in the statute, not only was he statutorily 
granted sole custody, but the time-span in which his children 
remained 'his' was considerably expanded.
Firstly, with the abolition of feudal tenures and all the 
incidents and obligations pertaining to it, guardianship in 
chivalry and socage was subsumed by the father's status as sole
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guardian. This was to extend until the age of 21, not as 
previously, where boys at 14 and girls of 16 could move out 
of wardship, and in limited circumstances appoint their own 
guardians
Secondly, not only was the mother excluded from custody, but 
the father could 'dispose of the custody of such child or 
children' after his death, to testamentary guardians, whose 
custody was as absolute as his, to the exclusion of the mother. 
Even her common law right to act as 'guardian by nurture' was 
exterminated (Bromley 1976; 306). Testamentary guardians were 
therefore free to determine the kind of education, religious 
instruction and religious affiliation their charges were to 
receive, and had the power to remove children from their 
mother's household and control if they believed their charges 
were in some kind of moral danger.
So all-embracing was the statute in matters of a father's right 
to custody, that as late as 1883, a case report noted:
'A father has a legal right to control and 
direct the education and bringing up of his 
children until they reach the age of 21, even 
though they are wards of court, and the court 
will not interfere with him in the exercise of 
his paternal authority, except where,by his gross 
moral turpitude, he forfeits his rights, where he 
has by his conduct abdicated his paternal authority, 
where he seeks to remove his children being wards 
of court, out of the jurisdiction without the 
consent of the court.'
(Re Agar-Ellis 24 Ch.D (1883); 317)
Agar-Ellis was only one in a long series of cases which
challenged the absolute authority of the patriarch. But case
law had a dual effect. On the one hand, case law nibbled at
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the edges of paternal authority, on the other, considerably 
amplified the father's natural right to control all aspects 
of a child's upbringing at the expense of the mother. A curious 
paradox perhaps, but it was through case law that Chancery elab­
orated its own grounds for judicially interfering with paternal 
power, while at the same time, upholding a father's claims 
to custody over and above that of the mother, and privileging 
paternal authority at the expense of a doctrine of 'the welfare 
of the child'.
As an illustration of the material effects of installation of 
statutory guardianship, we can refer here to a Chancery case 
(Eyre vs Countess of Shaftesbury, ALL E.R. (1558-1774) REP;129) 
heard in 1722.
The Earl of Shaftesbury appointed three testamentary guardians, 
who on his death were jointly to oversee the upbringing of his 
heir. At the time the case was heard, the Earl had died, as 
had two of the appointed guardians. The infant Earl , then 12, 
was living with his mother, but having Mr. Justice Eyre as the 
sole remaining guardian. Eyre was concerned that the infant 
heir had no regular tutor and furthermore, was consorting with 
'gentlemen ' attendants he thought unfit. Accordingly, he 
'petitioned that he as sole guardian, might have the ordering 
as he thinks proper of such governor, gentleman and other 
servants to attend the infant heir and that the person of the 
infant earl might be delivered over to him (the petitioner)'
(130). Lord Macclesfield (then Lord Chancellor) presiding, 
acknowledged that the father had the statutory right to dispose 
of the guardianship of his child until the age of 21, and his 
choice of guardian is binding until the guardian did something 
wrong. He concurred that the tutor, a Dr. Stubbs, 'Though (he) 
may be a good, learned, and pious man, yet he may not be so 
fit to attend the young Earl to all places, for instance to 
Court, places of exercise and diversion, etc., at which it may 
be proper for his lordship to appear (130) '. Eyre made it
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plain he did not want the boy to go to public school, but 
to move into the guardian's household. In the event, Macclesfield 
L.C. ordered Stubbs to be dismissed, but the Earl was to continue 
to live at home with his mother, though Eyre was to remain as 
guardian, in spite of the mother having personal, physical 
custody. A point brought forcefully home at a later date.
In March 1724, the Earl's mother married him off to the 
daughter of the Countess of Gainsborough, without Eyre's (the 
guardian) consent. The young Earl was 14. Accordingly, the 
case was brought to court, the Earl's mother being charged 
with 'ravishment of an heir' and marriage of an infant ward 
without the consent of his legal guardian, charges which 
carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment I
The court decided that the marriage was not of a 'disparaging 
kind' (the young Earl's wife after all was of the nobility), 
the financial settlement was adequate (though the court 
entertained the idea that his marriage portion might have been 
even better had he married later), and it recognised the 
marriage could not be rescinded (i.e. all legal formalitites 
were properly observed vis a vis the ceremony). This left the 
problem of the guardian's consent, which, Eyre being a testa­
mentary guardian, ought to have been sought. They acknowledge 
the mother's guardianship by nature and for nurture, but it is 
inferior to the claims of a testamentary guardian, but because 
she is a 'guardian' (however tenuous that claim might be) a 
charge of ravishment could hardly be brought against the mother 
of an heir. The marriage was allowed to stand, but, Eyre was 
to remain as guardian until the infant Earl attained his 
majority.
Apart from the immediate and interesting details of the case, 
it usefully displays some of the legal rules constituting the 
discourse of guardianship and custody.
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1. Notably, this case was heard in Chancery, signifying 
a considerable shift away from the common law rules which 
formerly provided the basis of familial legal relations.
How it was that Chancery assumed the mantle of arbitration 
in guardianship and wardship will be dealt with extensively 
below.
2. Nevertheless, this case, as did other Chancery cases of 
the 18th and 19th centuries, affirmed paternal power, by 
recognising testamentary guardianship as a continuation of 
paternal authority
3. In matters of custody, mothers even after the death of 
the husband were legally inferior to testamentary guardians. 
Consider the situation for example, where Eyre's claims to 
direct the education and general upbringing of the infant 
Earl merited the dismissal of a tutor chosen by the mother. 
Moreover, his claim to be regarded as the proper authority
in the choice of marriage partner was not over-turned (although 
the dowager's strategy of a quick and early marriage, de facto 
defeated his rule, even though de jure his authority remained 
in tact).
4. More interestingly, the case asserted a new principle, 
that wardship was to continue for males anyway, until majority, 
regardless of whether he was married or not. Female wardship 
however terminated on marriage (Mendes v Mendes (1748) 1 Ves. 
Sen. 89) .
5. Finally, the case is an early example of how the 'modern' 
law of custody worked its way through. 'Modern' in the sense 
that the accent is on the nature of personal and physical care, 
to be offered to children, be they children in the custody of 
natural parents, wards to testamentary guardians, or wards of 
court delegated the personal authority of guardians appointed
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by the High Court, Therefore, unlike the earlier conception 
of custody given through wardship and guardianship, which 
primarily regarded the person of ward as a personification 
of an estate which had to be protected. 'Custody' writes 
Bevan (1973) 'is an ambiguous term'. In its primary sense 
it means the right to physical care and control; it is the 
correlative of the duty to protect. But in its wider meaning 
it represents "the whole bundle of rights and powers vested 
in a parent or guardian" (p. 265. See also Bromley 1976;
304-311). While Eyre asked the Courts to enforce his rights 
to control the education and the marriage of his ward, the 
character of the custodial relation between parent and child, 
guardian and ward, was manifestly shaped through disputes 
as to whether a child was receiving a religious upbringing 
(Shelley vs Westbrook (1817) 2 Jac 226), whether a child might 
be corrupted by association with profligate and immoral parents 
or guardians (Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1, and 
Re Besant (1879) 11 Chan. D. 508 C.A.) and, disputes about which 
religious affiliation children should be raised to (Hawksworth 
V Hawksworth (1871) 6 Ch. App 539, Andrews v Salt (1873) 8 Ch. 
App. 622).
Custody, that bundle of powers and rights vested in parents 
or guardians, ties in adults and children into a particular 
form of social relationship, profoundly familial. But custody 
constitutes the similarity of the legal forms of parenthood, 
guardianship and wardship. The 'bundle of rights and powers' 
attributed to parent, guardian and the courts with wardship 
jurisdiction are broadly similar (involving obligations to 
maintain, educate and provide moral welfare to infants and 
minors). An effect of this is the transferability of these 
powers and obligations (e.g. under the doctrine of loco parentis) 
This means that other persons can stand as parents, to children 
who are not their own. However, because parents and guardians 
(and latterly foster parents, local authority institutions)
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are viewed as broadly similar in the powers and obligations 
they are expected to exercise, it also confers on them an 
element of comparability, to the extent that one kind of 
custody can be measured against another. The transferability 
and comparability of custody has important implications we 
shall develop below.
We mentioned earlier that the more recent law on custodial 
relations 'accented' personal and physical care. We must 
emphasise that it is an accent; the earlier notion of custody 
working along personal care and protection of property, never 
entirely disappeared. The extent to which families and courts 
sought to protect younger family members, and by extension, 
control them, (and familial goods) is displayed through the 
use of wardship proceedings. So while courts were settling 
cases concerning the personal and moral welfare of children, 
at the same time. Chancery asserted in a series of cases 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, that marriage of wards 
without the consent of the court is contempt (Halsbury, Laws 
Vol 24, para 600; 271). Cases such as Eyre v Countess of 
Shaftesbury (above). Long v Elways (1729) Mos 249, Brandon v 
Knight (1752) 1 Dick 160, Harford v Morris (1776) 2 Hag. Con. 
423, Wade v Broughton (1814) 3 Ves and B 172, reflect and 
encourage the strategy of making recalcitrant children wards 
of court to prevent unwanted marriages (singularly necessary 
prior to Hardwicke's 1753 Act). By this procedure, the 
patriarch or his testamentary appointee, remained able to 
assert his authority, but simultaneously, it constitutes his 
power, however latent, to control the marriage destinies of 
his children. And here we return to the principles of the 
common laws, where the welfare of the minor is identical 
to the obedience owed to the patriarch, where the 'natural' 
love, affection and authority of the father is the best 
guarantee of the child's well being.
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Taken together, the common law's view of the husband's 
primacy in the marital relation and his statutory attribute 
as sole custodian and solely able to appoint testamentary 
guardians fundamentally excludes mothers as legal personages 
within the family. It is against this background that we 
now consider the measures resorted to in and through the 
equity courts to overcome manifest absurdities and injustices 
that common law and statute put on married women with children.
2. Equity's jurisdiction over infants
Our narrative purpose here is straightforward; to establish 
the partial demise of a father's common law right to the 
asbolute custody of his children and the development of equity's 
jurisdiction to intervene between parent and child. Unfor­
tunately, we are attempting to address a" field of law judges 
and legal commentators are prepared to leave well alone I 
Chambers (1842) in his discussion of the jurisdiction of the 
high courts of Chancery over the property and persons of 
infants, admits that the origin of Chancery's jurisdiction 
is obscure, but undoubtedly now exists. Jurists ancient and 
modern speak of Chancery's 'perogative power', derived from 
the Crown 'to interfere to protect any person within the 
jurisdiction' (Bromley, op.cit; 298), or its 'inherent 
guardianship jurisdiction' (Halsbury, Laws ... Vol 24, para 
527); while at an earlier date Macpherson (1842) notes that 
Chancery exercises a jurisdiction over infants though where 
its 'jurisdiction came from is difficult to state and not 
of ancient origin (Macpherson; 95-99).
The synthesis of the decline of a father's common law status 
and the increasing power of equity's jurisdiction over infants 
is writ large over numerous cases and commentaries. In tracing 
out the connections between these two themes there is, in-
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herently a mapping of a intra-legal struggle between 
the common law's and equity's image of familial relations.
A complicated exercise, but worthwhile because it is 
revealing of:
a) the ways in which judge-made law is a creative process 
in spite of 'declaratory theory' (see Roshier and Jeff 1980) 
which asserted that judges merely 'interpreted' or 'discovered' 
already existing legal rules and principles.
b) an aspect of how legal rules emerge through intra- 
legal struggles, which receives little attention, namely in 
the field of family law.
c) the state asserting its claim to be the wise and supreme 
parent of all children.
As a guide through the thicket of technical exposition below, 
let us counterpose common law views of the relationship 
between parent and child and equity's framework of reference.
Simply put, the common law recognised the natural duty of 
protecting, educating and maintaining one's legitimate 
infants. These duties could really only be performed if a 
parent had custody of the child's person, a duty it put 
upon fathers (see Bromley op.cit; 298). Bromley adds, it 
should not be surprising that the correlative of duty was 
^ ^ight to custody, absolute even against the mother except 
in very rare cases (ibid).
Equity gradually acquired through the 18th and 19th 
centuries the power to intervene between parent and child 
to the extent that Chancery, while leaving untouched the 
duties of parents (set down in common law), circumscribed
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the near-unlimited rights granted to them in common law, 
(Bromley; 299). The limit position in Chancery was its 
right to remove a child from a natural father (e.g.
Shelley v Westbrook 1817). So while equity shared 
something of the common law's elaboration of familial 
relations, in respect of the father's absolute authority, 
its views are antithetical . On what basis then did it 
deconstruct the common law rights of the father and elaborate 
its own authority in and over family matters?
a. Pater patriae
With good reason, legal commentators note that equity 
has a jurisdiction over infants, but they rarely trace out 
its emergence. One commentator was a little more precise.
"In the year 1696, the year before Lord 
Somers took the seals, is the first instance 
to be found of a guardian appointed by the 
Chancellor on petition without bill; and 
since that time the power has been exercised 
unquestioned; though not quite without dispute 
(Chambers 1842; 2).
The case referred to is probably Bertie v Falkland (1696)
2 Vern 342 where Lord Somers argues that
"... there were several things which belonged 
to the king as pater patriae and fell, there­
fore under the care of the court, as infants, 
idiots and lunatics; and though afterwards 
such of them as were of profit and advantage 
to the king were removed to the Court of Wards 
by statute (12 H.8 C.l), yet upon the dissolution 
of that Court they came back to Chancery". 
(Chambers ; 2).
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Somers' judgement here can be used to illustrate the 
character and history of equity's jurisdiction; we can 
present these summarily:
1. It is a jurisdiction derived from the Crown; not 
from statute, not by custom. Quite how the Crown handed 
over care of infants to equity is not clear.
2. It is a protective jurisdiction, applicable to those 
who could not defend themselves (the legal non-persons, such 
as idiots, lunatics and infants) and by extension, who had 
no-one else to protect them. Note here this does not include 
married women (who were under the couverture of their husband, 
but who in law shared much with other non-persons). Children 
with fathers 'naturally' had guardians.
3. The Court in 1696 assumed the power to appoint guardians; 
a radical departure insofar as guardianship previously had 
been assumed under common law rules (by nature, for nurture 
etc.) and by statute (testamentary guardians), thereby 
writing into law guardianship by Appointment of the High 
Court, (Stephens Vol. 3;46). This alone is sufficient 
evidence already of the Court moving in the direction of 
assuming powers which were previously construed as familial.
4. Somers' reference to Chancery in relationship to and
a successor to the Court of Wards (see above) interestingly 
displays the Court constituting its own 'history'. A history 
taken up by Blackstone (Commentaries Vol. 3; 426) as an 
explanation of the expansion of Chancery's jurisdiction, 
and running through various judicial statements (Lord Eldon 
in Wellesley v Beaumont (2 Russ 1) to modern texts such as 
Bromley (1976; 298), and Halsbury (Laws Vol. 24; para 527).
But in Halsbury for example, the history is of no consequence; 
equity's jurisdiction in matters of guardianship, wardship.
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custody, parental obligations and so on is rendered as 
'inherent'.
5. But contained in its rendering of its own origins. 
Chancery acknowledges an inherent cleavage; between the 
protection it extends to children 'as were of profit and 
advantage' (infant tenants, whose estates had to be 
protected, by the king as superior tenant, and later by 
the Court of Wards) and, the persons of all infants who 
had no one else to protect them.
6. In its practice. Chancery, through to 1839, looked 
only to the interests of infants with property, but simul­
taneously it asserted its more general superintending power 
over all infants (but declaring it had not the means of 
actually doing sol). Thus we find Eldon arguing;
"In answer to an observation that the 
(Chancery) Court never exercised that 
jurisdiction unless where there was 
property belonging to an infant, he 
remarks that the question had hardly 
been sufficiently attended to; but that 
the reason that the Court did not act in 
such a case as that, was not from the any 
want of jurisdiction, but from a means to 
exercise it ... because it cannot take upon 
itself the maintenance of all children of 
the kingdom.'
(Wellesley vs Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1, 
my emphasis).
So while it presents itself as the direct successor to the 
Court of Wards, which explains its limited practice, the 
jurisdiction it claims as pater patriae, as if it acted 
as the Sovereign would act, remains unclear and unaddressed
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7. Through the use of pater patriae equity reveals one 
of its unspoken conditions of existence; the political 
doctrine of the divine right of kings, where subjects were 
looked upon as though they were children of the monarch.
It is precisely this doctrine, enshrined within equity 
principles, which provided an almost unlimited jurisdiction 
over those who could not protect themselves and without 
protectors. But, entailed in that doctrine, is a profound 
patriarchalism and an inherent paternalism. For it constitutes 
the political relationship between monarch and commoners,
as Sovereign and subjects, wherein subjects are always 
already fundamentally subordinate to kingly power. In simple 
terms, father always knows best. Pater patriae is at best 
'a single basis of obligation', combining 'the law of nature, 
Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and the patriarchalism of 
the Fifth Commandment (Schochet; 19 75;91).
8. By assuming the mantle of pater patriae. Chancery 
submits all subjects to its judicial gaze and authority, 
not only the child and the mad. While in practice it 
accepted only cases concerning infants with property, it 
held fast to its moral authority over all infants. And in 
this judicial guise it was prepared to-'appoint guardians, 
exercise its power to provide suitable custody for all 
children, if necessary at the expense of the claims of 
natural guardians.
b. Parens patriae; the Courts vs. paternal power
However tenuous it claims were to stand as pater patriae, 
successive cases in the 18th and 19th centuries served its 
cause in two ways. Only rarely did counsel ever question 
the nature of equity's jurisdiction in matters of guardian­
ship and custody. Moreover, as in Bertie v. Falkland, 
Shaftesbury v Shaftesbury (2 P Wms 102), Butler v Freeman 
1756 (Ambl. 303), judges in Chancery continually asserted 
their assumptions of crown perogative, reinforcing and 
amplifying their courts jurisdiction over all minors. Here
- 423“
we point to the salience of case law in Chancery, both 
creating and maintaining the superior claims of courts 
over all children and all adults to whose care they were 
entrusted.
The elision of pater patriae into thé more recent and 
common usage of Chancery taking its commission from the 
King as parens patriae is of uncertain date. The earliest 
case law we can find is Wellesley v Beaufort (1827) where 
Lord Eldon, ruminating in the origins of Chancery jurisdiction, 
mentions the phrase.
The substitution is of little moment, whether parens or 
pater patriae (father or parent), the effect of the 
jurisdiction remained the same.
It cannot be argued at this point that Chancery here was 
striking decisive blows against the absolute right to 
custody that the common law bestowed on the father, in 
favour of the mother. It was not. Chancery case law did
establish, nor did it argue for, a mother's right - natural, 
legal or otherwise - to the custody of children. The only 
claim it established was the right of Chancery against all 
other guardians, and, established the ground rules for 
removing minors from the custody of fathers. But this was 
not necessarily to the benefit of mothers.
In general, fathers had to display fairly spectacular 
behaviour to be deemed to be 'unfitness of character and 
conduct' so the Court would act. Cruelty, debt, immorality 
(drunkeness, dissipation, criminal assault on children), 
lack of religious principles, 'unfitness in external cir­
cumstances' (poverty plus bad character, robbing or 
spending an infant's benefit), or moving out of the country 
(out of the jurisdiction of Chancery) were considered sufficient 
conditions for the Courts to interfere with the custodial rights
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of the father (Simpson 1875; 138-145). Where these 
conditions were met. Chancery could declare its interest 
(providing the infant had substantial means), and make 
the child a ward of court. It may allow a child to stay 
in the care and control of a mother, but it was not bound 
to do so and mothers had no necessary prior right over 
other guardians, albeit in the absence of either testamentary 
or court appointed guardians equity continued to regard her 
as 'guardian for nurture' until the infant reached the age 
of 14.
The problem for equity, and problems faced by married women 
seeking care and control of their children, and the limits 
of action equity courts and married women encountered, arose 
still from the actions that fathers had through the common 
law courts. He could apply for a writ of habeas corpus 
for the return of his children to his custody, and in spite 
of drunkenness, criminal behaviour or adulterous behaviour, 
the common law courts (regarding children as a father's 
possession) would issue writs for the return of 'his' children 
as it would for any other 'thing' (see Pettit 1957; 60-64).
And the common law's principle of the primacy of paternal 
right was reproduced to a significant extent, in Chancery, 
thus the fairly outrageous conditions which had to be ful­
filled before those courts would interfere with paternal 
custodial powers.
Yet the common law had, by the logic of its own rules concer­
ning the discretion of infants, a seemingly more liberal side. 
Boys and girls over the age of discretion (fixed at 14 for 
boys, 16 for girls - these ages being absolute, and not 
being subject to tests of competence) were actually able to 
contest their father's writs of habeas corpus (Pettit op.cit. 
61). Habeas corpus was a general writ against illegal 
restraint; variously it could be used by individuals against
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the state, but equally it was a tool of familial power 
politics. Two illustrative examples of its operation 
are R. v Clarkson (1721) 1 Strange K.B. and R. v Delaval 
(1763) 3 Burr 14.
In R. V Clarkson, the King's Bench considered an application 
by one Dibley, that the guardians of a Mrs. Turberville (a 
woman of fortune) return Mrs. Turberville to him; he alleges 
a marriage between himself and the young woman (Mrs. Turber­
ville apparently was still at school). The Court asked 
Mrs. Turberville did she want to go with Dibley, to which 
she replied no. The Court ruled that it would not order her 
to do so; their interest lay in whether she was being illegally 
restrained by her guardians. As a further measure, they 
ordered tipstaffs to guard her, but at the same time, informed 
the guardians that she may go where she pleases, as they have 
no right to restrain her beyond her will.
R. V Delaval concerned a young woman aged 18, brought to 
court on writ of habeas corpus by her father. At 15, the 
said young woman was indentured to a Mr. Bates, to learn 
music. By the age of 17, she had become quite successful 
earning some income for Bates. In that year she met and 
was seduced by Sir Francis Delaval, who later indentured her 
as an apprentice, again to learn music. The father alleged, 
and the court agreed, that the master-servant relationship 
hid the real nature of the association and that the young 
woman was probably Delaval's mistress. The court ruled 
however that in the case of habeas corpus each application 
had to be taken on its merits ; the young woman had shown no 
wish to leave, she was not being illegally restrained and 
so the father's application for custody fell.
While there are numerous sub-texts in each of these cases, 
they stand in striking contrast to the nature of equity's 
jurisdiction. Whereas Chancery generally sustained the
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daims of parents and guardians over the care and control 
of infants, up to the age of majority (its protective side 
of its jurisdiction), common law courts granted considerable 
autonomy, displayed above, to infants merely over the age 
of discretion. While equity generally considered the 
material aspects of the child's circumstances (did the infant 
have property) at common law, this was not a condition the 
courts had to countenance. However, in practice, for an infant 
autonomously to go before the law, we must assume that they 
have the material and symbolic means of doing so, and at the 
same time had a guardian ad litem to sue their cause. Not, 
we should add, conditions which would ensure wide applicabilityI 
More generally, beyond the age of discretion, the common law 
appears to build into the custodial relationship an element 
of consent; where infants withdrew it or where it was unreason­
ably suspended such that freedom of movement was impaired, 
then the courts would entertain a plea of illegal restraint.
As far as we know, there is no evidence of a flood of writs 
by children charging parents with illegal restraint however, 
then or nowI
Within the manifest tensions between common law and equity's 
views of the custodial relation, the married woman remained 
still a legal non-entity. Nothing accrued to her from the 
marital relation vis a vis her children. Her motherhood of 
itself only generated her status as guardian for nurture, 
a status lesser in standing than testamentary, paternally 
appointed or court appointed guardians. As against her 
husband, her separate claims to custody were non-existent in 
marriage and only on par with other guardians, when separated 
and less than paternally appointed guardians, as a widow.
The decisive shift towards establishing a married woman's 
right to the custody of her children (as opposed to merely 
elaborating Chancery's claim to curtail the custodial 
powers of fathers) came by way of legislative initiative.
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3. Statute law and family relations
The Infants Custody Act 1839 (2 and 3 Viet. 54) broke 
with the traditional view of common law and equity courts, 
where any alteration to paternal power was tantamount to 
an attack on the institution of the family. On the altar 
of 'the family' the courts were time and again prepared to 
sacrifice the rights of mothers (Pinchbeck and Hewitt; II;
374).
It is unfashionable to view pieces of legislation as having 
particular 'authors', personalising history as it were, but 
the social history of the Infants Custody Act prominently 
features the activities of Mrs. Caroline Norton (see 
Holcombe 1983; 50-58: Pinchbeck and Hewitt II; 368-378) and 
her parliamentary ally Serjeant Thomas Noon Talfourd.
Mrs. Norton was the grand daughter of Richard Brinsley 
Sheridan, dramatist and Whig statesman. She and her two 
sisters were known as the 'three Graces' of London society 
in the mid and late 1820's, but her gifts as hostess and 
socialite apart, she established herself as poet, and 
dramatist and edited several fashionable women's journals 
and gift annuals. She married Norton in 1827, the heir of 
Lord Grantley. Norton had recently been elected to the House 
of Commons, and a lawyer by training .He had however little 
income though great expectations (Holcombe op.cit; 51), thus 
Mrs. Norton's continued literary productivity after their 
marriage. The marriage did not go well; her literary and 
salon circle standing in contrast to Norton and his associates.
In 1836 Norton abducted their three small sons and hid them 
away; he appropriated all her personal effects (jewellery etc.) 
which were legally hers, and initiated an action for 'criminal 
conversation' against Lord Melbourne (then Prime Minister), 
thus bringing an action against him for adultery with Mrs. 
Norton.
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The case against Melbourne was ignominously thrown out of 
court, but it left Mrs. Norton in 'no-woman's land'
(Holcombe; 53), separated with no recourse to divorce and 
without rights of access to her children.
Her riposte was a pamphlet 'The Natural Claim of a Mother 
to the Custody of Her Children as Affected by the Common 
Law Right of the Father, which she published in 1837.
This pamphlet, the circumstances of the case itself (society 
hostess, abduction of children), other anonymously published 
pamphlets, and the support of two legal friends. Lord Lyndhurst 
(a former Lord Chancellor) and Talfourd (a common lawyer ) made 
the Norton affair a cause celebre.
Talfourd was an unlikely ally on the face of it and an 
unlikely sponsor of two bills supporting a married woman's 
right to access and to custody of her children. Earlier in 
his career he had acted as counsel for Mr. Greenhill (see 
above) in a case which confirmed a father's claim to be sole 
custodian of children in marriage.
Reaction to Mrs. Norton's pamphlet and her letters to the 
newspapers, and the debates on the bills concerning infant 
custody were acrimonious. While the opposition invoked the 
possible dangers to the well-being of children likely to 
arise from contested custody. Pinchbeck and Hewitt perceptively 
note a sub-text to the argument. What the opposition most 
feared was the effect that proposed custody arrangements 
might have on the stability of marriage (p. 375). A tacit 
recognition that paternal custody was a means of exercising 
emotional and moral blackmail over married women; leave me 
and you will never see the children again. Talfourd's bills 
were thus represented as a subtle means of easing the process 
of husbands and wives separating, rather than a measure to 
ease the distress and legal plight of married women. For 
those advocating the passage of infant custody legislation
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their strongest suit lay in the comparison between mothers 
of illegitimate children who were allowed to retain custody 
and married women who had no claim whatsoever.
The nature of the compromise between both positions is 
inherent in the provisions of the 1839 Act. Most notable 
of the provisions were:
a. Where children were in the care and control of a father, 
his delegated or testamentary guardian, the mother could 
apply through Chancery for some relief, if the child was 
under the age of seven, but the Court's judgement was to
be. discretionary.
b. Mothers could apply to the same Court for rights of 
access at specified times.
c. But no woman was to benefit from this legislation if
she was guilty of adultery, proved either in the ecclesiastical 
courts or at common law (where the offence was 'criminal 
conversation').
In effect, the provisions offer only minimal custodial 
rights to mothers. Pinchbeck and Hewitt note: 'Under the 
Act the practice of the courts was to decide if possible 
in favour of paternal right rather than against it, and to 
exercise discretion against the mother even as to young 
children' (II;376). There had to be stout evidence against 
the. father before the courts granted even the minimal 
privileges allowed for under the Act.
More interestingly, we find a particular construction 
of motherhood embedded within these provisions. Firstly 
a mother's nurturing role ends at seven. Mothers therefore 
have a useful role in the upbringing of babes and very young 
children, which ends somehow when the serious business of 
life begins, at the ecclesiastical age of reason. Mother's
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place is construed here predominantly as child-minder, 
providing day care for nursing and developing children 
but with no real responsibilities when children encounter 
the world as rational beings. Secondly, the punitive 
provisions of the Act, manifest in the limitations it 
places on adulterous women, begin to forge the ideology 
of 'the fit mother' (Smart 1982;134). By statute, wives 
had not only to make a strong case against improvident 
or cruel husbands but themselves be beyond moral repute, 
simply to go before the courts, let alone have any guarantee 
of custody. What is beginning to emerge, through case law 
in Chancery setting limits to the kind of behaviour patriarchs 
could indulge in before the court intercedes and remove 
children from the governance Of the father, and, through 
statute in the case of the adulterous married woman, is the 
moralisation and regulation by the courts of the custodial 
relationship between each spouse and their children. Effec­
tively, case law and statute are elaborating a custodial rela­
tion between parent and child, which is somehow to be untainted 
and non-polluting. Though we are not at a point in time yet 
where either the courts or parliament begin to establish 
a coherent doctrine about 'the interests of the child', never­
theless we can see the glimmerings of such a doctrine exhibited 
through the court's concerns with the moral rectitude of a 
child's parents. Parenthood per se was no longer a simply 
natural duty, but a moral relationship as well, over which 
the state, through the courts had now the power to arbitrate.
It is difficult to say at this point how extensive the 
general superintending power of Chancery was after the 1839 
Act. Provisionally, we can say that all married women 
had obtained some relief from the absolute rights that fathers 
had over their children. In practice, such cases had to go 
before Chancery, an extremely expensive form of proceeding.
We know of no case where legal parties were not of substantial
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financial means, as our previous citations indicate.
In effect, we are mapping the legal regulation of aristocratic 
and bourgeois families, rather than a straight forward 
imposition of the bourgeois norms on the social formation 
in general.
However, if we see the Infant Custody Act, in a continuum 
with the Poor Laws Act of 183 4 (including the Bastardy clauses), 
the Factory Acts, and the Infant Felons Act of 1840 (providing 
Chancery with the powers to remove any infant out of the 
control of his parent and assign custody elsewhere - usually 
to a philanthropic organisation) then we begin to appreciate 
the extent to which the state, through the judiciary, poor 
law officers, magistrates, factory inspectors and philanthropic 
societies, was beginning to intervene in and regulate parent- 
child relations.
Of the 183 9 Act we can make the following summary points:
1. The Act did not fundamentally disturb a father's prior 
claim to be the sole custodian of his children in marriage; 
the marital relation conferred on him that sole custody.
To this extent the old common law rules pertained.
2. The statute granted Chancery discretionary powers to 
award custody to married women, under certain conditions 
(the age of the child, moral purity) which was a radical 
break from past practice, where a married woman had no 
formal claim at all, against the husband or his appointed 
guardians. Nevertheless, mothers had no superior rights 
over appointed guardians, they had to apply for relief and 
be subject to the morality test.
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3. Chancery's jurisdiction over families in general and 
in matters of parent-child relationships was considerably 
extended, at the expense of common law's dogged deference 
to paternal rights in matters of custody.
4. The Act, however, extended Chancery's considerable 
power (established in case law, against fathers) to award 
custody on the basis of the moral rectitude of the parents 
bringing a case to court.
5. By extension, though children had no say in custody 
proceedings, and though the courts and legislature had not 
yet developed any coherent doctrine concerning 'the welfare' 
or 'best interests' of the child, clearly such a doctrine 
was implied in the qualification of a parent's 'natural' 
right to custody through the imposition of a test of moral 
behaviour. For, what case law (in the case of fathers) and 
statute (in the case of mothers) were beginning to establish 
was the notion of 'the fit parent'.
The last point is of significance, for other commentators 
have ignored the case law which preceded the Infant Custody 
Act and have somewhat overemphasised and misread its signifi­
cance. Two illustrative examples. Pinchbeck and Hewitt note 
that 'the innovation; the absolute right of the father was 
now subject to the discretionary power of the judge' (II; 376) 
Well, the Act certainly extended Chancery judges' discretion, 
but. at the same time from the middle of the 18th century, 
those judges had elaborated the conditions which were 
sufficient for them to deny a father his custodial rights 
(broadly, 'gross moral turpitude '). Secondly, they claim 
the Act was 'the first statutory intervention in the common 
law rights of the father' (ibid). Not quite; the Elizabethan 
vagrancy laws (mentioned previously) had precisely the same 
effect, but in cases where fathers could not afford to support
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his children. Whereas Pinchbeck and Hewitt have tended 
to overemphasise the Act's significance, Carol Smart's 
illuminating essays on family law (1981, 1982, 1984) tend 
to interpret the Act in terms of the law's process of 
'creating greater penalties for the so-called unfit 
mother' without acknowledging the legal process (through case 
law) setting (albeit less stringent) limits to a father's 
conduct towards his children. Indeed an element in the 
development of parens patriae concerned Chancery's claim 
to assert its authority over all parents, not just mothers.
As we have suggested. Chancery asserted its own interest 
in all children, independently of all fathers and all mothers, 
not on behalf of one or the other, and this meant establishing 
some boundaries to any father's claim to custody. In the 
last analysis, the Infant Custody Act was probably more 
beneficial to the separate interests of Chancery judges, 
than it was to mothers involved in cases of contested custody. 
For the Act gave those judges considerably more formal 
discretionary powers; powers which could be used not only 
against mothers, but also against fathers. Whereas the 
doctrine of parens patriae has its roots in monarchical 
power, the statute added to Chancery's already considerable 
claim to be the moral entrepreneur of family law, but in 
this case its jurisdiction was derived from parliament. In 
the long term, the Act also constitutes a considerable shift 
away from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over family matters 
and is part of the historical process of secularising the 
institution of the family (Leonard 1978).
So far we have set out the social process by which the 
courts establish a superintending relationship with the 
family, and the means by which the 'private sphere' of 
familial relations becomes a concern of the public sphere 
of the state, through the judicial apparatus. To what 
extent then were social relations within families modified 
or transformed by case law and statute circa 1839? Was 
family form significantly altered by the legal process?
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We would have to say no. The legal doctrines of 
couverture the rights and obligations arising out of 
the marital relations, the difficulty of dissolving 
marriage, the father's continued place as prime custodian 
of children in the marriage and his new unlimited powers 
to appoint guardians whose claim to custody was equivalent 
and no less than that of natural mothers, and finally the 
non-existence (legally) of minors in matters affecting the 
family, broadly indicate how intact the 'ancien regime' 
remained.
Rather what case law and statute created was a relationship 
between the judiciary (specifically Chancery) and with 
different members of the family separately, not with the 
family as a unit. A seemingly paradoxical statement, but 
if we consider the family not as a unit, but as an ensemble 
of relationships, then it is possible to think through how 
the law might create and sustain role-models or idealised 
sets of attributes and characteristics for each family 
member, which together constitute the legal form of the 
family, and in particular what is to constitute the most 
adequate forms of bringing up baby.
Both common law and equity jurisdiction, and the 1839 
statute begin with the 'natural' authority of the father 
and his 'natural' obligation to provide for his descendants, 
infants or wife. Apart from his breadwinning role. Chancery 
gradually erected conditions which, taken together, constitute 
fatherhood as a position of moral rectitude and leadership. 
Simultaneously, however, common law considered his dependents 
primarily as 'his' possessions which were 'his' in spite 
of any immorality on his part, and whose possession could 
be protected by habeas corpus. The guarantee of the welfare 
of wives and infants was tantamount to remaining under the
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father's couverture and custody, these being obligations 
(though virtually non-enforceable) arising out of the 
marital relation. What equity and statute slowly estab­
lished for married women was a status combining sexual 
purity as an index of 'the fit mother' and a definition, 
of motherhood which is socially useful until a child 
reaches the age of seven. In matters of religious up­
bringing, choice of educational provision, marriage and 
the assumption of familial goods and property, however, 
within the marriage these were solely the domain of the 
father. In separation and after his death, either his 
or court appointed guardians had as much legal claim to 
decide on these matters as married women. The alloted 
destiny of children, at least in law, was always to be 
in custody, but with considerable common law rights, on 
reaching the age of discretion, to contest whose custody. 
Where such infants were in the care and control of their 
fathers, it was unlikely that even common law courts would
p
overturn paternal custodial claims . The ensemble of 
relationships constituting the family in law was fundamen­
tally not a system of equals, but a system of hierarchically 
ordered spaces, against which individuals in specific 
situations and circumstances, and providing they had the 
material and symbolic means of doing so, might seek to 
transform or modify. However, the courts retained the 
means, through a variety of writs (at common law) and 
petitions (to Chancery), to ensure that everyone could be 
returned to, and restrained in, their proper place.
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CHAPTER THREE: MOTHERS AND CHILDREN FIRST? 1839-1886
a. Families and Welfare
The fundamental principle in modern law, in cases concerning 
the custody, care and upbringing of children, demands that 
the courts regard the 'welfare of the child as the first 
and paramount consideration' (Guardianship of Infants Act 
1925, Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, Bromley (1976); 301) .
In disputes, between parents, between parents and local 
authorities, and in cases brought before juvenile courts, 
this principle obtains .
No such overarching principle was visible in law prior to 
1839, and between 1839 and the passing of the Guardianship 
of Minors Act in 1886, the special and separate needs of 
children (necessarily embodied in the principle 'the welfare 
of the child') was only gradually and partially established 
in family law. If we move away from the sphere of family law 
however, we find from the early 19th century onwards, substantial 
legislative provision directly affecting the welfare of children. 
The Factory Acts of 1802, and 1833 specifically limited the hours 
of work for children under 13. The Education Act of 1870 
introduced a general system of public education for children 
(0. Stone 1977;15).
The public concern for the welfare of children, embodied 
in the public financing of the factory inspectorate, the 
requirement that employers provide some form of schooling 
for child labourers, the general provision of elementary 
schooling (with the later requirement that attendance was to be 
compulsory), together with the early attempts to provide (at 
local authority level) school meals, posit the subject of the 
child as a person with different needs and interests from that 
of the adult. The content of 'welfare' specifically provides 
for the protection of children (from exploitation in capitalist 
enterprises), the education of growing and developing persons, 
and, provides for the means of life (food, clothing and shelter) 
for the victims of poverty (either through the Poor Laws or 
through the school meals services). The obverse of the child.
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is the adult, who has the obligation to provide for 
himself or herself, and for any familial dependants.
The content of 'welfare' at the level of public provision 
is the mirror image of the obligations that parents, but 
especially fathers, have in family law. The punitive and 
humiliating conditions attached to the public and private 
relief of poverty (through the Poor Laws of 1834, for 
example, and the requirement of the workhouse test) indicate 
how the welfare of children was seen in terms of personal, 
individual and familial provision. Child care was predominantly 
and primarily an obligation placed upon individual family units, 
and within that unit, it was a father's natural duty to provide 
for his offspring. The other side of that parental relationship, 
again enshrined in family law, lay in the authority and control 
exercised by fathers over the life chances of their children.
There is no easy fit, however, between general and publically 
financed attempts to provide for the welfare of children and 
the legal conception of the 'welfare of the child', in family 
law. Whereas as the former conceives the child in terms of 
vulnerability, a subject in need of care and protection, a victim 
of circumstances not of their own making, the legal process was 
decidedly less concerned about the special qualities of children. 
The discursive order of the courts, and in the debates surrounding 
the 1839 Act, assume that the moral and physical welfare of 
children rested upon the natural duties, obligation and authority 
of the father So long as his rights and duties were sus­
tained then the welfare of children was entirely unproblematic.
The welfare of the child was therefore a secondary consideration, 
because it was founded entirely within the natural obligations 
and authority of the father. In law, his perceptions of his 
children's needs and interests, his direction of their education, 
his provision of familial goods, his standards of morality and 
his imposition of discipline and punishment were the important 
matters. As subjects of his authority, therefore, there was 
no real need for children to express their wishes on any of 
these matters. In family law, they were silent subjects, as
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long as they remained part of their fathers' households.
Any attempt, therefore, to elaborate 'the welfare of the 
child' as the principle on which custody, care or control 
of children was to be determined, inherently involves the 
derogation of father-right and paternal power. For such 
a principle necessarily dissolves the identity of interest 
between the father's natural rights and duties and the 
welfare of his children, because it concedes that the moral 
and physical welfare of children is a greater importance 
than the father's rights and obligations. Furthermore, it 
means that persons and agencies, other than the father,
(mothers, courts, welfare workers, teachers) are important 
to, and therefore have some claim to speak for, children, in 
the interests of the welfare of the child. Finally of course, 
'the welfare of the child' shifts children to centre stage, 
as their interests, needs or benefits become the focus of 
attention, thereby creating children as the privileged subjects 
in custody proceedings.
From the time of the Custody of Infants Act 1839, through to 
the Guardianship of Infants Act, the principle of 'automatic 
father-right' (Brophy and Smart) was never entirely extinguished; 
indeed parental rights were still considered to be 'exclusively 
paternal rights' (Stone op.cit;13). There is no specific 
mention of the 'welfare of children' in family law legislation 
until the 1886 Act. When we turn to case law, however, we find 
a very different picture. In case law, we find Chancery (and 
after the Judicature Acts of 1873-75) High Judges, working 
with and managing the considerable tensions between paternal 
powers on the one hand, and the mutually exclusive principle 
of 'the interests of the child' on the other (see Re. Halliday 
(1841) 17 Jur 56, R V Gyngall (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317). We shall 
discuss these and other cases below, but firstly we need to 
consider the changing social context underpinning the observable
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shifts in case law concerning the custody, care and 
upbringing of children. Why, in the mid to late 19th century 
did the custody of children become important? What were the 
conditions appropriate to the undermining of the empire of the 
father in family law?
a) Some aspects we have already discussed and need not 
elaborate further. For example, the doctrine of parens patriae 
appropriated by Chancery asserted that all infants fell within 
the jurisdiction of Chancery. Therefore, Chancery judges were 
able (though following common law, rarely did) to place definite 
limits to the rights of fatherhood. By statute (the 1839) , 
mothers were given limited rights to the care and control of 
infants under the age of seven. By these means, fatherhood had 
become slightly more conditional than the status celebrated
in and through common law. Nevertheless, statute and equity 
continued to buttress the father's position as the prime 
authority, moral arbiter and care-giver within indiviual 
families. Simultaneously though. Chancery effectively brought 
questions of custody and care infants into its jurisdiction and 
established its right to arbitrate in these matters, basing its 
disposition on the moral rectitude of parents, though not 
directly alluding to the welfare of the child.
b) Questions of custody directly connects with the development 
of the modern bureaucratic state, a line of reasoning usefully 
developed by Leonard (1978) and Smart (1982). From the 1830's 
(Poor Laws 1834, Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
1836), new state agencies were increasingly concerned precisely 
with the question, who belonged to what family?
The requirement that all births, marriages and deaths were to 
be registered, inherently involves a sharper distinction between 
'official' marriages, legitimate children and other forms of 
cohabitation and other 'unofficial' family groupings. What was
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to constitute 'the family' (the marital relationship and 
its legitimate children) is constituted through the process 
of bureaucratic recording, not by the simple fact of people 
living together raising children in households customarily 
identified as discrete family units. Whereas the aristocracy 
had always been concerned with questions of valid marriage 
and legitimate children because these were important issues 
in the whole system of inheritance, marriage, legitimacy (the 
general question of lineal consanguinity) and the question of 
'the obligation to maintain', is brought sharply into focus, 
for the mass of the population and for state agencies in and 
through the operation of the Poor Laws (Smart op.cit; 131).
Poor Law relief was available as a last resort; primary respon­
sibility for welfare of family members was thrust upon any 
identifiable 'liable relative'.
What emerges is a complex interweaving of the legally designated 
obligations arising out of 'custody', the identification of 
children being the responsibility of definite parents, and, the 
obligation of parents to maintain their children if they wanted 
them to be kept away from the workhouse. The family relations 
of the common law, the registration of marriages, births and 
deaths, and the punitive provisions of the Poor Laws 1834 
combined to produce what Finer and McGregor (1974) called 
'the third system of family law'. On their view,
"It comprised the imposition of support 
obligations upon relatives; the denial or 
subordination of parental rights of control, 
and custody of children and the determination 
of their education or occupational training; 
as well as the general regulation of familial 
relationships" (112).
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Finer and McGregor continue:
"Thus was established (by the Poor Laws) a 
national system by which the public supported 
those who were unable to support themselves 
but sought reimbursement by imposing a legal 
liability upon financially able relatives".
(p. 113).
The 'liable relatives' were specified by statute but the 
required support was left to the discretion of magistrates.
In the case of bastard children, the liability was the 
concern of both the mother and the putative father.
Finer and McGregor speak of family law having three 
jurisdictions; a) the High Court (dealt with extensively above),
b) the magistrates courts (concerned principally with dispo­
sitions of maintenance) and c) the Poor Law as family law 
(100-112). Case law reported here primarily concerned the 
well-to-do, able to afford the proceedings available in Chancery 
and High Court (post 1875). The magistrates courts were of 
considerable importance pre-1834, when mothers of bastard 
children could go before a magistrate to charge a putative 
father for the upkeep of his bastard child (Finer and McGregor; 
116). Proceedings there were weighted in the mother's favour; 
only her sworn statement was sufficient for magistrates to 
levy a fine on the named father. Post-1834, actions for 
affiliation were transferred to the Quarter Sessions, heard 
before High Court judges, and were considerably less generous, 
procedurally, to mothers of bastard children, for putative 
fathers were able to contest her sworn statements (Anna Clarke, 
pers. com. 31/8/80, Finer and McGregor"; 116) . Fathers, however, 
could now be failed for non-payment of maintenance, however, 
poor law guardians had difficulty in enforcing maintenance 
payments, leaving unmarried mothers as a charge on the parish. 
The magistrates' jurisdiction over family matters became of
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real significance only after 1878, (when mothers were 
empowered to apply for the custody of children)^and after 
1925, when maintenance charges arising out of divorce could 
be dealt with by those courts; where women could claim 
maintenance for each child under 16, up to the amount of 
10 shillings (Finer and McGregor; 100-112). It is the 
coercive nature of the 'third system', the Poor Law as 
family law, which is more directly of concern here, for here 
we find a substantial rewriting of parent-child relations by 
the state.
In principle, the 1834 Poor Law abolished all forms of 
assistance for able-bodied paupers and their families in 
their own homes and required them to be given relief in a 
workhouse. It is difficult for us now to conceive one 
social site generating quite the ; fear and loathing that the 
workhouse achieved for some 100 years. It was a punitive 
institution in character and effect, and it is as well to 
remind ourselves of its principles of operation. Though 
practically it directly affected only its inmates, the fear 
of being sent to the workhouse had a hegemonic effect far 
beyond the population who had to endure its regime. The 
workhouse regime worked on the following principles:
1. On the 'less eligibility principle', it imposed severely 
deterrent conditions, ensuring for example, standards of 
living below those endured by the humblest working cottager 
and his family.
2. It involved the loss of civic rights.
3. It entailed the separation of spouses, and the separation
of parents from children. Young children were allowed to
stay with their mother in a wing away from fathers.
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4. The stigma of pauperism was deliberately imposed; 
being in a workhouse was sufficient to be labelled 
'pauper'.
5. A separate building would be assigned to each class of 
pauper so that (like the penitentiary) each would receive 
appropriate treatment.
6. The education and training of children was to be directed 
by the wardens and Poor Law guardians.
(See Finer and McGregor; 114-116, Pinchbeck and Hewitt II, 
op. cit.; Chapter XVII).
It was a regime as much geared to educating inmates and 
the population beyond its walls as to the causes of poverty 
(indolence, dissipation) as it was to dispensing the means of 
life to those unfortunate enough to be the object of its 
attentions.
The procedures of classification, separation and individuation 
precisely locate the causes of poverty and suffering at the 
level of the individual victim, rather than at the level of 
the labour market.
Once families were dependent upon national assistance, 
parental rights and duties arising out of the common law 
tradition, especially the right to custody, more or less 
entirely disappeared. Paupers were the limit case of the 
'unfit parent'; care and control of their children, and the 
control and direction of their children's education and 
training passed into the hands of the Poor Law guardians.
Once in the punitive domain of the workhouse system, the 
parent-child relationship, so sacred and 'natural' at common 
law and Chancery, was broken apart. In these circumstances, 
the welfare of the child followed not from the natural 
obligations owed to it by its parents, but precisely the opposite
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Their welfare was to be secured by the workhouse regime 
of discipline, education and forced apprenticeship, carried 
out by persons other than the 'immiserated', 'indolent',
'pauper' parents.
The orientation of the workhouse regime with regard to 
children, was to bring them up in a mode quite unlike the 
upbringing offered to them by their parents. Poor Law Boards 
were obsessively concerned with breaking the cycle of pauperism 
and the evils of delinquency said to be part and parcel of it. 
The 1861 Report of the Royal Commission on Education (1st Report 
Vol I) held,
"that the evidence they had taken had 
established the following propositions.
1. That pauperism is hereditary, and that 
the children born and bred as members of 
that class furnish the great mass of the 
pauper and criminal population.
2. That the best prospect of a permanent 
diminution of pauperism and crime is to 
be found in the proper education of such 
children."
(quoted in W. Chance (1897) Children Under the 
Poor Law; 21-22).
Education and moral training were the antidotes to the 
regeneration of pauperism, as prescribed by the Poor Law 
authorities. The Orders and Regulations issued by the
Commissioners in 1835 for the management of workhouses
called for the provision of schoolmasters and mistresses
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"who were to instruct the boys and girls 
for three of the working hours at least 
every day, in reading, writing and in the 
principles of Christian religion, and other 
such instruction ... as might train them to 
habits of usefulness, industry and virtue."
(quoted in Chance (1897); 4).
Aside from the pathological view of working class and 
pauper family habits and practices, these reports present 
the imagery of the 'normal' bourgeois family routinely at 
work. Where education, moral training and the habits of 
industry were absent, then there could be no ordinary family 
life. In these circumstances, children were the objects of 
neglect and therefore it was fit and proper for state agents 
to provide for the welfare of children, to the extent that 
they became the custodians.
What is absent from the Poor Law view of children is any 
sentimentality or affection. Their 'welfare' was conceived 
not in personal terms, with children being regarded as 
affective individuals needing emotional support and comfort, 
but rather as a population in danger of moral pollution, and, 
dangerous because they were potentially 'the rising generation' 
of paupers and criminals. Indeed, the Royal Commission of 
Education in 1861 was not entirely happy about the workhouse 
precisely because 'the children contained in them learn from 
infancy to regard the workhouses as their homes, and associate 
with grown up paupers whose influence destroys their moral 
character and prevents the growth of a spirit of independence', 
(quoted in Chance op.cit; 21). The Poor Law's child, the 
potential pauper who has to be trained out of its 'hereditary' 
circumstance is something like a vessel whose contents have to 
be changed. There is a considerable homology between this 
view and that of the passive recipient of fatherly authority 
set out in the High Court case law.
— 44-6
c) The social process of secularising family law 
continued with the passing of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1857. This Act for the first time in English law, permitted 
divorce by judicial process in civil courts (limited in the 
first place to the newly established Court of Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes). The Divorce Act empowered judges to 
make dispositions concerning custody of children, thus 
breaching further the common law's traditional defence of 
automatic father-right (see Graveson and Crane (1957),
Graveson (1957), Stone (1977), Bromley (1976), Holcombe (1983) 
Chap. 5) .
While the Divorce Act ended the ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
over the termination of marriage, the Act retained in structure 
much of the canon's law procedure and modes of disposition.
Grounds for divorce were limited; to adultery (or in the case 
of a woman seeking to divorce her husband, proof of his 
'aggravated' adultery, which proof of his adultery plus proof 
of some other offence such as bigamy, incest or physical cruelty), 
or if a husband was guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality, and, 
desertion for two years without cause. The Act also retained 
a two-tier structure of termination; the old a vinculo matrimonii 
became absolute divorce, while the divorce a mensa a thoro 
became the new decree of judicial separation (Holcombe op.cit.; 
98-99).
Under the 1857 Divorce Act, the judicial procedure was essentially 
punitive; it required a guilty party. Where guilt was proved, 
punishments followed, firstly in financial terms ; the property 
of either spouse (if a wife had brought property into the 
marriage) could be appropriated for the benefit of the non- 
guilty partner. Secondly, the Divorce Court was empowered to 
remove children from the custody of either parent, or both 
(by placing children under the protection of Chancery). Like 
the provisions of the Poor Laws, the 'unfit' guilty parent 
was to be punished by the loss of custodial rights over children 
of the marriage.
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While the Act made divorce more easily obtainable and 
probably somewhat cheaper than divorce by Act of Parliament 
(estimated to cost between £600-800 in the 1850's) because 
it was still the equivalent of a High Court action, the 
expense made it an impossible proposition for the majority 
of the population. As Dicey noted, 'The Divorce Act of 1857 
was a triumph of individual liberalism. It did away with 
the iniquity of a law which theoretically prohibited divorce, 
but in reality conceded to the rich a right denied to the 
poor' (quoted in Graveson 1957;11). One reason why the cost 
of divorce was kept artificially high, by assigning the 
jurisdiction to the High Court, was the fear that cheap divorce 
would encourage immorality and the breakdown of marriage and 
family life.
Nor was the Act equitable in the way it provided for men 
and women who wanted to end a marriage. The married woman 
had to prove 'aggravated adultery' or her husband's sexual 
perversity before she could petition for absolute divorce. 
Adultery alone by the husband, was grounds only for judicial 
separation. Where this obtained, to all intents and purposes, 
the couple were regarded as still married so the husband's 
common law rights to property of the marriage still held.
Only after absolute divorce was the woman treated as feme sole 
in matters of property rights and contract. A husband could 
petition for absolute divorce on the grounds of his wife's 
adultery alone.
It also made a considerable difference to the married woman 
and the maintenance she received as to whether the married 
couple were granted judicial separation or absolute divorce.
In the first case, a wife received alimony, usually set at 
one third of the husband's income, but this could be varied 
from year to year according to changing need. The divorced 
wife, however, received maintenance, determined by the court
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considering the amount (if any) of property t^e wife 
took into the marriage, the husband's ability to pay, and 
the conduct of partners during the marriage. Built in, of 
course, is the test of the good wife. In practice, the one 
third rule seems to have been applied, but, it was a sum 
fixed on a once and for a]1 basis; the amount could not later 
be varied (Holcombe, op.cit.; 100-101). Following ecclesiastical 
practice, the adulterous wife received no alimony, and while 
alimony was a personal claim against the husband, maintenance 
was a claim against property set aside for the wife's use, over 
which judges could exercise some discretion in the amount and 
the frequency with which the income was disbursed. Finally, 
the Act retained the old principle of allowing the husband to 
sue his wife's lover, the damages collected being used to pay 
maintenance to the wife and contributing to the upkeep of 
children. Wives had no such action against adultresses.
Much as the operation of parens patriae in Chancery, and 
the punitive provisions of the Poor Laws, the wide discretion 
of judges in matters of alimony, maintenance and custody, in 
the Divorce courts, made the parent-child relation increasingly 
permeable to judicial and administrative direction and regulation 
The private sphere of the family, 'the little commonwealth' of 
familial self-government set out in common law increasingly 
became the focus of judicial and administrative sanction. Basing 
the disposition of maintenance and custody on the behaviour of 
couples during marriage, at divorce, extends the principle of 
'good' parenting as claim to retain the custody of children.
It was no longer sufficient for parents merely to be natural 
parents but they had to be fit parents.
Separately and together, the High Court, Poor Law and Divorce 
Court jurisdictions are concerned primarily with the moral 
conduct of parents. The custodial relation of parent to child 
became part of what Smart calls the 'punitive' mode of family
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law (Smart 1982;131). The loss, suspension or the 
supervision of custodial rights became part of a disciplinary 
technique which evolved as the state more sharply defined 
what was to constitute a family and delineated more clearly 
the attributes, rights and obligations of individual members 
within it. The tactical relief, offered on the one hand, to 
married women seeking to leave their husbands but wishing 
to retain the custody of their children, and the relief offered 
to paupers through the Poor Law system, were benefits obtained 
at the expense of wider judicial and adminstrat.i ve powers to 
inspect the internal relationships of such families and persons 
as sought relief. Retaining the custody of children shifted 
away from a natural right to a reward for good behaviour.
We seek in vain statements concerning the necessity of a stable 
home background, the special care that only mothers can provide, 
the necessity of a personally nurturent and emotionally warm 
family environment - the modern discourse of child care. The 
welfare of the child was assimilated within, and made identical 
with, the morally upright parent. The principle of the 
distribution of child custody was as a reward to the least guilty 
party, not as is now the case, a disposition based upon an 
assessment of the situation which will be of most benefit to the 
special needs and interests of the child.
Such was the situation in statute law until 1886. Case Law in 
Chancery, however, from the 1840*s on, did begin to elaborate 
and work with a limited conception of 'the welfare of the child', 
and it is to this process we now turn.
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b. Chancery and 'the Welfare of the Child'.
To illustrate the character and singularity of the 
discourse of case law in Chancery, let us begin with two 
cases, separated by some 40 years.
In Re Halliday, 17 Jur 56, Sir George Turner made the 
following plea before -hhe Court.
"When (the Custody of Infants Act) came into 
operation it was undoubtedly the law of this 
country that the father is entitled to the 
sole custody of his infant child, controllable 
only by this Court in cases of gross misconduct. 
With this right, the Act does not as I understand 
it, interfere, so far as to have destroyed the 
right, but it introduces new elements and con­
siderations under which that right is to be 
exercised. The Act proceeds upon three grounds. 
First it assumes and proceeds upon the existence 
of paternal right. Secondly, it connects the 
paternal right with marital duty as the condition 
of recognising the paternal right. Thirdly, the 
Act regards to the interest of the child, for on 
no other grounds can I account for the distinction 
taken between cases of children above and under 
seven years of age, it being perfectly obvious 
that the comfort of the mother was as much affected 
whether the child were over or under seven years 
of age" (my emphasis).
In Re Agar-Ellis 24 Ch. D. 317 C.A. (1883) Cotton L.J. in 
his summing up recorded:
"This Court holds this principle that when, 
by birth, a child is subject to a father, it 
is for the general interest of families, and 
for the general interest of children, and really 
for the interest of the particular infant, that 
the Court should not, except in very extreme 
cases, interfere with the discretion of the 
father, but leave to him the responsibility of 
exercising that power which nature has given 
him by the birth of the child (p. 334).
(my emphasis).
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What is evident here is the extent to which the Courts 
still asserted the primacy of the father as the proper 
custodian of his children. But what is also becoming 
apparent, apart from making his custody conditional, is 
that the courts were beginning to consider the interests 
of children as a separate issue. Partly, this arose from 
the changing conception of parens patriae.
Lord Cottenham speaking to the Custody of Infants Bill (1839) 
held that the Court of Chancery has a general jurisdiction 
over the property of infants, and where the infant has 
property, it exercises jurisdiction over the infant 
(Macpherson 1842; 101). Chancery Courts thus continued
a customary separation between the guardianship of property 
and the guardianship over the person. The child had a case 
to plead only as a bearer of property; those without property 
were outside parens patriae. This is reaffirmed by Cotton L.J 
in Re Agar-Ellis (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317).
"The Court does not exercise its jurisdiction 
except when either there is money paid into 
court under the Trustees Relief Act, and for 
this purpose £100 is held sufficient, or a suit 
instituted to administer trusts of money on the 
infant, not because the jurisdiction is not there 
but because the Court will not interfere as 
regards the Custody and tuition, where it has 
not the means of providing them".
But as the Chancery Court constituted parens patriae as 
applicable only to those with sufficient wherewithal to 
provide for their own subsistence, maintenance and tuition 
(i.e. child heirs), the discourse was simultaneously being 
decomposed. Cottenham (1847) in Re Spence 16 LJ (Ch (NS) 309 
recants his earlier position (see above) declaring:
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"The cases in which the Court interferes 
on behalf of infants are not confined to those 
in which there is property. The Court interferes 
for the protection of infants qua infants by the 
virtue of the prerogative which belongs to the 
Crown as parens patriae"
(my emphasis).
Thus Cottenham in redefining the Court's responsibilities 
effectively reconstructs the doctrine of parens patriae, 
and the court's supreme parentage over all infants.
Cottenham's statements though must be seen in a much broader 
transformation of the Chancery's court relation with the 
family.
Chancery's equitable jurisdiction in the second half of the 
19th century was seen to offer some advantages to the 
litigants concerned primarily with the protection and safety 
of infants; a refuge against common law dispositions less 
willing to interfere with paternal rights (Bevan 1973- 257) .
Re Fynn (1848) 2 De G and Sm. 457 emphasised this side of 
equity when a common law judge said that equitable jurisdiction 
could only be invoked if
"The father has so conducted himself, or 
has shown himself to be a person of such 
description, or is placed in such a position 
as to render it not merely better for the 
children, but essential to their safety and 
welfare, in some serious and important respect, 
that his rights should be treated as lost or 
suspended - should be superseded or interfered 
with"(quoted in Bevan op.cit.; 257).
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The intercession of Chancery between a father and his 
children has little to say about the position of a mother 
vis a vis her children. His loss of custody did not confer 
on a mother, either in common law or equity her positive 
right to seek it, save the rights given to her under the 
1839 Act, to apply for custody of infants under seven 
(Bevan; 258). Married women continued to be the excluded 
subjects under both jurisdictions and case law did nothing 
to enhance her claims despite its increasing powers to 
protect infants against unreasonable physical or symbolic 
violence exerted by fathers. As late as 1883, in Agar-Ellis, 
Bowen L. J. (and his associates on the bench) disposed of a 
case solely in terms of the benefits accruing from 'the 
natural law which points out that the father knows far 
better as a rule what is good for his children than a Court 
of Justice can' (Agar-Ellis; 338).
Yet in particular instances. Chancery could act to award 
the custody of children to mothers, arising out of the 
jurisdictions given to it by the 1839 Act and by the 1873 
Custody of Infants Act (which amended the earlier legislation). 
The 1873 legislation was important in two respects. Married 
women were now empowered to apply for custody of infants under 
the age of 16, and, were now not barred from doing so because 
of adultery proved against them. Legislation had forced on 
Chancery something which its own logic continued to ignore; 
the importance of mothers as providers of child care. Of 
equal importance was Section 2 of the 1873 Act which contains 
the first specific reference to the child's welfare as the basis 
of making a custodial disposition (Bevan, 258; Pinchbeck and 
Hewitt II; 377). Section 2 'permits a father by an agreement 
contained in a separation deed to give up the custody or control 
of his child to the mother, with the proviso that the agreement 
is unenforceable if the court considers that it will not be for 
the child's benefit to give effect to it' (Bevan, f.n.;, 258 
and 263) (my emphasis).
454 -
As important as it is to record this new principle for 
determining custody, and the importance of the Act for the 
custodial powers it granted to married women, the Act also 
enhances the interventionist powers of Chancery. It could 
intercede and override any private agreement made between 
separate spouses about the care, custody and control of 
their children. The most celebrated case of this happening 
concerned Annie Besant (Re Besant 1879) 11 Ch. D. 508, where 
the court prevented her having the custody of her daughter 
(Bevan; f.n. 265), on the grounds of her atheistic opinions, 
her refusal to allow the child any religious instruction and 
because of her 'obscene' publications - on birth control]
In the absence of any agreement between separated spouses 
about the custody of children and where custody had been 
awarded to the father, as in Agar-Ellis, some tribunals 
of Chancery judges were still inclined to disregard the 
'child's benefit' and the child's wishes to see and freely 
correspond with the mother (Agar-Ellis op.cit.).
Each legislative initiative and each change of interpretation 
of parens patriae had the continuous effect of enlarging 
the discretionary powers of 'the family courts' (Chancery, 
Divorce Court). This perhaps is the unique character of 
these particular courts in relationships with families and 
family members. The courts placed considerable limitations 
over the primacy of the father without directly enlarging 
the legal claims of other family members. Even the private 
agreements on custody made by judicially separated spouses 
had to be ratified by Chancery, for example. We should recall 
however that it was at the behest of the father that private 
custody arrangements could be entered into; the Act did not 
acknowledge that mothers could initiate any such action 
(Bevan op.cit.; 263).
In sum, as the courts were required to consider the 
interests, benefit or welfare of the child, and were 
asked to consider the mother's claim to custody so its 
own discretionary powers increased, generally at the 
expense of the traditional, common law rights to custody 
of the father. By 1883, in Agar-Ellis, Chancery still 
held that father-right was the overriding principle in 
the distribution of custody. To many, it was a maverick 
decision and this judgement laid the basis for the 
introduction of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, 
which considerably expanded the custodial claims of the 
mother and wrote into the statutes the doctrine of 'the 
welfare of the child' (Bevan; 258, Pinchbeck and Hewitt 
II; 282, Brophy and Smart; 6).
c. Family law and custody in the 19th century; an overview.
To obtain some theoretical purchase on the diverse social 
process of legal change taking place in family law in the 
mid 19th century, it is useful to consider some of the 
recent writings specifically concerned with this problem.
Lee Holcombe's (1983) Wives and Property is primarily concerned 
with the social forces and political struggles bringing about 
the legislation reforming the status of married women as 
property holders (Chapters 6 - 10). But she also presents, 
with a model of clarity, the diverse legal categories 
constituting English family law (Chapter 1 covers common law. 
Chapter 2, equity). For her, the contradictions between 
common law, ecclesiastical and equity provide some of the 
dynamic of social and legal change.
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She notes for example:
"An account of the divorce law, like an 
account of the law relating to married 
women's property, reveals the confusion 
that characterised English jurisprudence 
in the mid-nineteenth century, a result 
of the survival of medieval institutions 
in an age when new ideas had won acceptance 
and other institutions had developed ...
Thus, reform of the divorce law, like the 
reform of the married women's property law, 
was but a part of the wider movement of 
legal reform which had as its goals to 
harmonise conflicting legal systems and to 
rationalise and modernize the country's 
judicial machinery" (p.94) (my emphasis).
Central to Holcombe's account of the 'harmonisation' and 
'rationalisation' of the legal system was the rise of 
feminism in the 1850's and its successful mobilisation 
as a political force throughout the 1860's and 1870's 
to bring about the recognition of married women as legal 
subjects entitled to own, use and dispose of property on 
their own account. Of the 1882 Married Women's Property 
Act, she writes:
"The reform was not precisely what had been 
urged by feminists, who wanted not the extension 
of equity, but the enactment of equal property 
rights for men and women. Nevertheless the 
Married Women's Property Act of 1882 was a 
great measure of reform, and feminists rightly 
claimed much of the credit for having won its 
passage" (p. 207) .
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Feminists, she argues:
"had struggled to end the 'virtual slavery 
of marriage' imposed upon women, particularly 
those of the lower classes, by the common law, 
and also to abolish the special, privileged 
status that wealthy women enjoyed under the 
provision of equity, 'the guardian of the 
weak and unprotected'. When they denounced 
the existence of these two rival legal 
systems, which meant in practice 'one law for 
the rich and another for the poor, the feminists 
won a wide and sympathetic hearing " (p. 206).
In her account of the beginnings of feminism as an organised 
movement, she carefully situates its appearance within the 
context of economic discontent; political unrest arising 
from such developments as the discrediting of the government 
in power or the emergence of a particular problem to be 
solved through the political process; the presence of leading 
personalities to voice economic and political discontents, 
to educate and arouse the conscience of the public about 
the reform desired,'and to present a policy of change, and 
some means of pushing reforms through' (p. 48).
Of particular note is her location of feminist disaffection 
with the law itself:
"One can argue that this very real economic 
prosperity (of the 1850's) fuelled feminist 
discontent with the legal position of women.
The common law affecting women had not changed, 
but the economic conditions of the society 
within which the law operated had been dramatically 
altered with the accelerating pace of industrial­
isation. In short, many more women than ever 
before felt the severe burden of disabilities 
placed upon women by the law" (pp. 48-49).
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Moreover, Holcombe notes, that with ^million women in 
the workforce in 1851, one quarter of whom were married,
'the common law, which clearly did not serve the interests 
of married women at work in a modern industrialised society, 
came under attack' . (p. 49) .
From Holcombe comes a view of law as a materially oppressive 
structure for women; it is not consigned to the nether 
regions of the ideological superstructure, but is the means 
by which married women were -dispossessed of property, and thus 
made economically and personally subordinate within the family.
In this account, the law constitutes familial relations and 
relations between husband and wife, father and children as 
relations of domination and subordination. These relationships 
are fundamentally unequal; the husband owned the familial goods, 
deployed the labour of his familial subordinates and controlled 
the custody, care and upbringing of his children. What remains 
unexplored is the extent to which both class and familial 
relations were also fundamentally exploi tative, through the 
two inter-connecting systems of capitalism and patriarchy.
Women were in the unique position, as were children, of being 
exploited by both systems, which each entailed on the one hand 
relations of possession/non-possession, on the other, the 
extraction of surplus value, on which capitalist and familial 
accumulations were based.
In a work, the focus of which is one strand of family law 
and in a work which recognises from the outset the family as 
a key site in the multiple structures of women's oppression, 
these remarks may be consigned to the dust-bin of theoretical 
nit-picking. However, the rejection of capitalism and patriarchy 
as oppressive and exploitative systems has some material con­
sequences for Holcombe's view of the social history of the 
19th century. An over^reliance on the concept of 'industrial­
isation' simply omits the considerable fact that factories, 
sweat shops and other small capitalist and petty-capitalist 
enterprises were unequally distributed, by region, throughout
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England and Wales. Sally Alexander (1976) notes that London, 
for example, 'offered no single staple employment for women 
comparable to that in the northern textile towns; secondly, 
in a city of skilled trades and small workshops, women, although 
long excluded from formal apprenticeship, often worked with 
their husband in his trade ; thirdly, much women's work outside 
small workshop production was intermittent and casual, which 
meant that most women's lives were spent in a variety of partial 
occupations, most of which escaped the rigid classifications 
of the Census (p. 66). Moreover, though Holcombe is sensibly 
cautious about the census classifications of occupations (p. 7-8) 
and the way that working wives curiously 'disappeared' in 1881, 
it is difficult to ignore the large proportion of women in the 
mid 19th century working as domestic servants (18% of women 
over 20 in London; Alexander op.cit. 72).
Certainly, married women in the mid-19th century worked but often 
as not in family units of production. And, as Alexander suggests, 
where they worked away from the home, the character of the jobs 
they did 'mirrored' the kind of work undertaken in the home 
('domestic' tasks such as washing, cooking, serving, mending 
etc.; child care; distribution of food) in enterprises while 
the division of labour was segmented and rewarded along lines 
which 'originated with, and paralleled that within the family' 
(Alexander; 73).
These detailed comments, which together suggest that the 
capitalist economy of the mid-19th century is not to be 
equated simply with 'industrialisation' however in no way
invalidate Holcombe's fundamental claim that women as
economically active agents were robbed of their claim to 
independent property and income by the common law, and this 
being the generative mechanism behind the rise of organised 
feminism. One of the effects of capitalism on the family, as
Catherine Hall (1980) has argued is the separation of the
domestic sphere from the world of production with the dual
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effect of generating a considerable tension between the 
social relations of capitalism and the social relations 
constituting patriarchy. The harmonisation and rationalisation 
of the systems of common law and equity, and the re-positioning 
of married women as legal subjects, resulting from organised 
feminist struggles, suggests a very long term and complex 
reconciliation of capitalism and patriarchy (observable in fight 
to reform the law on married women's property), but without 
the crucial transformation of either system. Women benefitted 
to the extent that they achieved the status of 'formally free' 
economic subjects, but did not win the right to vote, did not 
receive equal pay for equal work, and in the sphere of family 
law did not (yet) achieve parity with husbands in matters of 
child custody. The married woman was not and is not a unitary 
subject in law. The value of Holcombe's work is to provide 
a detailed account of how the contradictions between common law 
and equity, the contradiction between the married woman in 
family law and her place in the economy provided the context 
for a political movement which sought to transform the sytems 
of oppression by playing on these contradictory situations.
Whereas Holcombe's focus is primarily on the legal status of 
married women, Carole Smart 'engages' with the law as an apparatus 
of the state (Brophy and Smart 1981, Smart 1981, Smart 1984).
She is primarily concerned about the interplay between the law 
and the family, and conceives the historical development of that 
relationship in terms of different regulative modes that the 
state and the law operates 'to reproduce structures of dependency 
and inequality between husband and wife' (Brophy and Smart 1981;3, 
Smart 1981; 131 ff., Smart 1984; xi). Smart discerns a shift 
from a punitive 'negatively controlling orientation (Brophy and 
Smart;3) observable in family law of the mid-19th century 
(characterised by restricted access to divorce and financial 
security on the grounds of class and sex), (ibid), to a more 
'liberal' mode of regulation, where the 'overt and negative 
controls over the entry into and the exit of marriage are far
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less rigidly regulated' (Brophy and Smart;3). Notably, 
however, in its 'liberal' moment, the state has adopted 
'considerable powers of intervention and surveillance over 
the family' (ibid), but also beyond, because welfare law 
'is increasingly attempting to impose the duties and 
obligations of married (enshrined in family law) on the 
unmarried' (Brophy and Smart; 4). In a word, the categories 
of family law (obligations to maintain, rights to custody) 
have invaded welfare law to the extent that those adopting 
relations of cohabitation are increasingly obliged to act, 
be responsible and bear the responsibilities of married 
couples.
For Smart, the law is primarily a disciplinary apparatus 
of the state, which in operation defines 'normal' (legal) 
relationships (marriage, legitimate children) and punishes, 
intervenes and regulates coercively and overtly, the abnormal, 
the delinquent (the unmarried mother, the illegitimate child). 
Family and welfare law thus combine to create and sustain 
particular modes of behaviour, specific social relationships 
and specifies the rights and obligations of each family member 
which together constitute the family. Not only is the 
operation of the law disciplinary in the way it sets out 
'normal' structures and subjectivities, but operates symboli­
cally as a powerful message system by the way it 'punishes' 
those who either do not conform or choose alternative modes 
of existence. Smart argues that discipline and punishment 
operate strongly along class and gender lines; it is the 
unmarried mother, the illegitimate child and poor families 
who feel the interventionist state most (these being the house­
holds where fiscal benefits are obtained only if substantial 
conditions are met, and, households where the state is most 
likely to contest the parents' right to the care, custody 
and control of children) (Smart 1981; 132).
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What is attractive about Smart * s theorisation is the extent 
to which it problematises the boundaries between the state 
and civil society, the perimeters of the public and private 
spheres. Her suggestion of the constitutive power of the 
state to define what was to count as 'the family' breaks 
with the liberal conceptions of the family founded on the 
basis of individual volition and the power of personal, 
romantic and affective attachments in creating new families.
She is able to generate the dynamic of the state's evolving 
concern with 'who is of the family' by referring to the 
requirements placed upon various apparatuses of the state, 
to provide welfare and support for families immiserated by 
the cycles of deprivation and poverty inherent in capitalistic 
societies. Equally, in times of changing economic circumstances 
in the direction of expansion (after the 2nd World War, for 
example), the state is forced to adopt different strategies,
'to stabilise the family and contain its members' (Smart 1981; 
135). She asserts, as did Holcombe, the power of legal reforms 
to diminish patriarchal authority; that the law itself can 
be deployed against patriarchal ideologies and practices, 
'protecting wives and mothers against the worst excesses of 
masculine abuse' (Smart op.cit.; 136).
While there is no simple read off possible from the development
of the state (concerned on the one hand with securing the
continued process of the accumulation of capital, managing
and defending national boundaries, the care and exploitation
of overseas colonies deploying resources to offset
the generic problem of incipient 'legitimation crises' on the
other) with say,the detailed evolution of custody proceedings
as a strand of family law, nevertheless conceiving the law
as an apparatus of the state does provide us with the opportunity
to view family law being in a continuum with other institutions
(such as the workhouses), constituting state agency. It is
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therefore possible to conceive, as^Smart does, how the 
legal categories of family law, have material effects in other 
branches of social policy. More importantly, it demands that 
we consider the historical development of state formation, 
not simply in terms of the support state institutions offer 
to the process of capitalism, but also in terms of the way 
it adopts and adapts patriarchal structures. Thus the Poor 
Laws regulated the poor, but equally they became a strand of 
family law in as much as this legislation rewrote the relations 
between the state and the family.
Finer and McGregor's (1974) thesis of 'three jurisdictions' 
of family law (Chancery/High Court; magistrates; Poor Law) 
broadly conceives a continuum between family and welfare law. 
Economic circumstances define the possibilities of litigants 
to go before the law, and, which jurisdiction will be the 
regulative administration of individual families. There were 
material differences between jurisdictions which had profound 
effects for the relations of family members. In equity, for 
example, married women and infants of substantial means had 
some legal claim against the jurisdiction of fathers. The 
magistrates historically arbitrated in matters concerning the 
support of bastard children, but became the prime means by 
which married women of modest means could seek custody orders 
(after 1878) and seek maintenance orders (after 1925). From 
Finer and McGregor we sense how class-divided the jurisdictions 
of the law were; each being appropriate to different classes 
of economic subjects. While individuals going before equity 
and magistrates courts pursued their legal claims, those caught 
up in the administration of the Poor Laws were in grave danger 
of having their legal and civic identity^suspended.
■. 4-64- —
"The Poor Law was ... not only a law about 
the poor but a law of the poor. It dealt 
with a condition and it governed a class.
The special legal provisions were designed 
not to solve the problems of destitution 
but to minimise the cost to the public of 
maintaining the destitute".
(Jan Broek, quoted in Finer and McGregor; 113)
The legal ideology of individuals going as equals before 
a neutral system of arbitration here falls away to reveal a 
jurisdiction in which one class nakedly ruled another. The 
Poor Laws, through the workhouse, and through the conditions 
attached to the provision of outdoor relief, were, in Smart's 
word, wholly 'punitive'. They were premised on the ideology 
of the family embedded within the common law, with the exception 
that its punitive provisions broke apart the marital relation 
(by requiring husband, wife and children to be accommodated 
separately) and replaced the custodial powers of parents with 
the custodial powers exercised by agents of the state. The 
price exacted by the Poor Laws for the relief of poverty, was 
the right to control the education, vocational training and 
the labour of children who fell within its remit. The power 
of the Poor Laws resides in the visible exercise of its provisions 
on inmates of the workhouse and the way in which it visibly 
labelled beneficiaries as paupers, which collectively stood 
as a real threat to individuals and families living on the 
margins of subsistence by private endeavour. Gilbert (1973) 
notes the impact of these institutions on working class con­
sciousness. In the early 20th century, for example, the fear 
of stigmatization nearly caused the demise of the early school 
meals programmes because fathers would not allow their children 
to benefit from charitable hand outs by Boards of Guardians 
(108-109).
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The Poor Laws reserved its harshest measures for the 
unmarried mother and illegitimate children (Finer and 
McGregor; 116-121). It was urged for example that on no 
account should these women and children be given outdoor 
relief; the 1868 Poor Law Amendment Act restored to the 
parish the power to recover the cost of maintenance for 
bastard children, which went to the parish not the mother.
The unmarried mother became part of the 'educative' 
element in the exercise of the Poor Laws as a means of 
disciplining and controlling the poor and the working class.
The continuity of the 'three jurisdictions' through to the 
present day (where the Supplementary Benefits Commission 
replaces the administrative inspection and regulation of 
the Guardians) underpins Finer and McGregor's thesis (p. 119). 
Their identification of the differential distribution of 
legal rights and claims across jurisdictions and the positioning 
of individuals as either litigants or claimants is indicative 
of how one class becomes embedded in, and seeks redress from 
courts drawing on the traditions of equity, while another 
becomes enmeshed in the procedures of administrative tribunals, 
without the 'voice' and representation guaranteed elsewhere 
in the legal system.
One further aspect of the litigant/claimant division concerns 
directly the custody and care of children. In the equity 
courts, custody remained essentially a private matter between 
competing parents or between mothers and paternally-appointed 
guardians, petitioning judges for custodial power. The courts 
interceded and exercised its generally superintending power 
simply by making custodial dispositions or occasionally by making 
the child a ward of court, but did so only when called upon to 
do so by one litigious party or another. Compare this with the 
surrender of custodial powers demanded by the operation of the 
Poor Laws. In equity, the welfare of the child was conceived
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as coincidental with a parent whose claim was based on 
moral righteousness. Each case, judged on its merits, 
celebrates the assessment of the circumstances of individual 
parents and specific children. Expressed in the Poor Law 
provisions is a concern with a class of children, and children 
of a class; the rising generation of the 'indigent and criminally' 
poor. How else do we understand the installation of the dis­
ciplinary and educative regime directly addressed to the bastard 
child and the child of the pauper? What is common to the litigant 
and the claimant adult parent is the fact that the custodial 
relationship became a means of disciplining each; punishment 
equals the loss of custody, care and control of the child.
By 1886, the power of the state, through Chancery or through 
the Poor Laws to contest the possession of children, was in­
controvertible. The welfare of the child, however, had not 
yet become the paramount consideration in family and welfare 
law, but a concern with children, had become part and parcel 
of the disciplinary character of family law.
Brought together, Holcombe's study of the expressed concern 
over and struggles to improve the legal status of married 
women; Smart's theorization of family law as a disciplinary 
system of regulating, normalising and stabilising family 
relations; and Finer and McGregor's identification of three 
class-based jurisdictions of family law provides us with some 
theoretical pruchase on the diverse strands of family law.
The formation and termination of the marital relation, the 
regulation of the custodial relationship; the ideology of 
the obligation to maintain increasingly became a central 
concern of a secular, bureaucratic state. The sharply etched 
distinctions of 'the public' and 'the private' found in the 
common law tradition, fell away to equity's claim to protect 
those (the married woman, infants, the mad) who could not protect 
themselves, which in turn buttressed by the Poor Law provisions, 
where agents of the state assumed the custodial powers of 'natural' 
parents, and had the right to break apart the conjugal conditions 
of the marital relation.
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CONCLUSION
Several broad themes emerge from the study of family 
law in the mid-19th century; the merging of family law 
and welfare law through the common currency of legal 
categories of the family in both the family and the 
welfare sphere; the significant improvement in the legal 
status of married women; the consolidation of Chancery 
and the High Court as juridical site for resolving family 
disputes; the dynamic relationship between case law in 
Chancery and statute law; the class-specific jurisdictions 
of Chancery, the magistrates courts and the Poor Laws, finally 
the partial demise of the common law's construction of paternal 
power. Are these developments then, expressive of any new 
or different attitudes towards children, or about, childhood?
1. Leaving aside the.custodial relation conceived in personal 
and affective terms, what the law continually protected throughout 
the mid-19th century, however much it was nibbled away in case 
and statute law, was paternal power. One aspect of the material 
importance of the law's protection of a father's right to 
custody, is the extent to which;custodial powers gave fathers 
access to the property of infants and to the labour services 
of his children. Whereas equity functioned at times to protect 
an infant's property against fathers or their appointed guardians, 
and while the Factory Acts limited the extent to which children 
might be exploited by capitalists in capitalist enterprises, 
the common law tradition offered few such protections to 
children against their fathers. We have noted already the 
continuing importance of family-based enterprises and enterprises 
organised along lines of the familial division of labour, 
alongside factory-based industries. Custodial rights for many 
fathers, involved rather more than the right to determine the 
education, training and religion of their children; it also
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involves the right to control and exploit their labour.
Equity case law is entirely concerned with the former; 
where litigants were concerned about either an infant's 
property, or their upbringing, to the exclusion of facets 
of custody which were of considerable importance to many 
working class and petty bourgeois families. Nevertheless, 
it was the aspect of the custodial relation which the Poor 
Law authorities proceeded to exploit to the full in the 
instances where their authority displaced that of the father 
and mother. Therefore, while statute law was distinguishing 
between adults and children as economic agents (by limiting 
the enterprises the young might work in, and regulating the 
hours they worked and demanding some form of schooling at the 
place of work) the custodial element of family law made few 
such distinctions. In the familial and 'private' sphere, 
legally, no such distinctions were made; children could continue 
to labour for masters, whose claim to their services resided 
not only in the ownership of the means of production, but also 
in the very fabric of family law. Equity's conception of 
'protecting*infants and infants simply does not cover the 
protection of infants as workers. Equity's concern was limited 
to protecting infants from physical and symbolic violence but 
not economic exploitation.
In equity and in the Poor Laws then, there is no conception 
of childhood as.a period of grace, free from the rigours of 
labouring to live. Quite the contrary, in the Poor Laws anyway, 
where labour itself was a disciplinary technique deployed to 
snuff out the 'hereditary' tendency of paupered children to live 
a life of indolence and dissipation.
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2. The absence of sentimentality. We find no expression 
in family law (case, statute or administrative) of children 
possessing a fundamentally different humanity from adults, 
similar to modern discourses on child care. While there were 
intellectual currents in the mid-19th century celebrating (in 
the Rousseauian/Romantic tradition) the child as inherently 
innocent, essentially a child of nature, progressively corrupted 
by the shackles of adult civilisation and industrial technology, 
the law's child derives from the Calvinist/Puritan tradition (see 
Gammage 1982; 17-24). The happiness of children coincides 
with the exercise of parental (primarily paternal) authority .
So long as parents are morally upright then children would 
be trained and brought up with the correct set of moral and 
personal attitudes. While differing child-rearing practices 
were evident in the mid-19th Century, drawing upon a variety 
of intellectual traditions, the child-orientated family is not 
'the family' of family law? The education, religion, moral 
attitudes, pace of learning and its context, fit for a child 
depends not upon what is best for the child but upon what parents 
believe it is fit to provide. However, equity, through the 
doctrine of parens patriae and later by the discretionary 
powers given to it by statute, was able to determine custodial 
dispositions by drawing upon a very narrow set of attributes 
which constituted the fit parent; and the most orthodox parent 
could then be rewarded with the custody of the child. Equity did 
not work with the conception of the quality of care (used in 
the modern sense to include the ability to provide full-time 
supervision of children; displays of love, tenderness, affection) 
Neither did the Poor Law provisions. Such a conception posits 
the child as a subject specificity in need of these personal 
experiences to ensure healthy and stable development. The notion 
of 'development' being narrowly defined in terms of continuous 
moral enlightenment distances the child as the subject of family 
law from alternative conceptions of child-rearing practised by 
other bourgeois and professional families of the mid-19th century
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However, where equity's definition of child and its needs are 
most felt is not through equity's 'jurisdiction but in the 
workings of the Poor Law, which manifestly worked with precisely 
the same ideology of moral beseechment, and 'training-up' 
children, later to be found in the school-room practices
of the emergent system of compulsory education. Yet there 
is a counter-tendency, which we touch on below and which 
involves the developing claim of married women to take control, 
care and custody of their children at the expense of fathers.
The invitation to slide from legal conceptions of custodial 
relations to a more general view of the law being an 
instrument of class social control is considerable. The extent 
to which the Poor, Laws are saturated with the categories of 
family law derived from equity and common law is manifestly 
obvious, giving rise to a partially justifiable claim that 
the Poor Laws impose 'bourgeois' legal relations and 'bourgeois' 
familial attitudes on working class and paupered families. 
However, the work of social historians such as Lawrence Stone 
and Catherine Hall alludes to the problem of equating all 
family law with all the ideologies and practices of the landed 
gentry and of the bourgeoisie. Family law at best, specifically 
in matters concerning the parent-child relation, represents 
only one intellectual current, one ideological strand and one 
set of child-rearing practices amongst the many observable 
in the mid-19th century ruling classes. Indeed, family law 
'policed' bourgeois dissidents such as Annie Besant as 
effectively as it enabled one class to determine the child- 
rearing practices of another. For embedded in family law are 
categories and subjectivities which at once may well be 
entirely consonant with the way that many or most ruling class 
families ordered their day to day existence but without fractions 
of it being responsible for the formation of the legal categories 
of the law which equally governs them and the pauper family.
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Class-instrumentalist views of family law are deficient for 
two reasons. Firstly, family law concerns relations between 
men and women in marriage, and relations between parents 
and children; the legal relations focus primarily on relations 
of patriarchy, and this is-constant across families situated 
in any and all classes. Secondly, class-instrumentalist 
interpretations inadequately handle the complex and dynamic 
relationship between the state and civil society. Class 
instrumentalism presumes state power to be unproblematically 
possessed or exercised by one or a combination of economic 
classes, rather than as a site of struggle between political 
forces only insecurely attached to definite economic class 
situations. Furthermore, class instrumentalist interpretations 
overlook the fact that state institutions and state agents 
(and these may vary from judges in Chancery to wardens of 
workhouses) have the statutory power to impose meanings, exercise 
discretion, execute decisionsand re-order social relations on 
citizens as subjects of, and subject to the state, irrespective 
of class belonging. Certainly across the three jurisdictions 
of family law, there is a broadly consistent view of what the 
family should comprise and what the obligations and duties of 
each family member is, but the mechanism for legitimately floating 
off specific ideologies of the family and disciplining the 
recalcitrants who don't quite fit rests upon the specific powers 
allocated to individual state apparatuses, and these are not 
unambiguously the instruments of any one class. The consequence 
in this line of reasoning posits the'formation of an increasingly 
direct relationship between state apparatuses and children, 
but one which is not consistent across classes. The appropriation 
of children through the mechanism of the workhouse regime is 
quite dissimilar to the acquisition of children by Chancery, 
through wardship proceedings for example, but neither jurisdiction 
actually appropriates children from one class on behalf of 
another. What can be said however is that in the mid-19th century 
the state principally concerned itself with the 'welfare' of 
children of one class, through the operation of the Poor Laws,
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adopting the technique of directly inserting itself between 
parents and their children to prevent the reproduction of 
the 'hereditary' poor. It was not yet concerned with the 
health and development of all children as citizens of the 
future who were important to the continued existence of the 
race and the nation state, and therefore were to be of paramount 
consideration.
3. Age-lines and motherhood. Smart noted that the recognition 
of the married woman's claim to the custody of her children 
can be taken as the growing recognition of the social usefulness 
of mothering and motherhood. At what ages was it thought 
beneficial for children to be left in the care and control of 
mothers? Throughout the mid-19th century, judicial opinion 
continued to see the proper place for children in terms of 
the father's custodial power; they should remain in the custody 
of the patriarch while they were infants (up to 21). The struggle 
for custodial parity between husband and wife focussed primarily 
on the elevation of the legal status of married women; more so 
than any sense of children needing or wanting the specialised 
child care that mothers could, or were thought to, provide. 
However, the ages of children for whom mothers could apply 
for custody gives us some indication of the ages of childhood 
at which mothering and motherhood were regarded as important 
and beneficial.
The 1839 Act set the age at 7 years, extended to 16 in 1873 
(in the Act which also lifted the bar against custody applications 
from adulterous wives). Likewise, the Poor Law regulations 
generally provided for children under 7 to stay in the same 
wards as their mothers, or to be housed in a separate ward, 
with mothers being granted 'access at all reasonable times' 
(Pinchbeck and Hewitt II; 501). The Divorce Court was empowered 
to make custody orders on infants up to the age of 21, but 
magistrates were allowed to make discretionary custody orders 
in favour of married women on children under 10 (Bevan;253), 
suggesting that some married women were more entitled to custody
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than others. The chronological ages above offer no precise 
definition of subjects with special emotional and affective 
needs, though clearly the mother's importance to the child 
occurs in its early years of growth and development. There is 
no coherent ideology in family law yet that the welfare of 
the child being equated with either the presence of the mother 
or the quality of child care she offers or she alone can 
provide. 'Maternal deprivation' had no place in 19th century 
family law.
/
X'
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CHAPTER FOUR: POST -1886, CHILDREN OF THE STATE?
INTRODUCTION
The modern 'child' is a heavily protected species; protected 
from themselves, from their natural parents, from the local 
environment and the local community. The sheer volume of 
legislation devoted to this purpose is perhaps one of the 
defining characteristics of childhood itself; to be a child 
entails being in someone's protection. It is not new; over 
100 pieces of legislation protecting and privileging, and by 
extension creating and maintaining a singular notion of childhood 
received Queen Victoria's assent. Binding disparate pieces of 
legislation, administered through a variety of institutions 
and cutting across different spheres of law (family law, 
welfare law, employment and educational legislation) we find a 
common referent, 'the welfare of the child'.
Our purpose here is two-fold. Firstly, we shall indicate how 
judge-made definitions of 'the welfare of the child' interact 
with the legislative process of law-making. We do this to 
tease out the assumptions, about minors, about their families 
and about family arrangements embodied in judicial decisions 
and in an increasingly complex web of social administration 
directly concerned with the welfare of children. Secondly, 
it is our purpose to provide a narrative account of a continuously 
unfolding and increasingly complex relationship between the 
state and particularly statuses within the family. In this we 
shall be centrally concerned to demonstrate how the state 
forges a more direct relationship with 'its' children, for the 
sake of their physical and social welfare. We shall also 
question whether a public concern with the welfare of the child 
can be taken as a thermometer of the rise of a child-centred 
society or whether it functions as the ideological justification 
for the derogation of parental rights consequent by permitting 
the professionals in social adminstration to exercise more 
'parental' powers.
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While we are continuing to address the categories of 
family law, especially custody which specifies the legal 
and public parent-child relationship, it is significant 
that we have to add in, as soon as we speak of 'the welfare' 
or 'protection' of children, the state as an integral part 
of the formulation. The state is no longer something 'outside'; 
to which bourgeois parents surrendered themselves to resolve 
private disputes; or which appropriated children from the 
poor and immiserated. From 1886 onwards, it is the extent 
to which the state, across a variety of institutions 'borrows' 
the doctrine of parens patriae to assume the mantle of 'the 
wise and supreme parent' of all children of the nation state, 
at the expense of natural parents, which distinguishes the 
modern period of family and welfare law. In effect, children 
become subjects of and subject to the state as much as they 
were once the subordinate dependent subjects of their parents. 
Likewise, parents, while continuing to be the immediate adults 
in authority over children, who remain still as the key agents 
in the transmission of material, symbolic, social and cultural 
capital, but are so from a situation of delegated authority.
By this, we mean that parents continue to have obligations 
to their children, but unlike the imagery of the common law 
family, no longer retain unassailable rights to determine the 
quality, pace or methods of bringing them up. Recent legal 
commentators have noted the 'waning' (Hall J. C.,* 1972) or 
the 'fragmentation' (Maidment^1981) of parental rights 
Parents who neglect, abuse, fail to exercise expected levels 
of care and control, fail or refuse to send their children 
to school, or in spite of considerable effort, raise up 
children who commit criminal offences, find that their parental 
rights are suspended and their children removed from the family 
setting and placed elsewhere. 'The welfare of the child' 
disciplines parents as effectively as it protects and controls 
children.
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Let it be said immediately that we do not exist yet in 
some form of 'children's gulag' 'where the state willy-nilly 
exercises unlimited power to appropriate children; the law 
permits parental rights to be suspended but does not extinguish 
entirely the parents' existence as a legal entity capable of 
initiating legal or political action to resist the unreasonable 
exercise of state p o w e r H o w e v e r ,  not all parents are equally 
placed, by the nature of the unequal distribution of material 
and symbolic goods, to resist through the deployment of the 
law.
Because the welfare of the child has become embedded in 
many facets of the legal system and an important axis of social 
work practice, it is therefore important to sketch out its 
content, its material effects and the authoritative voice it 
gives to adults other than the child's natural parents. Let 
us refer them to the statute which sets out the welfare of 
the child as the principle on which custody, care and control 
of children was to be determined.
The Guardianship of Infants Act of 1925 in Section 1 states:
'Where in any proceedings before any Court ...
a. the custody or the upbringing of an infant; or
b. the administration of any property belonging
to or held on trust for an infant, or the appli­
cation of the income thereof,
is in question, the court in deciding, shall regard 
the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount 
consideration and shall not take into consideration 
whether from any other point of view the claim of 
the father in respect of such custody, upbringing, 
administration or application is superior to that
of the mother, or the claim of the mother is
superior to that of the father.'
(my emphasis)
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Erase 'infant', replace with 'minor' and we find the
identical wording some 46 years later in the 1971
7
Guardianship of Minors Act
What constitutes 'welfare' is less important than its 
deployment (with respect to children) to transform 
radically the position of infants and parents in 'any 
court' in matters of custody. The courts are required 
to discount the claims of the father and the mother 
(previously protected in slîatute, common law and equity) 
and instead to view custody cases from an entirely different 
perspective; what arrangements will be in the best interests 
of the child. More importantly, this statute (and its 
successors) allows for some arbitrational body (here, 'any 
court') to insert itself between the parents and the children, 
in the interests of determining how children's welfare is to 
be best secured. It severs the identity of interest between 
parental custody and child welfare. That principle now extends 
over all the branches of law exercising jurisdiction over 
children; from divorce law, wardship proceedings, social 
welfare law and to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
It is a principle which creates a judicial and administrative 
space, into which judges, social workers, court welfare officers, 
officers of the juvenile bureaux, children's panels of the 
social service departments, educational psychologists and so 
on, may be inserted. Once the fissure between parents and 
their children was socially created, then the ensemble of 
family relations is open to inspection and regulation by a 
variety of state apparatuses ® .
The 1925 statute was not the first, the main or the only 
means by which the welfare of the child became a major 
element of family and welfare law. We shall find a similar 
privileging of children as an embedded part of equity's 
gradual development of parens patriae, in the rhetoric 
of the eugenicist movement, in the concern to provide school 
meals and a schools medical service and in the organisations
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concerned with preventing cruelty to children and in the 
political struggles seeking to establish a family wage.
Whereas some commentators view the public and formal expression 
of a concern with the welfare of children as indicative of a 
shift in sentiment and moral attitudes to and about childhood 
(Pinchbeck and Hewitt II; 347), of equal importance is the 
extent to which the welfare of children provided an ideological 
justification for state agents from dispersed institutions to 
attach themselves to the family.
For what follows on from determining, as a general and guiding 
principle, that a child's welfare is of the first and paramount 
consideration, and is not necessarily identical with it being 
in parental custody, is a creation of techniques and criteria 
for assessing welfare and establishing some means to see that 
welfare is secured. Enter the personnel with expertise, 
certified professional competence, moral standing and requisite 
authority to 'speak' for children; the social worker, the 
NSPCC inspector, the medical profession, the health visitor 
and the environmental health officer. Legislation which saved 
children from neglect, abuse and exploitation simultaneously 
created the conditions for social and professional grouping 
of adults to bring to bear a complex web of ideologies and 
theories to describe, account, assess and execute social 
policies whose justification depends upon reference to the 
welfare of the child^ . In sum, the material effect^legislation 
referring to the welfare of the child generated the rise of 
professional child savers whose separate and different practices 
are justified by their explicit concern to act in the interests 
of children. However, their ideologies and practices simulta­
neously constitute what is to count as a 'normal' childhood 
and 'ordinary' family life.
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If one cuts through the stylistic opacity and the attendant 
neologisms of Jacques Donzelot's (1979) The Policing of Families 
(subtitled Welfare versus the State), there is to be found a 
very complex and elaborated argument broadly similar to that 
presented above. The family in Donzelot's work is a point of 
confluence between different ideologies, technologies and 
practices, articulated to different family members, but whose 
end is the preservation of children. For example, he argues 
that the particular concern with 'motherhood', providing 
mothers with the necessary techniques in baby-care, nutrition, 
hygiene and the provision of guides to help child-raising 
ensured on the one hand the rearing of healthy and properly 
socialized children; on the other, secured for mothers a 
privileged relationship in respect of children. Concern 
for the preservation of children, affected not only children 
within families but repositioned mothers insofar as they became 
singularly important in the strategy of raising up a healthy 
population. More interestingly, though is his broad argument 
that philanthropic and then state agencies (in sequence) become 
attached not to the family unit per se. Rather, the state 
enters and polices the family through a strategy of different 
agencies observing and regulating the practices of individual 
family members; being concerned with the employment prospects 
of, and directing fiscal support, to fathers; surrounding mothers 
with experts in hygiene, health and child development; providing 
education, separate juvenile courts, and educational psychologists 
to 'assist' children.
Donzelot's account of the state’s interventionist strategy 
describes a process entailing a) The individuation of family 
members, where each member is allocated specific duties and 
obligations one to the other. In supporting, and encouraging 
individual family members to fulfill these duties and obligations 
simultaneously, each member's importance is confirmed and the 
general well-being of the unit is secured, b) A multiplicity
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of ideologies and practices at play within the family 
separately and together confirming the correct relationship 
of each family member to the other, c) A process which at 
once shifts the balance of forces within the family, without 
destroying the unit as an entity recognisable as a 'family'.
For example, it is quite possible to destroy the absolute 
rights fathers had to the custody of children by defining 
and sustaining the importance of motherhood without removing 
the dependence of mothers and children on the male breadwinner, 
d) 'Intervention' or 'policing' involves a dual process of 
'observation' - collecting information, providing knowledges 
about families which then programmes finely graded patterns 
of 'regulation' (one extremity being 'assistantial', the 
provision of money, advice, help; the other extremity being 
'appropriation', where children are taken away from their 
parents). It is a historical process which at once differentiates 
and valorizes the structural positions comprising the family 
but draws on the guiding principle of the paramount consideration 
being the welfare of children. Buy why this principle and no 
other? Why not preserve the singular authority of the family 
set out in common law, 'the little commonwealth'? (Schochet; 95) .
Entailed in the conception of the family as 'the little 
commonwealth' are two competing and contradictory tendencies. 
Firstly, it is the corollary of the nation state ruled by 
the divine right of the sovereign; a divinely-given order of 
personal ties and obligations, an autonomous sphere of 
'charismatic' government. The nature of the state is 
encapsulated within the relationship of the patriarch and 
his dependent subordinates; the state is like the family, the 
family mirrors the state, each legitimating the other, by the 
similarity of images. Secondly, however, because the family 
is an autonomous sphere, how is it possible to regulate the 
production of children (in terms of quantity), regulate their 
cultural, political and economic socialization such that they 
do not become a danger to existing political, social and 
economic system? . In Donzelot's account, the family of the
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ancien regime; the autonomous, self-regulating system of 
governing individuals ceased to be the cell-form of 'the 
social' and became 'the enemy of civilisation' precisely 
because it had the juridicial power to repel invasion, 
interrogation and regulation of a state whose mode of 
domination and control had shifted from the invocation of 
'charismatic' (and kingly) authority to the impersonal 
application of abstract rules (the legal-rational mode of 
domination, in Weber's terms) . Too many children, 
wandering children, unregulated children cut loose from 
family ties, gathering in gangs, the depravity of children 
of different sexes sharing the same bed, spoke the fears 
of unregulated family life.
Transforming the family, undercutting its juridicial 
autonomy, while at the same time retaining its structure, 
Donzelot argues, involved two strategic lines of invasion;
'From being the plexus of a complex web of 
relations of dependence and allégeance, the 
family became the nexus of nerve endings 
of machinery that was exterior to it. Those 
new mechanisms acted on the family as the basis 
of a double game that eventually required its 
juridical conversion. On the one hand, they 
penetrated it directly, turning family members, 
with the help of the norm, against patriarchal 
authority, organising - in the name of the 
hygienic and educative protection of these 
members - the depletion of parental authority 
in general, and placing the family under an 
economic-moral tutelage. On the other hand, 
they induced the new norms as being so many 
advantages, favoring a more complete realization 
of the family's goal of increased autonomy.
They relied on a liberalization of intrafamilial
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relationships to get the norms accepted. 
Only five years separated the law on divorce 
(1884) and the law on the destitution of 
parental authority (1889).'
Donzelot (1979; 91).
A process combining 'public assistance' with moral 
regulation; in extremis, the civil rights of parents were 
suspended in order to save children from destitution and 
delinquency. While this was a strategy applicable to 
paupered and working class families, those families 
demonstrating ' a capacity for economic autonomy' escaped 
the attentions of public authorities as long as the new 
'liberality of the contract between conjugal partners' 
continued to produce socially useful members (91-92). The 
simultaneous application of class-specific carrots and 
sticks enmeshed all families and household in some kind of 
exchange with the state through a series of 'bridges', 
coupling the family with the system of public assistance, 
the schools, the juvenile courts, medicine and psychiatry (p.89)
The temporalities of the exchange between the state and the 
family, the matrix of institutions comprising the state, 
the historical trajectory of family law in France necessarily 
means that The Policing of Families has only a limited 
applicability in the English context. Also, his presentation 
of women as the willing dupes of philanthropy, law and 
medicine, the absence of any account of the feminist struggles 
to rewrite the legal subjectivity of married women mitigates 
against the uncritical acceptance of all that Donzelot has 
to say. However, some aspects of his study (given the homology 
between 'the preservation' and 'the welfare' of children) 
are particularly useful. Most pertinent perhaps is his 
conception of the 'preservation of children' as having no 
particular or singular point of origin but emerging from a
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multiplicity of social sites and joining together diverse 
institutions, agents, practices and ideologies. This view 
runs simultaneously with a complex view of the state-family 
nexus, which eschews any view of a monolithic state or an 
undifferentiated family 'unit'. Rather, it is the inter, 
and intra familial relations 'the differences between 
working class and bourgeois families'; the differences 
between family members that the various agencies of the 
state (and it delegated authorities in civil society) 
precisely play upon as means to install the mechanisms of 
investigation and regulation. By these means we can ease 
our way around two inviting but equally limiting notions 
of the family. Firstly, we can avoid the 'top-down' version 
offered by Stone and Aries, which argues for the downward 
transmission of transformations which took place in the 
bourgeois family, into the working class family. Signifi­
cantly, these accounts provide no mechanism for 'the spread 
of the modern organization from the bourgeoisie to the classes 
populaire (... 'the lower classes')'. (Hussain and Hodges 1979; 
88). Secondly, we can avoid the reductionisms inherent in 
the 'reproduction of labour power' thesis. Now this thesis is 
observable across Marxist-functionalist accounts of welfare
provision and in socialist-feminist accounts of the family in
10
relationship to capitalism . The problem here resides in the 
difficulty of allocating the state, the institutions comprising 
it, social and welfare policies which these institutions 
initiate and execute, any autonomy from the needs, interests 
and politics of classes in struggle. This makes it difficult 
to consider or analyse the state as crucial reproducer of 
patriarchal relations on the one hand, while on the other, 
allows little theoretical space for us to consider the material 
effects of social policies, welfare and family law other than 
as direct expressions of classed interests. Clearly, the 
state exists within, and the law, legislation and social 
policies have effects upon, a class-divided social formation 
and consequently differentially felt and experienced by economic
— 4-84- —
groups. However, these laws and policies have the power 
to constitute subjectivities (along the lines of race, 
gender and age), producing social identities and social 
relationships which are not wholly identical with those 
arising from economic class situations; married women and 
illegitimate children, for example, are social categories 
present across all economic classes who have been distinc­
tively disadvantaged (historically), whatever their class 
situation. When we turn to a specific principle such as 
the welfare of children, a principle upon which large areas 
of social life are organised, we are forced to accept the 
material effects of law, legislation and social policy.
The crucial point to retain is that a theory of the family 
must look two ways; to capitalist division of labour and 
the state. Thereby we can avoid two compelling accounts 
of the changing nature of familial relations. Firstly, 
that the family-household expands, contracts, changes in 
form according to the changing process of capitalist accu­
mulation. Secondly, and an extension of the above, that 
the spread of 'the modern family' is located in the mechanism 
of 'social control'; wherein one class forces or imposes 
cultural, social and economic social relations on another 
(which necessarily requires an instrumentalist state 
operating unproblematically for the ruling class). We can 
do this, without jettisoning the social categories of class, 
as we suggested earlier by acknowledging that the differences 
between class situations and class practices are deployed 
by the state in governing civil society.
One theoretical effect of this argument requires us to 
acknowledge the material effects of legislation, and the. impact 
of ideologies generated by the child savers on family form 
and family relations. We are required to consider the effect 
of the state separate from the effects of a capitalistic 
economy. While the latter may adequately account for the 
general demise of petty commodity production in households
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and the general separation, of the sphere of production 
from the domestic sphere, we also need to account for 
the impact of social policies which shape and support 
specific and detailed family forms by describing the 
appropriate character of the relations between individual 
family members. Why fathers should be privileged as 
custodians historically, to be superseded later by the 
practice of placing children in the mother's care (as in 
divorce law) why maternal deprivation was thought to cause 
long-term psychological problems but not paternal deprivation, 
are examples of the material effects of the state, firstly 
developing images of what the internal relationships of the 
family should be and then directing resources, and making 
custody dispositions accordingly.
We need to concern ourselves with the multiple determinations 
at work which describe and account for the development of 'the 
welfare of the child' as the first and paramount consideration, 
not simply as an index of the rise of a child-oriented social 
formation, but as a meeting point where different (and sometimes 
conflicting) social forces, ideologies and practices join, and 
effectively transform the balance of relations between indi­
vidual family members. We shall argue that through the 
'welfare of the child', not only did the state ensure the 
welfare and survival of children but ended up transforming 
the relations obtaining between spouses and between parents 
and children. The elements of this transformation we now 
set out below.
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1. Case Law and Custody
One aspect of the importance of case law is its interactive 
capacity with statute law. The two cases we discuss below 
are an interesting example of this process. In Agar-Ellis 
(1883) the court's findings prompted statutory measures to 
remove a visible injustice. In R. vs Gyngall (1893), the 
court's ruling set out principles later adopted as taken up 
in statute form and justified on the grounds that this 
represented the law as it then stood. The content of these 
cases however are crucial indicators of an important shift 
in how the High Courts treated questions of custody, and 
their dispositions represent a significant change in the 
legal relationship between the family and the state.
Agar-Ellis (1883) concerns a 16 year old girl, who in a 
lower court, by writ of habeas corpus had applied for the 
right to stay with her mother. The lower court had argued 
that in the absence of any suggested fault on the part of 
thefather, the court had no jurisdiction to interfere with 
the legal right of the father, to control the custody and 
education of his children (p. 319). The father had also 
prevented uncensored mail passing from mother to daughter 
and would not allow the daughter access to the mother. The 
lower court had stuck to the principles of common law (a 
father's sole right to custody; hearing a writ of habeas 
corpus), which then went to Appeal in 1883 as the above­
cited case.
The Chancery Court at once established that the girl was 
over the age of discretion (16 years for girls, 14 for boys) 
and was therefore entitled to petition under a writ of habeas 
corpus. Chancery then establishes its own powers of 
jurisdiction.
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'If the principles laid down by the Appellants 
(the girl and the mother) were to be adopted 
by the Court, they would produce a revolution 
in the relations of the father and the child.
Most cases cited are decisions at Common Law 
on writ of Habeas Corpus (but) ... in all cases 
relating to infants the Rules of equity are to 
prevail.'
(p. 323). (my emphasis)
The common law rights of the girl, to bring a writ of 
habeas corpus are quickly disregarded in a display of 
judicial support for the father's right to hold the sole 
custody of his children. The girl's writ suggests Brett M.R
'... seems to me to be directly contrary 
to the law of England which is, that the 
father has control over the person, the 
education and the conduct of his children 
until they are 21 years of age. That is 
the law.'
(p. 325).
Later, he continues:
'The law does not interfere (with the rights 
of the father) because of the great faith, 
and trust it has in the-natural affection 
of the father to perform his duties and 
therefore gives him corresponding rights.'
(p. 328).
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He ends with stating the general principles upon which 
equity acts.
'The Court must act upon the general 
rule, and say that on account of the 
general trust which the law reposes in 
the natural affection of a father, this 
case is not brought within any rules 
which authorizes the Court to interfere.'
(p. 329).
So the Court's benign trust in the father to exercise 
his rights in a responsible manner is a far more important 
consideration than the abrogation of an infant's right to 
pursue her legal rights under a writ of habeas corpus. To 
change it, as Bowen earlier argued, would certainly 
revolutionise father-child relations!
Cotton L. J., in his judgement continues to place the Court 
in a position such that it cannot act on behalf of infants 
against blameless fathers, because,
'... it is for the general interest of families, 
and for the general interest of the children, 
and really for the interests of the particular 
infant, that the Court should not, except in 
very extreme cases, interfere with the discretion 
of the father, but leave to him that power 
which nature has given him by the birth of 
the child.'
( p. 334).
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In all this, the mother and her rights, duties and 
obligations are absent. Regardless of claims to custody, 
she may have in statute (at divorce or on separation) 
the Equity rules , simply address the issue purely in 
terms of the father's rights and obligations.
Likewise the 1873 Custody of Infants Act gets short shrift. 
Bowen L. J., acknowledges that;
'... we must regard the benefit of the 
infant; but then it must be remembered 
that if the words 'benefit of the infant' 
are used in any but the accurate sense, 
it would be a fallacious test to apply 
to the way the Court exercises its 
jurisdiction over the infant by the way 
of interference with the father'.
(p. 337).
Ergo, we must also have regard 'to the natural law which 
points out that a father knows far better as a rule what 
is good for his children than a Court of Justice can'
(ibid).
Thus, all the statutory intentions for courts having regard 
for the benefit of the child disappear under a welter of 
words which condense down into a simple statement, that the 
child is best served by remaining in the father's custody. 
It was a judgement at odds with statutory intentions set 
out in 1873, and with the new legal rights accorded to 
married women, in matters of property. By this judgement, 
married women exercised considerable rights to possess, 
control and alienate property, but had no corresponding 
rights in the matter of either physically possessing or 
having custody rights over children of the marriage.
Unlike unwed mothers of illegitimate children, who in the 
same year (Reg vs Nash (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 454 C.A.) were held
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to have a right to claim custody of those children (0. Stone 
op.cit. 72). We may appreciate now why Stone argues that 
this 'strong' decision provoked the 1886 Guardianship of 
Children Act.
In Agar-Ellis, the material circumstances of the girl 
disappear in the celebration of the very principle of legal 
patriarchy; the 'natural' right of the father qua father 
to dominate his children. Her writ represents a threat to 
the social body, 'the general interests of children and the 
general interests of families' which the court entrusts to 
the good management of the patriarch. The 'social' as con­
structed by the bench is a set of households, internally 
regulated by a set of natural laws, stemming from the father's 
natural affection for, and responsibilities to, those in his 
domain. The family is the cell form of the well ordered 
society with sacred duties to perform, and where the court 
intervenes at its peril. What is to be regarded as most 
beneficial to the infant therefore, is their continued sub­
servience and obedience to the father's wishes.
By contrast, if Agar-Ellis celebrates legal patriarchy, 
the case of Reg v Gyngall (1893) 2 Q.B. 232, celebrates its 
decomposition. Gyngall is of some importance for its new 
reading of parens patriae, the elaboration of the notion 
'the welfare of the child', and finally for the space 
created for the interventionist state.
Lord Esher puts parens patriae in play in a revolutionary 
way:
'... the Chancery Court was put to act on 
behalf of the Crown as being the guardian 
of all infants, in place of a parent, and 
as if it were the parent of the child, thus 
superseding the natural guardianship of the 
parent'. (239).
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Chancery becomes the guardian of all children, it 
functions as if it were a parent, and importantly, its 
jurisdiction supersedes the natural guardianship of parents. 
Further, as 'the supreme parent of the child':
'The Court has to consider what is for 
the welfare of the child and for her 
happiness, what are her prospects ...'
(p. 243).
Thus the empire of the father and the natural rights 
of parents decompose in a judgement where Chancery 
'acting as a wise and high minded parent' (p. 245), 
fabricates a direct relationship not only with child 
heirs but with all children. We can see the doctrine 
intact in the principles of the Guardianship of Minors 
Act 1971.
In Reg vs Gyngall, we find the statutory requirement 
that the welfare of the child should be placed above the 
wishes of either parent, not only made effective but in 
some ways extended. Firstly, the court begins to take 
account of the wishes of the infant. Lord Esher, for 
example, acknowledges earlier judgements that spoke of 
this matter and notes that other courts fear that to 
acknowledge that a child had the power to consent to 
custody 'would be entirely to subvert the whole law of 
the family' (p. 241). Though not citing Agar-Ellis,
directly this argument is familiar to us, and is revealing 
of the extent to which courts had sought historically, to 
preserve the stability of the family by silencing the voices 
of infants. In Gyngall, Esher asserts that 'wishes' and 
'consent' are not the same, and that the wishes of an infant, 
over the age of discretion, are important too in assessing 
'what is for the welfare of the child and for her happiness' 
(241-243). Welfare begins to refer to the physical and moral
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emotional and mental well-being of children, a definition 
taken up in later Acts directly affecting the custody of 
children.
In Agar-Ellis (1883) and Gyngall (1893), we find a 
contrast between the 'old' discursive formation bounded by 
Common Law principles and the 'modern' conception of family 
law; the sphere of private regulation, gradually displaced 
by the superintending power of the state. The silent infant 
of the common law's family is replaced by the infant in 
equity, accorded the status of being a speaking subject. 
Simultaneously though, the infant stands in relief as an 
object of intra-familial dispute. Against this, we have 
to recognise that the principle of 'the welfare of the 
child' as the criterion for custody dispositions, allowed 
equity considerable powers over and above the rights of 
natural parents. 'Welfare of the child' remained a vague 
enough concept for the courts to begin to inscribe the 
contents of 'welfare' in the application of a general 
principle.
2. Legislation on Guardianship and Custody; ' a history 
of a change of attitude'?
Taken together, the series of acts covering guardianship 
and custody (Custody of Infants Act 1839, Custody of 
Infants Act 1873, Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, Custody 
of Children Act 1891, Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women)
Act 1895, Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, Guardianship 
of Minors Act 1971, Guardianship Act 1973), were the material 
means of effecting the shift of the balance of custodial 
powers between husband and wife. A 'history of change in 
attitude', Bromley calls them, which collectively 'whittle 
down the father's rights further and also give the mother 
positive rights to custody which even equity did not accord 
her' (Bromley op.cit; 306). Here we find who was to have
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the physical possession of, and provide day-care for them, 
and who would determine a child's education (its nature 
and length) and its religious affilliation.
The Guardianship Act of 1886, like previous similar 
legislation indirectly concerned itself with the welfare 
of children. Primarily, it was legislation giving 'legal 
rights to the mother of legitimate children in the presence 
of her husband' (Stone op.cit; 71). High Courts were now 
allowed to grant mothers custody of infants up to the age 
of majority. Furthermore, it repealed a father's right 
to oust the authority of the mother after his death; for 
any testamentary guardians appointed by him were to act 
jointly with the mother. Note 'jointly'; a mother's 
right to custody of the children after the death of her 
husband was not superior, only equal to that of other 
testamentary guardians. Mothers and testamentary guardians, 
in any dispute, were litigants of equal standing before 
the courts. Courts were also required to regard 'the welfare 
of the child' as separate consideration. Once installed, 
this principle allowed mothers guilty of misconduct to be 
awarded custody if the courts thought it was in the child's 
interest to do so (Pinchbeck and Hewitt; 382-383) .
'A history of a change of attitude'? Closer examination of 
the legal situation of husband and wife, parents and children 
in the late 19th century suggests an elaborate double game.
The 1886 Act, the 1895 Summary Jurisdiction Act (and later 
still the 1925 Guardianship Act) seemingly extend the custodial 
powers of mothers while sustaining and preserving the position 
of the father as head of the household (Brophy 1982; 151).
The formal and public acceptance of the custodial rights of 
mothers set out in case law and legislation was to be achieved 
at the cost of affirming the married woman's mothering role 
while affirming her dependence on her husband, and hardly 
disturbing his power to determine the life-chances of children 
in, or of the marriage. The key to understanding the dual process
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of legislation seemingly loosening the ties between fathers 
and children is to consider the powers delegated to High 
Court judges and magistrates in the acts. There was a 
transfer of patriarchal power, not so much an erosion; 
custodial and guardianship rights were not granted unambigu­
ously and independently, to married women, but it was left 
to the discretion of the courts to determine which parent 
would be granted custody (Grossberg 1983; 236). A judicial 
power considerably enhanced post-1886 when courts were 
required to 'have regard for the welfare of the child'.
As a brief illustration let us consider the Summary 
Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 189 5. It required married 
women to prove 'aggravated assault, desertion, persistent 
cruelty or wilful neglect to provide for her children', 
against her husband, such that she had to establish a separate 
residence. Both conditions assault etc. and separate 
residence had to be met before she could apply to the 
magistrates for custody of children (up to the age of 16) 
and maintenance for their up-keep (Brophy op.cit.; 167).
Like the legislation before it, the 1895 Act considered 
custody as an issue only when a) a father had failed (in 
the eyes of the court) his responsibility, b) a break up 
of the marriage (separation, divorce) occurred, c) marriage 
terminated by death. Within marriage, the father remained 
the sole custodian; he retained the power to create guardians 
after death whose authority was equal to that of his surviving 
spouse; his obligations to maintain his wife and children were 
unenforceable but formally and customarily they remained his 
subordinate dependents. On the break up of marriage, custody 
passed to a married woman only at the behest of courts; at 
death, testamentary guardians were empowered to challenge 
a mother's custodial authority, again before the courts.
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Whenever marriages were in danger, or breaking apart 
therefore, married women assumed custodial powers only after 
their behaviour dm marriage was assessed by jurists and it 
was to their power she had to defer, not that of her husband. 
The married woman's dependence shifts from the husband to 
the authority of the judiciary with its powers to award 
custody, and equally importantly, maintenance, to enable 
her to live in some kind of autonomous existence outside 
her husband's domain.
The 'expanded presence' (Grossberg op.cit; 237) of married 
women in the legal sphere should not blind us to the continued 
existence in the courts of an ideology which celebrated the 
family as an area governed by fathers and maintained by mothers 
Nowhere is this more evident in the way that the historical 
development of the conception of 'custody' unfolded, superbly 
analysed by Brophy in her interpretation of the 1925 
Guardianship of Infants Act (Brophy 1982).
What she detects is the splitting apart of the bundle of 
rights, duties and obligations pertaining between parents 
and children which collectively describe 'custody', such 
that day care and child-rearing were made the realm of mothers, 
formally separated from the custodial powers of fathers who 
still retained the power to determine the education, religion, 
vocational training and future occupation of children of the 
marriage. This remained so after marriages had broken up 
or terminated. So, even where married women were awarded the 
physical possession of children, the hierarchical arrangement 
of 'the common law family' could be perpetuated and sustained 
by and through the powers of the courts. By so doing, what 
was to be for the welfare of the child worked along two 
different axes. Firstly, child care was construed as women's 
work and of utmost benefit to children. However, child care 
is domestic work which makes it difficult for women to detach 
themselves from the home and become economically independent.
In turn, this means an increased dependence on the good will 
of husbands and the discretionary power of courts. Secondly,
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married men could at once be freed of an open-ended 
obligation to maintain (the courts delineated the amount 
of maintenance) whilst retaining considerable powers over 
spouses and children not living under his physical potestas.
They remained 'his' without being his physical possessions.
The feminists struggles of the early 1920s forcing the 
issue of custody on to the political agenda provoked 
powerful opposition from parliamentarians and lawyers 
(see Brophy, 150-156). Opposition, which fundamentally 
grounded its arguments in saving and stabilising the family.
Or at least saving 'the family' as founded in nature;
'Nature takes the thoroughly straight­
forward and natural line that marriage 
is partnership. The father has his definite
duties, and the mother has the more intimate
domestic duties'.
(H. C. Debates 1921, quoted in Brophy; 154).
The ideological 'spheres of men' and 'spheres of women' 
within families, slightling references to 'petticoat 
government' already existing in the nations households, 
and the impossibility of inserting legal jurisdiction into 
a relationship based on 'understanding and mutual forebearance', 
love and affection was the discourse deployed against the
feminist appeals for relief from inequalities suffered by
women in marriage. Unequal treatment before the law 
compared with husbands, compared with unmarried women, in 
matters of custody, the feminists argued, left the married 
woman as a second class citizen (Brophy; 151). Moreover, 
they argued that custody gave husbands leverage to force 
married women to stay in marriages which in many respects 
were intolerable, because husbands could threaten mothers 
with the loss of access to children if they left. Brophy 
correctly argues that this Act gave women some further 
rights to go before courts to acquire the custody of children.
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but more importantly, the Act demonstrates the state's 
concern to preserve one version of familial relations 
namely 'the natural' order of things.
Feminists and defenders of the 'natural' family deployed 
'the welfare of children'; the former arguing that they 
were powerless to intercede on behalf of children; the 
latter arguing that joint custody would undermine existing 
relations of authority, destabilize and therefore endanger 
the welfare of children (Brophy; 158).
Where did the 1925 Act leave custodial relations? Brophy 
concludes, 'Essentially, it did not intervene directly in 
the common law rights of fathers as sole legal guardians. 
Thus a mother could not exercise any parental right without 
her husband's consent. If he disagreed, she must apply to, 
the courts to assert her wishes. In the absence of legal 
proceedings her opinion as to what might be in a child's 
best interest was still to remain secondary to that of 
the husband.' (Brophy; 163).
One further effect of installing the principle of the 
welfare of the child as the criterion for deciding 
custody dispositions was the expansion of the state's 
power to investigate the psycho-social interior of the 
family. The 'private domain' of the family, the sphere 
of the intimate and affective relations became a terrain 
legitimately open to inspection and regulation for the 
sake of the children, regardless of the claims that this 
was an impossible area to legislate.
In case law it is interesting-to,note how the judges 
deployed the Act to bolster the natural parents' right 
to remain as the prime custodians. In Re Thain, Thaine 
V Taylor (1926) 1 Ch. 676, where on re-marriage, a father
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applied to the courts for the custody of a daughter 
of his first marriage (the first wife died), his daughter 
having been placed in the care of another couple in the 
interim, was awarded custody. He had, in judicial terms, 
'improved his station' (i.e. re-formed a family) and thus 
the court declared 'it was well-settled practice that the 
claim of the father must prevail, unless the court was 
judicially satisfied that the welfare of the child required 
that the parental right should be suspended' (676). Moreover, 
the court held that while the welfare of the child should 
be the paramount, it was not the sole consideration. What 
other considerations were material are revealed in their 
citation of Re O'Hara (1900) 2 I.R. and reading this passage 
into their judgement:
'Where a parent is of blameless life, and 
is able and willing to provide for the 
child's material and moral necessities ... 
the court is ... judicially bound to act 
on what is equally a law of nature and 
society, and to hold ... the best place 
for the child is with its parents'.
What the judicial utterances confirm here is the extent 
to which the state continued to promote the rights of 
natural parents in respect of their children, while simul­
taneously making that parenthood increasingly conditional 
upon specific performance. Parents living 'blameless 
lives', 'unimpeachable parents' (Re Thain; 684) were safe, 
and by the laws of nature and society, children were best 
left with them. Though we have looked at a series of acts 
fundamentally concerned with children and their welfare, 
we look in vain for anything pertaining to the rights of 
children against their parents. These acts simply allow 
courts and parents (in existing marriages) unproblematically 
to determine what was in a child's best interest and what
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was to constitute children's welfare. The primacy of 
parental authority which these acts assiduously confirmed, 
that strand of law which continually supported the location 
of children as the dependant subordinates of their natural 
parents, had one dire consequence. Their effect, until the 
middle of the 19th century, made it extremely difficult to 
protect children against wilfully neglectful, physically 
abusive or exploitative parents. Protecting children against 
their parents required a separate series of social interventions 
in order to free some of them from the nightmare existence of 
an abusive family.
3. The Protection of Children
'... a few weeks later (in 1882), at a 
meeting organised by the Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, an 
appeal for a Dog's Home became extended 
into an appeal for the protection of 
children'.
(Pinchbeck and Hewitt II; 622) .
The strange beginnings of the National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children is one of the curios 
of English social policy . Founded in the early 1880's, 
the rise of the federation of urban-based societies 
formed to protect children against cruelty and abuse, 
speaks the extent which the courts still supported the rights 
of parents and guardians to raise and rule their young 
charges as they wished. The courts' assumptions of 
parental rights, and, the effective working of parens patriae, 
materialized only after parents surrendered themselves to 
law. Staying out of its orbit meant that the familial 
governance of children remained intact. In the absence of
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any administrative machinery, a philanthropic body, with 
the powers to go before the Courts, as an interested party 
acting altruistically on behalf of children, found it difficult 
in the extreme to ’save' children from the family. In common 
law, there were criminal sanctions against extreme physical 
abuse of children by their parents, certainly criminal sanctions 
against child-killing. However, the rules of criminal evidence 
applied, such that intent and actual evidence of undeniable 
physical injury had to be proved for parents to be found guilty. 
Where failure to protect led to death or injury, courts were 
ready to acquit, or at least convict on a lesser charge ( e.g. 
manslaughter not murder) (Bevan op.cit.; 175-176). It was 
through statute law, legislation pressed for by a variety of 
philanthropic and church societies, that the apparatus was 
established to allow a third party to go before the courts to 
wrest control of children away from parents. The latter half 
of the 19th century is thus marked by the creation of corporate 
entities statutorily entitled to apply for the custody of 
children. Predominantly these were to be administrative branches 
of the state, but not completely so (the NSPCC, Dr. Barnado's, 
children's friendly societies were others empowered to contest 
parental custody).
The formation of the modern notion of protective custody for 
children draws upon a diverse set of legislative and administrative 
initiatives (Parton 1979, Geach 1980;1983). The process of de­
constructing the common law and equity tradition of the prior 
right of parents was difficult. Whatever else the common law 
tradition represented or accomplished, it had historically been 
a buttress against the exercise of arbitrary state power over 
individual citizens. The National Society for Women's Suffrage 
for example attacked certain provisions of the (then proposed)
Infant Life Protection legislation (provisions dealing with the 
licensing of day nurses) precisely on the grounds of state inter­
ference. 'The responsibility, they argued, for the child in infancy 
as in later life lies with (parents), and we emphatically 
deny that the State has any right to dictate to them the way 
it shall be fulfilled' (quoted in Pinchbeck and Hewitt II; 618) . 
Recall that equity assumed the wise and supreme mantle of 
parenthood of all infants by carefully asserting its long
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historical precedence, deriving from the Crown, to act as 
the protector of all those who were unable to protect 
themselves. The courts were at all times sensitive to the 
charge that they were wantonly interfering with private 
rights. Not surprisingly then we find the State interceding 
between parents and children, for the protection of children, 
occurring in a class specific manner; removing children 
from the families of social groups least able to defend 
themselves at law, and most open to the charges of neglecting 
and abusing children. Note also the extent to which the - 
powers of the state to remove children from natural parents 
into the protective custody of a 'fit person' (which describes 
the conspectus of the operation of all the Children's Acts, 
and Children and Young Person legislation since 1908 through 
to the Child Care Act 1982), derive substantially but not 
wholly from the Poor Law jurisdiction (Maidment 1983; Stone 0- 
1976).
There was, and is, strong tradition amongst liberal juridico- 
political theorists, that while the state should not interfere 
with the rights of citizens, conversely it had a duty to 
protect those who were politically incompetent, those who 
could not protect themselves and protect itself against the 
miscreants who mindfully ignored the social contract between 
citizen and the state (Eccleshall 1979). The kind of state 
paternalism which is inherently a part of child protection 
legislation legitimately drew on this political tradition. 
Little wonder also that child protection should be bound up 
with the older version of state paternalism found in the 
Poor Law system of relief, and shares its classed character.
One point of convergence between the two enterprises was the 
Poor Law Amendment Act 1868, (section 7) which made it an 
offence for a parent wilfully to neglect to provide adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, medical aid or lodging for children
-r503 -
under 14 years of age in the custody of an adult, such 
that their health might be seriously injured (Bevan, op.cit.; 
177). This act intended to remedy a moribund common law rule 
protecting children from violent parents but significantly 
extended by writing in 'neglect' as a sufficient condition for 
an offence.
If we are to identify the initiatives which shifted the balance 
between parental and state protective custody, however, it is 
a group of acts passed in the late 19th century which are 
most important; Children's Act (Prevention of Cruelty to, and 
Protection of Children) 1889, amended, and replaced by the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 189 4, the Custody of 
Children Act 1891, and the Poor Law Adoption Act 1889 (Bevan, 
op.cit; 177; Stone O. op.cit; 246-247; Bromley, 340-342;
Maidment, 1983, 71-73). Olive Stone called the 1889 Act 'the 
first great Children Act' (p. 246). The Lord Chancellor at the 
time said of the 1891 Act, 'It gives the poorer child the same 
protection given by the Court of Chancery to wealthier children 
who have property bestowed upon them' (quoted in Pinchbeck and 
Hewitt II; 385). For Maidment, current powers for local 
authorities to assume parental rights, draw directly on the 
1889 Acts. Let us then set out briefly the principles of child 
welfare established by these legislative initiatives.
a) The 1868 Poor Law Amendment Act, making neglect and 
physical cruelty to children an offence, was considerably 
extended and reinforced by the 1889 Prevention of Cruelty to, 
and Protection of Children Act. This remains a central feature 
of later Children and Young Persons Acts (but extended 
principally by the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act, sect. 1, 
which states that anyone over 16 in charge of, having care or 
custody of anyone under that age who wilfully neglects, assaults, 
ill-treats, exposes or causes unnecessary suffering or injury 
to health, is guilty of an offence) (see Bromley; 341). The 
federation of local NSPCC societies. Booth and the Salvation
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Army were primarily responsible for the investigation and 
publicity bringing attention to the social problem of child 
neglect and injury. By 189 4, ill-treatment, neglect and 
assault of children were all offences (Bevan; 177).
b) The 1894 Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 'specifically 
provided that a parent would be neglecting his child (sic) if, 
being without the means to maintain him, he failed to provide 
for his maintenance under the Poor Law' (Bevan; 177) (i.e. apply 
for Poor Law relief, and contribute to upkeep).
c) The Acts of 1889 and 1891 command our attention for two 
reasons. Firstly, public authorities were permitted to retain 
the custody of children against the wishes of parents (1891). 
Secondly, the Poor Law Amendment Act 1889 provided for Boards 
of Guardians 'to resolve that parental rights should vest in 
them where the child was deserted, or the parent was imprisoned 
to penal servitude or for an offence against a child' (Maidment 
1983; 71, my emphasis). This power for Guardians to assume 
parental rights (note, without judicial disposition) was extended
in 1899 to include children of parents who were mentally deficient,of 
vicious habits or mode of life, or a parent unfit to have control 
of it (Maidment;71).
In contrast with common law and equity traditions, these provisions 
are quite astonishing and are landmark rebuttals of absolute 
parental rights over children. The 1891 provisions arose out 
of a celebrated series of cases where Barnado tried to resist 
attempts by parents to take back formerly deserted children, or 
children they could not maintain and placed in one of his homes, 
at about the time these children were about to enter the labour 
force (see Stone; 246-247; Bevan;289: Bromley; 311-312).
Parents deployed the habeas corpus writ to obtain their children. 
Section 3 of the 1891 Statute required courts to have regard 
to the conduct of the parent, and.
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"if he has abandoned or deserted his 
child or allowed him to be brought up 
by and at the expense of another person, 
school; institution or public authority 
for such a length of time and under such 
circumstances that he must have been un­
mindful of his parental, an order 
giving him custody of the child cannot 
be made unless the court considers he is 
a fit person to have it".
(Bevan; 289).
Later case law (Re O'Hara (1900) 2 I.R. 232) provided some 
relief for parents who temporarily, and because it was in 
the best interests of the child, had to hand over care of 
the child to another party. Case law required that loss 
of custody could be effected only if some degree of parental 
moral turpitude could be shown, such that a parent was an 
'unfit person' (Bromley; 321).
The other aspect that a non-judicial authority, a Board of 
Guardians could pass a resolution, and vest itself of parental 
powers, constitutes an advance of the administrative (as 
opposed to judicial) power to confront parental authority.
But it connects up with the 1891 Act insofar as it works 
with notions of 'fit' and 'unfit' persons.
d) The principle of 'the fit person' was a provision of 
the 1889 Act. The 'fit person order' allowed for the removal 
of children from the care of parents or other persons having 
charge of a child. As an ideological construct the notion of 
children being in care of a 'fit person' combines strands of 
common law (an obligation to maintain, sanctions against cruelty, 
neglect and assault) and equity (with its requirements that 
parents be morally righteous). As a principle of regulation 
and control, deploying 'the fit person' as a criterion of
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custody rights allowed for outside intervention against 
a wide range of situations which might place children in 
physical and moral danger. By the end of the 19th century, 
this included children in the care and possession of persons 
who were criminals, mentally deficient, displaying moral 
turpitude (which could range across atheism, chronic drunken- 
ess, blasphemous language, consorting with prostitutes, 
living with persons other than a spouse - grounds established 
by equity) or persons who were neglectful of and cruel towards 
children, and, persons who could not afford to maintain children 
in their charge. Vagrant, wandering or criminal children, 
those beyond the care and control of their parents, guardians 
or other custodians were taken care of under a separate set 
of procedures (see Part 4) .
Collectively, these acts undercut the juridical autonomy of 
the family, in the name of protecting children. By offering 
a definition (through the construct of 'the fit person') of 
proper parenting, by extension this legislation simultaneously 
offers a substantial definition of the child's place in the 
social world; home-bound, off the streets, out of the work 
place, under the general superintendance of the wise and caring 
gaze of 'the fit' custodian. Where these general conditions 
could not be met by natural parents or their appointed guardians, 
then there was a formal and public duty to place children in 
a situation where these conditions could be fulfilled. Con­
temporary case law combined these new currents of thinking 
when Lindlay L. J. offered up a redefinition of the meaning 
of 'welfare' in relationship to the child.
"The welfare of the child is not to be 
measured by money only or by physical 
comfort only. The word 'welfare' must 
be taken in the widest sense. The moral 
and religious welfare of the child must
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be considered as well as its physical 
well-being. Nor can the ties of 
affection be disregarded."
(Re. McGrath (Infants) (1893) 1 Ch. 143).
Note the resounding silence about welfare and the release 
from poverty. As late as 1948, when annotating the Children 
Act of that year, one commentary records:
"From this (judgement) it would appear 
that a local authority would not be jus­
tified in acting under the present section 
merely on the ground of poverty of the 
child's home. There must be present some 
other factor prejudicial to his (sic) 
bodily, mental or moral well-being."
(Morrison, Wells, Eton and Harwell 1948;
34, my emphasis).
Relief was available of course, but at a high price because 
it required parents to surrender up children to the mini­
strations of the Poor Law system, with the consequent problems 
of bearing the stigma of pauperism, loss of care and control 
of children, and the danger of a permanent loss of custody.
The other route was for children to be placed with Dr. Barnado 
or with the various waifs and strays or children's friendly 
societies. There is a parallel here with Donzelot's complex 
of measures which he calls a system of 'economic and moral 
tutelage' (p. 91). A system which embraces the complex of 
institutions and sites within the state and within civil 
society. A system which caught up children and their families 
in a web of exchanges; assistance in exchange for control, 
a relief from obligations in exchange for a loss of rights, 
a means by which the welfare of children could be guaranteed 
but with no control over the 'contents' of welfare provision.
A system which embraced children without families (orphans, 
deserted children) and children of families simply too poor 
to maintain them.
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Critically placed between the family and the state at this 
conjuncture were the philanthropic societies; the NSPCC,
Charity Organisation Society, the waifs and strays and 
children's societies, who simultaneously fulfilled several 
roles; visitors providing comfort and assistance, as inspectors 
reporting on neglect and abuse, and as foundations providing 
housing and guardianship for children without families or 
children whose families found it impossible to support them.
They were also politically effective pressure groups, cam­
paigning on the basis of data and knowledge about living 
conditions in the great urban centres produced through the 
individual reports of home visitors, inspectors, and by larger 
scale social surveys. Thus, these bourgeois reformers were 
uniquely placed to inform and influence parliamentary opinion 
and to shape legislation . And they were ceaseless pro- 
selytizers which is why the campaigns look like moral crusades 
on behalf of children, as well as humanitarian programmes which 
relieved actual suffering. At the same time, as Donzelot 
notes, because they were private corporate bodies, because 
they were self-financing and not formally state institutions, 
they functioned as mediating sites between the public and 
the private; providing for individual needs without unnecessarily 
expanding state control over individual citizens. Moreover, 
they provided 'welfare' without incurring state expenditure. 
Officials contacting families,(the visiting C.G.S. officer, 
the NSPCC)were agents of private corporations not directly 
agents of the state; they functioned to retain a delicate 
balance between individual 'freedom' and state paternalism.
Because philanthropic societies and charities were 'private', 
when it came to interfering with the custodial powers of 
parents, they were regarded in law as 'strangers', against whom 
parents retained considerable civil rights. In Barnado vs.
McHugh and Barnado vs. Ford, parents could and did challenge 
the rights of custody and kind of guardianship offered by a 
philanthropic organisation. Mrs. McHugh challenged Barnado's 
right to bring up her own son as a Protestant. Mrs. Ford (again
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deploying habeas corpus) challenged his authority to ship 
her son off to Canada without her knowledge. Both mothers 
voluntarily surrendered their children into Barnado's custody; 
both still retained the civil right to request the return of 
their children, which the courts supported. It was this 
'crisis', the ambiguous status of philanthropic bodies to 
retain the custody of children which provoked the 1891 Act, 
which formalised and secured the custodial powers of corporate 
bodies . State support for philanthropy was extended by 
the 1894 Act (confirmed in 1904), which empowered NSPCC inspectors 
to initiate prosecutions and to take out warrants permitting 
them to remove children to places of safety. These developments 
firmed up the extent to which philanthropic societies acted as 
delegated state authorities. By these means also, charitable 
bodies functioned as policing agencies; where 'policing' entails 
both the provision of welfare-assistance, and, the more coercive 
function of bring sanctions to bear against individuals.
These powers are now vested mainly, though not exclusively, 
in local authorities, by the provisions of the various 20th 
century Children Acts and Children and Young Persons Act. Their 
character and their discourse ('place of safety', 'fit person', 
welfare of the child - where 'welfare' is constructed in forms 
of physical and moral protection) derived substantially from the 
legislation of the 1880's and 1890's . Indeed, the age- 
definitions of adult and child have remained substantially 
the same. The 1889 Protection of Cruelty to Children sets out 
the age-lines thus:
"Any person over sixteen years of age, 
who having the custody of a child, being 
a boy under the age of fourteen years or 
being a girl under the age of sixteen 
years, wilfully ill-treats" etc.
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While 16 years indicates the lower limit of 'adulthood', the age differences 
between boys and girls inflect the moralization of age-categories. Girls 
require a longer period of protection because they are sexualise subjects 
(following on from the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885) whose 'welfare' is 
taken to include freedom from sexual abuse and sexual exploitation.
CONCLUS ION
Childhood, at the end of the 19th century, is a category of increasing 
social importance. Not, we would argue, because of any increasing 
sentimentality about children, or any increasing romanticization of childhood, 
rather it emerges out of two complexly-linked processes. Firstly, more 
numerous sanctions against parents/guardians/custodians who neglected, ill- 
treated or failed to maintain children, constitute the categories of the 
abusive (adults) and the abused (children). Secondly, 'neglect', 'ill-treat', 
and 'maintain' are all ideologically loaded terms but collectively led to a 
closer specification of good-parenting. 'Neglect', 'ill-treat' and 'maintain' 
were effectively 'moralised' by the application of the 'fit person'. So 
quite separate social behaviours and attitudes (physical cruelty, failure to 
exercise sufficient parental control, and sheer poverty) were all rendered 
as moral problems and moral failures. 'Fit' and 'unfit' persons therefore 
emerge as categories of moral classification. The specification of good- 
parenting thereby defines the necessary contents of childhood. Parents 
offering the rudiments of Christian teaching, surrendering children to the 
schoolroom, keeping their offspring out of the work place, off the streets, 
and staying out of poverty had no fears of their custodial powers being 
wrested from them. That so much of child welfare derived its categories 
from and worked through the Poor Law system indicates that it was the paupered 
and working classes who were most likely to have their custodial powers 
challenged and their civil rights suspended.
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Measures to prevent physical cruelty to children unambiguously allowed
the state and its delegated agencies to increase the regulation of family
life. Adulterous parents, poor parents, cruel parents were all 'unfit' 
because they were morally inadequate to have and hold the custody of children
Removing children from their custody on these grounds threw a blanket of
morality over an underlying fear expressed in all the campaigns of social 
reformers, expressed in the parliamentary reports on juvenile delinquency, 
expressed in the workings of the Poor Law system; namely that morally 
inadequate parents would corrupt, improperly socialise and improperly 
encultrate members of the succeeding generation. Removing the child from 
the morally inadequate parent, therefore, had a wider social purpose; it 
was a means of interrupting the reproduction of social disorder. The develop­
ment of child-centered institutions, (the industrial and reformatory schools, 
compulsory state education, prohibitions on labour, protection against 
parental neglect and abuse), inserted between the child and the family, 
a set of institutions offering different (and sometimes contradictory) 
messages, requiring a different set of cultural and social practices and 
values from those presented by the family and its locality. By these means, 
state and state-delegated institutions and their agents were able to 
accomplish two things. Firstly, the creation of childhood, defined by 
chronological age, but equally characterised by setting apart, by distancing 
children from the adult world through a series of statutory 'protections'. 
Secondly, the social construction of childhood entailed the instrumental use 
of minors; they were to be the means of attaining a broadly based moral 
regeneration of the social order, something which could be accomplished only 
after curtailing the juridical autonomy of the family and installing the 
state as the wise and supreme parent.
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Securing the physical and moral protection of children in the family took 
place in the context of a broader set of social policies concerned with 
their health, education and general well-being. We note these initiatives 
only briefly because judicial ideology contributes very little either to 
the character or the analyses of them.
A concern with the national population of children as opposed to individual 
children who were objects of court cases was embodied policies directed at 
reducing infant mortality (Lewis 1980, Davin 1978), providing education on 
a full-time and compulsory basis (Lawson and Silver 1973, Horn 1978), 
providing school meals and school medical inspections (Lowe 1979, Lawson 
and Silver op. cit.) and in measured designed to give economic assistance 
to families with children (Land 1976, 1980, Davin op. cit., Lewis 1980), 
Numerous commentators, including those cited here have noted that these 
policies were not entirely altruistic either in intent or execution. It is 
argued that many of these policies were a consequence of fears about the 
numbers, strength and efficiency of Imperial troops, industrial labourers 
and the future of 'the race'. These fears were formally expressed in the 
proceedings of an Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration 
which reported its findings in 1904 (Davin; 58).
Mass education, school meals and school based medical inspections (the 
Education Acts of 1876, 1906 and 1907 respectively) brought the majority 
of the nation's young into everyday contact with the state. Beyond this, 
the campaigns to educate the nation's mothers in matters of diet and 
'domestic dirt' (Davin op. cit., Lewis op. cit.), the establishment of 
baby clinics, home visiting and the provision of domestic education for 
girls defined 'normal' and 'adequate' mothering practices.
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Taken together, these policies expressed a concern with children as a 
resource; as the future bearers of the nation and race. The ideological
character of the debate as to how 'the human capital' of nation was to
be best preserved involved a long running clash between the eugenicists 
and environmentalists (Lowe, op.cit.). Within that debate, there was 
a shift in the ideology of motherhood. Once celebrated as a natural, 
nurturing status, the production of training manuals, the rise of home 
visitors and infant clinics, relocated motherhood as a semi-professional 
enterprise to be conducted in the national interest.
Nevertheless, it is possible to see the promotion of 'public health and
domestic hygiene' by interlocking voluntary societies and local authorities 
connecting up with the initiatives to protect infants. The Infant Life 
Protection Act 1897 provided for the recruitment of home visitors to 
inspect households which might be 'unfit' for young children. The 
systems of 'protection' and 'welfare' thus intersect through the officials 
and agents of philanthropic and state-funded bureaucracies empowered 
to inspect, assist and advise families on the best, safest and most 
efficient means of bringing up baby (see Dingwall, et. al. 1984).
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NOTES
1. We use custody here in the sense which combines 'care'
and 'custody'. One legal commentator sets out the legal 
definition of custody as follows:
As we have already seen, in earlier law 
only a person with de facto care and 
control of a child could exercise the 
other rights which were attached de jure 
to the guardianship of a parent or other 
person. As a result, there was a tendency 
to use the word "custody" sometimes to 
designate all these rights and sometimes 
to designate only care and control ...
To avoid confusion ... the word "custody" 
wilL'be used in its widest sense to the 
whole bundle of rights and powers vested 
in a parent or guardian. The narrow sense 
of the term will be denoted by the words 
'care and control' or 'possession'. 
(Bromley 1976; 304-305).
For a full discussion on custody, see also Bevan 
(1973; Chap. 9), Maidment (1984) .
2. Boys over 14 and girls over 16 could go before the 
courts on a writ of habeas corpus. Maidment's very 
full citation of custody case law from 1741-1857 refers 
to no case based on a minor's writ of habeas corpus, 
(Maidment 1984; 93 ff).
3. Some of the speeches in the debate on the Custody of 
Infants Bill are reported in Pinchbeck and Hewitt II; 
362-378.
4. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1878 empowered magistrates 
to award custody of children under 10, to either parent 
(Bevan op.cit; 258).
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5. See Laurence Stone, for example, who argues that by 
1800 'there were six distinct modes of childrearing',
(p. 254).
6. See The Observer 19 August 1984. 'The spectre of children's 
gulag haunts Sweden' (p.6 .). A report which outlines the 
actions of Swedish social workers who seized a four year 
old girl and took her away from her parents, 'purely on
the evidence given in an anonymous phone call', which 
alleged mis-treatment.
7. '.Where in any proceedings before any court ... (a) the
custody or upbringing of a minor or (b) the administration 
of any property belonging to or held on trust for a minor ... 
is in question, the court in deciding the question, shall 
regard the welfare of the minor as the first and paramount 
consideration ...'. Guardianship of Minors Act 1971.
8 . These agents range across Court Welfare Officers who 
report to courts in the matter of divorce custody cases, 
social workers placing social enquiry reports before 
juvenile courts, case conferences deciding on the kind 
of care and supervision to be afforded to children in 
local authority care, the Official Solicitor and medical 
experts called in to wardship cases, teachers' reports
to juvenile courts, and reports from educational psychologists
9. See Dingwall (1983), Philip (1978), Woodroffe (1962.) .
10. For a review of the reproduction of labour power thesis 
and a trenchant critique, see Jane Humphries (1977).
PART FOUR
MINORS, THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE PENAL SYSTEM
"HELD, that the evidence that the defendant v/as 
a respectable child who had been properly brought 
up was sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
innocence which arose because of his age, and 
that the Justices and the quarter sessions were 
entitled to find that there was evidence of a 
guilty state of mind"
X vs X (1958) J. P. Jo 752
Appeal verdict on a 9 year old boy charged with 
stealing £2.00 and some chattels.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In 1831, John Any Bird Bell, a boy aged 13 years, was tried, 
convicted and hanged for murdering, then robbing the corpse 
of a boy the same age as himself (Knell, 1965; 200). The 
Children and Young Persons Act 1969, with the exception of 
murder, effectively decriminalized all offences committed 
by any person under the age of 14 years (Bottoms, 1974).
Capital punishment for anyone under the age of 16 years was 
legislated out of existence in 1908 (Knell op cit). This 
part then, is concerned with the transformation of the 
legal subjectivity of the child in English criminal law, the 
legislative history of which, we have just briefly outlined 
above. As an object of enquiry, we may pose the following 
question: how was it possible for courts to prosecute and 
order the execution of a minor in 1831 - that is, to make 
few distinctions between the adult and the child in criminal 
law, when a clear distinction existed in other legal discourses? 
The further question then suggests itself: what was the process 
of transformation of the criminal law and of its related penal 
practices that . reconstituted the child as a legal subject 
which could be excluded from the procedures and processes of 
adult criminal law?
In this respect we shall be arguing that the changing 
subjectivity of the child in criminal law occurs at the point 
of dissolution of, and as a consequence of, one system of criminal 
law enforcement, which we shall nominally call the absolutist 
system, and the formation of the 'modern' system of criminal 
law enforcement. The 'modern' system entails a new set of 
institutions, concerns, practices and agents connected by a 
common purpose; to discipline, reform and rehabilitate criminals 
rather than seeking to punish them in order to revenge, 
expatiate or merely to uphold the law. In the shift from the
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absolutist to the modern criminal justice systems, the place 
of the child is in fact quite ambiguous and complex, because 
as a category in law, 'the child' is, in one sense, passively 
changed by the larger scale transformations which have taken 
place, whilst on the other, the struggles to remove children 
from adult criminal judicial processes were an integral part 
of the process of the dissolution of the absolutist system. 
Because of this ambiguity and complexity we shall be limiting 
our argument to the period 1800-1860 in order to demonstrate 
these two facets of the child as a category in criminal law. 
Furthermore, the sharpest contrast between the old and the 
new systems of criminal law enforcement are evident during 
this period.
For our purposes, we conceive the absolutist system as a set 
of institutions, procedures and practices operating on the shared 
principle that a criminal offence is the physical manifestation 
of a morally evil mind. The criminal is therefore held to be 
absolutely responsible for his/her offence and therefore after 
conviction is to be punished according to the degree of trans­
gression. At the centre of the system is the virtual absence 
of the notion of extenuating circumstances 7 for once such 
circumstances are acknowledged, the consequence is to recognise 
that there are social reasons for committing crime, and therefore 
the principle of individual responsibility, upon which the legal 
process and practices of punishment were based, puts in jeopardy 
the ideological basis of the absolutist system of trial and 
punishment.
And yet it is possible to demonstrate that from the very early 
years of criminal law, the absolutist system did harbour a 
form of 'extenuating circumstance'. The form it took was that 
of the specific privileges, granted with discretion, to children 
under seven years, and the mad. One of the grounds around which 
the social reformers of the 19th century focussed their attacks 
on the absolutist system was the central principle of strict 
liability and they were able to use the child and the mad, as
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already existing categories within criminal law as instruments 
for the extension of the notion of extenuating circumstances.
In other words, they played upon already existing contradictions 
within the criminal law.
Our procedure in this Part will be as follows:
1. By reference to the work of Michel Foucault we shall 
indicate the form and nature of the systemic change 
from the absolutist to the 'modern' system of criminal 
law enforcement, in the period 1800-1860.
2. Schematically, we shall outline the notions of rationality and 
responsibility traditionally operating in criminal law
in order to indicate how these categories became instru­
ments of social reformers intent upon re-writing the 
legal notion of 'the child'. This will necessarily 
entail a synoptic history of the criminal liability 
of children.
3. By reference to archive material indicate something of 
the dense reality of the lives and experience of criminal 
children in the early 19th century, and to argue that 
there is a radical disjuncture between the practices and 
experiences reported in the documents, and the ends to 
which the documents were put. By this we mean that the 
documents discussed below, whilst enunciating young 
criminals as 'victims', cannot escape from the singular 
fact that these 'victims' were resourceful, purposive, 
rational actorÉ - the very characteristics which social 
reformers had to strip from them in order to remove
the young from the barbarities of the 'Bloody Code'.
In addressing these specific issues, it will be evident that 
there is an inescapable theme which runs as a thread through 
them and intrudes its way constantly into the analysis. It 
is this. We shall be constantly examining the shifting boundary 
between the State and civil society and this is because the 
relocation of the young in the system of criminal law enforcement
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is bound up with the emergence of new and differently organised 
apparatuses of the State, which articulate to the reality of 
civil society in radically new ways. To this extent, the 
changing subjectivity of the child in criminal law can be seen 
as a consequence of the changing structural relations between 
the State and civil society.
1. SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATION: CHANGES IN SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 
FOUCAULT AND THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
Michel Foucault's (1977) Discipline and Punish, traces the 
transformation in penal theory and practice in France in the 
years 1780 - 1840. Such a description conveys nothing of the 
richness of the arguments, the complex set of concepts 
deployed and the multiple determinations Foucault brings into 
play in his account of the birth of the prison. We are not 
concerned here to reiterate the general epistemological claims 
nor for example, to repeat the radically different theory of 
the 'microphysics' of power announced in his work, nor shall 
we be concerned to assess their theoretical rigour or political 
importance. Our concern is with the general trajectory
of change in the system of law enforcement which he traces out 
in the book.^ For anyone concerned with changes in the systems 
of law enforcement will be immediately confronted by the 
research agenda set out by Foucault. However much we may despair 
at his somewhat elliptical 'history', his leaping about in time 
and space, and at the complexity of his dense theoretical 
determinations, his.work is a highly suggestive map of a 
particular systemic transformation. What follows below is an 
exploration of the applicability of the general scheme of 
Discipline and Punish to a particular conjuncture in English 
criminal and penal history.
What Foucault traces out then, is the transformation of a 
system of punishment whose punitive domain was the physical 
violence exacted on the bodies of the judicially convicted 
(the limit case perhaps being his description of that meted
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out to Damiens the regicide) (Foucault; 3-5) to the 
installation of a regime of discipline. The latter takes 
as a constant the body of the offender, and whilst the power 
to punish likewise remains in the hands of the state, the 
mode of the exercise changes from tyrannical violence to an 
ever-present regulation; metaphorically, a shift from the 
guillotine to the penitentiary; from torture to the gaol timetable 
The judicial and punitive process becomes one of identification, 
individualisation, and regulation of subjects in time and space; 
the public spectacle of execution is replaced by the isolation 
of the prison cell;in the partition of the day into small 
periods of time spent on highly supervised and precisely 
defined activities (Foucault op. cit. 6-7). 'We are', Foucault 
argues,'now far away from the country of tortures, dotted with 
wheels, gibbets, gallows, pillories' ....(p. 307). We reside 
contemporarily in a 'carceral archipelago' (p. 298) amidst a 
pyramid of institutions whose apex is the prison. Institutions 
such as the orphanage, the reformatories, the disciplinary 
battalions;, the schools, charitable societies, the workshop, 
the almshouse are not directly modelled on the prison, but 
share its characteristics; the principle of classification of 
inmates/clients/daily attenders; the written rules and notices 
of formal procedures, whose infraction generates both delinquents 
to be normalised and the process of normalisation; the intense 
supervision of activities; the assessment of performance which 
produces knowledge about the individual, which in turn opens 
up that individual for more special surveillance and more precise 
correction. And it is the knowledge generated by and about 
individuals in such institutions which provides the ground of 
operation for new classes of state-employed officials, managers, 
advisers, agents, administrators, educators and repairers.
When looked at as a connected system of shared principles,
Foucault argues, what we see is no longer the disconnectedness 
of an exemplary system of punishment where torture and execution 
ritually celebrated a 'difference' between a sovereign and a 
social body, but a subtle gradation, from mere infractions of 
local rules treated as the correction of irregularities, to 
the punishment of a crime. The character of the carceral is
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this minutiae of gradation from correction to punishment.
In effect, Foucault continues, 'perhaps the most important 
effect of the carceral system and of its extension well 
beyond legal imprisonment is that it succeeds in making 
the power to punish natural and legitimate, in lowering 
at least the threshold of tolerance to penality' (301) .
By extension, we have the social body penetrated by rules 
and regulations, simultaneously carrying the possibility 
of their infraction and thereby continuing the process 
of normalisation. The rules and regulations though, must 
not be thought of in the negative, repressive, coercive 
sense, for though that effect is ever present, Foucault 
wants to argue that the rules, regulations etc. constantly 
produce knowledge about individuals and knowledge about the 
social body which is already regulated by them.
Such a short summary belies the-richness and complexity 
of Foucault's project. Not only does he present us with a 
working description of the historical transformation of 
penal practices and attitudes, but manages to place on the 
agenda a radical re-thinking of power, of knowledge and its 
articulation to ideology, a very contested and diffuse political 
programme and finally, some original insights into the develop­
ments, character and the social location of the social sciences. 
What makes Foucault's discursive analyses so contested (without 
of course taking account of the more mundane charges of 
generating major theoretical insights from little empirical data, 
or, first being plainly un-historical - having scant regard 
for either chronological or geographical sequence) is his refusal 
to take, for example, the transformation of criminal and penal 
systems as an index of other (and generally, more fundamentally) 
social changes or transformations. The procedure of examining 
discursive transformations in the light of multivariate 
determinations and a refusal to assign causality to the over­
arching principles either of 'the rise of capitalism' or changes 
in the mode of production, brings Foucault, contemporarily, into 
epistemological and political conflict with a wide variety of 
Marxists.
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For Foucault, the factory and capitalist work discipline 
are assigned an important place in the carceral society, but, 
they are not accorded a primacy nor are they regarded as 
points of origin. Rather the factory and capitalist work 
discipline are important regulative mechanisms within the 
social body, but not necessarily more influential than the 
prison, school or the asylum. Likewise, Foucault's explana­
tory system, while giving due consideration to the organisation 
and mode of producing material consumable goods, is insistent 
on giving similar weight to the work of psychologists, 
criminologists, jurists, psychiatrists and penologists whose 
metier is a theoretico-political contest in the production of 
(competing) knowledge systems. In terms of material outcomes, 
the knowledge systems are the providers of the ideological 
underpinnings, organisations, rituals and practices of a variety 
of institutions whose effects are the regulation of the social 
life of groups and of individuals. The concept of knowledge 
production being a material process, is of course widely 
appreciated by Marxists, post-Althusser, but where Foucault 
diverges from this tradition is his refusal to link the 
production of ideas with either the needs of capital or the 
interests of economically dominant social groups. This is not 
to suggest that the economically dominant exert no authority, 
nor exercise no power, but that power can be exercised, for 
example, but by state agents or functionaries according to 
the principles and logic of knowledge systems whose basis is 
not to be found in the principles of capitalist relations of 
production. More concretely, the organization of prisons, 
the principles of their operation are not derived directly from 
capitalist units of production; the modes of organisation and 
operation of the prison and the factory are dialectically linked 
in a two-way exchange. Both probably owe much to methods 
originally deployed in a completely separate system - the 
military. By way of one last horrific example ; the 20 th 
century phenomena of gas ovens and death camps of Nazi Germany, 
cannot be simply explained by the logic of capitalist develop­
ment nor by the needs of economically dominant classes.
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We have here perhaps the clearest example of a knowledge 
system, embedded in a particular political and ideological 
belief system, defining particular social categories whose 
existence was said to be a threat to the social body, and 
who were therefore expendable. In these circumstances we 
would want to make the knowledges, ideologies, symbols, 
rituals and practices of a specific political authority, 
the Third Reich, an object of enquiry, in order to understand 
the tragic fate of 6,000,000 Jews. To do so would require 
an understanding of the institutional forms ^ and the use of 
force, comprising an historically specific form of the state.
It is now commonplace, in an attempt to accommodate the 
conceptual framework of 'economic determination in the last 
instance' to argue that 'the economic' (however broadly or 
narrowly defined) does not shape, say, the minutiae of the 
capitalist state^ nor, the social relations of schooling, 
but rather 'sets limits' to the possible forms of institutional 
forms, social relations and social categories within a given 
mode of production . Broadly, such a theoretical approach
avoids the excesses of mechanical Marxisms, avoids the relativ­
ism of total theoretical eclecticism, on the one hand, whilst 
granting an autonomy in the form of a limited independent 
development in political, ideological, symbolic and cultural 
relations on the other. However, such an accommodation, 
however sophisticated and/or mediated its deployment might be, 
does not itself generate, any necessary theoretical or procedural 
protocols as to how we should proceed with the analysis, say, 
of the emergence of new social categories within the social 
sciences. It is, we would argue, one thing to say that 
capitalism 'sets limits' to the possible forms of social 
relations, but it also does not specify the principles which 
generate the, albeit 'limited' range of social, cultural and 
political forms which may emerge.
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We can acknowledge then that Foucault's scheme of change 
from punitive to disciplinary provides us with useful 
descriptive and theoretical procedures for mapping the 
manifold aspects of criminal and penal systems. In the light 
of Foucault's well known tendency to leap about in time and 
space however, we must be concerned as to whether the processes 
he describes are applicable and appropriate in the English 
context. We shall indicate in the section below that a similar 
transformation is observable in the historical development 
of the English criminal legal and penal system. But we should 
indicate clearly here that it is not our concern to provide 
anything like a complete picture of that transformation; our 
focus is much narrower. For we are centrally concerned with 
the question of a particular social category, identified in 
a diverse range of texts, parliamentary reports, legal texts, 
case reports and social, scientific inquiries - the child in 
criminal law - whose discursive positioning alters with the 
installation of the techniques of a disciplinary regime.
Necessarily, our inquiries will be limited to a particular 
historical period,* in this case the decades 1800 - 1860 will 
be the main, though not exclusive point of focus. This is 
not to deny other periods any salience; the Children Act 1908 
for example and the formation of the juvenile court, and, the 
considerable impact of the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act 
are particularly relevant to any study of the child and the 
criminal law. We would argue, however, that the juvenile 
courts generally carry on by other means, the separation of 
the adult and the child in the criminal and penal systems, 
established in the years 1800 - 1860, by other (institutional) 
means. Furthermore, it is the years 1800 - 1860 where we 
witness the most intensive, though by no means complete, 
transformation of the criminal and penal systems; the breaking 
apart of the absolutist notions of justice and retribution, 
the reduction of the symbolic importance of the gallows, and, 
the establishment of the prison, of notions of crimes having 
causes external to the mind of the criminal. Also, we can
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trace the development in this period of those institutions 
deploying disciplinary techniques, especially applicable 
to the newly formulated category of'juvenile offenders.
PUNISHMENT TO DISCIPLINE?
It is interesting to note a change in the writing, in English 
anyway, of the social histories of crime and punishment.
Our most influential histories have focussed on the history 
of capital punishment, its rise and demise (Radzinowicz , 1948, Hay 
1976 ). Only recently has there been an interest in the
'birth of the prison' (Ignatieff 1978 , McConville 1981 ).
The focus of interest in the historical studies of crime and 
punishment have largely been concerned with the social forces 
involved with the struggles over capital punishment. So the 
biographies of Beccaria, Bentham, Eden, Romilly and others 
whose writings and public activities were devoted to the 
opposition of the bloody system of criminal justice are known 
at a popular level. That prisons, the institutions popularly 
conceived as the normal means of punishing offenders, are in 
their present form and character, of recent date, does not 
register to anything like the same degree
But does the declining use of the gallows and the rise of
the English peni tential prison system, whilst it is a useful 
metaphors, signal the sustained structural change elaborated 
by Foucault? There is now considerable evidence that the 
movement from 'punishment to discipline' did take place in 
England, evidence made available by a variety of social histories
of the 19th century. Change did not come all of a piece; there
are local regional variations, where for example prisons in 
their modern guise and other appurtenances of the disciplinary 
regime were slow in coming. The prison
has to be regarded as the apex of a much wider range of 
institutions and practices whose combined effect is to produce 
a new and different form of social governance. Some of the 
institutions which fall into this category are as follows:
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1. The Poor Laws of 1834
The wider restrictions on out-door relief meant effectively 
that relief could only be obtained by the very poor surrendering 
themselves to the principles of classification, and, to the 
rhythm of the workhouse, supervised by the overseers and the 
Poor Law Guardians . The system of classification entailed 
separate quarters for men and women, and, at the age of seven, 
the separation of children from their mothers. Relief was 
deliberately stigmatized through Chadwick's principle of 'less 
eligibility'. This meant that those on relief should suffer a 
standard of living deliberately lowered below that of the lowest 
paid labourer . The effects of the Poor Laws were not
limited simply to those regimented in the workhouse but had 
wider effects, for example, in the network of social policies 
and family law which regulated familial relations. Of particular 
note here are the Bastardy clauses of the 1834 law which con­
siderably rewrote the common law and customary practices of 
child maintenance by requiring unmarried mothers to seek relief 
through the Poor Laws rather than through the magistrates courts 
(U. Henriques, 1967 ), The effects were the
stigmatisation and regulation of the sexual lives of 'fallen' 
women.
2. The 'active and preventive' police
It is only now becoming clear the profound effects that full-time, 
paid, uniformed policemen had on the social body in the mid 19th 
century.Peel's London force was to be the model for the rest of 
the nation. By 1856 it became compulsory for all Boroughs to 
have a police force, legislated for by the County and Borough 
Police Act of that year (Phillips D. 1980). The head notes of 
the 1829 Act make it quite clear that the police force's role 
was to be the defence of property (POLICE ACT 1829 10 GEO IV C44). 
But the 'property' here was of a different order from that 
defended by the county magistrates, and assizes and writ so large 
in Blackstone ( Vol. II; 177). What was endangered in and 
near the metropolis was not game, timber, fish or turves, but 
retail merchandise, tills, and personal effects carried in pockets
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Reaction to the uniformed constabulary was differentiated 
by class. Whilst for sections of the bourgeoisie they were 
'domestic missionaries', to the urban working class and to 
the poorest sections of the working class, the casual poor, 
they were the plague of 'Blue Locusts' (Storch 1976 , Gattrell, 
1980, Gorer G, 19 69)
The new police forces were 'active and preventive' and whilst 
their prime purpose was to defend property, the process necessarily 
included the identification of those social groups who preyed 
upon it. The net was thrown over not only those apprehended 
in the commission of crime but potential criminals. So section 
VII of the 1829 Police Act, defining the new powers of the 
police, delineates a class of possible miscreants;
" .... it shall be lawful for any man belonging 
to the said police force, during his time on 
duty, to apprehend all loose, idle and disorderly 
persons, whom he shall find disturbing the 
public peace, (having) just cause to suspect 
of any evil designs, and all persons (found) 
between sunset and the hour of eight in the 
forenoon, lying in any Highway, yard or other 
place, or loitering there ...."
Simply being in specified places at certain times now constituted 
an offence, making those whose milieu was the street and public 
places, liable to arrest and punishment.
Certainly the most potent change in the form of the state in 
its relation with civil society was the establishment of local 
police forces on a national basis. To a very large extent the 
local police re-wrote the basis of the relationship between 
the state and civil society, in that more and more intimate 
details of the daily experience of a newly urbanised, capitalised 
and industrialised population were open to routine surveillance, 
and when necessary, regulation, by the uniformed constabulary.
This applied even to the metropolitan no-go areas, the rookeries. 
For the law began to function in a different way. The reliance
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on the symbolic and ritual properties of the theatre of blood; 
the procession to, and execution at, the public gallows 
declined, and with it the network of authority relations, so 
brilliantly described by Hay (op cit), maintained not so much 
by the direct act of retribution (increasing numbers of offences 
were made capital but fewer people were hanged), but by the 
appeals for mercy, the letters of contrition written by men of 
property on behalf of offenders, actions which celebrate their 
power and authority in society, and over the propertyless. In 
this sense the law worked, in the late 18th and early 19th century, 
by winning consent through ritual and symbol and universalistic 
appeals to justice. However, as Gattrell (op cit 260) argues, 
the law was now to work through 'the police (asserting) a good 
deal of their influence through other than directly by punitive 
means (through the regulation of vagrants, street traders, lodging 
houses etc.) and it was intended they should do so.' (my emphasis). 
Ritual and symbol were now to be found in the military bearing, 
height and distinctive uniform of the constables, who, unlike 
their continental counterparts, were to circulate constantly 
and frequently with and amongst the civil population; they were 
to live with and amongst the population they were policing, not, 
as elsewhere stay behind the barrack walls (Gorer op cit. Pasquino 
1978). The state then is no longer a complex of institutions 
'outside' and 'above' civil society, but now significant 'above' 
but deeply imbricated 'in' civil society.
To judge the effects of the new constabulary force we should 
turn to Gattrell. Elis comments on the police forces are part 
of a larger project where he assesses the validity of drawing 
definite conclusions about crime rates in Victorian England, 
from the wide range of judicial and criminal statistics now 
available for that period, and for the period up to 1914. He 
concludes that social historians of crime have been reluctant, 
unnecessarily in his view, to draw conclusions about long term 
crime rates. While remaining sensitive to the disparity between 
crimes committed (the 'dark figure' in his terms) and crimes 
actually tried, rates of conviction, etc., he argues that it is
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possible to demonstrate the long term decline of offences
against property and persons from the.middle of the
19th century to 1914, and this is the face of a series of
2moral panics about rising crime rates . Gattrell's
assessment of the impact of police forces may be summarised 
as follows:
a) In respect of detection and prevention of some forms
of crime, the police forces were spectacularly successful; 
firstly the high conviction rates evident in statistics up 
to the middle of the 19th century give some indication of 
their apprehension rate of those engaged in particular offences 
against property; secondly, the deterrent effect of the police 
can be justifiably argued by reference to the declining rate
of offences against property from the mid 19th century onwards.
b) Against the new,disciplined organized force, the criminal
element remained innocently unorganized, and this in part 
accounts for the success of the policing in Victorian and 
Edwardian England. In Gattrell's words: 'In the ensuing
decades, while the machinery of control developed its techniques, 
the organization of crime seems to have adapted very little ... 
the contest between the law and the criminal was a wholly 
unequal one, a perfect paradigm indeed of the contest waged 
between a capitalist state and its as yet inadequately organized 
workforce.'
c) Those who were in the front line of this police's work
in the civil population were the casual poor. 'We should note,' 
adds Gattrell, 'that the casual poor in the second half of the 
century were being ever better supervised' (p.315). Firstly, 
by overt means; the Vagrancy Acts permitted up to 20,000 
individuals in the late 1850's to be prosecuted. Secondly, 'by
a plethora of secondary regulations to which the urban population 
was to be progressively subjected - the regulation of street 
trading and of lodging houses, and the enforcement of by-laws 
etc. ' ( Gattrell op cit; 315) .
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Increasing state activity by and through the means of an 
organised and disciplined constabulary was of course 
welcomed by sections of civil society; the urban bourgeoisie 
and petty bourgeoisie could carry on their trades with better 
protection than that afforded by the local watch committees 
and this sense of security seems to have been shared by the 
skilled artisans. We have noted the effect on those whose 
rhythm of existence was unskilled labour - unemployment - petty 
thieving - poverty (Gattrell op cit; 265), i.e. the casual poor.
What is striking though was the nature of offences which the 
existence of the police, made it possible to define and sanction.
The Police Acts and the Vagrancy Acts gave powers to the police 
to act, not only on acts of commission - the intentional committal 
of an offence against a person or against property (a notion of 
crime embedded in common law), but also against persons merely being 
in public places at certain times. The subtle gradations, the 
shading off of the distinction between offence and existence 
were the marks of a societal organisation which Foucault calls 
'the carceral'.
3. Penitential Institutions
Punishment under the Bloody Code did not begin and end with 
the gibbet. Before 1775, major crimes were punished with 
banishment, whipping or the pillory, as well as hanging; 
confinement was used for minor infractions, sentences being 
passed down by local magistrates (ignatieff , op cit; 24-25) . 
Banishment in the form of transportation to the colonies in 
Australia continued to be an important form of punishment until 
well into the 19th century. It is estimated that between 1787 
and 1862 some 162,000 convicted felons were transported to the 
Australian colonies (Rude 1978 ; 1)  ^.
Commuting the death penalty to transportation was one of the 
measures sought by Howard, Eden and Blackstone in the drafting 
of the Hard Labour Bill of 1778 (McConville op cit; 105-111).
By 1800, through commutations, pardons and the like, only 10% 
of those actually sentenced to hang were ever executed (Ignatieff 
op cit; 90). Branding was abolished in 1779. Whipping as a 
practice declined from 17% to 11% of Old Bailey verdicts between
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1775 and 1790: by 1805 whipping accounted for no more than 
4.5tof sentences at assize and sessions. It certainly did not 
disappear as we shall indicate below, but tended to be used on 
convicts for infractions of the rules (Ignatieff ibid)
Imprisonment was reserved for misdemeanours; offences which 
could be dealt with summarily by magistrates. Those incarcerated 
in Houses of Correction or 'Bridewells' were those awaiting 
trial, runaway apprentices, non-capital felons (Ignatieff op cit; 
11-12) (McConville op cit; 116-117). They were not prisons in 
the modern sense. 'They were rather loose and disorderly places' 
(Ignatieff; 11). There was an 'easy commerce' between the 
houses of correction, the jails and the streets outside for 
whilst local authorities were supposed to provide provisions 
for inmates, in practice they had to fend for themselves 
(Ignatieff 31-33). Jails housed the debtors, prisoners awaiting 
trial and convicted felons awaiting transportation or execution.
In most bridewells and jails the categories of prisoners freely 
mixed with each other and with the outside world (Ignatieff 
Chap. Two; McConville Chapters 1-3).
The bridewells and jails were not in any sense the'total' 
penitential institutions which were to succeed them, and which 
by and large displaced the regime of physical punishment. Some 
of them exhibited some of the characteristics which were to 
become, in mediated ways, the normal regime of the modern prison.
The daily timetable of Pentonville, the first 'total' penitential 
institution, described by Ignatieff brilliantly catches the 
distance between the bridewells, and institutions built for and 
devoted to the reform of the mind of convicted offenders(Ignatieff 
p. 1-11). Pentonville represents a massive shift in the punitive 
system; away from a concern to restrain and mark the body, to a 
concern for the reform and rehabilitation of the prisoner by 
making the mind the object of a disciplinary regime. Between 
1770 and 1840 a form of carceral discipline'directed at the mind' 
by putting prisoners in solitary cells, clothing them in dis­
tinctive uniforms, regimenting their days 'to the cadence of the 
clock', and trying to improve their minds with 'dosages of
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scripture and hard labour' (Ignatieff; xiii ) , went hand in 
hand with the establishment of new institutions - penitential 
in character, including the 'new' prisons, but also, industrial 
schools, reform schools, houses of industry and the like. The 
institutions were 'total' in so far as their architecture, 
organisation, timetable and discipline were designed to close 
off the outside world so that habits of industry, orderliness 
and an appropriate moral universe might be installed in the 
consciousness of those incarcerated in them.
As recent studies have been quick to point out, such institutions 
are not simply premised upon the economics and effectivity of one 
form of punishment as opposed to another. They are also premised 
on the considerable fact that habitual offenders could be 
reformed, something taken as unquestioningly given now, but a 
radical departure from traditional conceptions of crime and 
punishment in the late 18th century and early nineteenth century. 
Secondly, penitential institutions also conceived the notion 
that it was worthwhile, or, for the general well-being, to 
attempt the process of rehabilitating offenders
On the one hand,then,we have a considerable shift in the 
philosophies of the psyche or of the mind given in the 
concepts of reform and rehabilitation, and a reconsideration 
of the causes of crime, with on the other, a revamped moral 
economy. How the reform of offenders was to be achieved, and 
how prisons might act as a deterrent was never settled, certainly 
in the period covered by Ignatieff. The competing systems of 
'silence' and 'separation' each had its advocates, and peni­
tential institutions varied accordingly as to which system was 
5
employed . But there were observable principles common 
to each system and which ran thread-like through the penitential 
system . These were elaborated by Beccaria but most
fully and influentially by Jeremy Bentham? • Their ideas 
have been elaborated at length by Foucault (op cit), Ignatieff 
(op cit), Heath (1963), McConville (op cit), and by National
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Deviancy Conference contributors. Lea, .Anette and Melossi 
(1979). What follows is the briefest of sketches; we shall 
return to the relevant items in more detail later in the 
chapter.
Beccaria's opposition to capital punishment entailed the 
elaboration of different stance on punishment. His general 
maxim that the certainty of detection followed by punishment 
(non-capital) would serve as a greater deterrent than the 
wheel, stocks or gibbet, in practice sounds more like the 
philosophical basis for the active and preventive police, 
than for the system of penitential prisons. Punishment as 
deterrent rather than as retributive justice provides the 
crucial links between Beccaria and Bentham.
"General prevention ought to be the chief end of 
punishment as its real justification. If we could 
consider an offence which has been committed as an 
isolated fact, the like of which would never recur, 
punishment would be useless. It would be adding 
one evil to another.
(Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment 
p. 20-1, quoted in McConville; 115)
In Bentham's scheme, the penal regime of solitary confinement 
combined with hard labour was primarily a system of deterrence; 
reformation was a subordinate end in the process (McConville;114) 
But the regime was to adhere to four important principles :
1. The rule of parsimony; the application of sufficient 
punishment, and, no more, for individuals, so that its 
deterrent qualities would be effective.
2. The rule of lenity; "The ordinary condition of a convict 
doomed to forced labour for a length of time ought not 
to be attended with bodily sufferance, or prejudicial
or dangerous to health and"
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3. The rule of severity: "the ordinary condition of a 
convict doomed to a punishment which few or none but 
individuals of the poorest class are apt to incur, 
ought not to be made more eligible than that of the 
poorest class of subjects in a state of innocence and 
liberty" (my emphasis). This is the probable origin 
of the 'less eligibility' principle which Chadwick 
had inserted as an integral part of the Poor Law 
provision of relief. In other words, workhouses 
should be considerably less attractive than the pre­
vailing conditions experienced by the poorest labourers 
outside. For detailed analysis see Finer S.E. ( 1952 )
4. The rule of economy: "No public expense ought to be 
incurred, or profit or saving rejected, for the sake 
either of punishment or of indulgence". (Bentham, 
quoted in McConville; 115).
For Bentham, punishment was not to be applied unwittingly on 
some idealised, universal but non-existent subject; the intensity 
of its application was to be mediated by 'circumstances affecting 
sensibility' which included sex, age, strength, mental state 
and moral stability, variables which will be of particular 
relevance to the rest of this chapter (McConville; 113).
Taken together, Bentham's advocacy of 'circumstances affecting 
sensibility' and solitary confinement speak of penological 
theory based upon the process of individualisation, rather than 
the broader system of classification (identification and 
treatment of homogenous groups) which was the basis of separation 
under the poor laws. Bentham, of course, was to propose, in 
what was the logical outcome of his theories, the concept of 
Panopticism, a principle of institutional government extensible 
over not only penitential prisons, but workhouses. Poor Houses, 
manufactories, hospitals and schools*
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Deterrence combined with reformation in the penitential 
system had probably their most rigorous exponent in Sir 
George Paul and is evident in the manner in which the 
Gloucestershire prison system was reformed in 1792 
(Ignatieff: 98-109; McConville; op.cit.)
"On entry, convicts at Gloucester were stripped naked, 
probed and examined by a doctor, and then bathed, 
shaved and uniformed. This purification rite cleansed 
them of vermin and filth, but it also stripped them 
of those marks of identity that defined them as 
persons." (Ignatieff; 101)
The 'medical rituals' extended beyond the signification of 
the ritual passing from one world to the next; baths, regular 
diets, medical attention and whitewashed walls, and glacial 
indifference on behalf of warders were to attend the prisoners.
In order to reform, all links must be severed with the outside 
world. The separation of prisoners, one from another, was 
intense. At Gloucester, prisoners not only slept in solitary 
cells but worked in solitary day cells adjacent to their 
sleeping cell. Exercise was taken under the eye of officers 
whose job it was to prevent loitering and conversation. Habits 
of 'quiet resignation' and 'decent submission' were to be the 
normal demeanour of prisoners, exacted by a formal and highly 
ritualised regime;
"... the governor standing at attention in a uniform 
symbolizing his authority and his subordination to 
the state, issuing terse commands; the prisoner in 
uniform symbolizing submission, locked in the pose of 
obedience tensely awaiting the word of command."
(Ignatieff; 104).
A regime of solitude, sparse diet and unrewarded labour were 
intended to make the prisoner more malleable but it was 
religion which was to be the 'reformatory fixative' (McConville; 
130). It was geared to win a change of heart and conversion (ibid)
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We shall not deal in any detail here with the conflict as 
to which system, the associated silent system used at Auburn 
and Sing Sing in the U.S.A., or, the Philadelphian solitary 
confinement system, was to be implemented. Each had its own 
advocates and practitioners in English penology. We
shall conclude by underlining the considerable differences 
between the 'loose and disorderly' 'bridewells' and gaols 
and the new penitential institutions. The differences are 
partly constituted by the purpose built model prisons 
(e.g. Pentonville, Gloucester), the timetables, the uniforms, 
and, the regimes of labour, religion and confinement. Some of 
the other changes which contributed to the considerable shift 
from the old gaol to the penitentiary, and which of themselves 
are noteworthy were :
1. The demise of the old gaoler, for whom the position was 
a profitable sinecure and the rise of the prison 
governors. The latter were appointed by bureaucratic 
methods, generally for their 'expertness', and they 
were directly responsible to the state rather than 
local political forces.
2. The key position occupied in the process of rescue and 
rehabilitation, by the prison chaplain. The very idea 
of solitude has a religious basis in so far as it was 
a system practiced by Quakers in Philadelphia (McGowen 
1979; 123); silence and solitude were to give prisoners 
time to reflect on their evil ways. Whilst the regime 
of hard labour, isolation, and punishment of minor 
infractions, were to be no more than a softening-up 
process, it was the chaplain who was to carry the message 
of redemption (McGowen ibid). Converting the criminal 
was seen as an analogous process to that of religious 
conversion (McGowen; p. 136).
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3. The deployment of the discipline of labour. There
was a sharp conflict between prison reformers as to 
the place of labour in penitential regime, though 
all were agreed it was an essential part of rehabil­
itation i.e. learning the habits of industry. There 
were various forms of endeavour, okumpicking, the 
treadwheel, the crank, and shot drill designed to 
keep the body in toil, with little or no visible 
productive output. The utilitarians, however, 
conceived prison labour as being not only useful for 
rekindling the experience of honest work, but also a 
profitable enterprise which helped reduce the burden 
on taxes  ^ . Either way, labour was an integral 
part of a system designed to end the mixing, milling 
crowds in the prison yard - a prominent feature of 
the old gaols and bridewells.
"Thus", writes Foucault, "discipline produces subjected and 
practised bodies, 'docile bodies' " (Foucault op cit; 136 ).
The minute regulation of bodies in time and space speaks of 
new forms of power, exercised on the prisoner, in an extended 
attempt to re-arrange habits and attitudes. The penitential 
system constitutes a radically new subject in the discourse 
of penology. For at the core of the system of silence and 
solitude was the individual, no longer simply the bearer of 
a morally evil mind, but, also the bearer of some moral universe 
psycho-pathology or what you will, which was capable of being 
reformed, and, afterwards returned to society as a useful, 
productive and active member of it. Attended by the prison 
chaplain, 'as a doctor of the soul' (but whose effect was 
entirely dependent on the rigours of prison regimes - the 
beatings, the isolation and dress etc.), prisoners could be 
guided away from crime, to lives of honest endeavour. The 
penitential process admits, not a sharp distinction between 
good and evil, but a gradation between normality and deviance. 
The process of reform required measured steps along a set path; 
enclosure from the loose and idle world, loss of individual
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identity (shaven heads, uniforms) regulated work at a measured 
pace and compulsory religious instruction which were to 
combine to reduce the differences between the normal and the 
deviant and to render the criminal similar to the rest of the 
civil population.
The circle was never fully closed however. One of the major 
targets of the penitential system was the prison sub-cultures 
embedded in the 'loose and idle' crowds which mixed and 
milled in the old gaol yards. It was never entirely suppressed; 
the old lag continued to pass on the arts of criminal practice, 
juveniles continued to learn and communicate the variety of 
ways in which one might eke out a living on the streets (see 
below). At Gloucester, even Paul's attempts at the total 
regulation of all prison behaviour were ‘' frequently shattered 
by disturbances. Prisoners refused to work and called on others 
to put down their tools." (Ignatieff op cit: 103). In 1815 
Paul faced a full-scale uprising, which he suppressed then dealt 
out 36 lashes to the culprits (Ignatieff ibid). For Paul, 
however, such ripples merely confirmed the need to employ the 
right staff, staff who could be relied upon to enforce every 
rule and regulation increasingly and to punish all infractions. 
Furthermore, although we can point to falling crime rates in 
certain categories of offence, from the mid-19th century (see 
section 2 on the police, above), it is difficult to say what 
effect the penitential prisons had; Gattrell argues forcefully 
that it was the new police forces which were primarily respon­
sible for the measurable decrease in offences against property.
We have purposefully not detailed the regimes in other penitential 
institutions, specifically, the reform schools, industrial 
schools and the like because we shall be discussing these below. 
Our purpose, here, is to indicate some of the regulative 
principles of the penitential regime observable in prisons, 
firstly as an important historical development and secondly as 
a prelude to the analysis of the treatment received by juvenile 
offenders.
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4. The birth of the school room, and 19th century popular
education
The principle of the panopticon (or inspection house) 
Bentham claimed,was applicable to
"any sort of establishment in which persons of 
any description are to be kept under inspection; 
and in particular to Penitentiary Houses, Prison,
Houses of Industry, Work-Houses, Poor-Houses, 
Manufactories, Mad-houses, Lazarettes, Hospitals, 
and Schools"
Bentham (1830) The Rationale of Punishment, quoted in 
McConville (op cit; 118).
Monitorialism,claimed Bell, the principle of self- 
instruction under surveillance,
"is the new intellectual organ which characterises 
the new system of education - such the mainspring 
which puts the whole scholastic machine in motion; 
such ... the principle on which every schoolroom 
factory, workhouse, poorhouse, prison house, and 
the administration of the poor laws, and every 
public or even private institution of any magnitude 
should be conducted."
Bell (1797) An Experiment in Education made at the Male 
Asylum at Madras quoted in Jones and Williamson (1979;73)
(my emphasis)..
The panoptic-monitorial school in its pure form probably never 
existed in the 19th century. Certainly, the organisation of 
education, especially popular education, was too fragmented, until 
at least the mid-19th century to accommodate a view that education 
before that date was a giant and effective engine of instruction 
inculcating particular values, knowledge systems or moral universes 
Given the plethora of forms which education took, from the Dame 
schools, through to the bastions of Classical education, the 
great Public Schools, each delivering a variety of messages, it
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is difficult to assert that education, particularly popular 
education was one giant exercise in social control (conceived 
here as economically dominant classes controlling the range of 
activities, cultural experiences and social practices made 
available to economically subordinate groups, through the 
mechanism of schools). Like the prisons, police forces and 
work houses, the provision of education was shaped by particular 
local conditions richly variegated, and susceptible to local 
and regional balances of political and authority relations.
There were suggestions as to what institutional and architectural 
form education should take (e.g. panopticism) and what its 'ideal' 
organizational and pedagogical mode should be (e.g. monitorialism) 
Our concern here is not to consider the reasons why panoptic- 
monitorialism was never achieved, rather we are concerned as to 
why at this particular time schools were throught to be homologous 
with prisons, factories and workhouses, and what regimes were to 
be installed, and in what senses might they be conceived as 
'disciplinary'. We are concerned here with mass education in 
its pre-compulsory phase.
Social historians of education have pointed out an interesting 
paradox; that though early 19th Educational provision was the 
concern of private, religious, and local initiative the central 
government was far from a disinterested party to the means and 
ends of that provision (Johnson 1970, 1976, 1981; McCann (ed)
1977; Digby and Seafby 1981-;). State intervention, -
supervision and inspection of the voluntary schools systems 
(the most important and widespread being the National Society 
and the British and Foreign Schools Society systems) may be 
largely explained by reference to the system of state funding 
provided by the means of grants, very small sums in 1833, but 
rapidly growing over the succeeding decades (Digby and Searby 
op cit; 6-8). The Education Committee of the Privy Council 
Office, established in 1839 (though generally known as the 
Education Department formed to oversee the dispensation of
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grants, was in its day one of the largest apparatuses of 
central government; comprising by. 1-849- 50 civil servants 
(Digby and Searby; ibid).
The Education Department post-1839 was not to remain aloof 
from the daily organization, rituals and pedagogies of 
schools funded (partly) with state money. Prominently under 
Kay Shuttleworth, the Departmental Secretary from 1839 to 1849, 
the state agency was to develop its own policies and initiatives 
in the general field of mass schooling. During this decade, 
we can see the state, in general accord with (though not without 
tensions and differences), the religious organisations, begin 
to advance the concept of education as a civilizing force and 
as a means of governance of specific sections of the social 
body, in this case the labouring and pauperized classes.
The Swing Riots in agricultural areas and the Chartist dis­
turbances gave some overt evidence to the likes of Shuttlewoth 
that something broader based than the yeomanry raised at 
Peterloo, was needed in the control of unruly urban and 
agricultural mobs. It is precisely at this point, the target 
populations of the social policies, programmes and institutions 
of diverse 'reformers' such as Eden, Bentham, Bell, Carpenter 
and Kay Shuttleworth that we begin to see the connections 
between the school, the prison and the workhouses, and which 
gives some warrant to those who have interpreted the historical 
development of mass schooling as a process of social control 
(Johnson op cit) or 'socialization' (McCann op cit).
The representation of working class (labouring and pauperised 
fractions) cultural forms and social practices in the texts 
of the social reformers above operate on the axiomatic principle 
that they are 'foreign' and 'alien' social groups, groups whose 
moral values are so distant from the class location of the 
authors as to be totally opaque. Johnson's illuminating analysis 
of Kay's 1846 Minutes, and of Thomas Wyse, a contemporary social
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reformer argues that bourgeois investigation did not analyse 
the leisure of working people in terms of cultural analysis, 
but mapped them in the moral language of 'idleness', 'drunkeness 
vice and improvidence (Johnson; op cit; 49). One particularly 
florid example quoted describes the 'weekend' of an industrial 
worker:
"... after a stale and filthy debauch of two or three 
successive nights, with all that is degraded and sensual 
... returning with sleepless eyes, on Monday Morning, 
to his work - the Sabbath profaned, his health gone, 
his week's earnings robbed from his pining family, 
and the seeds planted of crimes which perhaps ere 
long, may consign him to the transport vessell, or 
the scaffold"
Thomas Wyse (1836) Education Reform, quoted in 
Johnson (1976; 49)
By and large, argues Johnson, the representation of the 
agricultural labourers are of individuals outwardly doltish 
but underneath sullen and resentful, whilst industrial workers 
are active, sensual, easily misled and volatile (ibid).
One education Inspector witnessed the following in Lancashire, 
near the town of Colne:
"... I have seen in broad daylight, at 9 in the 
morning and at 4 in the afternoon, men, one in the 
prime of youth, the other past middle age, running 
races or rather matches against time, on the public 
highway, quite naked.
... Amongst them, and along the road on which this 
shameless race was run, were women of all ages - 
mothers, factory girls, young children ..."
And he concluded that these practices:
"... are sufficient of the most striking instances, 
which came under my own observation, of the shame­
lessness and filthy habits, the want of chastity.
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the ignorance and carelessness with regard to 
religion, the neglect of worship,- the brutality 
recklessness, and almost animal state in which 
some of the labouring classes, both manufacturing 
and agricultural, of the county of Lancaster live, 
and to which their children must be inured from their 
earliest years"
Rev. F. Watkins, p.p. (1847) XLV p.p. 238-9.
Such representations of working class cultural forms and social 
practices are by no means atypical and neither is the vivid 
and certain analysis. But the analysis itself contains 
a programme of remedies; the installation of habits of moderation, 
industry, worship and protection for the children against the 
daily experiences in which they are inured; a programme not 
dis-similar from the penitential , principles of the modern 
prison. Similarly the 'loose and disorderly' world from 
which prisoners were to be excluded, provides in the texts 
of the educational reformers the opposition which must be 
civilised by appropriate forms of schooling. Furthermore, 
the educational reformers considered as 'dangerous' the same 
sites policed (in the widest sense) by the vagrancy laws, 
the new metropolitan constables, sites which were considered 
as fundamental to the formation of vicious and sensual habits, 
namely the back-streets, the 'cellars, garretts and cabins' - 
the homes of the working classes (Watkins ibid).
The prisons and the.schools, of course, were separated by the 
simple fact that the latter did not have a captive clientele 
(which was not achieved in any near-universal form until at 
least 1870). The penologists and educationalists shared a 
similar concern in so far as the institution per se was 
inadequate to tasks which had to be performed; the old gaol 
and the Dame school were regarded as inappropriate responses 
to criminal and to working class practices - indeed such places 
provided points for the circulation of filthy habits, licentious 
behaviour and dangerous knowledges. We find, therefore, as in
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Bell's writings the regime to be experienced being regarded 
as the very essence of progress. The most visible regime, in 
the schools provided by the Anglicans and the non-conformists, 
was the monitorial regime (a system run on slightly different 
principles by Bell and Lancaster, but sharing more similarities 
than they celebrated differences).
Of the quality of monitorialism, two commentators write:
"The guiding principles of this 'intellectual organ' 
were the division of labour, mutual instruction, 
classification of minute discipline, constant 
surveillance and ceaseless activity".
(Jones and Williamson op cit; 73)
Johnson notes the finely calibrated system of commands, 
classification of pupils into 'drafts', the numbering labelling, 
grading, the coercive regulation of petty rules and the graded 
punishments for the degrees of infraction (Johnson 1976;47-48). 
The underlying principles of the educative process comprised:
a) notions of restraint; enforcing the observance of religious 
and moral principles.
b) inculcation of habits; 'steady habits of industry and 
integrity'.
c) the working of the school was compared with machines
(a grand intellectual factory), the military; the firmness, 
promptness and decision attendant on military order.
d) education was likened to medicine; vaccinating the rising 
generation, a preventative against the poison of infection.
e) schooling was intended to shackle the mind; firstly by the 
'sheer habitual weight of the order of the schoolroom; 
secondly, by inuring children with religious texts and
by requiring church/chapel attendance and by the imposition 
of theologically derived punishments.'
(Johnson 1976; 47-48).
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The child as a scholastic subject appeared to be no more than 
raw material on whom change had to be wrought, against the 
resistances they would inevitably bring from home and class 
background. Liberal reactions to the rigidity of the 
monitorial regime and its assumption about the nature of the 
child, were to gain ground circa 1835, when the notions of 
childhood being a period of flux, of change and development 
(Johnson ibid) were increasingly to supplant notions that 
children had wills to be broken.
The regime itself necessarily assumes that there are appropriate 
agents to administer it, and, like the prisons, schooling was to 
be increasingly premised on the 'expert' - the correctly trained 
teacher following the right programme of knowledge transmission.
We note the growth of the pupil teacher system and the development 
of teacher training through the Queen's Scholarship .
What gives added impact to effect of educational systems though, 
is that those groups who formulate what is to count as appropriate 
schooling generally define what is to count as school-appropriate 
knowledge, even if it is at the level of how a multi-various 
matrix of empirical details about the material world are to be 
classified into 'subjects'. Social governance, in the view of 
one nineteenth century writer, did not stop at the mere instruction 
of duties and obligations 'enjoined by religion and morality,' 
but also depended upon the poor being'acquainted with those 
circumstances which principally determine their condition in 
life'.
"They ought above all, to be instructed in the plain 
and elementary doctrines respecting population and 
wages; in the advantages derived from the institution 
of private property, and the introduction and improvement 
of machinery; and in the causes which give rise to that 
gradation of ranks, and inequality of fortunes, that are 
as natural to society as heat to fire, and cold to ice."
(my emphasis).
Causes and Cure of Disturbances and Pauperism, Edinburgh 
Review Llll (1831) 611-12, quoted in Digby and Searby 
op cit; 115).
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The 'naturalising' or 'universalisation' of ^historically specific 
forms of economic organisation and political relations of course 
is generally conceived in critical social sciences as prime 
forms of ideology put into the service of dominant economic 
groups. However, it does point to the manner in which the 
knowledges to be transmitted through the appropriate forms 
of schooling were to be deployed in defence of property and 
the existing social order.
What we have been mapping here, albeit briefly, is how particular 
organisations in civil society, namely the competing religio- 
educational systems^ consciously deployed education as a means 
of social government and pacification, as, in due course 
did the State. The means of governance was to be the regime
of the schoolroom itself; the application of abstract, impersonal, 
careful calibrated rules under the monitorial system which were 
to imbue the necessary orderly behaviour. Secondly the regime 
was to transmit the appropriate knowledges, knowledges which 
legitimised the social order, in a manner which trained, rather 
than awakened or enlightened the scholar subjects. Thirdly, 
the appropriate knowledges and the means of their transmission 
were to be regulated by experts in its dispersion;"this necessarily 
de-legitimised the common sense and useful knowledges of the 
home and the Dame School. The relations between the state and 
the educational organs of civil society were of course substan­
tially reordered by the Revised Code of 1861 when salaries and
grants were made dependant upon the successful transmission
10of the appropriate forms of literacy and numeracy
SUMMARY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE 19th CENTURY STATE
Two brief disclaimers. Firstly, the process of tracing a 
historical shift from 'punishment to discipline' can in no way 
be read teleologically. The process is not one of unmitigated 
'progress', recording a shift from a brutal dark age to a more 
enlightened and liberal modern history. Could we claim that 
locking up felons for months on end in solitary confinement.
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commonly resulting in madness, was any more 'humane' than 
passing a death sentence on an individual than.either pardoning 
the crime or commuting the sentence to transportation? Changes 
from the gibbet to penitentiary, from an armed militia to 
unarmed bobbies does not necessitate the complete disappearance 
of the former, but only that new modes of policing predominate.
Secondly, the changing relationship between State and civil 
society is a material process of initiative, resistance and 
compromise and in no way merely the irrepressible rise of an 
irresistible capitalist state. For example, whilst the "New 
Police' were legislated into existence in 1829, it had in fact 
taken 44 years to bring them into existence, after the idea was 
first put to parliament in 1785 (Phillips op cit; 171). In the 
case of prisons, the earliest proposals to use prisons as the 
chief means of punishing felons, and notions that prisons could 
function penitentially, were in circulation in the 1770's, but 
Pentonville was not built until the 1840's; in other words, a 
gestation period of some 70 years. Furthermore, 'the last 
vestiges of voluntary and local administration ... the transfer 
of all borough and county jails to a central prison commission 
administered from Whitehall' was not completed until 1877 
(Ignatieff op cit; 205). In the case of education, if we date 
the State's large scale involvement in it from 1839 (the 
establishment of the Education Committee of the Privy Council 
Office - 'the Education Department'), the earliest date the 
Department exerts a decisive influence over the religio- 
educational systems is probably 186 2 (through the 'Revised 
Code') - a gap of 23 years. State schools, provided through 
local boards were brought into being through the 1870 Act, 
came into being post-1870, 31 years after the foundation of 
the Education Department.
Describing the pre—1870 pattern of educational provision, 
and noting its decentralised pattern, Johnson notes that
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education
"was seen to be indigenous to civil society. The 
direct organizers of education remained the repre- 
sentitives of dominant class-fractions in their own 
communities: clergy, gentry, manufacturers, merchants 
and, marginally, tradesmen and farmers."
(Johnson 1976; 47).
A pattern consonant with, we might add, the direct administration 
of the Poor Laws. Describing the currents of opposition to the 
New Police, Phillips delineates three different political 
forces in the decades 1780 - 1830 who firstly opposed the 
establishment of the Metropolitan Police, and consequently, 
similar constabularies being extended throughout England and 
Wales. Firstly, representatives of working classes, for whom 
the New Police were
"another instrument of crowd repression to add to the 
constables, special constables. Yeomanry and troops 
already used against political demonstrations."
(Phillips op cit; 172)
Secondly, there were the liberal whigs and the few parliamentary 
radicals for whom the New Police represented a threat to 
constitutional rights and to civil liberties, because the 
extended constabulary was seen as little more than the creeping 
edge of the centralised, bureaucratic state. Thirdly, and 
most importantly, the strongest and most potent opposition 
(because unlike the former, this group were an organised and 
powerful political grouping) came from 'many backbench country 
gentlemen'. Their opposition was two-fold. Their manifest 
argument appealed to the dangers to the liberties and rights 
of free-born Englishmen arising from the continental style, 
(especially 'French') over—centralisation of the New Police. 
Secondly, and perhaps more to the point, the New Police directly 
undermined one of the sources of their direct control over the 
shires, the powers to appoint the watch, the local constabulary 
and so on (Phillips. 172-3). Taken together with the first
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appointments of stipendiary magistrates (1792) and the 
revamping of the prison service, the coming of the New 
Police threatened their unique position as the natural 
guardians and purveyors of 'law and order' in the counties.
What we are arguing here, then, is that in tracing the 
large scale and long term structural change notated in 
Foucault's terms as the general switch from punishment 
to discipline, one is simultaneously mapping constantly 
changing edges between the State and civil society. We have 
noted above the considerable resilience of civil society.
This makes any one-to-one correspondence between the needs 
of a ruling class and the development of a capitalist state 
a difficult relationship to demonstrate. For,clearly, there 
are segments of the ruling classes, for example, the gentle­
manly squirearchy, and whig constitutionalists, who were 
prepared to use parliamentary means, and no doubt, a network 
of informal channels, to oppose the establishment of new 
institutional forms of the state, which undermined their 
own local networks of power and authority, and which did not 
therefore advance the squirely interests. What was to replace 
the system of patronage, deference and authority which was the 
mode of domination in the county system of law enforcement 
( Hay;op cit)? Increasingly, it was to be the paid agents of 
the state whose authority was to derive from particular 
institutions and not class location and whose mode of domination 
was to be enforcing'abstract rules' and bureaucratic rational 
procedures, and whose legitimacy more and more derived from 
their expertness. Alongside the distribution of power and 
authority in civil society structured by ownership and control 
of various forms of property we have noted the increasing power 
of the state to intervene and regulate social relationships, 
social practices and social sites which were once regarded 
as the domain of private, self-regulated existence. The 
competing systems of authority were not entirely class based; 
some of the tension between them was generated by their different
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spatially located bases, town versus the shires, for example.
At best, 1800 - 1860 is marked by an uneasy co-existence 
between the traditional forms and sources of domination and 
the newer state-located modes.
The balance was disturbed not only by the fact that the system 
of law enforcement was to be re-located away from the local 
sheriff, J.P.'s etc., but also by the state acquiring the 
characteristics of a huge information bank. Foucault, Donzelot (1979) 
and most recently Giddens (1981) note that some of the most 
important features of the modern state are to do with sur­
veillance, information gathering and processing, where infor­
mation becomes a major medium of power (Giddens op cit;174).
In the early 19th century we have the beginnings of the industry 
of registering and enumerating and classifying the population 
of the British Isles. Registration of births, deaths and 
marriages commenced in 1837. Seemingly innocuous, the fact 
that registration now took place permitted and produced much 
sharper distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate 
children, for example. In the early part of the century, of 
course, the monopoly of demographic information was not entirely 
in the hands of the state; various statistical societies, social 
investigators and medical men were beginning to enumerate the 
population, and identify sites of ill health, poverty and social 
disturbance. However, it was to be the school teachers, prison 
governors, inspectors and prison chaplains, the New Police, the 
factory inspectorate and Poor Law commissioners who were to 
provide the substantial information about relationships, 
practices and sites within civil society, and who were to 
become simultaneously the agents of intervention and correction.
We shall be providing more substantial evidence on this theme 
when we examine some of the work of Edwin Chadwick and W.A. Miles.
An integral part of the process of enumeration and identification, 
was the classification of populations into social groups. As we 
noted earlier, the activity of classification extended beyond
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a means of encoding numbers to the practice of fixing 
individuals into particular categories and then keeping 
the categories apart. We have mentioned this in connection 
with the administration of prisons and the Poor Laws; 
monitorial schools operated on similar principles. One 
of the outcomes of the process of enumerati'On .and classi­
fication in the first half of the 19th century was the 
identification of a set of relations, practices and sites 
associated with the phenomenon of youth, but more particularly 
with an emergent category - the juvenile delinquent. The 
identification of a problem category was to be one of the 
conditions for the institutionalisation, in criminal law, 
and in the penal system (i.e. the system of law enforcement) 
of a distinction between the adult and the child as legal 
and penal subjects.
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CHAPTER TWO
MISCHIEVOUS DISCRETION; CHILDREN AND CRIMINAL LAW
"a child knows right from wrong long before
he knows how to make a prudent speculation
or a wise will".
(Kenny (1965) Outlines of Criminal Law,
quoted in Smith and Hogan 1969; 110).
INTRODUCTION
How the legal system retained the apparent contradiction between 
infancy terminating at the age of 21 years whilst maintaining 
the criminal responsibility of children begins at 7 years, can 
largely be explained by the logic of the grammar of the English 
criminal law. The specific combination of fundamental elements 
of the criminal law (mens rea, actus reus, responsibility etc.), 
provided an almost insurmountable stumbling block to social 
reformers concerned with removing offenders of tender years from 
a legal process whose potential outcome was the gibbet.
This Chapter will be primarily concerned with the discourse of 
English criminal law in the 19th century, seeking to indicate 
how the principles around which its processes were organised, 
permitted the very young to stand trial as though they were 'full' 
legal subjects. This will entail looking in some detail at the 
concepts of criminal law, and how the criminal process, almost 
from time immemorial had accommodated offenders who were especially 
young. This is of particular importance because even under what 
we have termed the absolutist system, to be of tender years was 
regarded as being an extenuating circumstance, which though 
carrying no guarantees about the law not running its full course, 
did allow judges and magistrates to exercise judicial discretion. 
And it was in this particular 'space' within the discourse, that 
reforming magistrates, lawyers and 'child savers' sought the 
rescue, by separating the old from young offenders, of children 
and a new social category, 'the juvenile' from the rigours of 
the criminal law.
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In trying to carch a particular moment in the transformation 
of the criminal law, and in the criminal subjectivity of the 
child, we must be sensitive to wider changes which took place 
in the English criminal legal system during this period.
Attempts were being made to eliminate the contradictions which 
existed within case law (due in part to a poor system of court 
reporting and, a reliance on legal texts were themselves in­
accurate) , and contradictions which existed between case law 
elaborated under the procedures of common law, and, statute 
law. Diverse parties, such as Bentham, Adam Smith and 
lawyers serving on, and giving evidence to parliamentary 
commissions tried to put into statute, a criminal code (in the 
Continental manner) combining the complex forms of actions, 
definitions of crimes etc., into one coherent system. Reducing 
the number of petty offences which were punishable capitally, 
combining diverse definitions of forms of larceny, re-writing 
the definition of certain offences (forgery and fraud) and 
recognising new forms of property was part of the process of 
codification, which in the end was only partially achieved.
Children as Adults
That the criminal law did treat children as though they were 
'full' legal subjects in the early years of the 19th century 
is indisputable. Taking the death penalty as an index, 
children were sentenced to death for the same offences as 
adults. John Any Bird Bell, however, is an extreme example of 
the system of law enforcement running its full course. We 
should lay to rest the popular conception that children were 
commonly executed. One study traces the disposition of 103 
children who, after criminal trials, were sentenced to hang; 
the years 1801-1836; none were executed (Knell 1965). "Small 
boys and girls were not strung up on gibbets for petty theft" 
as some commentators have supposed (Knell op cit; 207). However,
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like Knell, Radzinowicz (1948) and Kean (1937) demonstrate 
that capital sentences for child offenders was by no means 
uncommon. John Morris, aged 8, was convicted of breaking and 
entering, and stealing the sum of 8 shillings and was sentenced 
to death at the Old Bailey (Knell; ibid). Radzinowicz reports 
that after the Gordon Riots, Horace Walpole wrote "... of the 
several persons, male and female, executed on account of the 
late riots, seventeen of them have been under 18 years of age, 
and three not quite 15" (my emphasis: Radzinowicz; 14, footnote 
40). It was possible then, until 1847, for children as young 
as seven to stand their trial in the same manner and under the 
same proceedings, as adults. No distinction, at the level of 
documents before the Courts, for example the Bills of Indictment 
(lodged in the P.R.O.), was made on account of age
Evidence suggests that popular consciousness was affronted 
by offenders of tender years being sentenced capitally. The 
widely reported case of William York, aged 10 is instructive. 
(Knell op. cit.. Smith and Hogan; 111, Radzinowicz; 12). In 
a trial at Bury assizes, in 1748, York was sentenced to death 
after he murdered a 5 year old girl and buried the body in a 
dung heap. York was condemned to death for the murder. The 
Lord Chief Justice, who was the presiding judge at the assizes 
postponed the execution "until he should have the opinion of 
other judges as to whether he (York) should be put to death 
or not" (Knell; 204). This was in consideration of York's 
tender years. York remained under sentence of death for another 
nine years, until in 1757 he was pardoned on condition he entered 
sea service. More than a hint perhaps of judicial indecision 
about executing young offenders. There is evidence from the 
19th century which indicates popular opinion. Numerous parlia­
mentary commissions report that traders and other victims of 
juvenile thieves preferred not to press charges, or, under­
reported the value of stolen articles (e.g. P.P. Crim. Law 
Vol. I (1819) 13-15). The jury in the Bell case recommended 
mercy. In another case, in 1800, a ten year old boy sentenced
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to death "for secreting notes at the Chelmsford Post Office" 
the judge noted
"The scene was dreadful, on passing 
sentence, and to pacify the feelings 
of a most crowded court, who all ex­
pressed their horror of such a child 
being hanged by their looks and manners 
... I hinted something of its still 
being in the Power of the Crown to 
interpose in every case that was open 
to clemency."(my emphasis: Hotham B ., 
quoted in Radzinowicz; 13).
Whether children had sentences commuted principally because
of their age is difficult to determine, for as we indicated
earlier, the practice of retaining capital punishment and
yet pardoning or commuting convicted adult criminals was
systemic to the law enforcement process at the end of the
18th and at the beginning of the 19th century. What is
demonstrable though was that other forms of punishment were
meted out to adults and minors alike. Transportation, the
hulks, whipping, and incarceration were punishments with few
11
chronological age boundaries . Nicholas White, aged 9, 
for example, was sentenced to death in May 1833 "for felonously 
breaking and entering the dwelling house of Thomas Batchelor .. 
and stealing therein, fifteen pieces of paint, value 2d", had 
his sentence "commuted" to a whipping and transportation for 
seven years (Knell;198). It was from this widely cast net of 
law enforcement that social reformers principally concerned 
with the "problem" of juvenile delinquency sought to free 
young offenders, largely though not exclusively, because of 
its brutality.
Paradoxically, from at least the 14th century, the criminal 
law had made special provision for child offenders. Once 
before the court, there was considerable judicial discretion
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as to whether the subject before the court was an 'adult' 
or a 'child'. This judicial discretion derives from one of 
the axiomatic principles of criminal judicial discourse: the 
notion of 'responsibility'.
As we shall argue more fully below, central principles of 
the criminal legal discourse include a set of judicial concepts, 
responsibility, liability, intention, mens rea, doli incapax, 
capcacity, motive, guilt and the like, which though they are 
in constant flux open to interpretation and philosophical 
debate, address the problem of the mind of the offender. For 
in criminal proceedings, not only must the offence be proved, 
but also the intent to commit it. This inevitably involves 
questions of rationality and reason. Case and statute law 
has elaborated general defences which allow specific subjects 
to plead on the grounds of insufficient (infancy) or impaired 
(insanity) reason;(other general defences include diminished 
responsibility, mistake, drunkeness, necessity, duress (or 
compulsion) and coercion, and superior orders (Smith and Hogan 
1969; chapter 9).
It was on the terrain of the mind as constituted in criminal 
and penal processes that child-saving reformers were able to 
find the means of re-writing the subjectivity of child offenders. 
However, central categories of the criminal law were challenged 
in a mediated manner, for what emerged in the struggles to 
remove children from the rigours of the criminal law was not 
simply calling into question the then-extant legal notions of 
responsibility, but more fundamentally the causes of crime itself. 
Furthermore, the power base of many arguing for a different 
system applicable to children, was not within the legal profession 
itself (though many magistrates testified to parliamentary com­
missions along these lines) but are familiar to us primarily 
as movers for penal reform, thereby attacking the criminal law, 
not only by arguing for separate procedures for adults and 
children, but also calling for separate institutions for adult
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and child offenders. In fact, the separation of children 
from adults in penal institutions was accomplished a decade 
prior to the establishment of formal procedures allowing 
offenders under 16 to be tried summarily for many offences.
The Convict Department in Van Diemen's Land for example set 
up a separate establishment for your male convicts as early 
as 1834, at Point Puer. Girls were not separated from 
convict women; initial placement throughout the period was 
in the Female Factory in Hobart ( see Appendix).
To address the complex issues of responsibility and the notion 
of liability more adequately, firstly we shall describe how 
the criminal law conceives these notions. Secondly, we shall 
consider the particular case of children's reason and child 
knowledge as conceived in criminal law.
a. 'Sufficient reason'; criminal responsibility
One of the foremost commentators on criminal law. Sir James 
Fitzgerald Stephen states that
"in order that an act may by the law of 
England be criminal, the following con­
ditions must be fulfilled:
1. The act must be done by a person of 
competent age.
2. The act must be voluntary, and the 
person who does it must also be free
' from certain forms of compulsion.
3. The act must be intentional.
4. Knowledge in various degrees according
to the nature of the offence must 
accompany it.
5. In many cases either malice, fraud or 
negligence enters into the definition 
of offences.
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6. Each of these general conditions 
(except the condition as to age) 
may be affected by the insanity 
of the offender"
(Stephen;1883:Vol. II; 97).
What is of note here is the centrality of notions such as 
'voluntary', 'intentional', 'knowledge' and 'malice, fraud 
or negligence', to the legal conception of what constitutes 
a criminal act. We should note that (except in the case of 
insanity) the form of the legal definition of a crime is 
generally ahistorical. Texts such as Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown (1787) and, more recently for example. Smith and Hogan 
(1969) generally define crime in the context of offenders 
being responsible for their actions unless special conditions 
obtain(for example infancy or idiocy). Smith and Hogan's work 
describes the elements of a crime as follows:
"Before a man can be convicted of a crime 
it is usually necessary for the prosecution 
to prove (a) that a certain event or state 
of affairs, which is forbidden by the criminal 
law, has been caused by his conduct and (b) 
that this conduct was accompanied by a ore - 
scribed state of mind. The event, or state 
of affairs, is usually called the actus reus 
and the state of mind the mens rea of crime".
(Smith and Hogan, op. cit.; 27, my emphasis).
Analytically, we are confronted with two discursive principles
constituting crime and criminal law. Firstly the actus reus -
the 'event or state of affairs' forbidden by criminal law.
Secondly the notion of mens rea which refers to knowledge,
intention, etc.. Each element is susceptible to transformation
but not in register, and according to different principles.
There is a third element, that of the form of judicial procedure
12
(ordeal, battle, trial by jury, trial by witness)
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The actus reus is constituted along two principal lines; 
offences against the person (murder, assault, rape, sodomy, 
prostitution, etc.) and, offences against property. Offences 
against the person are further valorised by reference to the 
status of the victim, so that we have historically, brutal 
punishments inflicted on the putative regicides * In
the case of offences against property, the criminal law works 
in visibly securing capitalist relations- the obsessive 
protection of private property, given through the capital 
punishments meted out for trifling offences of petty larceny 
for example. As the dominant forms of capitalist property 
change, the criminal law reconstitutes the offences deemed 
to be criminal. Thus, for example, we have the rapid passage 
of the Waltham Black Act (Geo 1 c 22 1723) which made 19 
separate offences capital, and which aimed predominantly to 
secure rural-agricultural property relations (namely the 
appropriation of traditionally 'common' lands to the exclusive 
use of the aristocratic landed gentry), (Thompson 1975). In 
the first half of the 19th century we find legislation obsess­
ively concerned with urban crime. (The Police Acts 1829 , The
consolidation of offences for petty larceny 1827 ) , and
a new concern with stealing, forging and disposal of finance 
instruments. The 18th century law for example placed no value 
on documents other than the paper on which wills, deeds, etc. 
were written. At the beginning of the 19th century there were 
about 80 pieces of legislation covering forgery (Cornish and 
Hart; 1978;49). Capitalist industrial enterprises as a matter 
of course, sought and obtained capital punishment, by parlia­
mentary means, for offences against its buildings, machinery, 
raw materials and finished goods (Hay et al; 1975,-20-22) .
Crudity, crisis and cruelty seemed to be the proper epithets 
for the criminal law specifically, and the common law in general 
" Its absurdities", remarked one commentator
5^ -
"are enough to make a horse laugh; a 
drizzling maze of empirical inventions, 
circuitous procedure, and unintelligible 
fiction, calculated for no purpose but to 
fortify monopoly (of lawyers) and wrap 
justice in deceit and mystery."
(Wade, 1835 Black Book; 327. Quoted by 
Manchester 1978;117).
In the early part of the 19th century it was difficult to 
discover what exactly the criminal law was; definitions 
such as murder, manslaughter, rape and larceny; defences 
such as insanity and self-defence, had to be extracted from 
the decisions of judges. It was difficult to appeal a 
decision because few records of cases were kept (and many 
that were, could only be found in private collections (Cornish 
et al; 51). The Criminal Law Commission 1834 (1st Report P.P. 
Vol. XXVI) was followed by a further four reports in an attempt 
to codify existing common law principles. A draft code was 
produced in 1849 but never put into statute form. It was 
Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law (1879) which became the most 
complete 'code' (subsequently forming the basis of the criminal 
codes in Canade, New Zealand, Queensland, Western Australia 
and Tasmania). (Cornish et al; 55). So much for the crudity. 
The cruelty we have dwelt on. The crisis is caught very 
precisely in the following passage.
"At a moment when the pecuniary enterprises 
of the Kingdom were covering the whole world, 
when railways at home and the steam on the 
seas were creating everywhere new centres of 
industrial and commercial life, the Common 
Law courts seemed constantly occupied in the 
discussion of the merest legal conundrums 
which bore no relation to the merits of any 
controversies except those of pedants of a 
machinery that belonged already to the past". 
(Bowen C. 1907;509, quoted in Manchester 1978;119)
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The law here, whilst its categories are sensitive to the 
relations of possession, (feudal/capitalist, rural/urban, 
agricultural/financial) at the level of judicial procedure, 
it may well retain an archaic and antiquated life of its own. 
through nothing more than sheer inertia. Whilst we have argued 
that new offences legislated into existence in the 19th century 
are distinctly capitalist can we also argue that notions of 
mens rea, criminal responsibility and liability 'reflect', 
'mirror' or 'correspond' to these distinctly capitalist forms 
of offence?
Two recent commentators writing of the absolutist system 
of criminal law enforcement certainly take this view. Clarke 
(1975) speaks of,
"... the classical view of crime,law and 
punishment which (in typically uncodified 
manner) forms the bedrock of the English 
criminal law, most notably in the subordination 
of questions of motivation to the questions of 
guilty knowledge and responsibility. This 
orientation has its roots in the image of 
bourgeois man generated in the formulations 
of classical political economy and political 
philosophy, the atomised, egotistical, 
rationally self-seeking embodiment of indi­
vidualism bounded only by the social contract."
(p. 12; my emphasis).
Likewise, Garland (1981) writes:
"One might say that the prison, penal law 
and the judicial process of the period 
effectively transferred the concepts of 
economic liberalism into the realm of 
punishment ... The twin doctrines of
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individual responsibility and presumed 
rationality formed the basis for the 
judicial findings of guilt - since in 
free-market society the criminal actor - 
like his economic counterpart - was 
deemed to be in absolute control of his 
destiny. Reason and responsibility were 
absolute and essential attributes and 
since freedom was guaranteed by market 
society, there could be neither excuse 
nor mitigation for crime . . . "
(p. 31; my emphasis).
Two valuable insights into the nature of what we might 
nominally call the juridic subject in general. The notion 
of the individual subject, like 'the economic counterpart' 
being in control of his destiny is not, however, strictly 
a bourgeois construct, especially in the case of criminal 
law. The homology between the bourgeois legal subject 
and the economic agent of capitalism will not bear up under 
the weight of historical evidence.
Absolute responsibility, where the legal subject is held 
liable for his actions is not unknown in criminal law in 
feudal times. Legal historians tell us:
"Law in its earliest days tries to 
make men answer for all the ills of 
an obvious kind that their deeds bring 
upon their fellows."
And of the 13th century in particular,
"If once granted that a man's death was 
caused by the act of another, then that 
other is liable no matter what may have
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been his intentions or motives. To 
this principle our evidence directs us, 
though for an unmitigated application 
of it we may have to look to a pre­
historic time."
(Pollock and Maitland; Vol. 11:471).
Questions of mens rea, culpability, liability and responsibility 
and the difference between intention and misadventure were 
known to and were being contested by mediaeval lawyers (Pollock 
and Maitland op. cit.; 470 ), so hardly bourgeois in origin
or distinctly capitalist in the social relations it secures. 
Individual liability subverted collective responsibility 
perhaps by denying the early law of blood-feud and familial 
rights to compensation.
A mens rea, (guilty mind), constituted without reference to 
environmental influences and therefore disallowing mitigating 
circumstances (brief description only of mens rea in the 
absolutist sense) clearly assumes a rational subject who has 
chosen to lead a life of crime and was therefore strictly liable 
for any punishment consequent upon conviction of an offence.
The legalistic construction, as Clarke (op.cit) rightly points 
out, privileges liability and guilt without reference to 
motivation. This construction remained as a hard core in 
criminal law for something like 500 years. However, the 
actus reus was transformed to take account, say of changing 
forms of property and securing changes in the relations of 
possession; The constituted subjectivity of the offender; 
a rational subject choosing the pursuit of crime, remained 
durably indifferent to the processes of codification and 
reclassification of criminal offences. For the rational 
subject is a premise of a law enforcement system where 
retribution is the organising principle. The rewriting 
of the subject is therefore consequent upon a re-ordering 
of the organising principle, and historically this was to 
take the form of asserting the notion of rehabilitation 
wherein punishment was premised upon programmes of reform.
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Where the law confronts the non-rational subject however 
is where we find the greatest clarity in legal enunciation 
of what is regarded as rational, and it appears as a very 
narrowly defined quality, purely cognitive and inherently 
biological in form. A pertinent example occurs in Hawkins' 
(1787) description of offenders who might enter general 
defences in criminal law:
"As to the first point it is to be 
observed that those who are under a natural 
disability of distinguishing between good 
and evil, as infants under the age of dis­
cretion, ideots and lunaticks, are not 
punishable by any criminal prosecution 
whatsoever." (ppl-2).
The third figure, alongside the child and the madman, was 
the beast. The law granted them,from at least the 13th 
century, a general defence against prosecution - as Bracton
argued in the 13th century, they were "protected by their
innocence", (quoted in Jacobs 1971;25). What then was the 
principle of classification whereby specific subjects were 
granted the privilege of innocence, rather than assuming the 
legal capacity of mens rea? The lines are made clear to us 
in the judicial considerations of the MtNaghten Case (1843).
The circumstances of the M'Naghten case are well known. Under 
the 'delusion' that Sir Robert Peel had injured him and 
mistaking Mr. Drummond (Peel's Private Secretary) for Peel, 
M'Naghten shot him dead with a pistol (Stephen 1883,-153:
Hart, 1968,-189-193: Jacobs 1971; 30-36). At the trial, the 
questions left to the jury were
"whether at the time the act was committed, 
the prisoner had or had not the use of his
understanding so as to know that he was
doing a wrong and wicked act, whether the
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prisoner was sensible at the time 
he committed the act, that he had 
violated both the laws of God and 
Man." (Stephen ; 153).
The jury acquitted M'Naghten, a verdict causing some public 
alarm, to the extent that the House of Lords asked the judges 
to respond to some very general questions about pleas of 
insanity. The judges' replies became in principle the 
M'Naghten Rules. Mental abnormality, post-M'Naghten, sufficient 
to constitute a defence, comprised three elements:
a) the accused at the time of the act 
must have suffered from a defect of 
reason.
b) this must have arisen from a disease 
of the mind.
c) the result of it must have been that 
the accused did not know the nature of 
the act or that it was illegal.
(Hart; 189: Jacobs; 30)
The defence then is framed purely with reference to cognitive
principles; the offender did not know what he/she was doing,
and did not know the act to be wrong. There is no reference
to a lack of capacity to control action (i.e. cases where the
offender knew the act to be wrong but could not prevent nor
control the act being done because of a lack of capacity to
do so). It was a peculiarly English version of the relationship
between crime and madness, very unlike the defence of madness
15in the French Penal Code 1810
Rationality then is founded upon knowledge. But knowledge is 
furthered refined, as in Hawkins (op.cit.), as the ability or 
disability to distinguish between good and evil. The general 
defence of infancy or insanity therefore could be entered, but, 
it was the judge's discretion whether or not the plea was a good 
one, determined generally by a common-sense process given the
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legal nicety 'voir dire', looking and talking! The legalistic 
conception of rationality, narrowly defined as knowing right 
from wrong makes no reference to habitat, environment or 
motivation, and was not disturbed by the M'Naghten Rules.
The cause of crime was sited within the individual, its point 
of origin being the guilty mind. This being the case, changes 
in the classification of what constitutes an actus reus, the 
redefinition of offences, and changes in formal court procedures, 
therefore have no necessary effect upon the judicial construction 
of individual responsibility.
There were attempts to subvert the judicial discourse of 
rationality. The M'Naghten case is notable here as a point 
where medical men tried to insert their claims as arbiters of 
the boundary between madness and sanity. If, as the judiciary 
claimed, madness was the manifestation of a diseased mind, 
who and by what procedures, was to determine whether a mind 
was diseased? Medical men claimed this as their specific 
terrain (Stephen; 125).
Perhaps the most coherent critique of extant notions of legal 
rationality, and its location, within legal discourse came 
from Benthamite philosophy. Bentham and his followers were 
fundamentally concerned to construct an all-embracing system 
of criminal law enforcement. Bentham's own projects comprised 
not only the elaboration of the principles of codication of 
criminal law, but a sophisticated (and obsessive) plan for 
reorganising English prisons. Bentham's system of
criminal law and punishment was premised as an 'economy of 
threats', enshrining the principle of deterrence, as an attempt 
to displace the organising principle of retribution. Punishment 
was structured by the minimal use of force, violence and coercion 
necessary to deter both the guilty and the innocent from 
pursuing criminal careers. While he embraced the legalistic 
notion of the rational subject, that subjectivity was put into 
play in a radically different way. For Bentham, the rational 
subject was both a target of the deterrent strategy and an 
instrument of it. An argument clearly demonstrated where
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Bentham considers cases in which punishment must be 
'inefficacious', cases where:
"... the penal provision, though it 
were conveyed to a man's notice, could 
produce no effect on him, with respect 
to the preventing of him from engaging in 
any (criminal) act of the sort in question.
Such is the case,
1. In extreme infancy, where a man has not 
yet attained that state or disposition 
of mind in which the prospect of evils
so distant as those which are held forth
by the law, has the effect of influencing
his conduct.
2. In insanity; where the person, if he has 
attained to that disposition, has since 
been deprived of it through the influence 
of some permanent though unseen cause.
(Bentham, 1970 ; 244) .
The general defences in criminal law accorded the infant and 
the madman, argued Bentham were "either false in fact or
confusedly expressed." In his view the legal arguments
"... that the will of these persons 
concurs not with the act; that they 
have no vicious will, or, that they 
have not the free use of their will 
(p. 161)
are purely circular and without purpose. How can these 
subjects be instruments of deterrence, when punishment has 
no effect on their conduct, nor on that of society in general, 
for the target of punishment is a mentally abnormal subject? 
Punishment as a deterrent strategy only works through subjects
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who are commonly supposed to be ordinary, rational members 
of society. It was, therefore, Bentham's view, a purposeless 
exercise to use the infants and the mad as instruments of any 
deterrent strategy, and this was to be the grounding of their 
extenuating circumstance, not merely their cognitive defects, 
which in Bentham's scheme, were little more than extention 
of bodily imperfections
The classic theory of deterrence conceives punishment as the means 
to obtain more than retribution, it was the means deployed to 
instil the rule of law in the offender and on society at 
large. The offender is not merely punished for transgression 
but also becomes a reified instrument of terror in the service 
of the law. What is central to the theory of deterrence, and 
to Bentham's scheme of law enforcement, which gives shape to 
his particular conception of the rational subject, was radical 
conception of preventive justice. That the law should serve 
a larger purpose than retribution, that it should use offenders 
as active agents of prevention is comprehensively articulated 
in Bentham's theories of the panopticon. However, it was not 
the rationalist-utilitarian of preventive justice which became 
the dominant practice in courts and prisons in the first half 
of the 19th century. Crime prevention was not systematically 
articulated to theories of deterrence in law enforcement 
institutions, but to the evangelical notions of 'reform',
'rescue' and 'rehabilitation'. The Panopticon remained an 
idea, the practical reality was the prison chaplain. The 
significant différence between the theory of deterrence and 
the evangelical programme of rescue, reform and rehabilitation 
is the letter's decisive shift beyond the 'twin doctrines' of 
individual responsibility and presumed rationality, into the 
problematic areas of motivation, and, the possible effects of 
environment.
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It was the logic of the criminal legal process in the first 
part of the 19th century which included young offenders as 
a category of criminal to be taken before the court and tried 
for alleged offences. The absolutist system recognised offenders 
only as persons freely making rational choices to commit crimes 
and therefore liable to any punishment the court might bestow. 
Where the criminal law differed markedly from previous legal 
discourses, we have noted earlier, was in the absence of any 
statutory protection of infants. Any protection extended to 
the young was purely by judicial discretion, not by any right 
statute only applied to their status. The privilege could be 
extended or witheld only within the very narrow doctrine of 
mens rea, as it was applied in the 19th century; namely a 
practical test of the judge deciding whether a young offender 
knew right from wrong. It was this very narrow interpretation 
of mens rea which allowed judges to try, and sentence, children 
of any age, treating them to all intents and purposes as though 
they were full legal subjects.
By dicta, precedent and customary practice, there were specific 
chronological ages which acted as markers in the exercise of 
judicial discretion. We shall outline these below, but emphasise 
here that these ages were no more than markers; judges could 
and did ignore them, applying more often their own rough and 
ready tests of mischievous discretion.
B .______ 'Of Sufficient Age': the criminal liability of children
We are innured to analysing and explaining social phenomena 
by reference to relationships between specific ages and definite 
aptitudes, characteristics and abilities, if only to indicate 
the normal from the abnormal, the odd from the conventional. 
Attaining a certain age (certainly up to the age of 18) constantly 
rewrites an individual's relationship to and within modern
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institutions; at the age of 5 we go to school, at the age 
of 16 we may leave it, and so on. Modern usage of chrono­
logical age remains with us as a rarely questioned, wide 
embracing principle of classification. Age is used as a 
precise boundary marker; an efficeint way of excluding 
individuals from the polity, the economy and the full 
rigours of the legal system.
Nineteenth century criminal law displays few of the certainties 
we attach to the relationship between specific ages and 
definite aptitudes and abilities. One principal reason of 
course was the absence until 1837 or any national system of 
registering the birth of individuals. Part of the process of 
subjectivity, in the modern sense, is to be assigned a date 
of birth (registering one existence and in part supplying a 
means of identification). In the absence of any such reliable 
means of identification, the English judiciary accorded little 
weight to the ages of offenders; the principle of legal 
classification was not so much age as physique • Judges
were more inclined to rely upon their own examination of the 
offender's physical appearance and mental competence when 
any general defence of infancy was deployed.
The weight of historical practice had, both by precedent and 
dicta, in common law^ bequeathed the 19th century judiciary 
three categories of young offender, loosely bounded, one from 
the other by age. The ages are broadly related to the legal 
notion of mens rea - either its presence or absence, which 
in turn determined whether a young offender was deemed to be 
exempt from, or liable to criminal trial and punishment. The 
operative categories were as follows:
a) under 7 years; a child of this age, by common law was 
deemed doli incapax (possessing no guilty mind), and therefore 
could not legally commit a crime, nor could be punished.
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b) 7 but under 14 years; the coiranon law generally 
presumed against criminal intent on the part of the 
offender, but (unlike those under 7) this presumption 
could be rebutted, and if it were, an offender was liable 
for trial and punishment.
c) 14 years plus; an offender was treated as an adult, 
and if convicted, liable to any punishments, even capital.
The general divisions are not disputed by any writers on 
19th century criminal law, or child law, (e.g. Hawkins 1787, 
MacPherson 1842, Stephen 1885, James 1957, Kean 1937,
Knell 19 65 ). We shall expand on the logic of these
categories below. In passing, however, we should note that 
for offenders under the age of fourteen, the criminal law 
offered the possibility of a measure of protection against 
its full rigour. However, the criminal law constituted as 
'adult' those offenders over the age of fourteen; unlike 
other branches of the law where infancy terminated at the 
age of 21. To all intents and purposes, the criminal law 
made no distinction between an offender over the age of 14, 
and an offender over the age of 21. Both were deemed 
'responsible' and therefore liable to suffer any punishments 
handed down by the bench. Age itself, for those over the 
age of 7 was not a prima facie reason alone, for the mitigation 
of punishment (this is a contemporary usage) but merely 
sufficient reason for judges and magistrates to consider the 
possibility of mitigation, based on a subjective assessment 
of the offender. To reiterate, age was related, not to notions 
of capacity - an ability to understand, to control behaviour 
but to the much narrower legal notion of responsibility - the 
ability to distinguish between (legally defined) good and evil, 
right and wrong. Legal logic dictated that the age at which 
one could make "a wise will or prudent investment" was an 
attribute acquired at least seven years after the acquisition 
of a knowledge of right and wrong.
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A notable absence in the common law was the notion of 
'juvenile'. Juvenile, as a descriptive term, applied to 
young offenders (of unspecified age) seems not to be a 
product of legal discourse but category arising out of 
the reports of surveys carried out by 19th century social 
reformers and philanthropists. One of the earliest ref­
erences to juvenile, in context of young offenders was the 
name of a committee (which neatly reflected its own object 
of inquiry) called the Society for Investigating the Causes 
of the Alarming Increase of Juvenile Delinquency in the 
Metropolis (Pinchbech and Hewitt 1973; 433-434). Their first 
Report was issued in 1816. This was followed by the Society 
for the Improvement of Prison Discipline and the Reformation 
of Juvenile Offenders which disseminated further the existence 
of that special species of offender, the juvenile. We are 
not claiming here to establish a terminological point of origin, but 
merely to establish a distinction between age-related legal 
categories and the deployment of 'juvenile' as a product of 
social philanthropic reportage. The distinction, however, 
between legal and philanthropic categories was maintained 
less and less post 1836. Before we explore the legal / 
philanthropic classification however we shall return to the 
general problem of age and criminal responsibility.
1. The age of responsibility
One commentator outlines the position of young children 
accused of criminal offence as follows;
"... within the age of seven years an 
infant cannot be punished for any capital 
offence, whatever circumstances of 
mischievous discretion may appear; for ex 
presumptis juris, he cannot have discretion; 
and against this presumption, no averment 
shall permit. Therefore if a child under 
this age steal the goods or fire the house 
of another, he cannot be punished for either 
larceny or arson. (Hawkins 1787;l-2 footnotes).
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A child under seven was immune from conviction primarily
on the ground that in law they were presumed not capable of
having a guilty mind - therefore to be doli incapax. The 
defence was not therefore infancy, but the irrebuttable 
assumption that they did not have the necessary mens rea 
(Jacobs op.cit; 63). Without mens rea, in law no crime could 
be committed.
The attribute of absolute innocence for those below the age 
of seven was purely arbitrary. The age of seven was probably 
drawn from Roman and Canon Law (Christian doctrine for example 
did not admit a child to the sacraments of the Church until it
had a mind of its own - customarily at the age of seven). The
age of criminal responsibility has varied across time. Con­
temporarily it is set at 10 years, though recommendations 
prior to the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act set the age 
at 12 years . There is some doubt as to when seven became 
the age of criminal responsibility. Evidence suggests that 
such a boundary existed in the 13th century. Pollock and 
Maitland report however that in the case of homicide
"it is with difficulty that even a child 
can escape the hard law. Reginald aged 
four, by misadventure, slew Robert aged two; 
the justices granted that he might have his 
life and members because of his tender age.
(Y.B. 30-1 Edw. I;511). A little later we 
hear that a child under the age of seven 
shall not suffer judgement in a case of 
homicide"(p.484).
Certainly such was the ruling in the 14th century. The Year 
Book Hil 4 Edw. II (1310-11) states that "an infant under the 
age of seven years, though he be convicted of a felony, shall 
go free of judgement because he knoweth not of good or evil" 
(quoted in Knell op.cit;364). Whilst the common law determined
- 576 -
a period of absolute innocence, the chronological upper 
limit was not fixed in any precise manner. Knell finds 
evidence of the age being fixed at seven, and at twelve 
years (Knell; 366-367).
However, the evidence suggests that the age line of seven as 
the upper limit of a designated period of absolute innocence 
was settled by the end of the 14th century (Knell; 36 7).
In a sense children below the age of seven were regarded as 
tabula rasa - completely without the attributes of guilt, 
intent, discretion and discrimination. These common law 
principles were operative in the 19th century.
2. The age of discretion
The doctrine of doli incapax operates where a defendant 
is seven years old but below the age of fourteen years.
Unlike the previous category however, the law entertained 
a rebuttable assumption that a child is capable of committing 
a crime. There is little doubt that lawyers had a great deal 
of difficulty in settling, firstly the upper limit of this 
category in terms of chronological age. It is the upper 
limit which is generally designated as "the age of discretion". 
The age of fourteen was settled on by both Coke and Hale in 
the seventeenth century. (Knell;369). Later writers followed 
their age line. Again, 14 years seems to be somewhat an 
arbitrary boundary for in criminal matters we know that dis­
cretion could be acquired as early as twelve, and that children 
below that line were said to be 'within the age'. Fourteen 
years was certainly thought to be the age of discretion in 
matters concerning socage, land and property, as we have 
demonstrated earlier. None of the authorities make any dis­
tinction between the age of discretion, in criminal law, for 
boys and girls, though we have shown that such a distinction 
existed in family law in medieval times.
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The second great difficulty for the judiciary and magistrates 
was to determine whether someone "within age" possessed 
"discretion", or whether the case being heard indicated that 
the offender had displayed "mischievous discretion". Much 
hung on the examination by the judge (which had to be carried 
out in court. Hawkins puts it this way:
"And if it appear by the circumstances, that 
an infant under the age of discretion could 
distinguish between good and evil, as if one 
of the age of nine or ten years kill another 
and hide the body, or make excuses, or hide 
himself, he may be convicted or condemned 
and forfeit etc. as much as if he were of 
full age." (Hawkins; 3: my emphasis).
The mischievous discretion, the knowingness displayed (hiding 
the body, hiding himself or making excuses) was sufficient to 
place a young offender in jeopardy of being treated as an 
'adult', liable to unmitigated punishment, regardless of the 
tenderness of years. "The capacity of contracting guilt is 
measured more by the apparent strength of the offender's 
understanding than by years or days", concludes Hawkins (op.cit.2).
How did the Courts assess this unspecified quality of 'discretion'? 
We can understand the process by reference to reports of cases 
where discretion was at issue. The initial presumption is that,
"Every person of the age of discretion is 
presumed of sane memory until the contrary 
appears, which may be either by the in­
spection of the court, by evidence given 
to the jury, or being a collateral issue, 
the fact may be pleaded and replied.
(Hawkins; 3, my emphasis).
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So in 1313-14, 'an infant within the age killed his companion; 
and then concealed himself (though some reports say he con­
cealed the body - in a cabbage patch) and thereupon he was 
hanged; for Spigurnel J. argued that 'by concealment, he could 
discern between good and evil' (Kean; 367, my emphasis). In 
the York case (1748), noted earlier in the chapter, where York 
aged 10 killed a girl aged 5, the Lord Chief Justice in his 
summing up argues:
"... supposing the boy to have been guilty 
of the fact, and there are so many circum­
stances stated in the report, which are un­
doubted tokens of what my Lord Chief Justice 
Hale somewhere calls a mischievous discretion, 
that he is certainly a proper subject for 
capital punishment."
(quoted in Knell 1965;204, my emphasis).
Mischievous discretion, the knowledge of right and wrong was 
given through the concealment of the victim's body in a dung 
heap. Though the boy was ten, the act of concealment therefore 
made him 'a proper subject for capital punishment.'
One further case is worth considering in a little more detail 
because it gives us some insight into court practices. The 
case of R v. Owen (1830) (E.R. 172; 685-686) involves a charge
against Elizabeth Owen, aged 10, for stealing coals.and was seen 
to put a few knobs into a basket. In answer to the prosecution, 
she admitted taking coals from the heap. The head note reads:,
"If a child more then seven and under 14 
years of age is indicted for a felony, it 
will be left for the jury to say whether 
the offence was committed by the prisoner, 
and if so, whether at the time of the offence, 
the prisoner had guilty knowledge that he or 
she was doing wrong. The presumption of the 
law is, that a child of that age has no
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guilty knowledge, unless the contrary 
be proved by the evidence."
Two points of some note; firstly a crime comprised actus reus 
and mens rea and both had to be proved; secondly, and more 
importantly, it was the jury who was to decide whether or not 
the child displayed guilty knowledge. This point is underlined 
in the judge's (Littleton J.) summing up.
"... such a person might not be convicted, 
unless there be evidence to satisfy the jury 
that the party at the time of the offence, 
had a guilty knowledge that he or she was 
doing wrong."
Indeed, Littleton himself stated he was of the opinion that he
"... cannot hold that a child of ten years 
is incapable of committing a felony. Many 
have been convicted under that age."
The defence solicitor agreed, but invoked the York case to 
show that conviction there was premised upon a strong evidence 
of guilty knowledge. Littleton left the decision to the jury, 
who acquitted Elizabeth Owen and the foreman declared the 
grounds of the decision by stating, "We do not think that the 
prisoner had any guilty knowledge". It will be remembered that 
the jury in the York case found him guilty but also put in a 
strong plea for mercy.
The Owen case seems to signal two things. Firstly, a shift 
in the procedure of who was to determine the possession or 
absence of guilty knowledge - in the 18th century the judge 
was generally the arbiter whilst the Owen case indicates that 
this had become the responsibility of the jury. Secondly,
there was a strong divergence between judicial and popular 
opinion as to the criminal responsibility of children, where
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the latter are unwilling to convict, whilst the judge made
his feelings quite clear that children of ten could be possessed
of such responsibility.
But if mischievous discretion was manifest in particular actions; 
lying, deceit, concealment etc. and thus according to the 
criminal law children between seven and fourteen were liable to 
punishment, there was also a second yardstick commonly applied 
as a test of childish cognition. The axis here was a knowledge 
of good and evil as measured by the process of oath-taking. 
Children appeared in criminal cases not only as offenders but 
also as witnesses and the judicial concern here was with the 
reliability of evidence.
The general principle in common law was:
"... the evidence of all children had to 
be given on oath in both civil and criminal 
cases; this followed from the general funda­
mental rule of procedure that no testimony 
whatsoever can be legally received except 
upon oath."
(James 1957; 187).
Coke, for example, argued that the age of discretion included 
an ability to understand the nature of the oath. He stated 
that this age was fourteen years (Coke Just. 1; 247b quoted 
in James op.cit. 187). This was by no means settled in 
judicial practice. In R. v. Brazier (1779 1 Leach 199) 
involving an attempt to commit rape on a girl under seven, 
the testimony was given by the girl's mother and a woman 
lodger. The girl was not sworn or produced as a witness.
This was raised as a point of law, on the grounds that 
evidence had to be produced by sworn witnesses bearing the 
responsibility of cross-examination. Because it raised the
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general problem of child witnesses, the judges (12 in 
chambers) made a general statement on the relationship 
between children and competence. Their statement included 
the following,
"... there is no precise or fixed rule 
as to the time within which infants are 
excluded from giving evidence but their 
admissability depends upon the sense and 
reason they entertain of the danger and 
impiety of falsehood, which is to be 
collected from their answers to questions 
propounded to them by the Court; but if 
they are found to be incompetent to take 
an oath their testimony cannot be received."
In Brazier's case the mother's testimony being hearsay and 
the child not being called, led the prisoner to being 
pardoned.
The relationship between oath-taking and competence turns 
fundamentally however 'on the child's understanding of the 
moral rather than the legal aspect of the oath'. (James; 187). 
Knowledge of good and evil as a test of discretion turns out 
to be simply little else than a knowledge of the existence of 
God and a knowledge of the catechism rather than any capacity 
to reason or to understand moral issues. In R. v. White 
(1786 1 Leach 430) an adult witness was declared incompetent 
as a witness because he acknowledged 'that he had never learned 
the catechism, was altogether ignorant of the obligations of 
an oath, a future state of regard and punishment, the existence 
of another world, or what became of wicked people after death". 
In a footnote to the case, the reporter records a later case 
where Mr. Justice Rooke in 1795,
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"finding the witness was an infant who 
was wholly incompetent to take an oath 
(the case involved a 7 year old girl), 
postponed the trial till the following 
assizes, and ordered the child to be 
instructed in the meantime by a clergy­
man in the principles of her duty, and 
the nature and obligations of the oath."
At the next assizes the prisoner was put upon his trial, the 
girl being found by the Court, on examination "to have a 
proper sense of the nature of the oath, was sworn, and upon 
her testimony the prisoner was convicted and afterwards 
executed". The act of postponing trials until child witnesses 
received proper legal instruction seems to be not uncommon. 
Macpherson (1842;453) notes this practice, especially where a 
child is a key witness for the prosecution. Blackstone noted 
that the competence test rests upon "whether a child has a 
conception of Divine punishment being a consequence of 
falsehood" (quoted in Macpherson;454).
What constituted a competent child witness is perhaps best put 
by Macpherson,
"... the admissability of children depends 
not merely upon their possessing a competent 
degree of understanding, but also, in part, 
upon their having received a certain share of 
religious instruction. A child whose intellect 
appears to be in other respects sufficient to 
enable it to give useful evidence, may, from 
defect of religious instruction be wholly 
unable to give any account of the nature of an 
oath or of the consequences of falsehood." 
(Macpherson; 453).
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There is no evidence to suggest that this test of discretion - 
a knowledge of Christian doctrine was ever applied to offenders, 
or that it was used as a plea for mitigationI
The uncertainties attending the notion 'the age of discretion' 
worked several different ways. Matthew Hill noted in 1852 
that the presumption that a child under fourteen was doli 
incapax 'fell into desuetetude' (Mogarey 1978; 18-19). In Hill's 
magistracy he was able to use the judicial space to pass on 
offenders to suitable guardians within the community, saving 
children from prisons and worse. But his comments of 'falling 
into desuetetude' were passed critically against magistrates 
who deemed that any one over seven, was by their actions alone, 
displaying sufficient reason for them to stand trial. These 
varying responses by magistrates will be developed more fully 
in the following chapter. One feature remains constant however. 
The uncertainty about 'discretion' devolves upon the judiciary 
an element of power, beyond the power of disposing of convicted 
offenders; for in the case of the child, the magistrate had the 
additional power to determine whether they were to stand trial 
at all. Whereas for offenders between 7 and 14, the presence 
or absence of 'discretion' could break either way, for the 
judiciary, the process of determining 'discretion' is merely 
an increment to their material and symbolic significance.
We have outlined here the significant age-lines, operative 
within the criminal law in the first third of the decade, and, 
we have indicated the principles upon which those lines were 
demarcated. The logic of our argument suggests that any attempt 
to redraw these boundaries would involve a fundamental recon­
sideration of the principles of responsibility, discretion, mens 
rea, etc.. As we shall indicate in the following chapters, the 
lawyers' obeisiance to fundamental principles sets the limit 
to what could be done to release children from the 'full' 
process of trial and punishment. The protracted transactions
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between the fixity of the principles upon which the criminal 
law was founded, and the reforming magistrates and philanthro­
pists struggling to re-write the location of the criminal child, 
gave birth to a new non-legal category, 'the juvenile'.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE BIRTH OF THE JUVENILE;
INTRODUCTION
In brief, and for clarity, the position of the young offender 
in 19th century criminal law may be stated as follows:
1. In the first half of the 19th century, there were no 
separate procedures - no juvenile courts and, for the first 
three decades, no separate penal institutions - for the dis­
posal of young offenders. An offender, of whatever age 
confronted one law enforcement system. By 1836, it became 
an established practice to separate 'adult' and 'child' 
convicted criminals: from 1847 offenders under the age of 
sixteen could be tried summarily for petty offences, which 
previously would have been passed on to Crown Courts and 
assizes.
2. The criminal law, somewhat belatedly, began to draw clear 
distinctions, along the axis of chronological age, between 
offenders standing trial and upon conviction, their dispo­
sition. Furthermore, we should note the drawing of a new 
age line, sixteen years, within the law enforcement system.
The age line announces a new subject, institutionalised by 
different court procedures and new programme of punishment, 
present with attributes, practices and motives radically 
different from the young offenders constituted by criminal 
law. The juvenile was not the biologically imperfect, 
cognitively defective subject (for that was the basis of
the general defence of infancy in criminal matters) of lawyers, 
judges and juries, but a social group bearing entirely 
different attributes - some said a race apart - deviant and 
dangerous because of their un-childlike precosity.
The rest of this ohaptee-will'be concerned broadly with the con­
ception of the juvenile elaborated in and through the discourses of 
child-saving, and we shall be concerned to demonstrate its impact 
on the legal subject of the child in criminal law.
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The history of the 'invention' of the social category, juvenile 
delinquent, has been well chronicled by writers such as Pinchbeck 
and Hewitt (1973), May (1973), Clarke (1975) and Magarey (1978).
In outline, the historical process involved the identification 
of a social group whose practices were perceived by philanthropic 
bourgeois social reformers (operating under the aegis of charitable 
organisations) as both deviant and dangerous . Deviant in so 
far as these practices included a range of petty criminal offences, 
pickpocketing, shop lifting, stealing from tills. Dangerous, 
because the delinquent life-style - living rough, dossing down in 
boarding houses, living apart from parents, being at large on 
streets, earning a living by casual labour interspersed with petty 
thieving, was un-childlike, autonomous, uncontrolled and therefore 
a perceived threat to a social order whose rules were profoundly 
structured by the concepts of private property, and, familial 
obedience. Furthermore, the juvenile delinquent was considered 
to be the 'rising generation' of hardened criminals. ^
In effect, however, there is only a loose correspondence
between social category 'juvenile delinquent' and the legal 
conception of the child as a subject in criminal law. In point 
of fact, philanthropic reformers had as one of their objects 
the construction of 'the child' as a category within criminal 
law, a subject which was to be formally separated from 'adult' 
offenders. The line of discontinuity between the common law 
child, as bearer of, or protected by the absence of, mischievous 
discretion, and the juvenile, is actually more than the chronological
age line. The law's cognitive definition of discretion was supplanted
by an assumption that juveniles were worldly wise, knowing, purposive, 
and malicious; attributes which sprang not from the individual 
rationally choosing, nor from possessing a morally evil mind, but 
from its breeding and its environment.. Innocence was a quality 
all children ought to possess, but its innocence, whilst assumed, 
was something in danger of being subverted by breeding and 
the classed practices of specific social groups. There is con­
siderable tension between the ideologies of childhood and 
childish innocence. Whereas rationalist utilitarian notions 
of children granted the child an angel-like quality of inherent 
goodness and innocence, evangelical notions construed the child 
as inherently corruptible. Children had to be made good through 
the constant invocation of the catechism and by insistent filial
and familial obedience. The weight of historical evidence suggests 
the triumph of the evangelical interpretation.
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What we are suggesting here then is that juvenile is a 
product considerably different from the child of criminal 
law. The legalistic points of reference, mens rea, doli 
incapax, discretion and responsibility refer to the strict 
liability of individuals and the cause of criminal offence 
is located therefore within the offender. Extenuating 
circumstances were granted only in extreme youth (those 
under seven) and in the proved absence of malicious discretion. 
The search for the "alarming increases in juvenile crime" 
beginning with the statistical societies, individual initiative, 
charity organisations, in the first two decades of the 19th 
century, went beyond the legalistic categories of youth and 
childhood and away from the embedded notion strict individual 
liability. Cause was conceived in terms of the corrupting 
environment. The judicial test of discretion was to be 
counterposed by the construction of individual biographies.
The morally evil mind of the offender was to be located within 
the matrix of specific social, cultural and moral universes. 
Social surveys did not remain.at the level of interesting 
contemporary accounts,(and presently, fascinating social 
history),but were deployed in creating new fields of inter­
vention, new programmes of rescue, reformation and treatment. 
Judioially ordained punishments were to be and remained the 
overtly coercive end of broader spectrum of interventions - 
what Garland calls "the welfare sanctions" (Garland 1981) .
We have to be careful of overstating the form of the change, 
however. For one recent commentator, the principal welfare 
sanction was the use of the reformatory (either in the form 
of the reform or industrial school) as a means of combatting 
juvenile crime. (McGowen 1979, Chap. VII). Judicial statistics 
reveal a different story. Gattrell argues that "in no year 
between 1.856 and 1914 were more than about 4% of convicted 
juvenile larcenists sent to reformatories ... while no more 
than 2% of those against whom charges were proved but whose 
convictions were waived were sent to industrial schools" 
(Gattrell 1980 ; 306). Those sent up to reformatories were
generally those with lengthy criminal careers and this may 
have had some effect in decimating the old criminal hierarchies 
of the first half of the century (Gattrell ibid.). But equally 
important was the softer option, pioneered by Matthew Hill, 
Recorder of Birmingham in 1839. Offenders were handed over 
to suitable guardians and Hill kept a register and received 
reports on subsequent behaviour. The scheme was widely 
adopted by other courts in the first half of the century 
(McConville op.cit? 334-335).As early as the 1820's, Warwickshire 
magistrates committed young offenders to the care of their 
employers (McConville ibid). In spite of these mitigating 
processes, convicted juveniles were commonly sent to gaol 
often before internment in a reformatory. Refractory juveniles 
in the prison colonies continued to receive strokes of the 
birch for breaking the rules (see Appendix).
The youthful category 'juvenile- was the product of a change 
in criminal and penal processes and an instrument of that 
change. Foucault's 'discipline'. Garland's 'welfare sanction', 
McGowen's 'educational solution' and May's 'invention' register 
in their diverse ways a change in the field of criminal law, 
penal policy and social policy; a move away from law enforcement 
premised upon terror and retribution (though these were never 
wholly absent attributes) to a more dispersed field of inter­
ventions, wherein a new social group, known by its youthfulness, 
became the object of state and state-delegated surveillance 
and treatment. For what the young possessed was the potential 
of becoming adult, hardened criminals, a class which preyed 
on the industrious, 'honest', productive segments of society 
and on its private property. Intervening on youth was an 
acceptable means of social engineering, the most efficient 
way of preventing the reproduction of depredators and predators. 
The natural condition of youth made it inherently malleable 
and its social location necessarily depend on and 
obedient to adults.
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LOCATING THE JUVENILE
Read with a contemporary eye, the documents and reports 
constituting the field of the 19th century enquiry into the 
problem of 'juvenile delinquency' have the revelatory qualities 
of explorers charting an undiscovered country. And in one 
sense it was, though the undiscovered country began at the 
end of the road inhabited by the urban bourgeoisie. But 
who produced this knowledge and why? Certainly, the magistrates, 
prison inspectors, charity officials - routinely in touch with 
young offenders - were responsible for collecting data, writing 
reports, giving evidence, and in diverse ways, indicating 
to parliament (and the classes represented there) that there 
was 'a problem'. And a problem which daily impinged on the 
public at large (through depredations of private property) 
and on various organs of the state (the problems of recidivism).
While the experiences,-observations and perceptions of officials 
qua officials are writ large, the 'scientific' basis of their 
knowledge, its claim to be objective and 'true', resided in 
the deployment of the biography. It was the young offenders 
themselves who revealed the details of the undiscovered country, 
made manifest in recounting the social relations, sites and 
practices of juvenile delinquency.
These themes emerge, for example, in the first report of 
the Society for Investigating the Causes of the Alarming 
Increase of Juvenile Delinquency in the Metropolis (1816).
The causes of delinquency listed as most significant were:
1. The improper conduct of parents.
2. The want of education.
3. The want of suitable employment
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4. The violation of the Sabbath and the habits of 
gambling in the public streets.
5. Other auxiliary causes, which aggravate and perpetuate
the evil. These may be traced to and included under 
the following heads: a) The severity of the criminal
code, b) The defective state of the police , c) The 
existing state of police discipline.
(quoted in Pinchbeck and Hewitt op.cit.; 435).
The means by which the society collected its information 
is no less interesting than the conclusions the Report 
draws. Over a twelve month period, with the help of a 
questionnaire framed by the Society, members divided up 
London into districts (each with a sub-committee) and set 
about completing questionnaires 'with the help of friends 
whose names had been given to the Committee by boys in 
prison' (Pinchbeck and Hewitt ; 433). Some 'pecuniary 
inducement' was needed in the first stage of business.
The questionnaires unwittingly provide rich biographical 
material on youthful offenders, which formed an integral 
part of the Report . For example :
" E. F. aged 8 years. His mother only is 
living and she is a very immoral character. 
This boy has been in the habit of stealing 
for upwards of two years. In Covent 
•Garden Market there is a party of 
between thirty and forty boys, who sleep 
under the sheds and baskets. These
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"pitiable objects, when they arise in 
the morning, have no other means of 
procuring subsistence, but by the 
commission of crime. This child was 
one of a number; and it appears that 
he was brought up to the several 
police offices upon eighteen separate 
charges. He has been twice confined 
in the House of Correction, and three 
times in Bridewell. He is very 
ignorant but of good capacity ...
Q.R. aged 12 years. He has no education,
has a mother who encourages the vices 
of her son. She turns him into the 
street every morning and chastises him 
severely when he returns in the evening 
without some article of value."
(quoted in Pinchbeck and Hewitt; 433-35)
The biographies themselves spoke the causes of crime. The 
repetition of the deprived circumstances of juvenile delinquents 
'decentres' the cause of crime. Individual responsibility, the
legalistic notion of the morally evil mind manifesting itself
in criminal behaviour is displaced by knowledge constituted by 
facts of the offenders' economic and social conditions of 
existence. Legal discourse of voir dire and the presence or 
absence of mischievous discretion did not admit the salience 
of the biography. Social investigation through biographical 
detail was a technique which occurs in the Reports of the 
Parliamentary Commissioners ( e.g. P.P. 1852 Vol. VIII), 
and in Chadwick's attempts to bring about a national constabulary 
force. The latter deployed the use of questionnaires, filled 
out by prison inspectors and prison chaplains, drawing on juvenile 
convicts as a source of information. So we find the Rev. W. 
Bagshaw in 1837 questioning Jane Doyle aged 18, convicted of
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felony and sentenced to transportation for 10 years (Item 12 
Chad. MSS Uni. College) . The questionnaire comprised 71 
questions, running through her parents occupations, regularity 
of worship, her own religious attendances, form of education, 
employment record, leisure activities ('used to play in the 
street till about 9 o'clock and then go home'), causes of 
first offence and subsequent criminal career (which began 
when she was 11 years old). Besides the questionnaire, but 
attached to it, is a lengthy 'confession' (some 12 large pages)
setting the circumstances of Jane Doyle's entry into prostitution
Here we have'the administrative extraction of knowledge'. For 
what accompanies the birth of the juvenile is a set of 
techniques and procedures which establishes a field of knowledge 
about classed practises in the 19th century. At the heart of 
this science stands the biography. The biography in Foucault's 
scheme is the articulation of the human sciences in and to the 
disciplinary society (Foucault 1975 189-193), for threshold 
of knowledge is lowered sufficiently to encompass and describe 
the lives of unexceptional individuals. Through the technique 
of the biography we find:
"... the bringing of everyday life into
discourse, the insertion of a kind of
administrative grid which systematically 
utilized old and previously localised 
procedures such as the denunciation, 
indictment, inquiry and report to Con­
stitute and accumulate dossiers and archives, 
to formulate knowledge about and to regulate 
everyday life."
(Smart B. 1982;129).
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It was Peter Bedford, W. A. Miles, the Rev. Bagshaw and 
the like who documented and dossiered the juveniles, brought 
them into discourse. "For a long time", argues Foucault,
"ordinary individuality - the everyday 
individuality of everybody - remained 
below the threshold of description.
To be looked at, observed, described in 
detail, followed from day to day by an 
uniterrrupted writing was a privilege.
The chronicle of a man, the account of 
his life, his historiagraphy, written 
as he lived out his life formed part 
of the rituals of his power. The dis­
ciplinary methods reversed this relation, 
lowered the threshold of describable 
individuality, and mode of this description 
a means of control and a method of domination.
It is no longer a monument for future memory, 
but a document for possible use."
And he continues:
"this new describability is all the more 
marked in that the disciplinary framework is 
a strict one; the child, the patient, the 
madman, the prisoner were to become, with 
increasing case from the eighteenth century 
and according to a curve which is that of 
the mechanisms of discipline, the object of 
individual descriptions and biographical 
accounts."
(Foucault; 191-192) .
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In this sense, juvenile lives became the objects of social 
scientific knowledge and the programmes of intervention.
But the knowledge itself, the very process of 'bringing into 
discourse' was premised in the beginning at least on the 'old' 
coercive institutions - the prisons, the House of Correction, 
the Bridewells - in which the targets of intervention were 
already incarcerated. The processes of writing and speaking 
are valorised by old forms of power relations - the semi-literate 
speakers are written into discourse by the social statisticians, 
the philanthropists, the prison chaplains and the prison inspectors 
In a strong sense the speakers were used, deployed or became 
instruments in documents which took away their biographical lives 
that were then put to use by the state and delegated agencies.
The relationship between speaker and writer, the fundament of 
the discourse, is structured profoundly by the extra-discursive, 
by class, by the possession of literacy itself and by the 
statuses of the investigator and the investigated. The system 
of knowledge production is only marginally different in form 
from the judicial voir dire though the content is of a radically 
new order. "The examination", writes Foucault, "surrounded by 
all its documentary techniques, makes each individual a 'case'; 
a case which at one and the same time constitutes an object 
for a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of Power." 
(Foucault; 191) .
Jane Doyle's three day examination by the Rev. Bagshaw plumbs 
the innermost secrets of her life, including the circumstances 
of the loss of her virginity. But her biographical life was 
simply part of Chadwick's investigation into the practices of 
local watch and constabulary practices » Question 42
of the questionnaire:
"Did you (or your companions) use any means 
with the constables, either to distract their 
attention, or induce them to permit or 
facilitate your escape? If so, what kind?"
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Unwittingly, the confessions of Jane Doyle and dll of other 
prisoners who submitted to the investigation were supplying 
the knowledge which Chadwick hoped would compel the state to 
establish a national police force that would more efficiently 
prevent the very activities through which the Jane Doyles 
provided a means of subsistence.
The biographies provided a field of knowledge and programme 
of intervention. In the case of the Society, its conclusions 
fell into three broad categories. Juvenile crime had its 
causes located in the following:
1. Parental neglect, and in some cases, parental inducements
to commit crime. Neglect and moral ineptitude were
demonstrated by the lack of education and the want of 
religious observance. The cause of crime is therefore 
fundamentally premised on poor parenting.
2. Dangerous associations and practices (gambling, unsupervised 
leisure) located on the public streets.
3. The system of law enforcement. Here the society was
concerned not only with the severity of the criminal and
penal system but also "the uncertainty of its operations 
(which) encourages the offender to calculate even if 
convicted, on a mitigated punishment." (Pinchbeck and 
Hewitt;437). Furthermore, the Society concluded, "Many 
a poor and unsuspecting and even guileless youth was 
enticed into crime ... by the police themselves, who then 
gave information of, and received a bounty for, the very 
offences which they have conceived, planned, suggested, 
aided and secured the commission of." (Pinchbeck and Hewitt; 
437) .
The strategic targets, the causes of crime - the home, the 
street and the law enforcement system - is a decisive shift 
away from legalistic conceptions of the morally evil mind and 
strict liability of individuals. There were extenuating 
circumstances, the evil influences of everyday life, which
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compelled juveniles to commit offences. The solution lay, 
not in stiffer or more brutal penalties but the reordering of 
the cultural and moral practices which gives rise to the 
hardened breed of juvenile criminals. Reforms were premised 
not on the inequalities of wealth and power but on the want 
of education, the neglect of the sabbath, the associations 
formed on the streets, the un-childlike precosity and autonomy 
displayed by the youth of'the dangerous and perishing classes'. 
The strategy was to interrupt the processes of cultural and 
social reproduction (relations of production are remarkable by 
their absence). Poverty, the want of secure employment by 
parents, the marginalised position of juveniles in the labour 
market, were contingent problems rather than the seat of all 
causes (McGowen op cit; Chap.VII). The writing into discourse 
of the diverse biographies occurs at the level of Reports such 
as the one discussed above. The terrain it mapped was enriched 
by the evidence given before parliamentary commissions and we 
can perhaps illustrate its pervasive net by reference to the 
accounts presented to parliamentary commissions, analytically 
divided under two heads; the home and the street, and, reform 
of the law enforcement system.
a) The home and the street
Let us begin with Matthew Hill's evidence before the Select 
Committee on Destitute and Criminal Juveniles (P.P. 1852 Vol.VII) 
A representative account of the field of juvenile investigation, 
differing little either in the descriptive language, the causes 
and the remedies of the variety of private reports on the same 
problem (c/f May op cit). In response to a general question of 
causation. Hill notes, like many of his contemporaries, that 
it is the growth of towns which is responsible for the rise of 
juvenile crime, bringing the breakdown of 'natural policing' 
and the growth of obscurity (p.42-43). The second effect of 
urban growth was the separation of the classes such that 'large 
masses have gathered together without those wholesome influences 
which operated upon them when the congregations were mixed."(p43)
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Asked to elaborate on living conditions, he continued:
"... it seems very difficult to imagine 
how it is possible that a dirty, unwholesome, 
ill-drained tenement, which is too small for 
the due separation of the sexes, and there­
fore which is too small for the purposes of 
decency, should contain respectable inhabi­
tants (respectable in the moral sense) and 
I should conceive that every improvement of 
a sanitary kind will have its operation in 
the diminution of crime"(p.43).
This is the soil of the rising generations of criminals.
The social relations of crime he describes in the following
passage:
"The first class is the children of 
criminals; they are the hereditary 
criminals: they are very often trained 
to crime: they are practically taught to 
think lightly of it, or even when they 
are not expressly taught to consider it 
a merit, which they generally are, to 
commit offences."
The second class comprise illegitimate children;
"the testimony Of inspectors of prisons, 
and of gaolers and the chaplains of gaols, 
is uniform to the fact that illegitimate 
children form a very large class of juvenile 
criminals."(p44)
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Thirdly, were orphans, and finally "the children of the 
very poor form a class". "But", he continues,"the result 
of 30 years observation on the subject has been to convince 
me that poverty, though a cause of crime, is a very much 
smaller cause than is usually supposed."It is poverty 
accompanied by 'idleness' (where poverty is either 
voluntary or caused by unemployment) which brings moral 
destitution (moral destitution being 'the want of training'). 
His characterology of the morally destitute child has all 
the resonances of William Beaver Neales 'street arabs'.
"... they have in truth all the vices 
and some of the virtues of savages...
He is indolent, averse from any settled 
or steady employment, averse to restraint 
of any kind; on the other hand, he is 
patient of hunger and thirst, and cold; 
and as to dirt he rather delights in it ... 
and he would rather be permitted to roam 
about at large, even suffering at times great 
privations than he would be at school or 
work under restraints which belong to 
civilized society"(p44).
The nomadic habits, enjoyed since early childhood, have to 
be countered, not by education (reading and writing) but 
training; 'it is training, moral, religious and industrial 
to which we are to look as the chief means of reformation'
(p44).
Hill was no extremist in his views. He was a kindly man in 
his way; his entry in the Dictionary of National Biography 
records that he bought a rifle to defend the Chartists against 
an expected armed attack from the state: his practices in 
dealing with young offenders spared many from the gaol and 
transportation. His testimony howeyer condenses a view of
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juvenile crime dispersed over a wide range of texts and 
testimonies. The object of investigation and reform, 
the juvenile, inhabits some mysterious qualities; immunity 
to hunger, thirst, cold, dirt and settled living. More a 
wild animal in its attributes than human individual. Crime 
is a disease; flourishing in dirt, spreading by contagion 
or by hereditary means. It is fostered by moral turpitude 
which sometimes but not necessarily accompanies poverty.
Its social context is the cultural and moral universe of 
the home and of the street. Hill's testimony was in fact 
also cogent, sensitively broad in the reflections of the causes 
of crime, compared with some of the evidence put before the 
Commissioners. An Appendix (Appendix 2) attached to their 
Report is an extract from the Report of a prison inspector 
of the Lancashire district, 1841. The opening pages of the 
Report generally outline the causes of delinquency: the 
fluctuating variety and vicissitudes of the population in a 
great maritime city (Liverpool), the ingress of the Irish, 
the absence of factory work for children, destitute orphans 
as a result of epidemics of cholera and fever, temptations 
to want and idleness afforded by unguarded property in markets, 
stores and docks and'the incitement to criminal pursuits 
induced by the low shows and theatres' (p 146). Only the latter 
is pursued in the Report with any vigour. It was, says the 
Report, shows at The Penny Hop and Sanspareil theatres which, 
by celebrating the exploits of Jack Sheppard etc. ,
"have invested these ruffians with indoubtable 
courage, impertible sang froid, fertility of 
expedient, lively conversation, indeed with 
every quality that can interest or divert".(p416).
The large number of interviews which formed an integral part 
of the Report, display an excessive concern with the link 
between crime on stage and juvenile crime.
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"R.F. aged 17. I have been seven times 
in prison, hundreds of times at the Sanspareil 
and almost as often at the amphitheatre, and 
I have been several times at the others also.
I have no home, no parents. I was in work 
when I went to the Sanspareil; paid the money 
out of my wages. It was at the theatre I first 
became acquainted with bad boys who enticed me 
to steal anything I could lay my hands upon."(p.417)
"J.F. (no age). I think I have been to the 
Sanspareil twenty times, I have also been at 
the Queen's . The first time I went I sold my 
cap; it was so late when we came out I dare 
not go home; I went with another boy to sleep 
in a stable; I slept there for four nights.
Since then I have always mixed with bad boys."
(p.418)
One can almost hear the prompting questions 1 The theatre 
causes its crime through its celebration of highwaymen but 
it is also the site of contagion; the good and the bad mix 
to reproduce the activities of disorder.
Certainly the power of the biography as a methodological 
tool for data collection resides in part in the numerous 
facets and sites of social life which are brought into a 
unity simply by the passage of the biographical subject 
through them. The biography reveals the criminal hierarchies, 
the fences, the flash houses used for dossing down and fencing 
property, the associates congregated in pubs, drinking houses 
and theatres, the barn or stable used for overnight rough 
sleeping. In a sense the biography is a condensation of all 
the sites that are pernicious and malevolent, a map of the 
dark side of town untraversed in the everyday perambulations 
of the bourgeoisie.
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Crucial to the circulation of stolen goods and for the 
subsistence of the young criminals for example, were 
the boarding Houses. W. A. Miles presents a potted 
biography for a number of incarcerated juveniles,
(Chadwick MSS: Item 4). The document itself is marked 
secret and was meant only for the attention of the Select 
Committee on Gaols and probably dates circa 1837. One 
example reads :
"--------------This lad is a -------- thief;
he is fourteen years of age and has twice 
been in prison. His father is a coal 
higgler and drinks very hard. The boy has 
been to a National school and can read and 
write. Boys in the county sell to the rag 
shop people and to trampers at lodging 
houses. There are established 'fences'
who keep no shops, living both at --------
and a t --------; one lodges with his girl
at t h e ------- and his name i s ------------ .
This man collects for a jeweller who keeps a 
very respectable shop."
The Artful Dodger is alive and living in other biographies. 
Micahel Dobby, 13 years old, for example:
"The first thing I stole was was apples.
Stole them to eat. Did the same thing 
7 or 8 times afterwards ... stole a hand­
kerchief off a line, intending to sell it.
Was not living with his parents at the time.
Was taken in for it and got seven days ...
Stole goods from outside shops. Stole a 
shirt, sold it to a woman in the Oxford 
Road. Taken in the same night, got 14 days ...
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"Got work at the factory in the place
of a boy who was sick, he got well, I got
sent away. The next day got through a 
window into a farm house and stole some 
pies and bread. Got seven years trans­
portation.... Stayed in lodging house; 
woman fenced stolen property; extended 
credit 6 - 1/- in return for stolen
goods at a future date. She charged 
2^ a night."
According to Miles, many young thieves had their girls 
(Chadwick MSS Item 4). Often he said, they were young 
prostitutes working for a pimp. Often as not 'the girls 
pay seven pence a room for four and twenty hours, and they
take strange men into them: the men are generally robbed
or bullied by the men who keep these girls or live with 
them.' This was certainly the lifestyle reported by Jane 
Doyle and her associates; the offer of sexual intercourse 
was deployed to get unsuspecting clients into back alleys, 
into rooms etc. where they could be pick-pocketed. The 
boys, however, would not teach the girls to earn a living 
by pickpocketing alone as this would hurt the trade! (Miles,
Item 4 Chad. MSS).
There is a hardness to the claim by Miles and others that 
juveniles had a career in crime. Stealing fruit from gardens 
or stalls preceded the more artful techniques of picking 
pockets and stealing from tills. The latter required some 
knowledge of the social connections of the underworld for 
the purpose of fencing stolen property. These associations - 
the women at boarding houses for example - would grant credit 
in advance of acts of petty larceny. One young thief reports 
that he would always have a halfpenny in pockets when shoplifting 
so that if challenged, he could always claim an intent to pay 
for the goods in his hands. ( James,McGinnis ; Chad MSS Item 12).
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Jane Doyle and her two associates always got rid of any 
money or property 'picked' from a client so that if the 
Watch was called, nothing would be found on their persons.
One of Doyle's associates, Ellen Reece, went so far 
as to secrete money in her vagina (once it was found when 
the Watch made her jump off a bed to the floor several 
times!). The other trick was to work in tandem with a 
friend. Once a client had been enticed into an alley, 
the friend called out that the Watch was coming, giving the 
prostitute a chance to run away with anything that had been 
stolen. (Chadwick MSS; Item 12, questionnaires on Doyle,
Ellen Reece, Mary Kay).
And the hard fact remains that for many, criminal activity 
at least provided a means of subsistence- for some, thieving 
was definitely more lucrative than earning a living by waged 
labour. Miles questionnaire went to some lengths to establish 
comparative earnings between honest labour and a life of crime. 
According to the information collected by Miles (Chadwick MSS- 
Item 12) 12 hours labour a day in a variety of jobs earned 
between 8 shillings and 15 shillings a week. Thieving yielded 
considerably more; the amounts vary. Many replied that in 
some weeks nothing was earned by thieving, in other weeks 
anywhere between £1 to £10. In his tables of juvenile offenders 
in the Borough Jail at Liverpool, on information collected 
in 1837 (Chadwick MSS; Item 4), Miles calculates that many 
young offenders were picking up as much as 6 to 10 shillings 
a day. Samuel Abbosley, aged 13 years, by pickpocketing, 
stealing from shops and tills and then selling any stolen 
property 'to a woman who kept a boarding house' (who gave him 
half the value for it) claimed to make between 6 pence and 
£8.00 per week and thought it a bad week if he made less than 
£4.00. (Miles, Chadwick MSS: Item 12). Knowing the boarding 
houses where one could stay overnight when pickings were 
scarce was a necessary part of the street savvy; it meant not
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only lodgings, as opposed to sleeping rough (thereby running 
the chance of being picked up as a vagrant), but also a source 
of credit. It also suggests a pattern of quickly expended 
plenty and times of scarcity. James McGinnis reported he 
always sold property to a woman who keeps a boarding house 
where he always slept after coming from the theatre. If he 
had nothing to sell, she would lend him 6 pence or a shilling 
to be repaid when he had. (Chadwick MSS: Item 12).
Street life, the network of lodging houses, outhouses for 
sleeping rough, the system of credit and fencing, the hierarchy 
of criminal practices and the 'career' of young offenders
speaks the absence of the familial home. Where home life was
written into discourse, it often figures, itself, as a source 
of crime, firstly by parental inducement and secondly by the 
hopelessly deprived circumstances on the other. Miles’ 
questionnaires, and his parallel studies of juvenile offenders 
in Borough Jail at Liverpool carefully elaborated the re­
lationship between parenting and crime. His study of Liverpool 
juveniles notes that the greatest proportion of thieves were 
Irish lads or of Irish parents, and continues
"... it would beggar description to give
an account of the filth, misery, drunkenness
and sometimes starvation state in which these
people exist."
He goes on to claim that many of the Irish are pig mongers 
'and share their rooms with the animals in which they traffic", 
(Chadwick MSS Item 4). The presentation of poverty, of the 
dire conditions of existence of the casual poor is constantly 
elided by inferences of poor parenting practices. Pig mongers 
allegedly keeping animals at their lodging clearly falls into 
this category. As a discursive technique, the elision of 
poverty and poor parenting as causes of crime finds its
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expression in Sir Frederick Roe's explanation of juvenile 
crime. Crime arises,
"... from the enormous luxury and wealth 
of the town, from the great negligence of 
masters in looking after their servants and 
their houses, from an inability in the lower 
classes to devote time to the restraint of 
their children, and the extreme temptations 
from the exposure of property, and the want
of caution in the protection of it in
every class of society."
(P.P. 1837 Vol XXXI; 17).
Even where remarks acknowledge the enormous luxury and wealth 
of the few, and the temptations it provides for those who do 
not share it, they are overlaid by a moralising attitude to 
the lower orders. If only they would restrain their children.
The second line of force connecting crime with parenting was 
the references, made by Hill, Miles and Mary Carpenter, to 
the prevalence of orphans, illegitimate children and children 
from the workhouse, that is children without, or separated 
from, natural parents, in the statistics of juvenile crime.
The notion of proper parenting found its most comprehensive 
articulation in Mary Carpenter's works. While we shall elaborate
her views in more detail later, the premise of her argument was
that parenting had to be the handmaiden of proper training and 
if parents would not, or by their absence, could not, provide 
it, then institutions must be established which could. The 
problems of the unequal distribution of wealth, the uncer­
tainties of the labour market, the rhythms of existence of
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the casual poor, problems of housing, sanitation and disease, 
that is the conditions of existence of the urban working 
classes who were the discursive subjects of all of these 
writings, disappear and are displaced by a single strategy 
of intervention: the moral and cultural reform of familial 
practices. There is abundant evidence that poverty and its 
attendant miseries were writ large in studies of juvenile 
crime but the programme of intervention was not aimed at 
poverty itself but at familial relations which were pro­
foundly structured by poverty. To emphasise the point, we 
should note that the number of juveniles imprisoned in 1848 
was 13,900 and during 1853, 11,3600 (Magarey op cit; 16-17) 
and in 1857, 12,500 (McConville; 337). These numbers, however, 
are slight when we compare them with those registered as 
destitute. In 1851 there were 43,028 under-16 year olds in 
workhouses and 275,000 receiving outdoor relief in England 
and Wales ( Magarey; 17).
Moralising economic problems as though they were problems of 
poor parenting belied the hardships faced by juveniles living 
rough, sleeping out and subsisting by thieving and prostitution. 
That orphans, illegitimates and workhouse children show up in the 
gaols of Liverpool for petty theft indicates the categories of 
the young who were made independent and autonomous, who were on 
the streets because they had no adults to be dependent upon.
Their biographical lives speak out, often as not about sorely 
tried but caring parents, sometimes rough in their ways. Jane 
Doyle reported "Great care was taken of me. I ran away three 
times. First time got in company with some bad girls of the 
town. Left work on Monday morning and stayed away a fortnight." 
Her mother found her living in the cellar, with six other girls, 
all aged 12, in the house of a woman called Old Granny. But 
"Mother fetched her out of that cellar. Old Granny made her go 
under the bed. Mother found her there - took her home, beat her 
severely with a rope for five minutes. Stripped her clothes off ■
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felt it for a fortnight - brought blood in two places on back. 
Kept her upstairs without clothes - in bed three days. Promised 
to be good and go to work. Went to work for 12 months and 
never went with bad girls or men ," ( Chadwick MSS Item 12). 
Ellen Reece's biography reveals much the same. Both girls 
left home shortly after their fathers died; Doyle's father 
had been a labourer (sinking wells), but two years before his 
death, hawked nuts: Reece's father was a slap-dasher (self- 
employed) . Both mothers 'kept house' for the family. Clearly, 
at the death of the father, the girls were major contributors 
to the family economy (Doyle was a piecer at a cotton factory- 
Reece, bound apprentice to a dressmaker and later a domestic 
servant).
Juvenile precosity was not some moral malaise but the result 
of early work experience (if work was available) and the 
struggle to survive often without adults to depend upon. The 
nomadic habits, the attributes of surviving hunger and thirst, 
written into discourse, were more than probably real enough 
but they were not animal-like attributes acquired at birth, 
or by instinct, nor were they freely chosen. They were the 
conditions of existence consequent upon a marginalised position 
in the labour market and on the absence of adults (parents, 
natural or surrogate) on whom to depend for the necessary means 
of life - generally - the only means of surviving in an urban 
environment with a measure of freedom. The alternative was 
the care and attention lavished by the workhouse and the poor 
law guardians. Prison at least offered the prospect of release 
after a short custodial sentence.
The 'godless depravity' exhibited by juvenile street life; 
thieving, gambling, drinking, theatres, going with men, living 
with girls, constitutes a subject where the legal niceties of 
'discretion', knowingness, guilty mind and catechistic knowledge 
are rendered silent. The juvenile may not have known the
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catechism but did know how to survive, regardless of 'the 
laws of man and God'. Once the category of juvenile was 
established, and by the biographical technique, displayed, 
to parliament, to the churches, to the police and prisons, 
as an animal-like depredator on property, (for juvenile 
crime was predominantly petty theft of one form or another, 
even for casual prostitutes such as Jane Doyle) the problem 
remained; what was to be the appropriate response in law?
b) Reforming the law enforcement system 
  (Newgate) nine times in prison,
"Some policemen take bribes from the boys;
City police much better to young thieves
than the Metropolitan Force. No, ........
does not take a boy if he thinks it will 
only be a summary conviction as he will 
get nothing for his trouble; he sometimes 
stops them to take property from them and 
then lets them go, but if it is an Old 
Bailey Case, he keeps the boy."
(Miles, Select Cttee on Gaols; Chadwick MSS 
Item 4).
Evidence from Richard Mayne, Metropolitan Police Commissioner;
".... the principle the Commissioners have 
always laid down for the police is, not to 
allow parties to go on to commit a greater 
offence, but to lay hold of them the moment 
they have done anything that justifies 
interference. And so it is with respect 
to boys picking pockets in the street; if 
the police see a boy feeling pockets, which 
is the first attempt, they lay hold of him
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"at once, but then the punishment is 
only confinement for a short time, 
whereas if they had committed a felony 
they might be transported: but the 
Commissioners always enforce the police, 
that they must not allow a greater 
offence to be committed for the sale of 
increasing the punishment".
(P.P. 1837 (79) XXXI; App 1; 23).
Jane Doyle's 'confession' to Rev Bagshaw,1837 :
"The first time I got fourteen days. That 
imprisonment did me harm. There was a deal 
of girls in the Prison, who used to talk
about things as I never knew about. I used
to take it up. My sister used to lick me 
for it. I learnt to swear in Gaol. Never 
thought of men till I heard them talking 
about them. They said they'd plenty of 
money and plenty of clothes."
(Chadwick MSS Item 12).
Jane Doyle was eleven years old when she was first put in 
gaol.
The technique of deploying biographical lines to map out 
the sites of the reproduction of juvenile crime did not leave
the law enforcement system immune. Biographies were grafted
on to the medical discourse of crime as a disease; crime 
therefore spreads by mixing, by contagion, and one of the 
prime sites was the penal establishment. The second area 
where the disease was thought to circulate was the street.
What the biographies revealed, because those interviewed were 
asked specifically, was the degree of integration of the police
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into the underworld of gambling dens, small brothels,
'lodging house, gin palaces and the like', and to what 
extent were constables turning a blind eye on petty 
pilfering in the hope of richer pickings at the Old Bailey 
on another occasion. Finally, of course, the investigations 
were working towards an end, namely to determine the best 
procedure for bringing juvenile offenders before the law and 
disposing of them in a manner that would either prevent, or 
seriously disrupt the process of the reproduction of more 
juvenile crime. For it was perceived by legal and penal re­
formers alike that the very system of law enforcement itself 
was threat to social order, insofar as it was providing, 
unwittingly, places where information, skills, technique 
and attitudes were being passed down from one generation 
to the next. To understand the complexity of the processes 
by which reforms were brought about, we shall proceed by dis­
tinguishing two broad areas of concern, i) the nature of 
juvenile offences and its policing, ii) penal reform . Changes 
in the criminal law will be_dealt with in the next chapter.
i) Susan Magarey (1978) in her short but excellent study 
of the invention of juvenile delinquency in the early 19th 
century, argues two main points. Firstly that the fears of 
property owners about a rising tide of young offenders was 
real enough in the second quarter of the 19th century (p 13), 
though the increase of delinquency in the under-seventeens 
did not continue to rise through the 1850s. Secondly, she 
argues, statutes such as Vagrant Act (1824), Malicious Trespass 
Act (1827), Police Acts (1829, 1839) and the Larceny Act (1827) 
'criminalised a whole range of behaviour peculiar to the young' 
(20). Her statistical tables suggest, for example that more 
than 50% of the total convictions of juveniles from 1838-1853 
were for offences under these statutes, that is, for offences 
only recently made criminal, and which often did not involve 
any violence towards property or persons. From 1836, prison
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statistics and prison officials generally treated persons 
under 17 as juvenile (pl6). An examination of the 'juveniles' 
carried on the prison ships to Van Dieman's Land in post-1836 
confirms this practice, although there was no particular 
warrant for this age classification in criminal law at this 
time. Peel's legislation was not aimed exclusively at the 
juvenile, but its provisions, perhaps unwittingly, provided 
a widely cast net of practices which allowed for the appre­
hension of a social category whose milieu was the street, 
the penny theatres and other public places. Furthermore, 
petty criminality, petty larceny in legal terms was put on 
a new footing by the Larceny Act of 1827. It provided that:
"the distinction between grand and petty
larceny be abolished and every larceny,
whatever be the value of the property stolen,
shall be of the same nature, and shall be
subject to the same incidents in all respects 
as Grand Larceny was before the commencement 
of this Act."
(Larceny Act 7 and 8 Geo IV Cap 29; SII) .
And, all courts who had the power to try Petty Larceny would
have the power to try every case of larceny (Sect. II). Those
convicted were thus liable to transportation for seven years, 
or, to be imprisoned for two years, and if male, whipped once 
twice or three times (Sect. Ill). The consolidation of grand 
and petty larceny, and their removal to Magistrates Courts,
a seemingly liberal move, in effect, made the range of
'trifling delinquencies committed by children' (Magarey, 20), 
open to summary conviction, extending the powers of the 
magistracy to try offences which once would have been tried 
on indictment in an open court. One effect was to confuse 
the administration of justice for children under the age of 
discretion; whether those doli incapax could claim defence on
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these grounds in Magistrates Courts was unclear. Some 
magistrates simply dismissed young offenders; others passed 
savage judgement. In 1851, an Essex Magistrate sentenced 
a boy to seven days imprisonment and two whippings for 
stealing a pint of gooseberries, (Magarey 22-23). So the 
petty thieving, pickpocketing, stealing money from tills, 
clothes from lines, fruit and groceries from trees and from 
stalls, under the Larceny Act rendered young offenders open 
to summary conviction and severe sentencing.
The Malicious Trespass Act of 1827 is probably better known 
for the protection it offered, under the threat of capital 
punishment contained in many of its provisions, to industrialists 
Persons setting fire to churches, houses, stables, mills or 
any building used to carry on a trade, on conviction could 
suffer death as a felon. Those destroying cloth, looms, 
weaving machines, were liable to transportation and whipping,
(7 and 8 Geo IV C.30 Sect. II and III). But the Act, by 
prescribing specifically 'carrying away any trees, plants, 
shrubs, fruit or vegetables', transformed street urchins 
scrumping apples from nuisances to criminal offenders 
(Magarey; 20).
Peel's Acts,especially the Vagrancy Act of 1824, and the 
Metropolitan Police Acts of 1829 and 1839 extended the 'loose 
and idle' practices which were to be considered criminal.
"By the Vagrant Act alone hundreds who were 
formerly permitted to remain at large, are 
committed not for the commission of a specific 
offence but as 'idle and disorderly' or 
'reputed thieves' ".
(Crawford and Russell 1836 quoted in Magarey;18).
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As prison inspectors, Crawford and Russell pointed up the 
causes for the influx of juvenile offenders into prisons.
Idle and disorderly persons under the Act included petty 
chapmen, unlicensed pedlars, common prostitutes, persons 
begging in streets, fortune tellers, persons wandering 
abroad with no fixed abode and those with no visible means 
of support. The Police Act of 1839 extended the categories 
of people the 'new police', using their own discretion, might 
arrest, beyond the category of 'idle and disorderly persons 
found abroad between sunset and eight in the forenoon (provision 
of 1829). These include audiences watching plays in unlicenced 
theatres, dogfights, cock fights, badger baiting, people in 
gaming houses or people playing games in public thoroughfares, 
(including kite flying and making ice slides), (Magarey; 21). 
Practices which accurately reflect the leisure activities 
of the working classes, in general, and the milieu of street 
children in particular. Mayne's evidence before the Parlia­
mentary Commissioners in 1837 suggest that the new police 
actively engaged on watching operations outside public houses 
in order to round up (unsuccessfully) reputed thieves. Police 
were also empowered, under certain conditions, to enter public 
houses to check on illegal gambling, disorderly conduct but 
also to check on the fraternization of young thieves. Further, 
the police had powers to stop and search 'persons carrying 
parcels', abroad at night. There were limitations to the 
effectiveness of the new police; there were after all only 
3,500 in Metropolis; there existed considerable confusion as 
to what constituted an arrestable offence ; there was a strong 
risk of a counter-claim for wrongful arrest if the police 
mistakenly entered indictments against innocent parties (which 
constables had to pay for out of their own pocket (Mayne op.cit., 
Magarey op.cit.). Police had now powers to prevent the young 
congregating and drinking in public houses, such as the 'Finish' 
in Covent Garden, in other 'low saloons' and penny theatres 
because there was no age limit to bar admittance. But in spite
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of Mayne's assertions that the Metropolitan Police were 
severely limited in their preventative capacities, the 
majority of juvenile offenders committed to prison were 
sent there under the provisions of the Vagrancy Act, the 
first Police Act and the Malicious Trespass Act; almost 
certainly for offences which did not involve theft of 
property (which would have been tried under the provision 
of the Larceny Act) (Magarey; 22-23). That is to say, the 
cause of the influx of juveniles into prison in the 1830s 
and 1840s, was probably not an outbreak of petty thievery, 
but an attack on the urban juvenile street dwellers, who 
were charged with such offences as 'frequenting', being 
'reputed thieves', and living as 'idle and disorderly persons'. 
In this regard, the police were granted wide discretion as 
to the individuals who fell into these categories, and who 
could be apprehended without a warrant.
If those researching the increase of juvenile crime in 1816 
were disposed to place some of the blame on the law enforcement 
system, particularly corrupt policing and the rigours of the 
criminal code, then we can only surmise, along with Magarey, 
that juvenile crime was further 'legislated into existence' 
by the Peel Acts. But it was already clear by 1836, and 
this unease finds expression in the Report and evidence of 
parliamentary commissioners in 1837, that magistrates were 
finding the severity of the Larceny Act, particularly with 
young offenders, a major problem in the administration of 
justice. And indeed, the main recommendations of the 1837 
Commissioners were in respect of the provisions of the Larceny 
Act.
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ii Penal Reform; the juvenile prisoner
The principle that there should be separate penal 
establishments and regimes for adults and for children 
was established by the Select Committee on Gaols 1835.
The Committee recommended the establishment of a 
juvenile-only prison. It was to serve two purposes.
First, it would provide the deterrent element which 
transportation was said to lack. Second, it would provide 
'such occupational training as would enable fit young convicts 
with little or no criminal record, to make a new life ...' , 
(McConville 1981; 204). These twin objects, terror trimmed 
by reform (where reform was to be effected 'by a judicious 
course of moral, religious and industrial training ...'
P.P. 1834, XXII; 643) prefigures the regimes to be 
instituted under the control government prisons for adults, 
including Pentonville and other penetentiaries between 1835 
and 1850.
Separation from adults, the retention of penality(locking 
up, corporal punishment) and the notion of reform through 
religious and moral persuasion and industrial training 
combined to form a juvenile-specific regime observable 
across the dispersed sites of juvenile incarceration.
We have three particular examples well documented.
Firstly, the juvenile only convict ships used to transport 
juveniles from England to Van Diemen's Land from 1837 - 
1846 (Archives of Tasmania; Index of Shipping Arrivals). 
Secondly, the establishment of settlement for juvenile 
prisoners in 1834 at Point Puer in Van Diemen's Land, a 
site guaranteeing its isolation from the adult prisoners' 
settlement at Port Arthur (Backhouse and Walker (1838) ,
CSO 1/807/17244).
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Finally, the juvenile prison at Parkhurst (opened in the 
Isle of Wight in 1838 to receive juveniles who had been 
sentenced to transportation). Though the history of 
Parkhurst is well-known to criminal and penal historians, 
the history of the juvenile-only prison ships and the 
settlement for juvenile prisoners at Point Puer is less 
well known in England. The differences in form and 
location however cannot mask their similarity of purpose.
Reporting on the voyage of the convict ship, Frances 
Charlotte in 1837, Mr. Alexander Nesbitt in charge of 
the first complement of juvenile-only convicts to be sent 
from these shores to Van Diemen's Land, wrote:
"His Majesty's Government having determined 
to transport boys by themselves, as a trial, 
whether by removing them from immediate contact 
with hardened and veteran offenders it would 
not tend to their ultimate improvement, and 
having been selected to conduct the experiment 
I was furnished in addition to the usual 
instructions with an additional, directing 
my attention to their moral improvement and to 
the conduct of the convicts who also accompanied 
them."
(Archives of Tasmania; CSO 5/35/728).
Nesbitt's statement about the experimental nature of 
the voyage, about the necessity to separate juveniles 
from 'hardened and veteran offenders' and about the 
priority of attending to their 'moral improvement' 
could equally describe the purpose and function of 
Parkhurst and Point Puer.
- 617 -
We should not be deceived into thinking that the regimes 
broke entirely with traditional forms of imprisonment.
The other marks of prison life were to be found at 
Parkhurst in 1840:
"deprivation of liberty, wearing an iron on 
leg, a strongly marked prison dress, a diet 
reduced to the minimum ... the enforcement 
of silence on all occasions of instruction 
and duty, and uninterrupted surveillance by 
officers."
(P.P. 1840 CCCVIII, 637, quoted by McConville;
205) .
These aspects of penality were part of the life of 
prison ships and Point Puer. Underlying the educative 
and reformative side of juvenile prison life was the 
overtly coercive system of punishment, prison-style.
It serves to remind us that these sites were still 
penal responses to the reproduction of 'a criminal 
class' however much it attempted to be a regime of 
reform.
From the records of individual juvenile prisoners kept 
in the Archives of Tasmania, it is possible to construct 
the penal career of juveniles passing through the new 
regime. Thomas Whitton is an illustrative example .
Thomas Whitton, aged 14, was tried at the Central Criminal 
Court on 13 June 1836. His bill of indictment records a 
charge of larceny, for stealing five yards of printed 
cotton of the value .6"s/9d. By his own account, he had 
been charged once before 'for what I don't know', and 
flogged for stealing beads. He was returned to the hulks 
prior to transportation. On the first of January 1837 
he embarked on the*Frances Charlotte for Van Diemen's Land,
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arriving there on 15 May 1837, where he was taken to 
Point Puer, a settlement for convict boys on the Tasman 
Peninsular (across the bay from the main settlement at 
Port Arthur). An ex-shoemaker's lad from Shoreditch, 
Whitton spent approximately three probationary years at 
Point Puer; by Parkhurst standards, a rough and ready 
set of buildings, barricades and farm land (but better 
fed than he would have been at Parkhurst). The daily 
routine included five hours of labour at one of a number 
of trades and 1% hours scholastic instruction and %hr 
of devotional exercises. Playing, washing, eating and 
mustering took up about eight hours. While at Port 
Arthur, Whitton suffered a number of punishments for 
minor infractions of.the rules - in July 1837, 'for 
making use of a blasphemous expression ' - two days 
solitary on bread and water; October 1837, 'having thread 
implement in his possession' - three days solitary on 
bread and water, and three or four similar incidents.
More serious punishments included up to thirty six stripes 
on the breech - not uncommon amongst some of Whitton's 
colleagues. Whitton would have left Point Puer to go into 
the service of a colonial employer, probably as a skilled 
tradesman. His sentence ended in 1843. He was tried 
for burglary in 1844 but found not guilty.
Whitton's biography demonstrates the extent to which 
the context of his reformation, or attempted reformation 
anyway, the educative and inspirational and industrial 
training aspects, was prison discipline, and its attendant 
punishments - solitary confinements with bread and water. 
Given the politics of the Society for the Improvement of 
Prison Discipline and for the Reformation of Juveniles, 
whose members and supporters, especially William Crawford 
(a strong advocate of the Philadelphia separate system) 
and their special influence on the 1835 Act, it should 
not be surprising that reformation was embedded in a system
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of hard labour, solitary confinement and scanty diet 
(cooper 1981). The 'juvenile' in the penal system 
however was a category which did carry with it the 
notion of reformation; unlike the adult prior to 1840.
Parkhurst, the'Frances Charlotte*and Point Puer received 
only juvenile boys destined, t>y the courts, for transportation 
(the majority of those on the'Frances Charlotte/had been 
convicted of larceny, housebreaking and other forms of 
theft), that is those charged on a bill of indictment 
in sessions or assizes. Those going before magistrates 
still served their sentences in local jails, bridewells 
or houses of correction. The existence of Parkhurst 
had one unfortunate side effect. Capt. W. J. Williams, 
Inspector of Prisons for the Home District reported that 
the judiciary were inclined to sentence juveniles to 
seven years transportation, so that they would be sent to 
Parkhurst (whose early function included the reception, 
classification and training of juveniles for two years 
prior to transportation), while adults charged with 
similar offences were being sentenced to one year 
imprisonment. He quotes one case of a boy who stole four 
steel rings; the boy was sentenced to seven years trans­
portation, although he had never been in prison before.
The boy was 10 or 11 years of age. (P.P. 1852 Vol VII 
Select Committee on Criminal and Destitute Juveniles; 22).
The judiciary's partiality to the transportation solution 
of juveniles lay in the belief that separation of the 
juvenile from their natural milieu and their transplanting 
in the rough and ready world of New South Wales and Van 
Diemen's Land.
While the papers and records lodged in the Archives of 
Tasmania contribute to our understanding of the regime 
of juvenile-only establishments, and document how 
individuals fared within the system , their significance
— 620 —
goes well beyond this. The records are of more general 
importance to the history of prison administration in 
the U.K., and they are crucial to our understanding of 
what constituted 'the juvenile' in 19th century penal 
ideology. These documents, especially those relating 
to Point Puer and the 'Frances Charlotte', are significant 
in three major respects.
Firstly, the loose notion of 'boy' or 'juvenile' is 
striking for the range of chronological ages it is used 
to describe. In the modern English penal system, anyone 
over 17 would be described as 'young adult offenders'. 
Whether or not the use of 'boy' pertains to physique, we 
cannot be sure. In the context of 19th century prison 
administration something interesting seems to have been 
happening. Parkhurst, Point Puer and the convict ships 
were elements of the convict service, dealing only with 
those sentenced to penal servitude or transportation 
(McConville; 339), that is with convicts serving lengthy 
sentences for 'serious' crimes.
Unlike local prisons, the national convict service 
instituted an age-rëlated system of punishment and 
reform, premised on the separation of adult from juvenile 
prisoners. Few local jails had sufficient cells or wards 
to permit such a classification. It would appear then 
than in pursuing the principle of rescue and reform, the 
convict service was very generous in its classification 
of 'boy' and juvenile, for in local prisons we doubt whether 
anyone over 16, (and probably over 14) would be considered 
as a juvenile.
Now, one of the effects of this meant that an 18 year old 
arriving at Point Puer, received stripes on the breech, 
solitary cqnfinement etc., as a 'boy'; in other contexts - 
in VDL or local English prisons - infractions of the rules
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could mean the lash, the chain gang and the tread wheel. 
Moreover, he could be a 'boy', even after attaining the 
age of majority.
Secondly the documents display the regime of rescue and 
reform actually at work, instilling habits of industry 
and honest endeavour. That judicious mixture of religious 
exhortation, trade training, teaching literacy and hard 
labour speaks the Christian-Philanthropic means of achieving 
social order. Furthermore, it announces a particular view 
of minority status. For example, there is no clear dis­
tinction between 'boy' and adolescent; all are amenable to 
the rigours of moral teaching, training in literacy and 
trades and all are regarded equally as malleable material 
to be prepared for the dull routine of hard work and 
honest labour.
The ideology of childhood made material in the regime's 
expectations and practices construes 'the boy' not so much 
in terms of age - for we have noted the range of chrono­
logical ages the term encompasses - but in terms of fallen 
innocents who must be returned to civil society. Childhood 
is a time of preparation for the world of labour and 
production.
Thirdly, the total absence of separate institutions and 
regimes for juvenile girls is quite remarkable (though 
not too much remarked on by social historians). Their 
absence is an important one for if, as we argue, the 
boundaries between adults and children are socially 
constructed and are made concrete by the development of 
institutions specifically for the management, control 
and education of particular age-groups, does the absence 
of the female'equivalents of Point Puer, Parkhurst and 
the 'Frances Charlotte' actually write out girls as 
children? We turn to this issue below.
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Though the local prisons of the 18th century permitted 
the association of men and women in the prison yard, 
by the 19th century, prison generally separated men 
and women convicts into separate wings or wards (Ignatieff 
op.cit.; 32-33). Newgate had its own women's wing, 
(Ignatieff Chap. 6) and by mid-century, Brixton, a pentagon 
at Millbank, Parkhurst and prisons at Woking and Fulham 
were sometimes used as women's penitentiaries (McConville; 
425-426). We can find no record of a separate establish­
ment for juvenile girls and no record of separate ships 
for young convict women either. The smaller number of 
establishments for women convicts and a smaller women 
convict population may well account for the absence of a 
separate juvenile penitentiary and the absence of juvenile 
women-only convict ships.
In other words, we can find no separate institutions 
devoted solely to punishment and reform of young women 
convicts. This does not necessarily mean the absence 
of a system of reform, but rather that all women convicts 
were subject to the same (or similar) regime, regardless 
of age.
There is one particular instance of convict women being 
classified by age and by length of criminal career. 
Elizabeth Fry's 'reformatory' experiments in the women's 
ward of Newgate Prison beginning in 1616 set about 
'imposing ordër upon (women) prisoners by classifying 
'the tried and the untried, the young and the old, the 
first offender and the 'hardened, drunken prostitute', 
and placing each category in a separate ward.' (Ignatieff 
op.cit.; 143). A regime of discipline was imposed; all 
finery and adornment were forbidden - instead, hair was 
close-cropped"and a plain white uniform issued. The women 
were set to work sewing, overseen by a matron, and run 
in small groups along the lines of Lancaster's monitorial
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school (Ignatieff op.cit.; 144). The regime became 
a public spectacle, with members of the bourgeoisie 
attending the women's service in the prison chapel to 
observe'how 'the lowest order of people' had been 
transformed into 'dutiful, orderly and pious penitents' 
(Ignatieff; 145). Fry's regime is probably the exception, 
at least until the coming of the women's penitentiaries.
So far as a cursory inspection allows, the convict ships 
carrying women only did not make any classification by age. 
The 'Angelina' (arrived in Hobart 28 August 1844) and 
'Emma Eugenia' (arrived 24 April 1844) each contained some 
juvenile women convicts in the 14-16 year age range (this 
happening at a time when age-segregated shipping was 
established practice for male convicts).
The authorities clearly believed that girl juvenile 
convicts did not need to be isolated from 'veteran and 
hardened' adult women offenders. The basis of this 
assumption is never made explicit.
Comparing the offences of juvenile girl convicts with
those of boy juvenile offenders, and then looking at
the length of sentence, it is clear that courts made
little distinction between the sexes. Jane Brady, 14
years, received 7 years for stealing 2 waistcoats and
a jacket. Mary Hinson, 16 years old, was sentenced to
10 years transportation for stealing a bonnet and a pair
of shoes. These girls however were not destined for a
probation station (Point Puer), nor for a regime of reform
and trade training. They were to be sent first to the
Female Factory in Hobart, with other adult women convicts,
17then to servitude as assigned domestic servants 
Whereas the prison authorities in Van Diemen's Land took 
great care to classify male convicts by age, juvenile girl 
convicts could be adequately disciplined, trained and
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reformed through the routine imposition of domestic 
service. For them 'papa's discipline' exerted in the 
isolation of the private household seems to be the way 
forward to enlightenment and reform. For them there 
is no special treatment because of their tender ages; 
they shared the same fate as the adult women prisoner.
As an extension of the British system of law enforcement, 
an aside on VDL usefully alerts us to the significant 
differences between the penal system and the criminal 
law in the matter of age segregation. What is surprising 
is the wide chronological latitude given to the term 
'convict boy', ranging as it did from 10 to 18 years 
(and beyond, by the time the probation period was 
completed). Compare this with the criminal law accounting 
anyone over 14 as 'adult'.
In terms of 'historical discovery', historians of juvenile 
delinquency and penal reform will have to reassess the 
importance of Parkhurst, given the substantial evidence 
from VDL that Point Puer and the juvenile-only convict 
ships embodied age-segregating practices, some time 
before the establishment of Parkhurst.
But, equally revealing, are the significant differences 
between convict boys and convict girls. We have argued 
that until 1847 anyone over 14 was tried as though they 
were adult, btit from the mid 1830's, the penal system 
established a category 'juvenile'. But did it? Certainly 
not for juvenile girls. There are no female equivalents 
of Point Puer, Parkhurst or the 'Frances Charlotte', and 
this point has to be driven home. It is seductive to 
write accounts of juvenile crime, the rise of juvenile 
penitentiary, and extend this to say that age-grading 
'arose' as a significant feature of British society during 
the 19th century, when in fact we are writing 'the history' 
of boy delinquents and convicts.
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We have to write back into chronological categories, 
'juvenile' for example, the sexualised quality that 
has slipped out. The problem resides partly in the 
nature of historical evidence. Girls become invisible 
partly because there are ne institutions devoted to 
their incarceration and reform that we can write about.
Why this was so becomes the new historical problem, the 
lines of which we have set out above, and explanations 
of which we have only briefly speculated about. The fact 
that convict girls did not receive probationary training, 
tells us a great deal about 19th century ideologies of 
fit work and punishment for convict women and girls.
But the absence of special regimes for girl convicts 
raises another problem. Juvenile penitentiaries and 
regimes offered a 'softer' form of incarceration for boys, 
and offered magistrates a range of optional dispositions. 
Convicted girls on the other hand still went to 'adult' 
prisons, some of which (evidenced by Fry's organisation 
of the women's wards at Newgate) separated prisoners by 
age. Me Conville's lengthy text on prison administration 
makes scant reference to the organisation of women's 
penitentiaries and offers little evidence as to whether 
age-segregation was an established practice. It may well 
be that no systematic and wide-spread separation of the 
old and young took place until 1854 when girl offenders 
could be sent to reformatories. In the last analysis, 
it could be argued that girl convicts received tougher 
and more exacting treatment than convict boys.
The history of childhood then needs to be case in a 
gender-specific way. The evidence suggests, for example, 
that the process of creating boy and girl juvenile 
prisoners is not unitary, rather it displays gender- 
specific temporalities. In the context of prison 
administration, it is possible to demonstrate that boys 
were 'boys' 20 years before girls were separated out from 
women.
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Moreover, the process of creation and age-segregation 
takes place within quite separate referents. Habits of 
industry and moral regeneration for convict boys locates 
the process in terms of the waged-labour market? girls' 
destinies are defined in terms of the home and the family 
and domestic labour. So while age-segregation develops 
and extends, it does so within larger continuities, namely 
the material and ideological differences between men and 
women.
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c h a p t e r FOUR
FROM PARKHURST TO METTRAY; SAVING CHILDREN FROM THE LAW
We noted in the last chapter the first phase of saving young 
offenders from the 'full' disposition of the law enforcement 
system, taking place through the age-segregation of offenders 
within the convict service. We now turn our attention to two 
related themes; the second phase of child saving which posited 
the inappropriateness of prison as a place for reforming 
youthful criminals, and secondly, changes in the criminal law, 
the crucial moments being 1847 and 1879, which allowed summary 
justice for juveniles. Key moments because the criminal process 
of trial breaks along the categories of age. We shall continue 
the narrative of the previous chapter, firstly for clarity, and 
secondly, because the attack on the Parkhurst system set the 
conditions for magistrates to mobilise forces at the parliamentary 
level for a statutory change of the criminal law. It is essential 
to understand the overlap between social forces engaged in a 
sustained critique of the policy of merely segregating juvenile 
convicts within prisons and the manoeuvres to re-write the 
position of the child in criminal law. The analytical route is 
circuitous but reflects the priorities of the child-saving 
movement in the second half of the 19th century.
i. The second phase; the 'failure of Parkhurst'
The inappropriateness of prison, as a means for the prevention 
of the reproduction of a juvenile criminal class was clearly 
enunciated in the Minutes of Evidence presented as part of the 
Brougham Report (Select Committee, House of Lords; Execution 
of the Criminal Law Respecting Juvenile Offenders and Trans­
portation, P.P. 1847 Vol VII). The 'failure' of Parkhurst is 
the key discursive element of the reformatory movement. We 
shall not pursue here the organisational politics of the 
movement, the series of meetings, reports and evidence presented 
to Parliament, calling for a national system of reformatories 
for juvenile delinquents. The Brougham Report displays the 
continuities and discontinuities between the purely penal and 
the reformatory programmes. It was in response to the Report 
that Mary Carpenter wrote, Reformatory Schools for the Children 
of the Perishing and Dangerous Classes and for Juvenile Offenders 
for what the Committee recommended was an extension of the 
Parkhurst system (a judicious mixture of confinement and re­
straint with a touch of industrial training and occasional
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use of corporal punishment). 'A plague of Parkhurst's ', was 
Carpenter's response; prisons in name and fact, designed for 
incarceration and not reform. The 'failure' of Parkhurst 
was construed in three ways. Firstly, its brutalising effect; 
according to Carpenter, in one year, 34 boys had tried to 
escape, that 165 were whipped and 79 had been returned to 
Millbank Prison as incorrigible (Pinchbeck and Héwitt;471).
This was no basis for reform but a regime of fear. Secondly, 
Parkhurst in particular and the prison system in general was 
having no effect on rates of recidivism (and this was the 
most potent claim against Parkhurst). Thirdly, the cost 
of the failure to reform young offenders was costly, in terms 
of immediate financing of prisons. Against Parkhurst were 
set the Continental reformatories, the Rauhe Haus at Hamburg 
(1833) and more especially Mettray in Touraine, France (1839) .
It is interesting to recall that the impetus for the 1835 Act 
(the statutory basis of Parkhurst) came partly from visits by 
prison inspectors, to the United States; the reformatory 
movement drew exclusively on the Continental experience.(In 
passing, it is striking on reading the Brougham Report 1847 
and the Parliamentary Report on Criminal and Destitute Juveniles 
1852, P.P. 1852 Vol VII, just how many of those giving evidence 
had either been to, or were able to report in some detail on 
Mettray).
What then was to replace Parkhurst? The Brougham Committee 
suggested its extension, a system of asylums based on reform 
plus 'a modest use. of corporal punishment', to be used for 
juveniles convicted of their first offence. Recidivists would 
go to ordinary prisons. The Brougham Committee strongly 
supported separate establishments for juveniles; justified in 
the language of 1835
"That the contamination of gaol as gaols are 
usually managed, may often prove fatal, and 
must always be hurtful to boys committed for 
a first offence, and that they may be trained 
to the worst of crimes is clear enough.
(P.P. 1847 Vol VII;5).
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If the first gaol sentence failed to reform, all was lost, 
and ordinary prison was then sufficient. The rest of the 
penal system - the convict service (transportation), the 
death penalty, whipping and the separate system of the 
penetentiary - were kept intact (though the Committee had 
doubts about the deterrent capacity of capital punishment).
The Committee also recommended that parents or natural 
guardians should help bear the costs of juvenile offenders 
who were put in asylums on their first conviction.
A synoptic form of the reformatory movements programme for 
juveniles was set out in paper before the Committee by 
Matthew Davenport Hill, reporting a meeting of the Society 
for Promoting the Amendment of the Law held in 1846. Their 
proposals were:
1. That a national system of asylums should be established.
2. These asylums would receive young persons, to be classified 
according to age, sex and strength as well as past pursuits 
and associations.
3. The asylums would be conducted by government officers, 
and placed on the lines of the great trunk roads to admit 
cheap and ready access.
4. Out-door labour should be united with mental and religious 
education and with instruction in mechanical employment.
5. The cost of feeding inmates should be borne by the labour 
of inmates and by their parents' contributions.
6. All children, under a given age, violating the law, or,
'found in such a state of destitution as experience 
abundantly shows must lead by sure consequences to crime, 
shall by order of a magistrate, be sent to one of the 
intended asylums'. (P.P. 1847 Vol VII appendix to Minutes 
of Evidence).
The decisive shift is two fold. The asylums were not 
to be prisons with a n c le ts pr is on  guards and 
prison discipline, and, they would embrace the young whose 
only crime was to be declared, judicially, destitute. The 
model institution was to be Mettray.
"The children are received into what are 
called Families. They are taught trades. The 
principle of self-control and self-respect is 
cultivated from the moment they cross the 
threshold. They make no mistakes such as we 
made at Parkhurst in our first attempt, when 
we kept an anclet, an iron ring on the leg 
which of course was a badge of degradation from 
the beginning, (my emphasis).
(Edward Rushton, Stipendiary Magistrate, Minutes 
of Evidence, P.P. 1847 Vol VII ; 192.
Parkhurst was at once a 'failure' and a necessary pre-condition 
for the emergence of the reformatory. For Parkhurst was 
penality materialised; anclets, prison garb, shaven heads, 
meaningless tasks and corporal punishment. Mettray was a 
condensation of future possibilities and programmes. Whereas 
Parkhurst materialised the separation of the adult from the 
child in the penal system, it retained the old and adult symbols, 
rituals and practices, without sufficiently advancing its reason 
for existence, as an interrupter to reproduction of juvenile 
crime. The 'failure' of Parkhurst and the promise of Mettray 
unify the diverse voices and texts of Serjeant Adams, Edward 
Rushton, Frederick and Matthew Hill and Mary Carpenter. It was 
the latter who most eloquently articulated the problems of 
Parkhurst with the necessity of establishing a reformatory.
But her public declamations, the texts and speeches weave in 
not only a programme of reform, but specific conceptions of the 
child, images of the family, critiques of the criminal law.
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which at once signifies both the conditions which made the 
discourse possible and future meaning of reform.
1. Of Parkhurst children Carpenter wrote, "those unhappy 
young persons, who have become, to their unspeakable mis­
fortune, the children of the state'(Juvenile Delinquents - 
their Conditions and Treatment, 1853; quoted in Pinchbeck 
and Hewitt; 475). Children of the state encompassed the 
workhouse children - the orphans, the destitute young whose 
considerable misfortune was to be placed outside the natural 
circumstances of the family. She was candid on this point:
"... I believe that a well conducted family
is the order of Providence, and is more 
calculated to develop the human being than 
any school can do".
(P.P. 1852 Vol VII; 123).
Her works resonated the distinction between the children of the 
state and children regulated by 'the well conducted family'.
For her, the first principle of reform was to model any 
institution on 'the well conducted family', and this principle 
was to apply to the reformatory (the proposed replacement for 
Parkhurst's criminal children), the Free Day Schools for the 
poor but industrious classes, and the Industrial Training Schools 
for the 'half dressed little savages', vagabondising in the 
street'. (P.P. 1852 Vol VII; 114). The state - the cold, 
coercive, publically funded institutions - was to be replaced 
by the family - the warm, personal, affective domain.
"The child ... must be placed where the 
prevailing principle will be as far as 
practicable, carried out-where he will be 
gradually restored to the true position of 
childhood. He must be brought to a sense of 
dependence by re-awakening in him new
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"and healthy desires which he himself cannot 
gratify, and by finding that there is a 
power far greater than his own to which he 
is indebted for the gratification of those 
desires. He must perceive by manifestations 
which he cannot mistake, that this power, 
whilst controlling him, is guided by wisdom 
and love; he must have his affection called 
forth by the obvious personal interest felt 
in his own individual well-being by those 
around him; he must in short be placed in a 
family ... This it is apprehended, is the 
fundamental principle of all true reformatory 
action with the young, and in every case where 
striking results have followed such efforts, 
it will be traceable to the greater development 
of the principle, to a more true and powerful 
action on the soul of the child, by those who 
have assumed the holy duties of the parent. 
(Juvenile Delinquents 1853; 298).
The rhetoric of caring, loving guidance, the affectionate 
gratification of desires, the individual action on the soul 
of the child masks the true location of the child as a 
dependent appendage, whose loss of autonomy is a necessary 
process to the awakening of new and healthy desires, Clarke 
(1975) comments.
"Carpenter reveals, inadvertently through the 
agency of the context into which it is being 
inserted, (the family) an institution of coercion 
creating and enforcing dependency in the child 
through the calculated manipulation of those 
rewards which constitute its 'surface appearance' 
love, affection and interest."
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This is the nature of the familial form, which in its 
structure, is transferable to the institutions whose regimes 
were not to retribution but to reform. The reformatories 
were to be staffed by individuals assuming the holy mantle 
of 'the parent'.
2. The precepts of political economy were to be paramount.
The institutions of reform were not to be state agencies, but
paid for and managed by philanthropic, religious individuals, 
signifying their distance from the state and the responsibility 
of civil society. Like the family, reforming was a process 
outside the domain of the state. Drawing on the provision
of the 1834 Poor Laws, Carpenter further argued that parents 
of criminal children should pay for the upkeep of their children 
in reformatories, as they were required to do for any dependants 
placed on indoor relief (P.P. 1852 Vol VII; 126).
3. "I can speak thus far, that we have been
the means of rescuing a number who had 
either begun to fall into crime, or were
on the verge of doing so; but what I rely
upon is beginning earlier with the members 
of families whose children would inevitably 
fall into crime if left in the streets without 
education. That is the particular object of 
the ragged schools."
(Mary Cairpenter P.P. 1852 Vol VII; 131) .
With remarkable candour, she addressed the problem of 'the 
class below ' the criminal children;
"you could not say that they were guilty 
of any crime; but supposing an active police 
were constantly walking in these parts, or 
supposing any individuals had the power to 
take the hand of any such child, as he or
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"she might meet in this vagrant condition, 
in the streets; supposing in going into the 
courts of Red Cross Street, which you probably 
know, and seeing the half-dressed little 
savages there ... ; supposing these could be 
gathered compulsorily, being no longer permitted 
to be vagabondising in the streets, and forced 
to go to this Industrial School, that would be 
the class that I would contemplate."
(p.p. 1852 Vol VII;114) (My emphasis).
The institutional solution seemingly runs counter to Carpenter's 
professed anti-statism. But at the same time, the pre­
conditions for the institutional solution was the state itself. 
From 1837, to the end of the 19th century, some 105 pieces 
of legislation concerned with the care and protection of 
children provided a material basis, for the possibility of 
apprehending children, guilty of no crime, taking them out 
of the family, setting and placing them in institutions. In 
the name of social order. Carpenter was prepared to extend the 
powers of surveillance and control (by the agency of 'active 
police'), using the powers of the magistracy for the appropri­
ation of juveniles in 'the class below'. Once the coercive 
powers of the state had been properly deployed (the process of 
appropriation) matters of reform were to be left to institutions 
private and philanthropic - organised on the familial principle.
4. The programme of reform was premised on a distinct view 
of the child. "A child is physically and spiritually in a 
very different condition from a man ... youths are in an 
excitable state of body and mind; they have not the power of 
reflection, but they feel intensely." (P.P. 1852; 99). "The 
juvenile mind is flexible" (p.112). "In the man the character 
is to a certain degree formed, he cannot be altered except 
by a very great change in his mental condition; but a child 
acts on the impulse of the moment. It is not generally from
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any essential evil in his character that he commits the 
faults which make him a nuisance to society ... nor do 
I know how any children can live free from sin, in the 
condition of things which I described as existing in 
Bristol ... (125)." Images of innocence, unformed but
flexible minds corrupted by parents of vicious habits 
and degrading surroundings locate the child as a suitable 
case for protection and treatment, away from the formative 
environments of the home and the street.
The reformatory regime proposed a mixture of education, a 
moral and spiritual training, and useful and financially 
productive and (rewarded) labour; agricultural labour along 
the lines of Mettray - the rural image - was thought especially 
suitable (121). But the child must participate in the process 
of reform. The child's will must be enlisted, not broken 
(the Parkhurst 'treatment'). "We must act upon his spiritual 
nature and make him cooperate in the work of reformation"
(p.99).
"He has", she continues, "therefore, 
been acting without any discernment of 
his true position. He must now be bound 
to those who are with him from a feeling 
that they have his true interests at 
heart, and that being the case, he will 
more readily submit to discipline, which 
will be quite ready to exercise it, and 
which is intended for his good. This 
should be the principle of every 
Reformatory School ..." (100).
The pre-condition of reform is surrender and submission, 
the return to dependent, childish innocence, to be guided 
and formed by these assuming the true duties of parents.
Allied with the twin objects of industrial training.
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'to give habits of industry and to develop the powers of 
the child, ' (p.121). Carpenter's reformatories would 
produce children who would be useful members of society 
and render them independent (ibid). Reformatories them­
selves were constituted with productive capacities; their 
discursive appeal was a structure of inputs and outputs.
The very notion of retribution in Carpenter's view was not 
only brutal but also wasteful. Redhill, Stretton on 
Dunswood, the early reform schools were constantly measured 
against Parkhurst in terms of the cost per head or re­
habilitated juveniles.
5. 'What is the industrial training of girls that you 
propose, corresponding with the industrial training of boys?'
Carpenter; "In all industrial establishments there
is a very great amount of housework, which 
very probably would devolve on the girls, 
as preparing them for their future position 
in life; this occupation calls out the girls' 
minds, very much in the same way as agricul­
tural labour does a boy's mind, and the 
establishment may have to be conducted with 
very much less expense if boys and girls are 
in the same school, as they will perform 
different departments of work."
(P.P. 1852 VII; 135).
Such arrangements, for this was the basis of the Raue 
Haus, and the New York reformatory had much to recommend it, 
she explained, because it returns boys and girls 'more 
closely to the family system ' (ibid). There is no indication 
whether domestic labour would be paid as was boys industrial 
labour. The reformatories were to deploy the sexual division 
of labour of the family, because it saves expense, because 
of the moral influences one gender exerts on another but at 
the same time the reformatory was to be the great amplifier 
of good order - the well conducted family.
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Adequate accounts of the apprehension, prosecution and 
incarceration of girl offenders in the 19th Centruy 
have yet to be written. There were no female equivalents 
of Parkhurst, Point Puer and the Frances Charlotte; young 
female offenders seem to have been contained within the same 
institutions as women offenders, and for this reason, they 
are remarkable by their absence when the institutional analysis 
of penality is conducted. Only recently have Australian 
social historians been providing accounts of the network of 
female factories established in New South Wales and Van 
Pieman's Land. Accounts of'the invention' of juvenile 
delinquency are largely accounts of young male delinquency.
Not that this is a problem peculiar to the present; contem­
porary accounts were similarly orientated to the problem of 
young male delinquents. The biographies of Jane Doyle and 
Ellen Reece are two of the very few biographical lives 
dossiered by the prison inspectors and the societies advoca­
ting penal reform. Neither Mogarey (1978) nor McConville 
(1981) break down their figures of juvenile convictions 
by gender .
On this point, Mary Carpenter's evidence before the Select 
Committee is very thin. She intimates that no separate 
establishment was available in Liverpool for "the prison 
chaplain of the Liverpool gaol ... has greatly desired 
permission to send the girls (to reform schools), instead 
of their being exposed to contamination in the prison (136) .
Yet her attitude to girl offenders is abundantly clear.
"Although girls may be considered 
■ altogether as rather more virtuous 
than boys, if they are kept out of' 
temptation, yet when they do fall 
into vice, they are even more danger 
to society" (ibid).
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And furthermore,
"It is very important that the greater 
attention should be directed than has 
hitherto been done to girls, especially 
when we remember that they are to be the 
mothers of the next generation. I have 
known numerous instances in which a 
family has been well brought up, with 
a bad father and a good mother, but I 
have never known an instance of a family 
being otherwise than vicious with a bad 
mother." (ibid) (my emphasis).
The discursive positioning of girls, as future mothers, 
articulates both to the well ordered family and its 
location as a reproducer of good order. But their danger 
also lies in their sexuality. Jane Doyle and Ellen Reece 
were not only thieves but also prostitutes. "Falling into 
vice" in that perishing and dangerous class, sunk the girls 
very far below the boys (136). Because of the depths of 
their moral degradation, and the contaminating influences 
of the prison. Carpenter was to assert that reformatory 
discipline would be more necessary than prison discipline 
(136).
The passing of the Youthful Offenders Act 1854, represented 
only a partial victory for Carpenter and the reformatory 
movement. Whilst legislatively establishing the possibility 
of reform schools, it required 14 days penal servitude before 
the programme of reform was to begin. In a congratulatory 
letter from Matthew Hill to William Miles M.P. (185^) , Hill 
wrote :
"You have established three great principles. 
First, the value of voluntary action in the 
institution and conduct of Reformatory Schools.
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"Secondly, the substitution of reformatory 
treatment for retributive punishment as the 
rule ... Thirdly, you have recognised the
duty of the parent to maintain his offspring,
and not to cast the burden on the public."
(quoted in Pinchbeck and Hewitt op cit;477).
The reformatory schools were established along the lines 
of three great principles (though whether Miles 'established' 
or merely 'facilitated' these principles is an open matter). 
State-delegated reformatories, privately run with government 
inspection were followed in 1856 with a network of industrial 
schools for the 'class below! But we must be careful not 
to overemphasise the impact of the reformatory. Certainly 
they and the Industrial Schools lay down markers, institu­
tional boundaries between treatment of adult and child 
offender, but this did not constitute the immediate end of 
the penal sanction for children.
Whilst the Youthful Offenders Act provided for reformatories
for juvenile offenders, under the age of 16, by 1866 there
were 65 reformatories accommodating fewer than 5000 offenders, 
whilst the 50 industrial schools provided for 2500 needy 
children (McConville op cit;338). They did not stop the 
flow of children into prisons; partly because the act 
stipulated an initial 14 day imprisonment, and further, 
there were insufficient places for the young offenders.
A few prisons, Tothill Fields, Holloway and the City House 
of Correction had special juvenile wings (McConville ibid).
There was a long term decline in the number of offenders 
committed to prisons (McConville, 339 ),, due partly to the 
new powers granted to magistrates for summary disposition. 
Significantly though over a thousand children under the age 
of 12, were receiving prison sentences of some form. 
Alternatives to the penal sanction; the informal practices
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of magistrates delegating responsibility to suitable 
employers and parents, the use of sureties for good 
behaviour (formalised in 1879), the reformatories and 
industrial training schools, and the closure of Parkhurst 
seem to have a long effect in reducing the number of 
children spending time in gaols.
Parkhurst and Mettray display the shifting models of 
reformatory action on juveniles; the former clearly Icoated 
as a penal institution, the latter condenses the hopes, 
aspirations and programme of the second phase of the 
separation of adult and child offenders. The discursive, 
positioning of the child offender as a corrupted innocent - 
the sources of tainted innocent being thè home and the 
street, not the morally evil mind - displays the contra­
dictions between the legal criminal discourse and that 
deployed by the various factions of penal reformers.
But the shift from punishment to discipline entailed as 
a necessary part of its logic, a shift in focus from the 
class of juveniles who had already offended against the 
legal rules, to those who were potential offenders; 'the 
class below'. The deployment of the biographical technique 
from 1816 through to Carpenter's reports in 1852 and 1353, 
yielded the knowledges of juvenile sub-cultural life; the 
points of dangerous contamination, which included the prison 
and the system of policing. The biographies provided the 
practical knowledge of, and programme of reform for, juvenile 
offenders, giving at the same time a means of illustrating 
the size of the 'juvenile problem' easily comprehended by 
legislators and state officials.
The shift from the penal sanction to reformatories, 
industrial schools, the use of sureties^ and the release of 
young offenders to the supervised care of parents and 
employers marks a displacement of the rituals of retribution 
by the celebration of individual, personal-affective action 
on the soul of the subject, who was considered to be inherently
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reformable. The techniques of control away from the purely 
penal context to a context which is familial and educative 
speaks a new and different organising principle, applicable 
to a group beyond the category of the criminal class.
Drawing on the precepts of laissez faire liberalism (private, 
non-state, institutions - the reformatory, the employer) 
political economy (child labour and parental contribution) 
and evangelical Christianity (inherent innocence which can 
be saved) reformatory action drew its legitimacy from the 
fact that it was not (in practice it was argued that it was 
in opposition to) penal retribution, therefore it was 
legitimately extensible to juveniles legally 'innocent' but 
living in conditions inherently 'dangerous' (displayed by 
their location in relationship to the labour market, the 
home and leisure activités). The notion of 'saving' 
inherently meant the separation of the child from the working 
class adult world of gambling, drinking, theatres and commu­
nity street life.
Both the Parkhurst and reformatory phases, by locating causes 
of crime in the home, celebrate the notion of reasonable 
parenting. In the absence of the proper parent-child 
relationship - where children exhibited autonomy, precosity 
and worldliness and displayed less than filial obedience - 
the lack could be legitimately replaced by returning the child 
to its 'true position' within an institutional, familialy 
orientated setting (master-servant relationship, the industrial 
school or the reformatory). Whilst the reformatory movement 
advocated the more extensive use of surrogate family settings, 
the legal position which gave their advocacy its effectiveness 
rested upon the Chancery Court rewriting the relationship 
between the State and the private domain of the family, 
broadly under the principle of extending child protection 
measures. In short, the programme of reform was premised 
upon the child being located in the power relationship 
consonant with the image of the bourgeois family; dependant
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upon and obedient to a male head of household, cared 
for and guided by a non-labouring wife-mother.
The long term effect of the reformatory movement can 
be judged by considering the position of children in 
relationship to reformatory action at the end of the 
19th century. Clarke Hall states in 1897 the following:
"The Law is at present, that any child, 
within the following categories, may be 
sent to a reform school for 3 to 5 years.
a) Children between 12 and 16 who have 
been convicted of any offence punishable 
by penal servitude.
b) Children under the age of 12 who have 
been so convicted and against whom a previous 
conviction has been proved.
c) Children at an industrial school convicted 
of wilful refusal to conform to the rules
of the school.
d) Any boy under 16 convicted under Sect.4 
of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.
(Clarke Hall 1897; 105).
What is more striking is the categories who could be 
compulsorily sent for industrial training. The Prevention 
of Crimes Act 1871, added the category of children of any 
woman convicted of a crime, whilst the Education Act of 1876 
added children whose 'education was habitually neglected' or 
found 'habitually wandering or consorting with disorderly 
persons' (a breach of the school attendance order). Juvenile 
activities were further policed by the school attendance 
officers. Beyond this there were 20 other categories liable 
to industrial training,., if so ordered by a magistrate..
These included any child under 14, found begging or 
receiving alms, found wandering and not having any
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home or settled place of abode, found wandering 
and having no proper guardian, found being destitute and 
an orphan, children found habitually in the company of rogues, 
vagabonds, disorderly persons or reputed criminals, fre­
quenting the company of prostitutes or lodging, living, 
residing in a house frequented by prostitutes (Clarke op cit; 
109-110). Clarke reports that in 1895 there were 142 
industrial schools, holding some 13,000 boys and 4241 girls 
and further, there were truant day schools and day industrial 
schools (where the period of compulsory attendance was about 
12 weeks) treating some 2000 boys (Clarke Hall, 131).
In spite of Carpenter's sense of frustration at the 
retention of the 14 day period of imprisonment prior to 
reformatory action (which ceased in 1893), the power of 
her work, and that of her colleagues, has its monument in 
the extensive network of institutions, existant at the 
end of the 19th century, premised on the positive belief 
that children who offended, and those who were potentially 
'criminal', were different from adults and therefore required 
separate and different treatment; reformation by the action 
of moral and industrial training.
iii) Summary justice; the child of the courts 
There was no institutional corollary of the reformatory 
within the judicial procedures of criminal law at the end 
of the 19th century; no juvenile or children's courts 
existed, nor was any such institution generally advocated 
by the reformatory movement. Apart from the exemptions 
granted to children under the age of seven, and the re­
buttable assumption of innocence granted to offenders 
between seven and fourteen, adults and children were liable 
to the same process of trial, in the same courts, before 
magistrates, and in the case of felonies, before judges 
at assizes and sessions. The evidence suggests that 
magistrates frequently passed down dispositions which kept 
children out of gaols but these were informal practices.
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mitigating the full extent of judicial power. In the 
first half of the 19th century, an offence, whether 
misdemeanour or felony, committed by any child was 
liable to prosecution as though that child was an 
adult. Reformers concerned with the 'juvenile problems' 
advocated the process of summary trial and dispositions 
for petty offences against property, but did so generally 
in the context of keeping young offenders out of the 
contaminating influences of the prison. This is a 
separate argument, however, and is not in opposition 
to the legalistic conceptions of mens rea, responsibility 
and retribution. To a large extent, despite the summary 
dispositions allowed under the Acts of 1847 and 1879, 
the legalistic conceptions of the child before the court, 
remained undisturbed.
Whether a mode of trial 'peculiar' to children charged 
with criminal offences was an appropriate response to 
juvenile delinquency and to the excesses of the absolutist 
criminal law system had been discussed at the Parliamentary 
level a decade prior to the revisions of 1847. The Third 
Report on Criminal Law, had as its brief to consider making 
any distinction in the mode of trial between 'adult' and 
'juvenile' offenders (p.p. 1837 Vol. XXXI). The Commissioners' 
opinion was, "that it would not be desirable to make any 
distinction in the mode of trial of adults and juvenile 
offenders, except,by increasing the summary jurisdiction of 
magistrates", (p.p. 1837 Vol. XXXI76). The Report consciously 
avoids any radical change in the legal form of the child's 
responsibility before the courts, whilst recognising that in 
practice, courts take account of "the youth of the offender, 
usually rendering him more an object of compassion than 
a fit subject of punishment; and if the jury do not, under 
such feelings, acquit him altogether, they recommend him to 
mercy on account of his youth" (ibid; 7).
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Extending the summary powers of the magistrate, which was 
certainly the most radical recommendation of the 1837 Report 
seems to be concerned to accomplish two objects. Firstly, 
to decrease the exposure of young offenders 'to the evils 
of idleness and contamination of bad associates' caused by 
lengthy pre-trial spells in prison. Secondly to reconcile 
the widespread and popular practices of Magistrates courts. 
Assizes and Sessions of treating young offenders more 
leniently than adult offenders, contrary to the 
legalistic requirement to treat both categories as though 
they were both fully responsible subjects.
The Commissioners recognised that the majority of offences 
committed by juveniles were petty thefts and 'wanton acts 
which come under the general denomination of vagrancy'
(ibid; 7). While the latter could be tried summarily (under 
the provision of the Vagrant Act and Petty Trespass Act), 
petty theft, where it constituted larceny. Magistrates had 
no power to fine or dismiss the case, but were bound to 
send the case to Sessions or Assizes (ibid;7). For the offender, 
this meant 'weeks or perhaps months in prison without being 
subject to compulsory discipline', (and therefore idlenss and 
'contamination'). Accordingly, the Commissioners recommended 
that offenders not exceeding the age of 15 years, convicted 
of stealing property not exceeding 10 shillings, should be 
summarily sentenced to 6 months imprisonment; where the value 
of property exceeded 10 shillings but was less than £5.00, 
then sentence could be up to 12 months imprisonment. In 
effect, this meant imprisonment would be in the form of 
compulsory discipline (separate and silent incarceration) so 
that the two great objects of penal laws,'the prevention of 
crime' and 'the reformation of the prisoner', could begin 
immediately.
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In the second instance, the Commissioners openly stated:
"To a certain extent, the discretion 
of absolutely discharging a prisoner 
is already assumed by many Magistrates 
though without any direct authority from 
the law; and it is now not an infrequent 
practice to dismiss charges against 
children . (ibid;8) (my emphasis).
To give these practices 'direct authority', they further 
recommended that Magistrates should be empowered to 
dismiss charges for trivial offences against children.
Saving time and money, and retaining the awesome spectacle 
of the full trial for more serious offences were some of 
the reasons advanced for extending this power to Magistrates.
The Report of 1837 is notable for the manner in which the 
legal subjectivity is made consequent upon the restructuring 
of the powers of the Magistracy. The silence about the mind, 
the discretion and the criminal responsibility of the young 
offender, indicates the extent to which the fundamentals of 
mens rea went undisturbed. The discussion is largely about 
appropriate dispositions necessary to confront the problem 
of juvenile crime, not the appropriate mode of trial for 
young offenders. Any recommendation for a change in the legal 
subjectivity of the child was hedged in by the fundamental 
precepts of the criminal law, especially the- notion of re­
sponsibility. But the Report did attempt to institutionalize ■ 
to make formal already existing practices - categories of 
adult and juvenile offenders, by allowing more lenient 
dispositions for offenders under the age of 16 years.
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That the Report only confronted the 'problem' of juvenile 
delinquency, as a specific social malaise, rather than 
addressing the issue of the positioning of the child locked 
into a system of criminal law - which was dissonant with 
the position of children in property, family and contract 
law - is partly accounted for by nature of the evidence 
presented to the Commission. For the evidence came from 
Inspectors of Prisons, from prominent Magistrates such as 
Sir Frederick Roe, from Richard Mayne, the Guildford Bench 
of Magistrates and from the Chief Justice of Australia.
Their presentations collectively constituted the system of 
penality as the cause of the reproduction of juvenile crime.
The system of law enforcement was deficient only to the 
extent that Magistrates were not entitled to try larceny 
summarily, thereby ensuring the continued mixing of the 
young offender and old lags.
While the 1837 Report was never put into statutory form, 
it seems to have set limits to the debate about the position 
in criminal law. The Juvenile Offenders Act 1847 (10 and 11 
Viet. C.82), specifically states in its head notes that it 
was an Act "to ensure the more speedy trial of juvenile 
offenders, and to avoid the evils of their long imprisonment 
previously to trial ....".The provisions of Section 1 declare 
that;
a) Any offence committed and deemed and declared to be simple 
larceny or punishable as simple larceny, and where the 
offender is under the age of 14, they can be committed
by two Magistrates.
b) Sentences can be up to three calendar months with or 
without hard labour in a common gaol or House of Correction
c) If male, the offender can be privately whipped, either 
instead of, or in addition to prison.
d) Magistrates can dismiss the accused if they deem it 
expedient not to punish them.
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The Brougham Report (p.p. 1847 Vol VII) and the head notes 
of the Act, leave no doubt that it was the pre-trial, non- 
disciplinary form of imprisonment which was to be reformed 
by extending the summary dispositions of the Magistracy.
Of the Act, one commentator noted:
"firstly as being practically the 
earliest recognition by the 
legislature of any distinction 
between the crime of an adult and 
that of a child (and secondly) as 
conferring for the first time upon 
justices of the peace, the power of 
dealing summarily with an indictable 
offence", (my emphasis)
Clarke Hall (1897; 144-145).
The Act achieved the reconciliation of the criminal code 
with the informal practices of the Magistrates, outlined 
in 1837. . In one sense it celebrates the notion of
judicial discretion, an elementary feature of the English 
legal system. There appears to have been no criticism of 
Magistrates displaying leniency to youthful offenders, more
a recognition of their right to do so.
The extent to which the legal subjectivity of the child in
criminal law was rewritten by the Act is somewhat more
difficult to assess. The consequences of the Act in this 
sense were:
a) Given that the majority of juvenile offenders before the
courts were charged with petty theft and forms of vagrancy, 
the effect was to limit court appearances to summary trial 
before Magistrates, with only more serious offences going
before Judge and Jury on an indictment. And, there was no
right to appeal for a trial before a higher court. No
change was made in the mode of trial.
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b) Magistrates' power to dismiss offenders under the age 
of fourteen and to pass limited gaol sentences con­
stituted a boundary (along the axis of chrono­
logical age) between adult and a 'child', but in effect, 
was less generous than the boundary operating within 
the penal system (where prisoners under 16 years were 
separated from adult prisoners).
c) While powers to try cases summarily were extended, in 
practice, children under 14 could still be sent to 
trial before Judge and Jury; there was no absolute 
exclusion from the full rigours of the criminal law.
d) Critical boundaries; the age of responsibility and 
discretion (7 years and 14 years) were not changed.
Nor was there any fundamental reassessment of mens rea.
A little known Act (13 and 14 Viet. C.37. 1850) extended 
summary justice for simple larceny to offenders whose age 
did not exceed sixteen years. However, the Act 'corrects' 
an ommission of the 1847 legislation; Magistrates were 
required to offer a jury trial, and objections to summary 
trial could be entered either by an offender under 16, 
or the parent. It has been commonly assumed that a later, 
piece of legislation (1879 Act) extended summary justice 
to all young offenders.
The Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 (42 and 43 Viet. C. 49) 
extended the Magistrates' powers to deal with young offenders 
still further. The Act conferred on Magistates:
a) Powers to try all children under the age of 12, for any 
offence, except homicide, and unless a parent of the 
prisoner opted for a trial by jury. Available dispositions 
were: a maximum of one month's imprisonment (with or 
without hard labour), fines up to 45 shillings, whipping 
(if male) of up to 6 strokes of the birch.
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b) Power to try offenders aged 12, but under 17 years 
summarily for offences in the nature of larceny, 
embezzlement, railway or post office offences. 
Punishments were limited to 3 months imprisonment, 
£10.00 maximum fine, or 12 strokes of the birch. 
(James 1957, Clarke Hall 1897) . *
Legal historians such as Sharpe (1982) and Cockburn (1978) 
in their studies of crime of the law (principally in the 
early modern period), have cautioned that 'the law' and its 
'practice' display certain discontinuities. The badly drafted 
indictment, containing slight inaccuracies about abode and 
occupation, could in theory lead to a charge against a 
prisoner being thrown out of court. In practice, such 
inaccuracies often presented no obstacles to the presiding 
Judge, and the cases proceeded. With young offenders. 
Magistrates, drawing upon the capacity of judicial discretion, 
for some 50 years disposed of young felons - releasing them 
to the custody of parents, employers, workhouses, dismissing 
cases out of hand - in a manner that had no 'direct authority' 
either in statute or case law. Thomas Mayne, a Metropolitan 
Police Magistrate, declared that he 'laid it down never to 
convict (offenders) under nine years of age'. And with 
children under seven, charged with a felony, 'I have 
either sent him to Union workhouse or got his parents to take 
him home', (p.p. 1852 VII; 91). Magistrates appear to have 
drawn their own lines of the age of responsibility (nominally 
7 years), adopted esoteric ages of discretion (nominally 14 
years) for a complex variety of reasons; saving the expense 
of a full trial, saving children from the rigours of a full 
trial, keeping young offenders out of the contamination of 
prisons, and recognising a popular sentiment that prisons, 
transportation and whippings were inappropriate sanctions for 
offenders of tender years. Perhaps we are sketching here a
*(Right, to trial by jury disappeared in 1952; James:162).
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'history' of statute and case law, and the hard and fast 
categories of 'responsibility' and 'discretion' - being 
systematically undercut by the informal, unauthorised'* 
practices of the Magistracy. These customary practices 
were made clear, in parliamentary reports, as early as 
1837, but the fundamental categories of criminal respon­
sibility and discretion remained résiliant to change.
We have argued here that the categories were not transformed 
because they were constantly undermined in the Magistrates 
courts.
CONCLUSION
We have noted the unchanging grammar of the common law 
categories applicable to children in criminal law. The 
chronological boundaries of criminal responsibility and 
discretion were the same at the end of the 19th century 
as they were at its beginning. The absence of a separate 
court for children indicates the continued inclusion of 
children in a process of justice which was also applicable 
to adults. There were no absolute exclusions; child offenders 
went before Magistrates and the Crown Courts on the same 
charges, under Bills of indictment which formally made no 
distinctions in terms of age. Children under the age of 
seven were regarded as 'sans discernment', between seven 
and fourteen, liable to punishment if intention could be 
proved. However, the element of judicial discretion, 
allowed Judges and Magistrates, operating a variety of rule- 
of-thumb measures - age, possession or absence of discretion, 
physical maturity - and being sensitive to popular sentiment, 
continuously transformed the criminal law's grammatical 
inflexibility. Cases were dismissed, convicted offenders 
were released to the care of employers, parents, workhouses 
and charitable organisations. It was the operation of judicial 
discretion, the informal practices of Judges and Juries which 
kept the young away from the gibbet, not the absolute for­
bidding of the criminal law.
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Discussing the operation of judicial discretion in an 
earlier period. Hay (op.cit) argued that the greatest 
beneficiary of the court's magnanimity was the network 
of authority relationships displayed in the discretionary 
process. Offenders arguing for leniency, pleading miti­
gating circumstances acknowledge powers greater than their 
own, to reduce the severity of sentences thereby reprodu­
cing a system of authority and deference. It acknowledges, 
through the process of discretion, a power structure outside 
'the legal' (constituted by sharply etched charges, clear 
rules of procedure and a fixed tariff of dispositions), made 
known by informal and formal appeals to judiciary from 
landlords and employers - a paternal patronage - deployed 
to offset the worst excesses of the law enforcement system 
The network of authority relationships was sufficiently 
powerful to ensure that certain offenders never went before 
the courts, or that some offenders were tried for non-capital 
offences. Historians of crime acknowledge that we have an 
imperfect knowledge of the process by which some offenders 
went to the courts, while others were not charged, and, that 
we still know little about the changes in the kinds of offences 
that ensured the offender would go before the courts, while 
at other historical moments, the judicial solution was not 
pursued (e.g. Cockburn, (1978 ), Sharpe (1982), Hay(op.cit.).
Following Hay's broad argument, we have indicated the extent 
of judicial discretion with regard to young offenders, and 
we have indicated the extent to which the dispositions 
applicable to them were consequent upon the extension of 
the Magistrates' powers to try summarily, clearly set out 
in the Acts of 1847 and 1879. This is crucial because it 
is the level and range of dispositions which separates the 
adult from the child, more so than the grammar and the process 
of the criminal trial. Parkhurst, the convict ships bearing
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juvenile-only passengers, Point Puer in Van Diemen's Land, 
the reformatories and the industrial schools indicate that 
adult-child boundaries were operative within the penal system 
from the mid 1830's, and these were extended, becoming more 
important classifications of 'difference'. The socially 
constructed status of childhood, is dependant upon 
institutional forms of separation, the elaboration of a 
difference and the confirmation of 'the other'. We have 
noted the unsentimental theories shaping this movement in 
penology; the emphasis was firmly on the prevention of the 
reproduction of juvenile delinquency, expressed in the medical 
discourse of disease, mixing, aeriation and contamination.
Such theories are 'naturalistic' insofaras young were conceived 
rather like plants, 'tender', 'malleable', and especially open 
to training, shaping^ or ’hardening'.The young were regarded 
as especially receptive to crime either by breeding, parental 
inculcation and less resistant because of their youth, to its 
infectious disease, located in the streets, parental culture 
and the loose and disorderly life of the 'unclassified' 
prison. Naturalistic theory programmes the response to 
youthful crime in social policy. Separation from 'adult' life 
(on the streets, in the family and in the prison); shaping 
and training by regimes of instruction, continuous industry, 
moral uplift, arousing sentiments of familial dependence 
and obedience - all underwritten by the coercive violence 
of incarceration, regimentation and liberal punishment. 
Retributive justice for the young - hanging, whippings, 
prison and transportation was displaced by a dispersed set 
of institutions profoundly 'reformative' and 'educative' 
in character; a possibility premised upon naturalistic 
differences posited in terms of old and young,^tender^and 
^hardened/
The significant allies of the Magistrates, the network of 
power and authority relations 'outside' the legal system, 
were not the old traditional social forces mapped by Hay,
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but the prison inspectorate and the private, urban-based
child saving organisations (the societies for the
prevention of juvenile crime). Their elaboration of 'the
juvenile' as a social category with distinctive modes of
existence, committing identifiably different crimes penetrated
the legislative arena through their own published accounts,
and by their evidence before successive parliamentary
commissions on the criminal law. Drawing upon the biographies
of convicted juveniles, they mounted a sustained critique
of the Parkhurst system and provided an alternative system
of reformatories, prior to the system of state-delegated
industrial and reformatory schools with the informal
complicity of sympathetic Magistrates. Their image of
'saving' was to place young offenders in settings which
were in combination 'total' (hour by hour regulation,
industrious, educative), familial, (dependant children,
regulated by figures assuming parental roles demanding
obedience, organising inmates along the lines of sexually-
divided labour), rural, (sites away from the dangers
of urban settings) , and in spite of the rhetoric, coercive,
(infractions of the rules entailing restricted diet,
beating etc.). In ethos and setting, the reformative
institutions were not unlike the public schools of the
19th century. Theorists concerned with the purely class
content of the reformative institutions tend to overlook
the obvious 'generational' similarities between two sets
22of dissimilar institutions . -
The child saving institutions bear considerable sociological 
import given the social significance assigned to putative 
biological differences through their naturalistic mode of 
discourse. Part of the child saving discourse is premised 
on the fact that the young were considered to be capable 
and moreover, worth, being 'saved'. Their very plasticity, 
the attribute of 'not yet formed', designated the distinctive 
attribute of the juvenile criminal. This gave considerable
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strategic leverage to the critique of the absolutist form 
of law enforcement. For the child savers were able to 
offer a programme which was genuinely protective (by removing 
the child from the threat of capital punishment and degrading 
and brutal imprisonment) - its most radical and liberationist 
intervention^ educative (in terms of both 'useful' training 
and moral uplift)'while offering the means of 'interrupting' 
the reproduction of juvenile crime (separation from the urban 
parental and prison cultures). Such programmes, concentrating 
on individual reformative action posed no radical break with 
legalistic notions of individual responsibility. For example, 
whilst the Magistrates and their allies stressed the social 
matrix of juvenile crime, its cause was located not in the 
poverty, the unmet needs and the marginal position of 
juveniles in the labour market, but in the cultural and 
moral degeneracy of parental- cultures. In this context, the 
juvenile offender is the hapless victim of circumstance.
The solution was the institution premised upon classical 
familial order where juveniles would learn their place and 
habits of sobriety, industry and moral restraint; principles 
central to the Protestant,patriarchal family, celebrated in 
assumptions of family law.
Biographical evidence, suggests however that young offenders 
rather than being hapless victims or passive receptors of 
parental culture were active and reflexive participants in 
crime, sometimes out of dire need, often because petty 
thieving at least offered a modicum of 'civilised' existence. 
They were victims but not in the sense propounded by the 
child savers. Nor were they individuals freely 'choosing' 
a life of crime; the legalistic 'responsible subject' of 
the criminal law.
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In what is still the most sensitive and authorative 
account of child saving (albeit in the context of the 
USA in the late 19th and early 20th century), Platt notes 
that "The child saving movement was 'anti-legal', in the 
sense that it derogated civil rights and procedural 
formalities while relying heavily on extra-legal techniques". 
(Platt 1982;159). His invocation of 'rights' and 'formal 
procedures' as expressive of 'the legal' permits us to 
consider something of the character of the child saving 
movement, and to consider any transformations in the legal 
subjectivity of the child in criminal law.
Carpenter and her colleagues were prepared to 'reform' 
compulsorily social groups who had not yet committed a 
crime, or had not even gone before the courts formally 
charged with a crime (here defined formally as committing 
acts proscribed by the welter of criminal statutes). They 
were quite prepared to lower the threshold of criminality, 
encompassing a range of youthful activity not formally 
proscribed by laws, in order to appropriate and reform a 
class of 'potential' criminals. This is the effect of the 
classification of essentially working class youth into 
'perishing' and 'dangerous' classes. In this sense, the 
movement was quite prepared to derogate 'rights' (assigned 
by the process of formal charge, proper trial, fixed dis­
position - constitutive of criminal law - where formal 
charges etc. could be made on the commission of specific 
acts). The movement was prepared to criminalise the 
practices of youthful activity whose conditions of existence 
were chronic poverty, overcrowding, marginal economic activity, 
and whose milieu of circulation was the street.
In effect, the machinery for this process existed but not 
necessarily activated on a large scale- the activities of 
the 'new police', and the Vagrancy Acts selectively picked
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up street children to take before Magistrates. With 
the addition of industrial and reform schools to the 
workhouse, we can discern the emergence of a 'system', 
specifically concerned with, and whose target was, the 
juvenile delinquent - not the juvenile criminal. The 
sociological importance here is not simply the axis of 
class, but also of 'generation'; class-embedded age 
groups, were target populations for a new set of state 
apparatuses.
We have indicated that the numbers coercively reformed 
were small. However, we should not deny the symbolic 
power of the reformatory institutions, particularly in 
their articulation to the rise of mass compulsory 
schooling. Oral historians such as Humphries (l98l) 
and Thompson (1981) record in their interviews, how these 
institutions permeated the consciousness of working class 
families. The threat of the 'truant' school (used generically) 
and the 'reformatory' was constantly invoked by school teachers, 
the police and welfare officers. For the young then, their 
conditions of existence were experienced not only in terms 
of class membership - and all the cultural and social effects 
that entails - but also in terms of confronting boundary 
riders, the police, welfare officers and teachers marking off 
prohibited areas of activity and who confirmed their status " 
as youthful and different.
The construction of system of control specifically targeted 
on juvenile delinquency is of fundamental importance to any 
analysis of the legal subjectivity in criminal law. To 
reiterate, the grammar of responsibility, of individuals 
freely choosing crime, remained resiliently unimpressed by 
the 'outside' category of 'juvenile crime'. The child's 
rights (except for a’ brief period between 1847 and 1850) 
were not formally derogated; trial before Magistrates or 
an elected trial before judge and jury remained as a necessary
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preliminary before reformatory action could take place.
Formal privileges, the powers of Magistrates to dismiss 
cases summarily for offenders under 12, and the summary 
trial of persons under 16 years certainly removed the 
young offender from the worst excesses of the law enforce­
ment system. At the formal level of procedure, the 
distinctions between adult and child over 12 were few - 
both were regarded as responsible, unless judges and 
juries decided otherwise. But this was subject to judicial 
discretion, and not necessarily an outright claim of a 
right to lenient disposition. We should recognise, however, 
that the child of criminal law was still distinctly at 
odds with the infant of property and contract law.
Any such legalistic analysis must remain blind to the 
significant importance of the juvenile delinquent and 
its location within the system we referred to earlier, 
operating from 1854. As Magarey (1978) demonstrates, 
the majority of juvenile convictions from 1848 to 1853 
were under the Vagrancy, Malicious Trespass, Larceny and 
Police Acts and the Juvenile Offenders Acts (1848, 56%;
1849, 60%; 1850, 61%; 1851, 62%, 1852, 63%, 1853, 64%).
The pattern of juvenile crime involved mainly petty theft 
and various forms of vagrancy and wandering. Vagrancy, 
if proved, meant imprisonment (with hard labour, for one 
calendar month). The Juvenile Offenders Act permitted 
imprisonment for up to 3 calendar months. The Larceny 
Act was more severe, permitting sentences of transportation 
for seven years or two years imprisonment with a whipping.
Given the demise of Parkhurst and the system of transportation, 
the introduction of the 1854 Reformatory Schools Act, 
actually increased the time that juveniles might be incarcerated 
For its provisions allowed for a detention of not less than 
2, nor more than 5 'years (Clarke Hall 1897;95).
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Moreover, we should note the emergence of a system dealing 
with juvenile delinquency which at each stage (arrest, 
trial, reform) which was highly discretionary, operating 
alongside the formal legal system of criminal law. Given 
the nature of juvenile crime, the police were in a unique 
position to proceed selectively against street children.
At the trial stage, considerable latitude was allowed for 
judicially determined 'responsibility', and, finally, 
within the reformatory system, the authorities were 
permitted considerable freedom to determine when an inmate 
had been reformed. Furthermore, the system targeted a 
population least able, materially and symbolically, to 
resist the operations of a highly discretionary process.
The presence of discretion is not some deformation of 
the criminal process in its applicability to the juvenile 
delinquent, but a fundamental and characteristic feature 
of the form of that system, post 1854. The industrial and 
reformatory schools are best conceived as additions, not 
alternatives to, the law enforcement system, permitting a 
wider range of dispositions for offenders whose difference 
was to be youthful. For it remains a salient fact that 
industrial and reformatory training were not, and given that 
their character^ were never popularly conceived^as claimable 
rights, in place of a prison sentence* Nor did the possibility 
of prison entirely disappear. The law enforcement system 
was more profoundly generationally divided by 1880 than 
it was at the beginning of the century. Certain privileges 
had been extended to offenders of 16 years or under, without 
'fixing' that chronological boundary as the difference between 
adult and child. More crucially, however, the elaboration of 
the category juvenile carried with it clear messages about 
appropriate social conduct and practices, which, if ignored 
or violated, the response was not gestural or symbolic, 
but formal and coercive.
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PART IV : SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Our foregoing analysis suggests the following historical 
developments, which may be summed up as follows:
a) By the end of the third decade of the I9th century, capital 
punishment for offenders under 14 years had virtually disappeared 
Sentences were commuted to transportation.
b) By 1840, the prison service was systematically segregating 
convicts by age, to the extent that separate establishment 
(Parkhurst, Point Puer) were built specifically for male 
offenders under the age of 17 years. Moreover, the service 
experimented with separate convict ships for juvenile prisoners 
(e.g. the 'Frances Charlotte') in transit to convict colonies.
c) Whereas the 'phase one' reforms ( a) and (b) above 
proceeded on the principle of age-segregated punishment, pre­
trial prisoners mixed in loose and idle disorder, with few 
attempts to classify prisoners by age.
d) To this, there were two responses, evident in parliamentary 
commissions post-1837.
i) Attempts by magistrates to extend the power of summary 
justice for offenders 16 and under, so that the pre­
trial 'contamination' of young offenders could be reduced.
ii) A successful attack on imprisonment as a useful means 
of dealing with juvenile criminals, focussing on the 
reformatory as the principal means of replacing Parkhurst.
e) Until 1847, few formal distinctions existed in the criminal 
law between adults and children over the age of 7. Over this 
age, young offenders relied absolutely on the discretion of
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magistrates and judges for any mitigation of sentence, or, 
for dismissal of case (based on the judicial perception of 
'capacity'). The evidence suggests that judicially exercised 
discretion mitigated the extremes of the law enforcement system.
f) Statutes of 1847 and 1879 drew age lines in criminal law, 
setting down unambiguously the ages (14 years in 1847, 16 years 
in 1879) at which magistrates could try summarily most of the 
offences which constituted the majority of juvenile crime. It 
is at these moments, the criminal law (as distinct from the 
penal system) distinguishes most effectively between 'the adult' 
and 'the child'.
g ) The distinctions between convicts within the penal system 
along age lines, constantly runs ahead of the ambiguities of 
age distinctions which operated within the criminal law, and 
became one of the determinants of change within the criminal 
law.
h) Social reformers interested in 'the problem' of juvenile 
delinquency elaborated a subject, the juvenile, constituted by 
reference to the pathological, physical and cultural environment 
which necessarily produced victim delinquents. Unlike the pre­
cepts of criminal law (mens rea, responsibility), these social 
circumstances were seen as mitigating circumstances, making 
imprisonment inappropriate, but rehabilitation absolutely 
necessary, in order to interrupt the process of the reproduction 
of crime and the criminal class.
i) But a short step away, exampled by Mary Carpenter, was the 
extension of reformatory principles to children who had not 
yet offended, but were enclosed in a physical and cultural 
environment which would lead them to doing so.
j) The 'softer' institutions of the reform school and the 
industrial and training establishments, made available an 
extended range of dispositions, and gradually in response to
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them, the extension of the range of offences (wandering, 
truancy, having licentious or criminal parents) which were 
applicable only to children. More so for children under the 
age of 17, than for 'adults', we find a shading off in dis­
tinction between criminality non-criminal-but-dangerous, 
between offence and existence.
k) The organising principle of reformatory action was premised 
on the well-ordered family, whose 'absence' caused the emergence 
of the refractory juvenile.
A recent American study interestingly confirms some of the 
findings presented here (Sutton 1983), albeit in a different 
context. Sutton demonstrates how the houses of refuge and 
reformatories for juvenile delinquents prefigure changes in the 
legal status of the child in a variety of states.
In many respects, the discovery of 'the juvenile' the institu­
tional forms of salvation arising out of its discovery, and 
finally, the re-conception of young offender before the courts 
as a victim of a pathologically aberrant physical and cultural 
environment, is a sequenced process common to both countries. 
Perhaps this is hardly surprising given the similarity of the 
metropolitan contexts providing the milieu of the two child- 
saving movements (though the US concern was with immigrant 
paupers), and the shared ideologies of child saving movements - 
here and in the US - rooted in evangelical beliefs based on 
moral regeneration of young offenders, which was to take place 
in a suitably reforming environment (away from the home and the 
sreet, in a setting imbued by the qualities of the well-ordered 
family). The earliest refuges for juveniles were established 
in the US in .1824. Those, and the reformatories which followed, 
were known to prison inspectors such as Miles and Crawford, and 
to reformers such as Hill and Carpenter (though they referred 
to Continental institutions more often), so providing another 
strand of connectivity.
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And like Sutton, this analysis is not primarily concerned with 
reformatories and industrial and training schools 'as organisa­
tional end-products of social change, but rather with them as 
exemplars, as sources and carriers of further changes in social 
definitions of childhood ... (Sutton op.cit.; 916). It is to 
this aspect we now turn.
The criminal law in the first half of the 19th century continu­
ously offered a measure of protection to legal subjects under 
the age of seven (constituted by their total lack of criminal 
capacity) and to young offenders between seven and fourteen 
(whose lack of capacity was presumed, unless and until the 
contrary was proved. Note that privilege and protection was 
premised upon capacity; the age lines were not hard and fast, 
and were susceptible to judicial reinterpretation.
The statutes of 1847, 1850 and 1879 not so much re-wrote the 
age lines (after all allowing magistrates to try summarily all 
children under 14, then under 16, simply adopts the already 
existing chronological boundaries of the common law and the 
penal system), rather the statutes gave a new solidity and 
significance to age as opposed to capacity.
Aside from the obvious advantages of certainty in determining 
adult and minor status, before the law, classification by age 
has one other important consequence. Chronological classification 
homogenises the capacities of all individuals within a given 
age grouping. In this sense, the criminal law begins to move 
closer to adult-infant distinctions found in property and 
contact law. It facilitates the possibility, for example, of 
thinking about generic categories, such as juveniles, as opposed 
to individuals bearing differentiated capacities.
While we shouldn't attach too much importance to shift from 
capacity to age classification, for the two remain inextricably 
linked (and the relationship between the two is never entirely 
settled), the significance of falling on one side of an arbitrary
— 666“
chronological age line begins to assume its modern 
form.
And where this is related to new forms of state and state- 
delegated institutions, which are established to deal with 
particular age-sets (the industrial and training schools, the 
reformatory, and from 1908, the juvenile court, along with com­
pulsory schooling introduced from 1876), then age not capacity 
sharply etches the distinctions between adult and minor. More­
over, the chronological boundary itself becomes a form of 
legitimacy for treating all young 'offenders', criminal and non- 
criminai'\ differently from adults. Because they are 'children', 
they need protection for their own good - even where they have 
committed no criminal offence, but live in circumstances where 
they might do so.
Within the law enforcement system we can detect a significant 
shift in the ideology of protection and privilege. Whereas 
lack of capacity had the concrete effect of saving very young 
offenders from both criminal trial and the gibbet, with the 
emergence of regimes focussing upon reform and rehabilitation, 
then the ideology of protection serves to cast the net more 
widely over youthful practices. And 'protection' is offered 
at the expense of participating in a regime of reform, premised 
as we have argued, on moral regeneration within an institution 
structured on the principles of the well ordered family and geo­
graphical separation from the cultural practices of the working 
class. At this point, the very limited, moralistic character 
of the reformatory principle is most clear, for what was to be 
inculcated with bourgeois values, of filial obedience, spiritual 
purity, biblical notions of correct conduct, habits of industrious­
ness at the work place and in the home, but without the signifi­
cant advantages of economic security, a settled and well furbished 
place of residence and some purchase on the means of parlia­
mentary participation.
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We argued earlier that institutions concerned with youthful 
delinquency only ever directly affect small numbers of children, 
even from the classes most susceptible to their attentions.
This, as we also argued, is not the limit of its coercive effect, 
because its existence is invoked as a constant threat by social 
controllers and by parents. In practice, the compulsory clauses 
of the 1876 Education Act more effectively cleared the streets 
of problem juveniles than the combined efforts of police, magi­
strates and child savers (Gattrell op.cit.; 306-307). But as with 
the other apparatuses of the law enforcement system, the classi­
fications elaborated by prison officials, magistrates and child 
savers and made concrete within the criminal law and in the penal 
and reformatory system, produce within the social formation 
generationally located subjects. By this means, particular 
class and bureaucratic views, about chronological age and its 
relationship to criminal capacity, about appropriate age- 
specific behaviours, practices and attitudes, about proper 
parental practices and about adequate forms of treatment and 
rescue, acquire a universal significance.
By 1880, the possibility of a young offender under 16 being tried 
by judge and jury had considerably diminished (for the majority 
of offences except homicide, they were tried summarily), the 
possibility of capital punishment all but disappeared (though 
capital punishment remained on the statute book), the incidence 
of imprisonment greatly reduced (replaced by reform, rehabili­
tation and release to approved guardians). Considered in light 
of the circumstances obtaining at the beginning of the century, 
these exclusions mark a considerable change in location of the 
child within the system of criminal law enforcement. But this 
liberalizing trend away from shaven heads, anclets, flogging, 
the prison cell and prison ship, contains a central paradox.
Having defined the qualities of youthfulness in terms of reforma- 
bility and rehabilitation, the criminal law enforcement system 
could be, and was, deployed against juveniles in instances where 
no crime, in adult terms, had been committed.
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NOTES
1. For some applications of Foucault’s work to the 
English system of law enforcement, see John Lea 
(1978) and Dario Melossi (1978).
2. See for example Gattrell, et.al., study of the 
London Garroting Panics in 1862, a 19th century 
equivalent of ’mugging’.
3. Penal colonies were established at Sydney 1788 and 
then Van Diemen’s Land 1804, necessary following
the loss of the North American outlets. Transportation 
as a punishment can be traced back to the 12th century 
(banishment from the realm). In 1597 justices were 
empowered to banish to the galleys, rogues, vagabonds 
and sturdy beggars (McConville: 105).
4. See Sheehan (1977; 243) for an extended description of 
Newgate in the 18th century, and the free and easy 
traffic between prisons and the world outside.
5. The two penetential models observed in the USA were;
a) Philadelphia system of solitary confinement. Kept 
in absolute solitude for five years, prisoners existed 
in separate cells with small exercise yards attached.
b) Auburn and Sing Sing, the associated silent system. 
Prisoners worked in silence but at night were separately 
penned. Crawford and Whitworth returned as advocates
of the solitary system, though advised that five years 
solitude was too long. The appeal of the separate system 
lay in its destructive effect on prison sub-cultures, and 
a much reduced reliance on corporal punishment. Pentonville 
and the penetentiaries which followed it, generally 
organised themselves on the solitary system.
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6. Beccaria's study. An Essay on Crimes and Punishments 
was translated into English in 1767, and four further' 
editions appeared by the end of the century (McConville, 
op. cit.; 80). His thesis propounded the idea punishment 
being in 'just proportion' to the crime, rather than 
asserting the doctrine of 'maximum severity'. Secondly, 
he asserted the end of punishment was 'to prevent others 
from committing the like offence' (quoted in McConville; 81) 
Here we can detect a shift away from the use of punishment 
as retribution, to the idea of sufficient punishment for 
the purpose of deterrence. See McConville, pp 80-82).
7. Bentham's writings on prison architecture and the function 
of the penitentiary come to us most forcefully through 
his work. Panopticon ; or the Inspection House (1791). As 
early as 1786 however he had observed his brother's work­
shop in Russia and began to design an institution, 'a mill 
for grinding rogues into honest men' (quoted in Cooper,
1981; 676).
8. See Bentham (Chap. XIII, Collected Works (1970), An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
1789).
9. The pupil-teacher scheme was introduced in 1846. After 
a five-year apprenticeship, pupil-teachers could then 
compete for a Queen's Scholarship, taking them into teacher- 
training colleges (see Digby and Searby, 1981; 41). The 
Queen's Scholarship were abolished in 1861 under the Revised 
Code.
10. The impact of the Revised Code was to emphasise the 
importance of the Three R's as the foundation of the 
elementary school curriculum. After 1867, certain other 
subjects could be offered for examination (e.g. grammar, 
geography and history) for the purpose of obtaining grants.
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11. Girl minors seem to have escaped the hulks. They also 
escaped the beatings but in exchange for hard labour.
12. For a brief account of the antecedents of criminal trials 
by jury - ordeal and battle - see Pollock and Maitland II; 
632-33.
13. Under the Code Napoleon of 1810, it was a defence to 
show that the accused was mad at the time the offence 
was committed; it did not require the defence to show 
a causal relationship between madness and the alleged 
criminal act. The English conception of madness as an 
extenuating circumstance does require proof, both of 
madness and its causal effect on the alleged criminal 
act (Jacobs, 1971; 31).
14. Bentham draws a relationship between 'circumstances and
sensibility'. 'The circumstances of insanity of mind 
correspond to that of bodily imperfection', (Bentham 1970;
58). He then goes on to note other kinds of bodily
imperfections; infancy, deqrepitude and, 'the imperfections 
of females' 1 (Bentham, bid.). For a general account of 
philosophy's treatment of women, see Okin (1981).
15. Notably Humphries (1981), Hooligans or Rebels, and John 
Clarke (1975).
16. Convict Registers 31, 33, Archives of Tasmania.
17. See L. M. Heath (1978) 'The Female Convict Factories of
New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land; an examination of 
their role in the control, punishment and reformation of 
prisoners 1804-1854'. Unpub. M.A. diss. A.N.U..
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The ’history of childhood' is best realised through the anal­
ysis of the ideologies and practices which socially divide 
adults from children. The historical evidence suggests that 
the social processes which have constructed a 'difference' 
between generations have also rendered childhood as a protected, 
dependant and subordinate status.
The analysis I develop here takes as its object inter- 
generational relations as the means of more adequately 
describing and accounting for the social category of 'child­
hood' . Inter-generational relations have been theorised in 
terms of power and authority, domination and subordination, 
the means by which power and domination are exercised and 
the social consequences they have for minors. The generative 
ideas for this approach draw up Marxist conceptions of class 
and recent theorisations of patriarchy. Both are ultimately 
concerned with the unequal distribution of resources and 
with the unequal distribution of power and control. I have 
attempted to apply those sociological traditions to the 
analysis of inter-generational relations.
In terms of sociological analysis this framework represents 
a considerable shift away from two earlier approaches to the 
study and analysis of childhood and youth; the writings of 
Aries and the English writings on youth sub-cultures.
Aries' study of cultural and iconographie representations 
of children, combined with his dichotomous history (societal 
indifference to chiId-centredness) leads to the unsustainable 
conclusion that childhood is a relatively recent social 
phenomenon.
Recent 'youth studies' have focussed on two themes; street­
wise cultural practices and the articulation of youth to the 
labour market. I have argued that the outcome has been to 
subsume inter-generational relations under a more overarching 
concern with class formation and class divisions. Early critics
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of this approach pointed out that its definitions of youth 
were essentially male. Beyond that however, its specification 
of the generational qualities of youth was and remains weak 
because 'youth’ is a category defined by shared cultural 
practices and by its location increasingly on the margins 
of the labour market. No real attempt was made to compare 
and contrast the situation of ’youth’ as a category in 
relationship to the category of ’adult’. In many ways, it 
shared Aries’ concern with sentiments, feelings and icons, 
though it has been informed by a sophisticated theorisation 
of the state which is absent from the core of Aries’ study of 
childhood.
Unlike the above approaches, I have focussed, in a formal 
analysis of the law, upon the unequal distribution of 
economic resources, political chances and legal capacities 
obtaining between generational categories and the means by 
which those relations were achieved and maintained.
In Parts 1 and 2, the argument runs that to be ’an infant’ 
or ’a minor’ in law means to be one of the dispossessed; 
of land and productive capital. And if not actually dis­
possessed, then it means the young have no control over 
protective assets. The study of infancy and minority in 
terms of their economic significance, alone marks considerable 
theoretical shift away from Aries and youth studies. More 
generally, the concern with ’possession’ and ’dis-possession’ 
is considerably at odds with most histories of children 
and childhood, where the object of analysis has been child 
labour (its character and exploitation) in capitalistic 
economics. Terms such as ’infancy’ and ’minority’, the legal 
definitions of ’childhood’ and ’youth’ are not simply social 
constructs or cultural categories, they also have and imply 
economic meanings and consequences.
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Much the same applies to legal terms arising from the laws 
of succession ('heir', 'bastard', 'illegitimate', and 
'descendant'). Commonsensically, these are significations 
of social approval or stigma. In Part 2, I argue the importance 
of these categories because they define the legal family, 
membership of it and the consequences arising from inclusion 
or exclusion from that membership. Most importantly, the 
laws of succession maintain and reproduce relations of 
power and authority, between parents and their descendants.
These laws spell out, as my formal analysis shows, the powers 
that elders have to dispossess their descendants and the con­
siderable leverage they have to shape the life-chances of 
the young.
What else the study of the laws of succession reveals is the 
poverty of research on British inheritance practices. Empirical 
work has been the labour of economists and historians. Sociolo­
gists have had relatively little to say either in theory or sub­
stantive research. We can speculate about the changes in 
inheritance practices, arising from chances in the laws 
regulating them. We are still in the dark about transmission 
of property routinely passed on at death, its volume, its 
character, and the rules by which it is informally distributed. 
There is nothing as yet to suggest that the unit of transmission 
is other than the family.
In one respect, the analysis of inheritance systems places 
the study of inter-generational relations within the framework 
of historians of the family. Haraven, Stone, Elandrin, Vincent 
and Goody, to name but a few, have written about childhood 
within the context of inter-generational relations. They have 
been concerned with the familial distribution of power and 
resources, confronting not only the relations pertaining between 
elders and minors, but also reflecting on the relations of 
husband and wife, master and servant(s). One of the themes
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I have tried to develop has been to locate the analysis 
of inter-generational relations within the family, moving 
the study of childhood and youth away from recent place 
in sociology as sub-set of class theory and class relations.
I should add immediately this is partly a practical necessity 
pressed on the analysis by law's construction of the legal 
subjectivity of 'the child'.
Aside from the criminal law, the legal construction of 
'infants', 'minors', 'heirs' and 'bastards', and the 
drawing of significant age lines such as 'majority',
'discretion', 'marriage' and 'consent' takes place in respect 
of the rights, duties and responsibilities of parents and/or 
guardians. The law relating to children is predominantly 
family law, or law regulating families. That conclusion is 
inescapable. The salient fact of infancy and minority is 
always to be under the protection of an elder, usually a blood- 
related adult. The length and nature of that protective 
relationship, and the character of the relations of independence 
and subordination which accompany it, depends on three factors, 
class, gender and chronological age.
All the evidence suggests that the chronological age relevant 
to the assumption, possession and control of property, consent 
to marriage and the right to leave parental custody were 
written by and for the landed classes. So are the differential 
legal incapacities which have characterised boy and girl minors. 
Historically, girl minors could consent to marry at an earlier 
age than their brothers, but could only assume an inheritance 
in the absence of any brothers. In that matter, males took 
precedence over females of the line. There are numerous 
other examples of male privileging. The message of the law 
is clear enough; the line and the estate are 'his' to maintain 
and reproduce. 'Her' minority status, while it could be
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postponed at an earlier age, was reimposed on marriage, 
and with it, dependence on and subordination to patriarchal 
authority.
We might fairly claim that the analysis of infancy, minority 
and inheritance practices has thrown considerable light 
upon the construction of gender divisions within English law. 
We have argued that these divisions depend, not on the 
prejudice of male judges and lawyers, but on the operation 
of legal categories endowed with gender-specific qualities. 
Erase one cohort of the judiciary and replace it with another 
but little changes because the engendered categories and 
subjectivities of family law remained intact and in place.
Like Carol Smart, it is argued here 'that law does not just 
reflect patriarchal relations, but in addition (it) reproduces 
patriarchal relations inside the family' (Smart 1984; 220).
The analysis of 'parens patriae' in Part 3 provides an 
historical account of the changing relationships obtaining 
between the courts, parents and children. Fundamentally, 
it is concerned with the process by which the state acquired 
the legal basis to regulate the personal relations of parents 
and children. Very little is known about the precise origins 
of 'parens patriae'. It is this doctrine which Chancery 
assumed and adapted for the purpose of limiting the absolute 
authority of fathers over their children, right he enjoyed 
by Common Law. 'Parens patriae' it is argued is crucial to 
any analysis of the state's right to regulate and intervene 
in the formerly private sphere of the family. Though it 
referred originally to the sovereign's duty to protect those 
who have no familial protector or guardian, through Chancery's 
reworking of the doctrine, it became the means by which the 
courts generally moved in to arbitrate familial disputes.
Later legislation concerned with the protection of children
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transformed the old 'sovereigns's duty' to an enforceable 
legal right held by a range of state (and state-delegated) 
officials to curtail the absolute powers of parental 
authority.
The rights of parents (or their designated surrogates) over 
children are no longer 'paramount'. The power of mothers 
to determine the life chances of their children has 
increased as against the absolute authority of the father.
I have argued that this situation was accomplished by 
the dual system of judge-made law and by statute but the 
beneficiaries are not necessarily either minors or their 
parents. For minors at least, of those going before a court 
there lies the promise of freedom from want, neglect and abuse. 
However, these are not civil rights that minors may press for 
as a right per se. In the distribution of life chances, 
via education, training, privileged entry to the labour 
markets, access to property (and the mode of its distribution) 
the divisions of class and gender still obtain; as for adults, 
there are formal rights to be unequal. For parents of minors, 
the rights of parenting are still discretionary upon adhering 
to modes of living adjudged to be 'normal' by the professionals 
of welfare, and ultimately by the judiciary. You can be 
different, but not too different. As with teachers, I argue, 
parents have a 'licensed autonomy'; the trouble is, we never 
know is advance what that license permits until the account 
is called.
But the changing relations between the state, parents and 
children is not merely of historical interest. Since 1979 
the Thatcher government has been fundamentally concerned with 
'the family' in general and parental rights and obligations 
in particular.
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The clear re-establishment of parental authority as the 
basis for good social order, runs concurrently with economic 
pressures (high youth unemployment, low rewards on training 
schemes and young workers' schemes), forcing minors to be 
more dependant upon their parents for longer (see Rhodes 
1982). This is reinforced by the absence of a mandatory 
system of educational maintenance grants and increased pressure 
on parents to support their children's passage through higher 
education by requiring them to contribute more towards fees 
and maintenance. By these means childhood, and the dependant 
and subordinate status this entails for minors, is being 
visibly extended. The economic significance of 'crossing 
the bar' by attaining the age of majority is of decreased sig­
nificance when young adults do not have the means to purchase 
property, enter marriage or take out credit facilities.
The study of childhood and the law would be complete without 
focussing on the criminal law and its subjectification of 
'juvenile' offenders. The theoretical framework of Part 4 
drew on Foucault's theorisation of 'discursive transformations' 
In respect of how 'the social is and has been 'governed', he 
postulates a shift from 'punitive' to 'disciplinary' regimes 
of social governance. The study of the criminal law and 
penal system's treatment and disposition of child offenders 
is a sustained attempt to employ Foucault's theories in an 
English context. While Foucault's theoretical framework 
is not without its problems, it does evoke an attempt to 
construct a multi-faceted history of the generation of a 
'social problem' and the institutionalised responses to it.
The imagery of the 'juveniles', their social environment 
and the causes of crime identified by philanthropic bodies 
and by the magistrates in the early and mid-19 century (the 
'mixing' of young and old on the streets and gaol),'programmes' 
the penal response - a regime of moral regeneration and 
industrial training for young offenders.
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Two other findings are important here. Firstly, though 
I am not concerned directly with a 'history of juvenile 
delinquency' my study suggests that the authoritative 
accounts by May and by Magarey are seriously deficient 
in one respect. They have produced histories of boy 
delinquents. Girl juveniles are notably absent. A concern 
with generation has not been matched by a focus on gender. 
These partial accounts probably result partly from the absence 
of institutions devoted exclusively to the punishment and 
reformation of 'girl' offenders. These appeared post- 
Carpenter, after 1854. Yet, as I indicate, albeit briefly, 
there were girl offenders and they were imprisoned and/or 
transported. Unlike 'the boys', they were not segregated 
from 'old lags' who happened to be women.
The second point to note is the. considerable variation 
between the criminal law's and penal system's interpretation 
of 'young'. Until the mid-19th century, in criminal law, 
offenders over 14 were strictly fully responsible for their 
offences, while offenders between 7 and 14 could be held 
responsible for any crime they committed, and providing they 
could distinguish between 'right' and 'wrong', they could be 
punished as if they were adult. The evidence suggests that in 
the 1830's, magistrates were subverting these age lines by 
constructing forms of punishment (with no strict basis in 
law) in order to keep the young out of gaol. Also, it is 
now clear that penal authorities were segregating 'juveniles' 
from 'adult' offenders well before the criminal law made any 
such formal difference as between juvenile and adult offenders 
on trial.
Juvenile courts have persisted with divisive dispositions 
directed at boy and girl offenders. Girl offenders are more 
likely to be placed under supervision orders than boys, for 
a first offence and receive supervision orders for committing 
lesser offences than do boys (Webb 1984). The repertoire 
of dispositions available for girls found guilty of committing
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offences have until recently been less than the range of 
provision for boys (Webb op.cit.; 367). Practices we find 
in the 19th century criminal-penal system are strongly 
present in today's administration of juvenile justice.
The findings here give considerable weight to one argument 
which runs throughout this work, namely that the law's child 
is a non-unitary subject.
How the diverse discourses comprising the law each constitute 
'the child' as a legal subject has proved to be an effective 
indicator of the values and assumptions embedded in the 
several branches of the legal system. 'The child' has functioned 
as an object of inquiry and has provided the means for exploring 
a technique for writing a sociology of law. We have focussed 
on the legal subject and the means and consequences of its 
construction in law. The attributes the law endows on legal 
subjects is both a comment of the law, as institution, ideology 
and practice and an explanation of rights, privileges and 
disabilities which differentiates individuals. It is argued 
that these differences are not abstract but have practical 
consequences for individuals in all facets of social life, 
in the economy, politics , the family and in courts of law.
The study of law illuminates the understanding of 'childhood' 
to the extent that it explores the formal relationships obtaining 
between generations. A study of 'the child' in law adds sig­
nificantly to 'the history of childhood' because is it concerned 
with laws, legislation and institutions which separate and 
divide populations on the basis of chronological age. This 
by no means fully realises the 'history of childhood', but 
contributes to that project.
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We have adhered to the concept of childhood as descriptive 
of the material situation (historically) of infants and 
minors. We have argued that it speaks of the two systems 
which characterize that status; personal subordination and 
economic dépendance. We have tried to indicate that these 
systems individuate 'the child' through the differential 
impact of these systems on specific age groups and to girl 
and boy minors. We argue that different branches of the 
law produce 'children' defined by their attributes as non­
adult. The 'child' that the law produces is non-unitary, 
except in one important respect. The law's child seems to be 
incapable^ or being non-rational or pre-logical ,and as such 
enjoys little autonomy within the set of social relations and 
practices which the law constitutes around it. Granted 
privileges and protections, but little effective capacity 
to initiate legal actions, the lot of the law's child is 
to be in perpetual custody and all that entails.
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